

"PRETENDS", LINGUISTICS, AND GAME-THEORY
/A PARADIGM CASE OF GENERATING FICTION/

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O. Introductory Remarks

It seems to be a common assumption among scholars that the verb "to pretend" plays a significant role in generating fiction. It has been equally taken up by such different approaches as the strict logical-linguistic analysis, the speech act theory, the possible world semantics and ontological philosophy of literature.¹ It has gradually become a common practice unduly to impose burdens on a single predicate, while the fictional interpretation of the word went uncontested. So, the question whether there is any ambiguity hidden in its semantical representation has not been raised. On the forthcoming pages our concern will be to give an analysis of what such a representation may look like. This we do in two major stages: first, by drawing a detailed picture of the different uses of our word we touch on some problems of multiple interpretation and assert how fiction can be generated, and secondly we hint at a game-theoretical framework in which our previous assessments could be reformulated. But in order to clear the ground for our task we should make some preliminary statements.

The basic difference between our approach and the attitude generally accepted is, as we see it, that the latter is towards giving some consistent system in which the claims of a descriptive study of fictional phenomena are met in order that the question how fictional interpretations are possible, rather than whence such a possibility may come,

may be properly answered. To accomplish this aim "pretends" is introduced into the analysis as a primitive term which is supposed *eo ipso* to account for the usual real/fictional ambiguity. Whereas our approach is focused on what "pretends" means and on how it is used in different contexts; It turns out that it has a multiplicity of independent readings and an intricate web of presuppositions, so much so, that no onesided application of it in the field of literary semantics seems to be forthcoming. It follows then that "pretends" is by no means primitive but should be traced back to the concept of identity. A corollary of our approach to the semantics of "pretends" will be an argument on the need to distinguish two kinds of identity: metaphysical and epistemological.² Evidence for this distinction will be extensively given on examining linguistic data for our term; yet, some independent clarification may be in order. We call methaphysical any identity (or concept whatsoever) that can be established on the basis of our linguistic and logical capacity alone, whereas we call it epistemological if it is established on our assessment of what the world looks like and of what may contribute to confirming our knowledge of it. To see this distinction work we may give some examples where the two interpretations are conflicting: e.g. consider of there being some competing candidates who, say, have written a test; then uttering the sentence "I could be the winner" will be metaphysically or epistemologically biased depending on whether I am excluded from the class of the participants or form part of it. Or the sentence "I could be your father" is viewed differently if it is the product of pure fantasy or a topic introduced in court. To put it in a general way, the multiplicity of possible routes that events may have taken is a merit of our conceptual system in the first case, while, in the second it is the result of our trying to cope with how things really are, and hence it reflects our lack of knowledge. Although

this distinction is not one of possible worlds (for both seem to allow them), a difference in the assessment of identities is generated: a metaphysical identity is a kind of trans-world identity based on some logical-linguistic criteria and hence calling for an answer to the problem of essential and contingent attribution of predicates, whereas an epistemological identity is a kind of trans-world identity - if any - for which the much-debated essential/ contingent ambiguity may not arise, as we have seen in our second example: having a certain father is usually esteemed to be an essential property, it can rationally be questioned in some circumstances without its having the least bearing on the identity of him for whom this property is predicated. An epistemological identity is then not only any continuity in time-and-space but as the second part of our definition above puts it, it is any assessment on sameness that may prove useful in understanding how things are. What are now the criteria of this latter identity? It is this question which a proper analysis of "pretends" must raise and try to answer. What may seriously hinder such an attempt is the fact that the meaning of "pretends" is contaminated by the interference of the two identities, so much so that a multiplicity of readings is generated. In order to entangle them we should embark on a systematic study of its possible occurrences.

1. *An Attempt to Locate the Meaning of "Pretends"*

This part is devoted to giving a diagnostic treatment of the meaning of "pretends": it should reveal the basic problems in understanding the word and give some tenets for asserting the ambiguities in its interpretation. To prove our hypothesis we first have to clarify, what constraints seem to be imposed on the use of "pretends" in linguistics; whether they are valid should bear heavily on what inter-

pretations are assigned to the given grammatical structure it happens to be embedded in. Two such constraints seem to be in the offing: one comes from Searle who says that "one cannot truly be said to have pretended to do something unless one intended to do it".³ "Pretends" then should "contain the conception of intention built into it."⁴ The other goes back to G. Lakoff: it says that the use of this word always presupposes the truth of the negation of its sentence-complement.⁵ Let us examine them briefly.

The first constraint by Searle is stated in the pragmatics of speech acts: it is part of the essential condition of "pretends". Yet, it seems to be dubious whether it can qualify as such in the form cited above. Consider the following short dialogue uttered in court:

A: The accused pretends to be innocent. But he is guilty.
B: He does not pretend to be innocent, for innocent he is.

Both interlocutors can be rational in arguing for the particular positions they hold. If so, then the use of "pretends" is supposed to be neutral as regards whether the accused has had any intention whatsoever. This boils down to the fact that a statement of the form:

/1/ He pretends to be so-and-so although he has no intention of doing so.

need not be paradoxical. One may be unaware of playing off a belief of being so-and-so. A proper example for /1/ can be somebody who is considered mad, although less sophisticated cases would do as well. On the other hand, the use of "pretends" seems to affect what people believe about the person of whom it is predicated. Bearing this in mind we may try to replace /1/ by the stronger form:

/2/ He pretends to be so-and-so although he cannot be said to be playing off a belief of being so-and-so which is indeed paradoxical. Now, we can formulate a more palatable condition on the illocutionary force of "pretends":

/C/ One cannot be truly said to have pretended to do something unless he can be said to be playing off a similar belief

Instead of "playing off a belief" we might have said "making others believe accordingly" as well. The reason why there seems to be a difference between what the audience conceives to be like an illocutionary act and the performance of such an act simpliciter, in our opinion, resides in the fact that "pretends" is not a performative verb. One cannot say: I hereby pretend...⁶ We can only describe an act of pretending, i.e. we can assign a similar force to utterances which we esteem to convey such a force in advance. But then it loses its explanatory power and is reduced to being a proxy for a previously accepted distinction. It is this fallacy that is often committed when "pretends" is claimed to account for fictional phenomena: it seems to state that fiction is what is intended as such whereas it should state rather that fiction is what is supposed to be intended as such. It will turn out later that to amend this characterization we should conceive fiction as a particular game in which players aim at an agreement other than in normal communication. But for the time being we remain with the idea that there is a methodological difference between illocutionary forces assigned on the basis of the performative character or on the lack of it.

By blurring this distinction Searle is led to the confrontation of two different senses of "pretends": one being an intention to deceive, i.e. "to pretend to be or to do something that one is not doing", the other referring to a performance "which is *as if* one were doing or being the thing" but this time without any intention to deceive.⁷ He claims that fiction can be predicated in the latter sense. Although his further analysis of the role of pretending in fiction involves the same fallacy we hinted at above: in order to assign the illocutionary force of pretending to

utterances one should not only presuppose the real/fictional ambiguity but be aware of how it is already distributed over the utterances, this postulation of different senses stands in need of an adequate justification. For, what could be the difference between the concept of deception and that of "as if"? For one thing, it cannot lie in the lack of intention because it would violate the essential condition of "pretends" and we cannot speak of two different senses of the same word any more. If so, then the lack of intention to deceive with "as if " cannot mean a lack of intention simpliciter. And indeed, Searle is ready with the answer: if we take "pretends" in this second sense, the speaker's intention is aimed at suspending the requirements that are to obtain when the speech act of assertion is performed. If I pretend to be Nixon in this sense, then I could only pretend to refer to Nixon as myself, i.e. reference is suspended. Searle's example here is misleading; for he mentions only fictional individuals as cases of suspended reference, while with existing individuals like London, Napoleon, Nixon, etc. reference is claimed to be successful. This is again due to the hidden assessment about what can count as real/fictional before we embark on our analysis. But as we can see in the case of my pretending to be Nixon, reference to an existing individual can equally be suspended if the problem is formulated in this way. So, suspension is rather a general criterion. In order for an utterance to be fictional a proper act of pretending of reference should be enhanced. But what happens if I state that I am Nixon so as to be let into the White House? Does referring apply then? We might feel prone to answer in the affirmative provided that the deception was successful. But soon it is realized that such a use of "pretends" equally violates the essential and also the sincerity condition of assertion in that the speaker does not believe in what has been uttered and that it does not rep-

resent an actual state of affairs. Yet, it could be argued that the suspension of these conditions is not intended - although it is dubious whether someone could lie without the slightest intention of suspending being sincere! - but what is really intended is a successful reference. But what does it mean to refer successfully in this case? Does it mean that I refer to Nixon? Clearly not. For on the basis of a casual reference to the president I would never be admitted into the White House. Such an approach will then misplace any idea of rigid reference. Does it then mean that I refer to myself? Clearly not. For referring successfully to myself would again be inadequate for entering the building. It will misplace any idea of a speaker-oriented reference as well. So, if there is any reference intended in this case, it must be of a queer sort. Rather, it is the supposed identity of Nixon with myself that is intended in order to be let in.

If we want to keep up the difference between the two senses of "pretends", we have to allow that there is an intention to play off an identity belief in the first case while it is lacking or suspended in the second. But is this so? If I state that I am Nixon on the stage, is there no, however vague, idea of a similar belief being played off? A negative answer would undoubtedly render stage-roles meaningless. Of course, there is a sense in which no complete identification is possible, but no more can we speak of complete identification in the case of deception there is a clear sense in which I could not be one with Nixon however I strived.

To sum up, the difference between the two uses of "pretends" cannot be located in having some intention of playing off a belief, for in both senses there is a similar intention; it cannot be put into the kinds of belief that are being played off, for they equally involve identity. It must lie then in the belief-contents to be appropriated. If so,

then we must speak of different meanings of "pretends" but not of different senses. To account for the complexities of these belief-contents will be the task of the semantics of our term: ambiguities are generated as a result of different identity beliefs which are to be played off.

The constraint that G. Lakoff seems to impose on "pretends" apparently belongs to its semantics. It is tantamount to saying that a sentence like

/3/ John pretends to be a caesar

seems to depend on another:

/4/ John is not a caesar

If we look upon the relation between /1/ and /2/ and state it to be presuppositional, we are drawn to the peculiar character of this verb in that it cannot be tucked into any of Karttunen's three categories: I plugs, II epistemic verbs, III holes, for either it is a plug since it blocks the truth of its sentence complement or it is a hole since it filters the negation of the very same clause.⁸ To put it in another way, the role of "pretends" is then to express or rather to conjoin the contradiction of "x is an F" and "x is not an F" in a non-contradictory way. This idea is emphasized by the somewhat taunting

*/5/ John pretends himself to be a caesar

which can have the following logical form underlying:

/6/ x pretends x is an F

If we take further the unnegated complement of "pretends" as the proper belief-content that is played off when an utterance like /3/ is put forward, we immediately see why Searle's examples were misleading: he considered sentences which had the structure of /7/ rather than /6/:

/7/ x pretends y is an F

The asymmetry of /6/ and /7/ seems to have justified the difference between the two senses of "pretends". We have witnessed that a form like /6/ can equally well be used to generate fictional interpretation. There seems to be nothing

in /6/ and /7/ that would call for one or another meaning (or sense). But then corresponding surface forms should inevitably be ambiguous, for apparently /6/ and /7/ are not the same. To bring their difference home we have to refine them to a considerable degree along the lines we have been arguing for the belief of identity. Then the relevant readings of contexts with "pretends" will soon yield to analysis.

2. *The Ambiguities of "Pretends": Fundamental Cases*

An independent motivation for our claim can be given by investigating pronominalization in constructions like /3/ with respect to /5/ and /8/ on the basis of /6/ and /7/. A similar argument has already been given by Barbara H. Partee⁹: the core of her argument is aimed at showing that surface forms like /3/ and /5/ go back to a structure of /6/ while surface forms like /8/ go back to /7/:

/8/ John pretends John to be a caesar

/5/ resulted from the variable reading of pronouns whereas /8/ by a corresponding pronominalization of laziness should yield /9/:

*/9/ John pretends him to be a caesar

The acceptance of /9/ may be doubted, although similar constructions with "believes", "imagines", etc. are readily available. The reason why /9/ seems to be felt incorrect lies in the fact that there is a residual claim of identity in it, which is absent from contexts with e.g. "believes":
/10/ John believes him to be a caesar.

where there is no relation whatsoever between John and the referent of "him". According to Partee there are some other examples which suffer from the same fault as /9/, i.e. which do not allow a corresponding laziness-reading; they are so-called psychological verbs like "feels good", in which a prohibition to substitute the same referring expression into independent variables can be motivated by the fact

that one is unable to have the same sensory feeling as another, and hence, to use an idea of Castañeda¹⁰, one cannot feel self-identified except with himself. To account for a residual identity claim with respect to /9/ we now have to bring up evidence for /8/ and show therewith that this residual identity is different from self-identity that has a structure like /6/ and hence gives way to reflexivation. In this way we can reinstate the distinction between /6/ and /7/ by saying that they convey different identity claims. Let us consider constructions with "only" by means of which ambiguities like that of /6/ and /7/ are usually tested:

/11/ Only John pretends himself to be a caesar

/12/ Only John pretends John to be a caesar

The meaning of /11/ is clear, but we may feel embarrassed by /12/. Yet, we would like to argue that we can think of a situation when /12/ is true while /11/ false. Consider a masquerade to which people are admitted only if they are disguised as one of the others /also present/ in order for him to be caricatured. If now, by some acid self-irony, John thinks of spoiling the party by making a mockery of himself, and if being a caesar is not a unique way of caricaturing, then /11/ says something about each individual's self-identity while /12/ is concerned with their supposed identity with John. The rule of equi-deletion would then delete "himself" in /11/ and pronominalization-of-laziness lead to /9/ in /12/. Such an idea can be made more blatant by paraphrasing our construction slightly:

/13/ Is is a pretense for John for him to be a caesar but
it is a reality for Jack

/14/ It is a pretense for John to be a caesar but it is a
reality for Jack

/13/, which comes from constructions like /12/ and /9/, becomes a natural way to express the difference between Jack's and John's judgments about John's being a caesar; while in /14/ it is a difference between Jack's and John's claim for

the throne which is judged. In /14/, which involves each individual's self-identity equi-deletion was obligatory. The correct semantical representations of /13/ and /14/ are respectively:

/15/ It is a pretense for x for y to VP but it is a reality for z for y to VP

/16/ It is a pretense for x for x to VP but it is a reality for z for z to VP

/15/ and /16/ may be looked upon as the first result to amend the original /6/ and /7/. The use of identical variables in both conjuncts stand for our residual identity claim, while self-identity is safeguarded by the use of distinct variables in each. However, on closer inspection, they will turn out to be still inadequate to apply to cases put forward along the Searlian argument of "pretends". Take his first sense: /15/ may partly explicate what is happening when "I am Nixon" is uttered with the force of pretending; substituting "to be Nixon" for "to VP" we will have:

/17/ It is pretense for x for y to be Nixon but it is reality for z for y to be Nixon

If the variable "y" is used to bring home a residual claim of identity and if our argument about there being such an identity in any fictional representation in order for the idea of role to be realized is sound, then /17/ will equally represent the second sense of "pretends", and hence the difference has again been lost. The reason for this is that we have only tried to represent the two identity claims in two separate sentences and disregarded the possibility of conjoining them into one. Yet, fiction seems to be the result of such a conjunction of identity beliefs: for, what is lacking to disambiguate /17/ is the idea that in the case of deception the individual to be substituted into "z" takes his belief-content "for y to be Nixon" to convey a self-identity for him with respect to "y", while in the case of fictional representation he takes it to convey the residual identity claim but not the former, which can be duly said to be sus-

pended. To account for this and similar amendments we have to formulate the corresponding semantic representations so that they make clear not only which of the two identities should figure in the relevant belief-contents that are being played off but - as we shall see - also to which the individual who is playing them off is committed.

But before laying down these representations we would like to produce some independent motivations for making our distinctions.

3. *A Pragmatical Paradox in a Semantical Vein*

Consider a case described in Johnson-Laird /1982/ after Bas C. van Fraassen:¹¹ the king's son is thrown into prison and is forced to wear an iron mask. Although the king believes that the is dead, he should appear before him but he is looked upon as a common criminal. However, had the king's son endeavoured in vain to be recognized by his father, the following problem may be easily raised: How can we sincerely report the effort of the son? We cannot say that he claimed simply to be the son of the king for his father believes him to be dead and naturally would not trust a common criminal. Neither can he have claimed not to be a common criminal because people in iron masks are generally considered to be criminals. And neither can he have claimed not to be a man in iron mask for no-one realizes that he is wearing a mask, and hence, it would amount to saying that he is not identical with himself, which is absurd. We think this the proper place to use "pretends"; what he can do is try to play off the least obtrusive belief about himself. As he cannot take off his mask or assert absurdities, we may report his intention as

/18/ The son of the king pretends that the man in the iron mask is not a common criminal

The peculiarity of /18/ is that identities are expressed via definite descriptions, yet the meaning of "pretends"

does not seem to have changed: the same multiplicity of interpretations can be correlated with the different contexts /18/ may occur in (e.g. release from prison, being locked up again, or mutual recognition) depending on how identities are taken to figure in the corresponding belief-content that is part of the meaning of an act of pretending. But we do not enlist these possibilities here since they flow easily from the various semantical representations we are going to define next.

4. *A Semantical Paradox in a Pragmatical Vein*

An independant motivation of distinguishing between different concepts of identity results from an investigation into the semantic principles of introducing definition or meaning postulates into one's language. Suppose we define "mad" as "having a wrong idea of oneself" which should be tantamount to an incorrect predicate-attribution. But what happens if we apply "mad" to its own definiens; for clearly, mad is a property and hence can be assigned to any individual. Yet, if one incorrectly attributes "mad" to himself, he is supposed to be mad by definition; then however, he cannot have attributed it incorrectly to himself since he is already in possession of it. And if, in turn, he is right in attributing it to himself, he cannot be supposed to be mad again by definition. But then he should be attributing it incorrectly and a vicious circle is established.¹³

To realize that semantic paradoxes inherent in any vocabulary run on parallel lines with our previous example where we can speak of a so-called deictic paradox, and that they are solved if the two concepts of identity are taken into consideration, we may re-formulate the present case by using "pretends"; we do not think that there is anything wrong with this, for, how else could we sincerely report one's serious misconception about himself than making use

of "pretends"? Not for example by "imagines" since to imagine oneself to be so-and-so has clearly nothing to do with what others should believe of him but in order for one to be considered as mad this latter condition is necessary. /19/ can then be a neat approximation:

/19/ John pretends to be mad

If the semantical representation of /19/ is taken to be similar to /6/, the vicious circle argument is introduced. Yet, if we apply our ideas on identity, the paradox is dissolved: John not only believes himself to be mad but rather he self-identifies himself with someone who is mad. Then his madness results from a misconception of self-identity rather than an incorrect attribution of a predicate, although the latter is part and parcel of the former /see below/.¹³

5. *An Attempt to Formulate Ambiguities in the Traditional Framework*

On the basis of the foregoing discussion we may try to re-assess the semantical importance of the different contexts "pretends" is allowed to occur in; the only problem arising from this claim is the lack of a proper transcript for the two kinds of identity. As a loose approximation we may try to express self-identity by a formula common in the epistemic logic of Hintikka to represent identification of referents: $(x = a)$; while we may indicate by another formula $(x = y)$ identity simpliciter. The meaning of "pretends" then results as ambiguous in six ways:

/20/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and /x = a/ and F/a//

/21/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and /x = a/ and /y = b/
and F/b//

/22/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and F/y//

/23/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and /y = b/ and F/b//

/24/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = a/ and F/a//

/25/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = a/ and /a = b/ and F/b//

Possible paraphrases of /20/-/25/ can be given as follows:

/26/ John is considered mad because he self-identifies himself as a caesar

/27/ John is considered mad because he self-identifies himself with no-one else but Napoleon who is a caesar

/28/ John is an actor: he tries to play off the belief that he is a caesar

/29/ John is an actor: he tries to play off the belief that he is no-one else but Napoleon who is a caesar

/30/ John is being hypnotized: he behaves as if he were a caesar

/31/ John is being hypnotized: he behaves as if he were no-one else but Napoleon who is a caesar

Applying "only" as a test, we see that the contexts which contain a self-identity claim do not give way to nominalization-of-laziness:

/32/ Only John is hypnotized in order for him to behave as if he were no-one else but Napoleon

/33/ Only John is hypnotized in order for John to behave as if he were no-one else but Napoleon

While /32/ is understandable as what makes a restriction on who is to be hypnotized to behave as if he were Napoleon, /33/ amounts to the same, or else it is an obvious nonsense: for, there can by no means be anybody the hypnotizing of whom would result in somebody else's, say John's, behaviour as Napoleon. If there is self-identity involved, then only a variable-reading of pronouns is possible.¹⁴

The tackle Fraassen's example, however, we have further to refine our formulation. For, there are cases (our case of being let into the White House included) in which to understand the meaning of "pretends" we have to define not only what the corresponding belief-contents are but also what

the epistemic attitude of the audience is like. What we are implying here are examples like:

/34/ John unaware arouses the suspicion in others that he is a caesar

/35/ John unaware arouses the suspicion in others that he is no-one else but Napoleon who is a caesar

which can have the structures:

/36/ /Ex//Ey// / — /x = y/ and — /x = a// and /Ez/ B_z//x=y/
and /x = a/ and F/a// ⊃ /x pretends F/a//

/37/ /Ex//Ey// / — /x = y/ and — /x = a// and /Ez/ B_z//x=y/
and /x = a/ and /y = b/ and F/b// ⊃ /x pretends//y=b/
and F/b//

Of course, our intuition about the acceptance of these formulas should be checked: it might be thought illicit to predicate "pretends" of somebody who would not be prone to admit that he has done so. Yet, we claim that we do use this word not only to highlight the difference between what one intends to make us believe he is doing and what he is really doing but to attribute a similar difference between what one is said to be trying to make us believe and what he is said to do. We can think of the whole history of madness and how "mad" is attributed: as we may put it, what we have previously explained as cases of being mad are the clinical cases whereas these new forms can be looked upon as the non-clinical. Apart from any consideration of whether they are acceptable, an important conclusion should follow independently: the use of "pretends" is motivated by any difference in the epistemic attitude of the speaker (or the subject of the sentence) and the audience either with respect to how things are or how they (the speaker or the audience) are supposed to conceive of them. From this it results that the truth of the negation of the complement is only optional and hence the presupposition could easily be suspended provided a difference in the relevant epistemic attitudes makes

up for it. I may be truly said to pretend to be the president even if unbeknown to me I have already been elected for some time and try to be let in the White House if no-one around should happen to have learnt about my being president /Lakoff's presupposition cancelled/. But I may be equally said to pretend to be the president if by some foul deed unbeknown to me I have already been deposed for some time and try to be let in if every-one around should happen to have learnt of my misfortune (Searle's condition cancelled). It can be seen then that no easy transcription of a proper semantical representation of some occurrences of "pretends" is easily forthcoming. There are some serious demands on the contexts of its use which lead to a multiplicity of readings as to how the relationship between beliefs, iterated beliefs and reality should be construed. For instance, a possible reading of our original White House case is the following:

/38/ /Ex//Ey// / — /x = y/ and — /x = a/ and x pretends//x = y/ and /y = b/ and F/b/ \supset /Ez/ B_z//x = y/ and /x = a/ and /y = b/ and F/b///

To arrive at Searle's second sense of "as if", we should omit the second occurrence of the formula /x = a/ from /38/, thus giving our last amendment to /23/. We shall not reproduce here all the amended versions as they can be calculated on the basis of /38/. We give, however, a formula for the paradoxical case of B. van Fraassen to show the neat resemblances between the semantical reasons of "pretends" and its pragmatical motivations, both of which should be as proper contextual extension of its occurrence. For the sake of simplicity, assume that the son of the king is John while the man in the iron mask is called Jack. Then the interpretations of /x = y/ and /x = a/ and /y = b/ are forthcoming if John = a and Jack = b. Indicate the corresponding predicates by capital M/ask/, S/on/ and C/riminal/. Disregarding here the inner structure of definite description as irrelevant to the point we are making, we arrive at

the following formula:

/39/ /Ex///M/x/ and /x = a/ and S/a// and /Ey// —/x=y/ and
/C/y/// \supset /x pretends///y = b/ and M/b/ \supset — C/b// \supset
/Ez/ B_z///x = b/ and M/b// \supset — C/b/////

The complexity of /39/ is due to the surplus difference of belief contexts and reality. It is entirely different from either of the previous forms, and this is as it should be: for, John cannot be taken as a fool or an actor since the audience have no idea of his being a son of the king or of his being disguised. Yet, John's supposed act is an act of pretending because he intends the audience to take a reasoned step from what he knows to be an acting in disguise to a purported fact about his self-identity with the person behind the mask. It is as if from one's playing a part on the stage, there were something to be inferred about his identity outside the stage. No wonder then that the effort of the king's son fails. This is a step which requires thinking in the metalanguage. A premature conclusion might be that from something fictional no judgement on how things are in reality can follow.

A final comment on the formulae conceived in the traditional framework should still be made. It might be suggested that they are based on scope distinctions, so much so, that "pretends" appears to be functioning as an operator. If so, we must have committed the very fallacy we wanted to avoid: the assumption that it is primitive. This idea, however, would be based on the fact that our formulae are sound; yet they suffer from a serious drawback: the different identity claims they seem to raise can in no sense be said to be pretended by the speaker (or the subject of the sentence). What then can be the reason for their being embedded in its scope? In accordance with what we have said about the general character of its illocutionary force, a reason may be put forward in the form of an assumption like the abstract performative hypothesis. It would entail there still being a

unique sense in which the semantics of "pretends" can contribute to the analysis of the sentences. Ambiguities could not arise; for, in how many senses can I perform an act of asking or threatening or boasting, etc? Apparently in one, otherwise the concept of illocutionary force itself would be ambiguous, and we would have to introduce some other hypothesis or an element playing the part of disambiguation. Yet, we have seen that already Searle accepted at least two different senses of "pretends" and we argued that the difference between them can only be accommodated as a difference in meaning. If identities are a semantical fact, then where does our knowledge of fiction come from when we are present at a performance on the stage? A pragmatically-biased answer would run as saying that it is not the meaning but the use of sentences: how language is used - that yields this information. So far so good. But this pragmatical fact cuts deeper into the meaning of terms: not in that it assigns referents to them but in that it gives criteria for establishing new identities between individuals, and this is already a semantical result. To describe what is at work here theoreticians introduced possible world models which generated the same problem as is at stake here: how can identities across worlds be constructed? And so, the problem was given purely semantical twist. Our approach ventures to pass in between: identities are a result of strategical moves of the participants in a language game; in that they are yielded by moves, they are semantical facts, but in that the corresponding moves are made in a language game the playing of which is motivated by some pragmatical fact outside the game, they are pragmatically related. On starting to play a game players have to decide how to interpret individual terms; but why they interpret them as they do cannot be justified within the game. A major merit of such an approach is that it enables players to pass from one game to another almost in-

perceptibly by reinterpreting their terms. Such a possibility may be indicated by a game rule correlated to the use of "pretends". Another advantage of the strategical characterization of identities is that it explains away the difference between what we called epistemological and metaphysical modalities. The use of identical terms or terms which stand for identical variables in two different language games can only be metaphysically grounded: residual claims of identity always refer to such possibilities: they relate two different variables from different worlds under some description like "x playing the part of y" that might or might not equal alternativeness in a possible world theory (see below). Self-identities, on the other hand, are a restriction on using the same variable all through a given a language game. As such they express epistemological attitudes with respect to a world. The two Searlian senses of "pretends" can be thought of as initiating different language games. When formulating the meaning of "pretends" it is not enough to say that an act was performed but we have to lay down what game the players seem to be starting on; the proper criteria, however, cannot be given within the terms of the game, as an actor cannot say to the audience that he is acting. They abide by the rules, the acceptance of which is a contingent fact on the part of the players.

A strange but well-founded conclusion to the discussion above can be added to the effect that, since "pretends" is considered a game-initiator rule and it is up to the players to start playing or not, there are no truth-conditions to be correlated with the use of "pretends". For I may at any time turn my back on the stage or take an utterance as part of a similar move at face value, i.e. as a move in the original game. It follows rightly from the fact that no act of pretending can be explicitly performed, rather such acts are so described. Hence, this is our solution to the problem of assigning a force of pretending to an utterance in a non-

explanatory manner.

6. *A Further Evidence of the New Identity Claim*

Independant evidence for the need to explain identities can be recovered from the classical problem of systematic ambiguity of predication. To put it clearly, we may recur to an example by Reichenbach: scarfs can be used either as turbans or as slings. However, objects individuated as turbans cannot be identical with objects individuated as slings, unless the property "scarf" is predicated of both of them. But then, we create systematic ambiguity by assigning to a predicate "turban" an argument, the value of which could be either objects originally made as turbans or objects originally made to be scarfs but eventually used as turbans. In the latter case, to avoid ambiguity, the function "being scarf" can be introduced as an argument of a higher type. To apply our device to the case, consider the following example:

/40/ Mary was wearing a turban but she unfurled it for Peter to wear it round his neck

/40/ enables us to re-formulate our ideas in terms of pronouns; how should "it" be interpreted? To take it to be bound by some antecedent like "a turban" and "a sling" will lead to the absurdity that the two occurances of "it" do not refer to the same individual. /40/ then expresses a nonsense situation by conjoining two entirely different clauses. But we can equally take "it" to stand for that common aspect (being a scarf) under which turbans and slings are associated: it then expresses some residual claim of identity between some object which is a turban or a sling and one which is a scarf. Putting it in the traditional way we can represent the core of /40/ as:

/41/ $/z//Ex//Ew///x = z/$ and $G/x/$ and $W/w,x/$ and
 $UF/w,x// \supset /Ey//Ev///y = z/$ and $\neg T/y/$ and $S/y/$ and

W/v,y///

where the capitals T/urban/, U/n/F/urls/, S/ling/, and W/ears/ stand for the corresponding predicates and the variables z, x, and y range over objects of which "scarf", "turban" and "sling" can be predicated respectively.

Examples like /40/ testify that identities of variables may in the last resort be epistemologically based and hence be part of the same language game. So, we should revise our ideas on this. To accomplish this aim we should consider a related example.

7. Fiction vs "Pretends"

On the basis of our argument about /40/ we may feel entitled to substitute "pretends" for "was" in it;
/42/ Mary pretended to be wearing a turban but she unfurled it for Peter to wear it round his neck

Yet, /42/ is different from /40/ as can be seen from a closer scrutiny of the structure of the first clause. It duly gives way to the presupposition that results from negating the complement of "pretends"; but because of the scope ambiguity of negation there are three distinct outcomes:

/43/ — /Ex///x is a turban/ and /Mary is wearing x//

/44/ /Ex///x is a turban/ and — /Mary is wearing x//

/45/ /Ex// — /x is a turban/ and /Mary is wearing x//

/43/ is clearly unacceptable for it makes pronominalization impossible in the next clause; /44/ is unacceptable for the same reason; so, there remains /45/. It says that there is nothing as a turban: there is no object which is a turban; while /40/ asserted that there was something as a turban only it was unfurled. Formulating the core of /42/ alongside with /41/ we have:

/46/ /Ex//Ey//Ew//Ev/// w pretends //x = y/ and T/x/
and W/w,x// and UF/w,y// \supset /S/y/ and W/v,y///

By /46/ we have returned to our original /x = y/ formula, which indicates that there is an optional move to initiate a new game. Since it is optional, it may or may not be respected in the next moves. If it is, then what follows the complement of "pretends" will pertain to fiction and /46/ has to be re-written accordingly. If it is not, then /46/ applies, i.e. "pretends" is only used as a garden variety of one of its presuppositions, this time /45/ to secure pronominalization. This kind of use of "pretends" is quite common in forms like "He pretended to be happy" for "He was not happy" or rather for "He tried to be happy", "They pretended to have built a nice house" for "They built an ugly house", etc. This use of "pretends" is parasitic on negation: in our example, it turns on whether or not what Mary was wearing can be considered to be a turban; it is a purely epistemologically-biased question. Hence, the only thing that counts is that the presupposition-filtering be such that it allow further play, this time pronominalization. To secure it, the use of /42/ should intend some function like "x consists of y", "x is a long strip of cloth" or simply "x is a scarf". These functions are means of ensuring play in the original game: they are based on the epistemology of the situation in which the sentence is uttered. They are what associate /42/ with /40/; yet, it is important to keep in mind that sentences like /42/ are parasitic on negation, for, it is this fact which the other use of "pretends" takes advantage of. It initiates a new game which in some sense conjoins /40/ and /42/: as /42/ is parasitic on negation this new use is grounded in the fact that something is not as it is perceived or known of. But it does not aim at enhancing this default in our epistemology as we indicated above, for then it would mean continuing the original game;

but it tries, so-to-say, to perpetuate this default by simply taking it for granted and hence assembling /42/ together with /40/ but from the standpoint of a new game; note that if it were the original game to be played, it would amount to cancelling the awareness of an error and to perpetuating a misplaced awareness of its opposite. Players who miss this game-initiating use of "pretends" simply fall into the state of illusion or deceit. But by enhancing the principles of a new game the meaning of /42/ is raised in the form of /40/ onto a higher metaphysical level. Normal language games are epistemological games: they are played so as to further the knowledge of the participants. Games initiated by "pretends" are metaphysical games: they are played so as to give the participants some hindsight about how things could have been. This is the reason why "pretends" is not performative, why /40/ can equally be taken as a move in a game initiated by "pretends": what is sure is that some or all proper parts (let alone "presuppositions") are parasitic on negation. "Pretends", then, cannot be made part of some particular sentence structure for it could be part of any. But it cannot have an illocutionary force simpliciter for it entails semantical principles of playing a new game, which we examined at some length in the previous parts of this paper.

With this we round off our analysis of the use of "pretends". In the remaining pages we put forward a constructive proposal for the treatment of this peculiar verb within some game-theoretical framework. For lack of space we can only hint at the basic outlines of a similar theory that could accomodate most of the problems we have come across during our analysis. The two major pillars on which the present approach to "pretends" rests and which, though they have been treated separately, should be integrated in a natural way, are what we called the Searlian condition on "pretends"

and its presupposition matrix proposed by G. Lakoff. Armed with these tools we are ready to set out on a more elaborate proposal.

8. *"Pretends" in Game-Theory*

We have already adumbrated in a concise form the problem which a game-theoretical analysis of "pretends" should resolve. As it has to be a kind of linguistic theory based on game-theoretical principles, we have to cast a glance at what results have already been achieved in the field. A by now rather extensive body of works deals with the possibility of introducing game-theory into questions of semantics: there are game-theoretical semantics elaborated by J. Hintikka and some of his followers. The basic aim of such a theoretical approach is to give an algorithm for the evaluation of infinitely long sentences by reducing them to their atomic constituents; this it does by correlating semantical games with each such sentence with the definition of proper rules to govern the moves of the two players, Nature and Myself. These verificational games however, may have no relevance to the analysis of "pretends" if the latter has no truth-conditions, and hence cannot be given a truth-value. Having a truth-value is not a linguistic fact, however, so it may not be a major default if the semantics of some sentences need to be played off by some other criterion coming from outside its linguistic context. And, correspondingly, there is another recent approach to linguistics on the basis of game-theory, which provides a similar possibility. It is elaborated in the book of L. Carlson on dialogue games. He departs from the idea of semantical games in that the aim of playing dialogues cannot be the evaluation of sentences but rather the realization of some specific agreement with respect to them. Of course, ordinary dialogues should be levelled at putting forth true sentences, for players do


want to have a common idea about how things are in reality. Biased by the idea of truth Carlson can without much difficulty accommodate the semantical game rules in his dialogue game theory. To secure adherence to truth each player's contribution to a game is viewed as an effort to approach Nature's position, whose moves can without further ado be introduced into the playing of any game. Dialogue games are then played in order to know, and hence they are epistemological.¹⁵

If we want to define what new game "pretends" may initiate, the first principle to be substituted is that of truth. What can be the aim of the players if agreement with truth is taken away? It might be answered: entertainment. But it is not a constitutive principle; it is not an aim within the game, rather an outside motivation, and as such, it could refer to any kind of play in general. Neither would passing the time or similar solutions be a better candidate. Anyway, on closer inspection it turns out that there is nothing that could coherently replace truth as a principle. Hence, what we would like to propose is that the aim of playing a game of fiction is agreement of the players simpliciter on some particular metaphysical possibility of how things could be arranged. It is important to see that this attempted arrangement can equally violate physical or even logical laws that govern ordinary dialogue games. Yet this arrangement is not something to be guessed; it should be based on the actual moves the players make in the game. If there is an author or performer, his moves are to be accommodated within the game just as those of Nature have been in ordinary dialogue games. It is his position, then to which the agreement of the participants is duly recalled. Any dialogue that takes up a passage from a text by such an author should be viewed correspondingly. Take the following example:
/47/ Who killed Roberta?

On the basis of Carlson's argument on representing dialogues by means of game-trees, a natural interpretation of /47/ can be given below. The necessary assumptions for doing this flow directly from the dialogue game rules Carlson formulated. To wit, to put forward /47/ one should presume an, even implicit, previous move that somebody killed Roberta. This (these) previous move(s) should play down the fact that a new game different from that of seeking the truth is at stake here; for, how else would players know what game a move by /47/ is part of? This pre-condition of game-playing can be made common by the use of "pretends", yet, there are other forms to recall attention to it, e.g. "I have read it somewhere...", "He told us the story of his latest novel", etc. But as it is simply a means of giving intention that one is playing a game, to say it out loud is not a necessary condition of playing: I may turn to somebody with the boldest intention of asking /47/ and he may or may not understand my aim when answering; moreover, he may even misunderstand my aim, and rack his memory about some actual Roberta who has been killed. And he need not be unsuccessful in his effort. Can we say then that we are playing a game? We think not. Yet, our utterances affect moves, only moves within two entirely different games. Then common understanding can be reached only by explaining explicitly what separate game each of us is playing. Asking /47/ then - just like the utterance of any sentence in general - necessitates that one's aim in putting forth that particular move the given utterance instantiates be divulged. This requirement is no more for instance than the knowledge that we are playing bridge and not poker. An utterance can easily count as a move in two different games. If so, then players should be reminded of what game they are playing or else their moves cannot be accommodated within the same game.

Albeit as we think it justified that the new game that

"pretends" might initiate should be defined as a separate game on the idea that the players are furthering a different aim, we can turn to the game-tree of /47/. We cannot give, however, a complete representation of it as it would involve all possible answers - which may easily be infinite, but rather a partial branching which, however maps the intuitively correct answer to the question.¹⁶



In drawing the figure of /48/ we did not deviate from Carlson's method of analysing dialogues, only the middle branch is to be interpreted as the silent moves of the author, this time T. Dreiser, whose position is the ideal which the other players, A and B. would like to share. This amendment, however, carries some other explanatory power: contrary to Nature, the Author may be directly addressed, and hence his moves may not necessarily remain silent. This further means that he may participate not only in a



dialogue game about some book of his but he may even be questioned about some hitherto unwritten story of his. That is, he may put forward any fictional story he likes. On the other hand, if a story, whose author is already dead or is simply unknown is at stake, his moves are doomed to be silent. This means nothing more than that the Author is at once the authority of the corresponding game.

Another justification of such an interpretation of the Author is given alongside our proof about fiction as metaphysical possibility. For, what else can one's inquiry into the way things may have turned out mean than authorizing oneself to occupy the position of Nature in a corresponding game? This is the way fictional interpretations of sentences can most differ from the original. If we are contemplating by all means in our power some epistemic possibility - which we would tend to call probability - we are trying to remain within the boundaries of the same game, i.e. we are doing our best to confine ourselves to what the moves of Nature are. To use our initial example: if one has undergone an exam, one ponders whether he is accepted or not, then *eo ipso* one guesses what the position of Nature could be by making some proper moves such as "I solved almost all the exercises" by (D. argue). "Then I have many points" by (D. infer), and "He who has many points is accepted" by (D. explain). Whereas, if one starts telling a story about being a candidate and doing some test to pass an exam, and he states that he is accepted, his audience will not take his moves - if taking them correctly - to be guesses about the position of Nature, but rather about the position of an Author who may or may not be instantiated by the speaker. This latter fact explains away the case that virtually anybody may re-tell the story of some author: it is not a serious restriction, however, for it asserts only that there should be some Author or other whose moves, either silent

or not, are incorporated in the relevant game tree of the game.

At this point we can relegate our discussion to the problem of identities; in an epistemological situation self-identities are to be safeguarded by any player of the correlated game. The use of identical terms is warranted by the logical game rules. Yet, at any stage of the game the option of starting a new game may arise; e.g. when contemplating on the result of the test, one might wish that he had never volunteered to do it. Epistemology may give way to metaphysical thinking at any moment. Then, we may have said he pretended that he did not take the exam, in which case the use of identical terms or variables were motivated by our residual claim of identity. The difference of identities is safeguarded by the difference of games; within one single game no such claim can be justified. Metaphysical games are parasitic on epistemic games in the same way as the use of "pretends" is on negation. Hence playing the former requires the awareness of some of the latter kind. Yet, this information may not be available to every player, and so misunderstanding is forthcoming; it then entails an identification of the residual identity with self-identity on the basis of the use of self-identity being warranted all through a given game. Misunderstanding may come from either direction: if one takes a residual claim of identity for self-identity, he is said to be cheated into this idea, and the first Searlian sense of "pretends" is born. If one takes somebody's self-identity claim to be based on a residual identity, he is said to consider that person as mad, i.e. as one who misconceives his own identity. Neither interpretation is however, connected with the notion of truth; for, they are based on how a player conceives the game he thinks he is playing and the game he supposes his partners are playing. Yet, from the latter fact may come other misunderstandings:

for not only may one have lost the information of some previously played game, but one may attribute a similar loss to any of his partners while he is still conscious of the difference. So, if one takes somebody to be such that he considers a residual claim of identity as based on his self-identity, then one is said to take that person as a simple disbeliever (as with the mirror case of madness, it would need further elaboration as the whether it should be assembled with it or not); if one takes somebody's self-identity claim to be grounded in a residual identity, then one is said to take the person for said to take the person for mad. It seems to be similar to the second case of misunderstanding above, but it may turn out to be different if we emphasize that this time another viewpoint is being made: it is not belief simpliciter, rather attribution of a similar belief that counts. Hence, one may equally consider somebody to believe or not to believe the claim of misconceived identity; we have spoken about the first alternative, if it is the second, then one may consider the person to have been hypnotized in order to play off the given identity.

These are all proper cases which may motivate the use of "pretends". Correct or not, they can equally be represented by corresponding game-trees which contain the relevant epistemic states of the players even with respect to each other's thoughts. What should be emphasized, however, is that the fictional use of "pretends" is distinct from the previous in that it requires from every player that he be aware of having started a new game. No similar misunderstanding we have delineated is welcome. This does not, in our opinion, disqualify the use of "pretends" in the other cases; it is based on the idea that the players construe about how the relationship of two different games should be viewed. And it is the possibility of such a construal, rather than the notion of truth, that is required.

9. *Logical Game Rules and "Pretends"*


Elaborating further the concept of the new game we seem to meet with some difficulties regarding the proper specification of rules. The underlying idea, which motivated the application of logical rules in enveloping the structure of the dialogue, has been an adherence to truth, a conservation principle of consistency. If nature as an ideal player is replaced by some less omnipotent source, the whole system of logical game rules will be threatened. Consistency cannot be warranted by some application of a rule simply because any Author may authorize any move. He can even harbour inconsistency. Hence, if the aim of the players is a common sharing of his position in the game, the inconsistency, when divulged, cannot be eliminated but should be admitted into their epistemic alternatives. Intuitively, this means that everything should be allowed to be metaphisically possible. By what rules can such a claim be safeguarded? The proper answer is a serious challenge to the concept of game; by some roundabout reasoning on how people understand fictional utterances we may feel entitled to propose that understanding it is not a necessary conclusion of playing, which in game-theoretical terms would mean that players may happen to miss the rules that the corresponding game necessitates; and playing without an adequate knowledge of the rules is a contradiction in terms. Yet, we think that this latter is a non-sequitur. Examples of misrepresenting some of the rules of the game are abundant: the most fitting ones can be the apparent violations of any of the rules by some of the players, like e.g. offside in soccer, which of course result in punishment of the perpetrator. But it would be misplaced to say that he was not playing in any sense of the word. If it were so, then he would be simply disregarded as such and could not interfere with playing. The condition for his remaining in the game may be the fact that he can still be said

to have been following the rules of the game in every respect except the particular one he violated. In order to be disqualified his violations would have had to exceed a certain limit, the definition of which is almost always very arbitrary. One minor point to be noted here is that as for the violation of a rule, there is no difference methodologically whether the person has only misrepresented the rule, simply disobeyed it, or been unconscious of it. What counts is whether the move has been made or not. In order to be said to be empirically playing a game, one need only be considered to have been observing a limited number of game rules.

This general observation can be extended to language games as well. One may err in playing and yet not be disqualified. Naturally this point is further enhanced when one's playing a game of fiction; for while Nature's moves always recall the same set of rules, which by some routine of play may have been adequately internalized, in a game of fiction the position of the Author can be instantiated by almost any player, and hence the corresponding moves may recall a different set of rules, so much so that one may be able only to guess at them at the outset. What makes the principle of playing survive, however, is that, since the means of carrying off moves, i.e. uttering a set of sentences, is essentially the same as in games with Nature; there is always a rather well-defined set of rules in the former that can have been internalized by playing the latter.


The internalization of the rules of a game of fiction is achieved by trying to cooperate with the supposed Author of the game. As he can be addressed, the use of rules can be tested by putting to him such questions the answers to which will recall one of those rules. This way to obtain some idea of the game is, then, inherent in the aim of the players: by selecting proper strategies to arrive at a common agreement they go through a process of understanding. While sharing

the position of Nature meant knowledge of how things truly are, sharing the position of the Author here means understanding what he meant by putting forward his sentences. Games of fiction are not played in order to know the truth but rather to comprehend how a player conceives things to be. A major difficulty in completing a process like this resides in the fact that the moves put forward by the Author may often leave doubt about some implicit moves needed for the internalization of rules. To formulate correct topical questions with respect to them may turn out to be decisive for understanding. It would be well worth giving some examples. Works of the fantastic, paradoxical or absurd genres can serve us here. "Dans le labyrinthe" by A. Robbe-Grillet provides us with a good many cases; consider one of the basic problems of the novel, which is also referred to by the title: What was the relationship between the boy and the soldier? Who led whom? Interpreting the Author's moves by putting questions, we arrive at the thought that the logical rule (C. cons) is no longer available; on the other hand, we have to make a case for the opposite rule (C. in-cons): contradictory moves may be admitted if both have been adequately explained in the game. To understand what is at stake here, consider the corresponding game-tree; we have indicated the rules we applied so that each node followed from the one above in the tree:



The two last moves by /D.infer/ put forward by the Author clearly violate /C. cons/. Hence it warrants our conclusion.

While /49/ keeps the other logical game rules intact, we may consider another case, which makes the use of /D. argue/ obtrusive; we are referring to the problem whether the soldier finds himself in the same room at the end of the novel as at the beginning of it. The relevant core of the game-tree is the following:



What is remarkable about /50/ is that the last move by /D.infer/ connects two branches, which have contradictory nodes higher in the tree (Yes vs No by (D.answer/). This is clearly different from /49/ in that it not only violates /C.cons/ but also conjoins contradictory moves in an inference which directly challenges the meaning of the tree. Hence either it is the conclusion of the inference which is unwarranted, or it is the premises which are incorrectly put forward. As with /49/ we have seen that there is nothing wrong with /D.infer/, it must be the rule that connects the premises with the rest of the upper trunk of the tree, which has been misplaced here. Hence, we eliminate /D.argue/ by simply cutting the tree of /50/ at the relevant nodes into two.


A last example for the internalization of rules comes from the play "Waiting for Godot" by S. Becket. We reproduce this time the relative passage in its entirety.¹⁷

/51/ Estragon: In my opinion we were here.

Vladimir: (looking round) You recognize the place?

Estragon: I didn't say that.

Immediately we give a game-tree for it:



When interpreting /52/ we have two solutions: either we state that the Author violates /C.cons/ by putting forward Estragon's two sentences, or we note the particular role /D.explain/ plays in the tree. But as we lack the moves for relegating the right branch to the highest topical question, a respective violation of /C.cons/ seems to be unwarranted. Note here the apparent difference between /52/ and /49/: the condition for violating /C.cons/ can be defined as a condition that two contradictory answers of a polarity question should be put forward as a move by the Author. As "No" to the highest topical question remains only a possibility (in the lack of closure of proper branches), we cannot assert the violation of /C.cons/. On the other hand, we note that the move by /D.explain/ is almost ineffective as such, for, it explains nothing: from it either a positive or a negative answer to a polarity question can be inferred. The first is an implicit move, while the second is explicit. Hence our conclusion about the futility of /D.explain/. This means in other words that either nothing can be adequately explained because the contradictory possibility still survives, or anything can be explained because at least one of the answers of a polarity question can be provided with an explanation. This way we have intuitively formulated a condition on the futility of a rule: a rule /D.explain/ is ineffective if it leaves open both possibilities of a polarity question that follows from what should have been explained.

By now, we can re-assume our results about games of fiction in the following three conditions defined by means of game-trees; these three conditions are basic in the process of making a guess at the valid rules of the game, hence they are basic in understanding fiction. They attest simply how the use of some rules may be found invalid or not. Hence, they contribute to the way players must reason in order to make moves governed by rules which are accepted within the game. We state them briefly as


- /C.E/ Whether an epistemic alternative of the Author is consistent or inconsistent depends on whether two contradictory answers of a polarity question are put forward independently by him
- /C.EL/ A rule should be eliminated from the game if there is some move governed by some other rule which can be inferred from two premises put forward by the given rule as moves that are connected to the two contradictory answers of a polarity question higher up in the tree
- /C.IN/ A rule is ineffective if there is such a polarity question that in the event of one of its contradictory answers being connected with some move put forward by the use of the given rule, still permits its other answer to be put forward

Possibly, there are other such testing procedures. Yet we think it has sufficed to show that the idea of a game of fiction can be rationally based, and that the conclusion that game playing with imperfect information about some of the corresponding rules is out of place is really a non-sequitur. An inductive test at rules not only can be levelled at game-positions but should be referred to by the players of the game in order to understand the relevant structure of the game, viz. to guess at the previous moves, and hence to understand fiction as the result of the game.

A final note on this part should be made before going on. By defining the aim and the rules of a game of fiction we have almost rounded off our argument about the game-theoretical treatment of fiction. No explicit foundation of so-called supernatural sentences should be needed; if confronted for instance with a fable by La Fontaine, we do not meet any serious difficulty in correlating a game with it just because it may contain some sentence about animals that speak. Accepting a sentence as

/53/ The ant asked the cricket why he danced so much.

will not amount to a violation of some rule simpliciter; it will only incorporate a move by the Author about ants and crickets to the effect that they can speak, which is game-theoretically trivial. It can again be shown by drawing the corresponding game-tree for /53/: it is important to see that it depends on the correct formulation of the highest topical question:



From /54/ it results that the highest topical question of a game of fiction bears special importance: it represents the point of playing at which the new game we have now represented was initiated. If so, then there may have been some preceding move by which it was overtly expressed. This is in accordance with the possible use of "pretends" we proposed before. By some due re-consideration of the condition for putting forward the topical question of /54/, we can assume the point at which the game of /54/ was initiated to be instantiated by the following sentence:

/55/ x pretends that someone can speak
where x stands for the actual Author of the game. Then, on the basis of what we said about the use of "pretends" being parasitic on negation we are confronted by the next two possibilities:

/56/ /Ex/— /x can speak/

/57/ — /Ex/ /x can speak/

The discussion of the two forms /56/ and /57/ will be the topic of the chapter below; with this we close our analysis of "pretends" and the game-theoretical framework proposed as a possible approach. This closing topic is the problem of reference, to which we will be giving a dialogue game solution.

10. *Reference, Games, and "Pretends"*

A major merit of a game-theoretical approach to fiction, we consider, is that the problem of non-existents, and hence of reference, will not arise as such. Consider for instance the question of there being speaking ants in the fable by La Fontaine; it is simply a contradiction in terms, for, there is no game whatsoever in which such a question could be put forward as a valid move. No concept of play can tolerate a sentence such as:

/58/ There are speaking ants


/58/ is either misconceived or ambiguous; if it is the latter, then it is tantamount again either to /59/ or to /60/:

/59/ Speaking ants exist

/60/ "There are speaking ants" can be correlated with an accepted move in some game of fiction

/59/ is clearly false; for, there is no move by Nature whereby the putting forward of /59/ could be taken to be a means of furthering common agreement with respect to truth, i.e. the position of Nature. /60/, on the other hand, is true as /54/ testifies it. Yet why can forms like /58/ arise? If we retrace our steps to the two kinds of identity, an answer may be forthcoming: /58/ belies the same misconception of identity claims as was seen to motivate the use of "pretends". Though we cannot go into the different interpretations of /58/ according to which a misconception is created -- we have already given a similar enumeration, but we at

least hint at the source the dilemma of /58/ may come from; in order to see it, consider a transcription of /54/ with variables to indicate semantical structure. We also add the necessary dialogue premise of /54/, i.e. the complement-sentence of /55/ as the game-initiator move. A partial dialogue semantical tree of /54/ is the following:



Now, it should be clear that the underlying dilemma of /58/ is the misconception of an identity claim $/x = y/$ in the form of self-identity $/x = a/$. Whereas the only warranted conclusion might have been something like $/y = a/$, which is, in turn, the proper interpretation of /60/. /61/, and hence /54/, is ambiguous: they can induce either an ordinary or a new dialogue game interpretation. It is /55/, which should be taken to be a necessary dialogue premise of /54/ and /61/ in order to safeguard fictional reading; to avoid misconceived forms, such as /58/ a game-initiator move such as /55/ should be henceforth remembered.

By now we are ready to answer the problem of choosing between /56/ and /57/; if our previous argument is sound, then to understand /54/ we have to assume /55/ as a dialogue premise, which is neutral to the difference of /56/ and /57/. It is simply irrelevant on what kind of negation the use of "pretends" is parasitic in particular; it will only become relevant if "pretends" is used merely as a proxy for negation (see our distinction above), i.e. if epistemology replaces metaphysical thinking. If dialogue games have any explanatory power, then it need not come as a surprise that

the meaning of a sentence is not a matter per se, but rather a matter of embedding it into some dialogue context or other. If sentences are semantically ambiguous, they must induce various contextual analyses. Since reference is part and parcel of semantics, it is, in our opinion natural that an ambiguity like the real/fictional, boils down to the construction of different dialogue game contexts between which no direct inferential relation need be adequately based. The use of fiction is justified as long as the information of playing a separate game is kept alive.

11. *To Sum up*

In this paper we have attempted to give a detailed treatment of the word "pretends" and its semantical character. We stated that its ordinary uses give rise to a neat distinction of identity claims, and sought for a possible coherent formulation of the ambiguities attested. We hinted at the inadequacy of the classical framework and proposed a game-theoretical solution. In outlining the corresponding theory, we touched upon some related phenomena as logical structure, reference and real/fictional ambiguity and argued that they can be accommodated in dialogue game construction in a very natural way. We think finally that a game-theoretical analysis of fiction can be considered as further evidence of the utility of introducing the concept of game into the field of the humanities, besides the already available approaches, Hintikka's semantical and Carlson's dialogue game theories.

Notes

- ¹ Cf. for instance Searle (1974), Pavel (1981), Lieb (1981).
- ² Saarinen (1982a) makes a similar claim with respect to reference simpliciter; his approach encouraged our distinction, though we will argue that it is a distinction in the way how identities are viewed.
- ³ Searle (1974); also in Searle (1979) p. 65.
- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ Lakoff (1970) ch. V.
- ⁶ Cf. Searle (1979) p. 7.
- ⁷ See note 3.
- ⁸ Cf. Karttunen (1974).
- ⁹ Cf. Partee (1975).
- ¹⁰ It is Partee herself who brings up an argument by Castañeda; for the latter, see for instance Castañeda (1968).
- ¹¹ In: Saarinen (1982c) pp. 1-69. See p. 47.
- ¹² This example is taken from a short satirical piece by a fairly well-known Hungarian author, F. Karinthy; Science.
- ¹³ What is at stake here, in other words, is that John may think that he is identical with, say, de Sade, who, in turn, is mad, without forcing us into a circle of reasoning on John's madness.

- 14 The following remark may be in order here: as our analysis is biased by the concept of identity, this argument cannot be connected directly with an approach based on coreference like e.g. that in Hintikka-Carlson (1977). Coreference can be realized by either kind of identity: in game-theoretical semantics it is expressed by the fact that the same set of rules is used in each case. What is at stake here is a distinction in the rules that support the different identity claims (see especially when our game-theoretical framework is put forward). Our restrictions then may be looked upon as a restriction on the uses of variables rather than on the individuals they refer or corefer to. Laziness is a matter of independent substitution of the same term into different variables - hence giving way to some, say, residual claim of identity $/x = y/$ because there may be terms for which a similar process is not valid, whereas in Hintikka-Carlson (1977) the question of a pronoun's being lazy or not depends on its corefering with one term or other, hence in each case a claim of self-identity with respect to the coreferred individual applies.
- 15 In what follows we constructively apply Carlson's dialogue game treatment to the problems of "pretends" and of fiction. For lack of space we cannot reproduce his arguments in detail, neither can we repeat his definitions of game rules. Yet, we do not think that a complete acquaintance with his work should be necessary in order to understand the basic claims of our paper.
- 16 Cf. Carlson (1983) p. 11.
- 17 We use the Faber paperback edition of Becket's play; Samuel Becket: *Waiting for Godot*, Faber and Faber, 1956, London, p. 15.

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