

## Tájékoztató bibliográfia

- Adams, F. and Stecker, R. (1997): *The Semantics of Fictional Names*. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78, 128–148.
- Almog, J. (1986): *Naming Without Necessity*. Journal Of Philosophy 71, 210–41.
- Ashline, W. L. (1995): *The Problem of Impossible Fictions*. Style 29, 215–34.
- Bach, K. (1987): *Thought and Reference*. Clarendon Press.
- Bach, K. (1994): *Conversational Implicature*. Mind and Language 9, 124–62.
- Bach, K. (2001): *You Don't Say?* Synthese 128, 15–44.
- Bach, K. (2002): *Giorgione Was So-called Because of His Name*. Philosophical Perspectives 16, 73–103.
- Bernáth Á. (1981): *Gottlob Frege jelentéseméletének irodalomelméleti vonatkozásai*. Irodalomelméleti közlemények 5, 632–653.
- Bezuidenhout, A. (1997): *Pragmatics, Semantic Underdetermination, and the Referential-Attributive Distinction*. Mind 106, 375–410.
- Braun, D. (1993): *Empty Names*. Nous 27, 449–69.
- Bremond, C. (1980): *The Logic of Narrative Possibilities*. New Literary History 11, 387–411.
- Brock, S. (2002): *Fictionalism about fictional characters*. Nous, 36. 1–21.
- Burge, T. (1973): *Reference and Proper Names*. Journal of Philosophy 70, 425–39.
- Burge, T. (1979): *Sinning Against Frege*. Philosophical Review 88, 398–432.
- Caplan, B. (2004): *Creatures of Fiction, Myth, and Imagination*. American Philosophical Quarterly 41, 331–337.

- Chalmers, D. (2002): *The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics*. Chalmers, D. and Jackson, F. (2001): Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation. *Philosophical Review* 110, 315–360.
- Chihara, Ch. (1998): *The Worlds of Possibility: Modal Realism and The Semantics of Modal Logic*. Clarendon Press.
- Cohn, D. (1990): *Signposts of Fictionality: A Narratological Perspective*. *Poetics Today* 11, 775–803.
- Currie, G. (1988): *Fictional Names*. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 66, 471–488.
- Currie, G. (1990): *The Nature of Fiction*. Cambridge University Press.
- Davies, M. and Humberstone, I. L. (1980): *Two Notions of Necessity*. *Philosophical Studies* 58, 1–30.
- Devitt, M. (1981): *Designation*. Columbia University Press.
- Devitt, M. and Sterelny, K. (1987): *Language And Reality*. MIT Press.
- Doležel, L. (1989): *Possible Worlds and Literary Fictions*. In: Sture Allén (ed): *Possible Worlds In Humanities, Arts And Sciences*. Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65. Berlin, New York, 221–242.
- Doležel, L. (1979): *Extensional and Intensional Narrative Worlds*. *Poetics* 8, 193–211.
- Doležel, L. (1995): *Fictional Worlds: Density, Gaps, and Inference*. *Style* 29, 201–14.
- Doležel, L. (1998): *Heterocosmica. Fiction and Possible Worlds*. Baltimor and London, Parallax. Re-Visions of Culture and Society.
- Donnellan, K. (1966): *Reference and Definite Descriptions*. *Philosophical Review* 75, 281–304.

- Donnellan, K. (1974): *Speaking of Nothing*. The Philosophical Review 83, 3–31.
- Dummett, M. (1973): *Frege: Philosophy Of Language*. Duckworth.
- Dummett, M. (1981): *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy*. Duckworth.
- Evans, G. (1982): *The Varieties Of Reference*. Clarendon Press.
- Everett, A. and Hofweber, T. (eds.) (2001): *Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence*. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
- Everett, A. (2003): *Empty Names and 'Gappy' Propositions*. Philosophical Studies 116, 1–36.
- Farkas K. és Kelemen, J. (szerk.) (2002): *Nyelvfilozófia*. Budapest: Áron Kiadó.
- Frank, M. (1991): *Selbstbewußtsein und Selbsterkenntnis*. Stuttgart, Reclam.
- Gerrig, R. (1993): *Experiencing Narrative Worlds*. Yale University Press.
- Geurts, B. (1997): *Good News about the Description Theory of Names*. Journal of Semantics 14, 319–348.
- Goodman, J. (2004): *A Defense of Creationism in Fiction*. Grazer Philosophische Studien 67, 131–155.
- Grice, H. P. (1989): *Studies in the Way of Words*. Harvard University Press.
- Haas-Spohn, U. (1997): *The Context-Dependency of Natural Kind Terms*. In: W. Künnle et. al (ed.): *Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositionale Attitudes*. Stanford, CSLI Publications, 333–349.
- Inwagen, P. van (1977): *Creatures of Fiction*. American Philosophical Quarterly, 299–308.

- Jackson, F. (1998): *Reference and Description Revisited*. Philosophical Perspectives 12, 201–218.
- Jackson F. (1998): *From Metaphysics To Ethics: A Defense Of Conceptual Analysis*. Oxford University Press.
- Kamp, H. (1971): *Formal properties of "now"*. Theoria 37, 227–73.
- Kanyó Z. (szerk.) (1980): *Studies in the Semantics of Narrative*. Studia Poetica 3, Szeged.
- Kanyó Z. (szerk.) (1984): *Fictionality*. Studia Poetica 5, Szeged.
- Katz, J. J. (1990): *Has the Description Theory of Names been Refuted?* In: George Boolos (ed.): *Meaning and Method: Essays in Honour of Hilary Putnam*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kripke, S. (1980): *Naming and Necessity*. Blackwell.
- Kripke, S. (1977): *Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference*. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2, 255–76.
- Kroon, F. (1987): *Causal Descriptivism*. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65, 1–17.
- Larson, R. And Segal, G. (1995): *Knowledge Of Meaning*. MIT Press.
- Levinson, S. (2000): *Presumptive Meanings: The Theory Of Generalized Conversational Implicatures*. MIT Press.
- Lewis, D. (1973): *Counterfactuals*. Blackwell.
- Lewis, D. (1986): *On The Plurality Of Worlds*. Blackwell.
- Kitcher, P. S. (1982): *Two Versions of the Identity Theory*. Erkenntnis 17, 213–28.
- Maitre, D. (1983): *Literature And Possible Worlds*. Polytechnic Press.
- Martinez-Bonati, F. (1981): *Fictive Discourse And The Structures Of Literature*. Cornell University Press.

- Martinez-Bonati, F. (1983): *Fictive: Towards a Formal Ontology of Fictional Worlds*. *Philosophy and Literature* 7, 182–95.
- McDowell, J. (1977): *On the Sense and Reference of Proper Names*. *Mind* 86, 159–185.
- Metzinger, T. (1993): *Subjekt und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität phänomenalen Bewußtseins vor dem Hintergrund einer naturalistischen Theorie mentaler Repräsentation*. Paderborn, Schöningh.
- Mihailescu, C. A. and Hamarneh, W. (1996): *Fiction Updated: Theories Of Fictionality, Narratology, And Poetics*. Ed. University of Toronto Press.
- Neale, S. (1990): *Descriptions*. MIT Press.
- Pavel, Th. G. (1979): *Fiction and the Causal Theory of Names*. *Poetics*, 179–191.
- Pavel, Th. G. (1986): *Fictional Worlds*. Harvard University Press.
- Perry, J. (1977): *Frege on Demonstratives*. *Philosophical Review* 86, 474–97.
- Perry, J. (1993): *The Problem Of The Essential Indexicals And Other Essays*. Oxford University Press.
- Perry, J. (2001): *Reference and Reflexivity*. Stanford, CSLI Publications.
- Phillips, J. (2000): *Two Theories of Fictional Discourse*. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 37, 107–119
- Pitt, D. (2001): *Alter Egos and Their Names*. *Journal of Philosophy* 98, 531–52.
- Plantinga, A. (1976): *Actualism and Possible Worlds*. *Theoria* 42, 139–160.
- Predelli, S. (2002): *'Holmes' and Holmes: A Millian Analysis of Names from Fiction*. *Dialectica* 56, 3–35.

- Putnam, H. (1975): *The Meaning of „Meaning“*. In: Gunderson, K. (ed): *Minnesota Studies In The Philosophy Of Science*. University of Minnesota Press 7, 131–193.
- Putnam, H. (1994): *Sense, Nonsense and The Senses: An Inquiry into the Power of The Human Mind*. *Journal of Philosophy* 91, 445–517.
- Quine, W. V. (1995): *From Stimulus To Science*. Harvard University Press.
- Recanati, F. (1993): *Direct Reference: From Language to Thought*. Blackwell.
- Reimer, M. (1998): *Donnellan’s Distinction/Kripke’s Test*. *Analysis* 58, 89–102.
- Rescher, N. (1975): *A Theory of Possibility*. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh.
- Rescher, N. (1999): *How Many Possible Worlds are There?* *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 59, 403–420.
- Richard, M. (1983): *Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief*. *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 12, 425–52.
- Ronen, R. (1994): *Possible Worlds in Literary Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Russell, B. (1905): *On Denoting*. *Mind* 14, 479–93.
- Salmon, N. (1986): *Frege’s Puzzle*. MIT Press.
- Salmon, N. (1998): *Nonexistence*. *Nous* 32, 277–319.
- Saul, J. (2002): *Speaker Meaning, What is Said, and What is Implicated*. *Nous* 36, 228–248.
- Schiffer, S. (1977): *Naming and Knowing*. *Midwest Studies* 2, 28–41.
- Schiffer, S. (1978): *The Basis of Reference*. *Erkenntnis* 13, 171–20.
- Schiffer, S. (1981): *Indexicals and the Theory of Reference*. *Synthese* 49, 43–100.

- Searle, J. (1958): *Proper Names*. *Mind* 67, 166–173.
- Sorensen, R. (2000): *Direct Reference and Vague Identity*. *Philosophical Topics*, 28, 177–192.
- Soames, S. (1989): *Semantics and Semantic Competence*. *Philosophical Perspectives* 3, 575–596.
- Soames, S. (2002): *Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity*. Oxford University Press.
- Spohn, W. (1993): *Wie kann die Theorie der Rationalität normativ und empirisch zugleich sein?* In: L.H. Eckensberger, U. Gähde (Hg): *Ethische Norm und empirische Hypothese*. Frankfurt a. M.
- Spohn, W. (1997): *Begründungen a priori – oder: ein frischer Blick auf Dispositionsprädikate*. In: W. Lenzen (Hg): *Das weite Spektrum der Analytischen Philosophie*. Berlin, de Gruyter.
- Stalnaker, R. (1999): *Context And Content*. Oxford University Press.
- Stalnaker, R. (2001): *On Considering a Possible World as Actual*. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 65, 141–156.
- Stanley, J. (1997): *Names and Rigid Designation*. In: B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.): *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language*. Blackwell, 555–585.
- Stanley, J. (2000): *Context and Logical Form*. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 23, 391–434.
- Strawson, P. F. (1950): *On Referring*. *Mind* 59, 320–44.
- Szabó E. és Vecsey Z. (szerk.) (2003): *A jelentés dimenziói. Modális elméletek Kripke után*. Jate Press.
- Thau, M. (2002): *Consciousness And Cognition*. Oxford University Press.
- Thomasson, A. L. (1998): *Fiction and Metaphysics*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

EGY - 2h XA62131

Tájékoztató bibliográfia

- Thomasson, A. L. (2003): *Speaking of Fictional Characters*. *Dialectica* 57, 205–223.
- Voltolini, A. (1994): *Ficta Versus Possibilia*. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 48, 75–104.
- Walton, K. (1990): *Mimesis as Make-Belief*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press
- Wettstein, H. (1984): *How to Bridge the Gap Between Meaning and Reference*. *Synthese* 84, 63–84.
- Wettstein, H. (1986): Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake? *Journal of Philosophy* 83, 185–209.
- Yagisawa, T. (1988): *Beyond Possible Worlds*. *Philosophical Studies* 53, 175–204. Yourgrau, P. (ed) (1990): *Demonstratives*. Oxford University Press.
- Zvolenszky, Zs. (2005): *Analitikus igazságok és Kripke szemantikai fordulata*. *Világosság* 2–3. 171–182.



X 60 9 20