Hungarian Philosophy.

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By Prof. B. Tankó, Debrecen.

Hungarian philosophy! Should that mean a new revelation of hidden treasures of the spirit of a nation which has so often surprised those standing afar, as was recently the case in the music of Bartók and Kodály, or when the world discovered the metaphysical beauties of Madách's Tragedy of Man?

No, certainly not. Philosophy, we must tell frankly, does not belong to the medium by which the genius of the spirit of Hungary has hitherto revealed itself. It could not rival in this respect other manifestations of ours, — our constitutional history, our literature, music, or art. It has not yet had the privilege of attracting the attention of the world through outstanding personalities taking part in the one common task of human culture in endeavouring to give a solution to the final problems of mankind. We certainly cannot point out philosophers of the rank of a Plato or a Kant, nor even ranking as a Locke or a Rousseau, and it is only in the latter times that we may name thinkers on a level with their foreign contemporaries.

And none would seek to conceal this fact nor to complain of it, since, if we consider, it finds its very simple and natural explanation in the circumstance that philosophy has always been the latest fruit on the „golden tree" of culture. So it has been since its first and most admirable favourite in history, the Greek. And, if we consider further, we have had to serve a longer period of apprenticeship in spiritual life than the more fortunate nations have had to do, owing to the simple fact that we had to put aside our strivings after culture and take up the

sword to fight for it, to secure the liberty and leisure for that higher task, menaced by the barbaorus Levante of that time as it is also now.

And yet philosophy has a deeper significance in our spiritual history than simply that of an empirical matter of fact, to be mentioned only to be able to say that we also possess it. The highest appreciation of philosophy is contained in the well known words of *Hegel*, according to which it is the mirroring of all the ruling ideas of a period condensed into the most abstracted and therefore the most comprehensive shape of pure thought, — that is, philosophy is the research into the real basic significance of our notions. This all means that philosophy is the most condensed form of the whole content of the culture of a period, — what *Spencer* expected of it, the „completely unified knowledge", because of its being the knowledge of the principles in all fields where the culture-forming mind may be found at work.

In this sense, philosophy has no less significance with us than anywhere else, although it is not so conspicuous as in literatures where presuppositions of mightier currents are richer and realize themselves in a freer way than with us. *Inter arma silent musae.* How true that old sentence has proved in our history, and how much it explains of the long intervals of seemingly entire spiritual lethargy in our nation! How often we see Hungary fighting almost hopelessly in defence of the civilized life of the West! Is it any wonder then that philosophy, the latest fruit on the „golden tree" should appear so late with us?

We now may understand a somewhat unusual way of solving the problem of Hungarian philosophy. There was a time when some critics simply thought there is no problem regarding Hungarian philosophy, since the Hungarian mind is not made for philosophy.

We do not deem it necessary to defend ourselves against such a hasty error. The evolution of our literature with its present productions is our crowning witness, and we have an abundance of it before an unprejudiced tribunal. Here above all, *our language*. It can hardly be said of a nation that it has lacked the capacity and bent for philosophy, if we find that its language, out of its own germinative force, could produce the

basic stock of words expressing the fundamental functions of mind. The Hungarian could not have been lacking in this quality when notions like soul, spirit, mind, thinking, beauty, good, cause, wise, attention, space, time, understanding, judge, and a long list of words for the most spiritual functions and for their finest hues and shades, were ready, and long ago in use, when the Hungarian nation took possession of her present final land.

And this language shows such a splendid concordant and unbroken evolution that foreign observers cannot find words to express their surprise and admiration that the people of the higher and lower classes speak the same language, enjoy the same poetry, sing the same songs; — a circumstance which is unknown in their respective countries, torn into many dialects unable to understand one another. We read in *Galeotti Marzio,* the Italian historian at the court of King *Mathias of Hunyad,* that in his country the peasant did not understand the burgess nor the nobility, while in Hungary there was a uniform language, — the same pronunciation, the same words, the same accent everywhere.[1] This was so about the year 1200, and ever since then our language shows an evolution. From the time it began to emerge to a higher level of life out of the great common matrice of all European literary lives, the Latin, it is surprising to observe the rapidity with which it grows ever more polished and pliable to the deepest currents and the finest windings of thought and feeling.

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Therewith we have touched the fact that the real Hungarian literature was preceded by a Latin period as was elsewhere the case. „Our modern polyglott world-literature was born out of the literature of one language, a dead one. The Latin died away, but its rich heritage was gradually taken up and further enriched, even in its lifetime and during its increasing voidness, by its daughters to whom nieces also attached themselves, and later on some languages not belonging to the relatives, as the Hungarian", says our scholar poet, Mr. M. *Babits* in his masterly survey.[2] The way of this evolution, which is

[1] See *Pintér;* History of the Hungarian Literature. I. 422. (Hungar.)
[2] M. *Babits;* History of European Literature. (1934). p. 6. (Hungar.)

the real *genesis* and *exodus* of our literature, we may trace now in the full evidence of historical research into the whole problem, in the brilliant work of Prof. Joh. *Horváth,* The Beginnings of Hungarian Literary Culture, 1931.

We cannot value too highly the historical mission of this Latin period, general bequeather to all later literatures of a grandiose heritage, that of the Greek. It gave us, too, the medium for exchanging the results of culture both of mind, as wrought out in the admirable network of Greek philosophy, and that of the *ethos* of Christianity as contained in the Gospels of Jesus Christ. And however severe or even harsh the promulgation of Christianity in Hungary may have been, so that it annihilated many of the customs and notions of the primeval national soul, yet the solid structure of this soul was promted by it to save and to insure its contents, which were by nature so much akin to those of the great heritage of which it learned through this general mediator of European culture. The Hungarian spirit soon gained by that means its free access to the general service of the common values of the West, and so we find that no current of thought was alien and unknown to us. All the movements agitating the Euopean spirit found their echoes in our spiritual life too, nor did they lack their Hungarian representatives or even forerunners.

So we find that the universities of Europe were richly attended by Hungarian students to acquire a worthy preparation for the ministry of religion or for the scanty civil service. And universities established by our kings (Ludovico the Great, at Pécs, 1367; Pozsony in 1465; by Sigismund at Buda in 1389, for Roman and Ecclesiastical law) gathered foreign scholars around themselves (Regiomontanus taught at Pozsony 1467—71), and also spread Hungarian savants throughout Europe. To give a few names of the many, — Marcus and Augustus Hungaricus about 1300; Petrus de Dacia (according to Peter *Bod,* one of our first church historians, Petrus Transylvanicus); Paulus Beatus at Bologna; Boethius ex Transylvania 1345, a devoted follower of Aristotle; Peter Várdai at the court of King Matthias, a pupil of Pythagoras. Michael de Hungaria published his sermons at Strassburg, 1407. Part of the sermons delivered at Pécs were preserved in the State Archive at Munich. Under

the Hunyadys and Jagellos there were over 2600 Hungarian students in Vienna; and over a hundred of the professors were Hungarians. In Padua the Hungarian students numbered 160. Under Ulászló and Lodovico II. there were 650 at Cracow. The school at Veszprém, (abolished 1276) used to be compared with that of Paris. And in Italian, German, and French universities it became the custom to name and call a group of students after the Hungarians. Magister Simon Kézai, one of our oldest chroniclers who wrote about 1248, got his degree abroad.[3]

The Renaissance, as now widely known also abroad, was a glorious period of learning and culture through the mighty and attractive personality of King Mattias. Bartholomew *della Fonte* greets him with these words, — „The Muses, long since banis-

[3] *Pintér;* I. 477. — The history of the relations between Hungary and the West has not yet been systematically written. As for England, a valuable preliminary work has been done by Prof. Alexander *Fest* in his essays, English Literary Influences in Hungary up to 1825 (in the Hungarian, 1917, edited by the Academy), and, Englishmen in Hungary During the Period of Reforms, 1825—48, (in Hungarian). — Among the historical relations, one dating as far back as the reign of the Anglo-Saxon king, Edmund Ironside, is the most remarkable. When the king fell in battle, his two little sons came into the hands of Canute the Great who ordered them to be killed, and it was only by the care of a servant that they escaped, and could flee to Hungary where they grew up, and the elder married the daughter of King St. Stephen, Agatha. Later on, King Edward the Confessor, being childless, called home the son born of this marriage, Edgar. He followed the call but was prevented from taking the throne by Count Harold. In 1066, however, he was elected king by the Anglo-Saxons, but he resigned in favour of William the Conqueror, who was kind to him. Nevertheless, Edgar determined to return to Hungary with his mother, the daughter of the king of Hungary. Unfortunately the ship was cast on the shores of Scotland, where they were kindly received by King Malcolm, who married Edgar's younger sister, Margaret. So a Hungarian princess became ancestress of the Stuarts. — See to all this, the English number of the „Külügyi Szemle" (Foreign Review), Vol. II., especially the artiele of E. *Horváth,* Papers relating to the History of Anglo-Hungarian relations, p. 229—47. — The volume contains the opening adress of Count Jul. *Andrássy* in the Anglo-Hung. Society, and a list of English books on Hungary.

See further: *Beöthy,* Zsolt, The development of the intellectual life of the Hungarians, 1914. — *Riedl,* Fred., A History of Hungarian Literature (in the series: Short Histories of the literatures of the world). — *Reid,* Emil, Hungarian Literature, 1898, London. — David *Angyal:* The political relations of Transsylvania with England, 1903, Budapest (In Hungarian).

hed from Greece, left in the lurch by almost all our princes, neglected by France and Germany, flee to thee, praise thee as their only pride and safe refuge".

Buda became indeed a centre of the highest culture, and its leader, *Johannes Pannonius*, sent not only polished and courteous letters to Marsiglio Ficino at Firenze, but exercised a high criticism on the movement, — he required more Christianity! The movement was, however, too much an affair of the aristocratic nobility to have a deep influence on the larger masses, and the *Sodalitas Litteraria Danubiana* (1497) had no long life.

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These were the moments in the forming of a general framework for our literary life. Could it be, we may ask now, a mere chance?, is it not rather a symbolic fact, that the first literary work of Hungary is — a philosophical one? This is the work imputed to our first king, the great *Stephen* I., the saint, — *De institutione morum ad Emericum ducem liber.* Whether or not he is the author of the work, the ideas are his, (Bishop Gerhard, tutor to Prince Emericus being the penman). And so Joh. *Erdélyi*, one of our earlier historians of philosophy, was right in saying that the first king of Hungary was its first philosopher through this „manual of political ethics".[4]

And we may call this work symbolical in a special sense too. It forebodes, as it were, the tendencies and natural bent of the Hungarian philosophizing mind. It is on the problems of practical life, private and public, that is, on the questions of moral and of governing, that our interest is fixed.High-soaring metaphysical speculations and raptures of the mystic are rather alien to us. Instead of this, a kind of sober and positive mind shows itself in our view of the world, wherein, however, there is not lacking genuine admiration, the highest form of human attitude towards the world, devotion before the simplest facts of every-day life. This is in reality the true attitude of that new-comer into the European commonwealth of culture — as Zsolt *Beöthy* sees the Hungarian on his appearance at the borders of his new and final home when he peers with his lynx-

[4] Erdélyi: The philosophy in Hungary, (1865, newly edited 1885, p. 10. — In Hungarian).

eyes accustomed from of old to broad horizons, these new-ones, full of unknown poblems to be solved by him.[5]

Meanwhile began the fertilizing process of the one common literary language, the Latin. The official language of the Church had to open thousands of channels into the real life of the people if real fruits of her care were to be expected at all. And above all, the preaching required patterns in the language of the folk; the more so as the first preachers were to a great measure foreigners. Such patterns we possess in the oldest literary relic of our language, the so called *Funeral Sermon. — Sermo sup. Sepulchrum,* and in the prayer attached to it. Gradually the members of the clergy were recruited more and more from native Hungarians, and a fresh, vivid, spring-like shoot began to sprout from under the Latin covering, — a translation of the meaning, in the best sense of the word, a Hungarianization was begun. „He who wrote in his native tongue did not do anything else than to Hungarianize the Latin", says Horváth (p. 96). The treasures of our language had been waiting, germ-like, the conscious shaping and alloying, and together with the general evolution of our national literature, and proportionally, the training to philosophical interest grew too, although a practical realization in an unbroken chain has not been granted to it.

For unfortunately, all rich promise of a spring-like beginning were as if deluged by the disaster of Mohács, 1526, where Hungary, left alone by those for whom she fought, was overwhelmed by the Turks and had to begin her life quite from the beginning again. It is simply a marvel that she did renew her spiritual life at all. She could have found abundant excuses for a life dispensing with all the higher aims and confining herself to the mere saving of her life and livelihood. But instead of this we witness a wonderful and mighty renewal of national and spiritual forces. We hear the breaking out of sincere avowal of penance and penitence like a confession — and all this in Hungarian. And as if it were a proof of the solidity of the former work, our language emerges vigorously and mighty, and full of warrant of a fuller future.

The Reformation was the natural confederate and leader

[5] *Beöthy* in his above quoted work,, introductory lines.

in this great national revival for us, as it was elsewhere. Translations of the Scriptures, preaching, and disputes, together with the new hymns, were the efficacious means of an astonishingly rapid evolution in which our language in three generations reached the level marked by the names of Peter *Alvincy* (1570—1634), Peter *Pázmány* (1570—1637), and Nicolas *Zrinyi* (1620—1664).

Philosophy of course has not had an immediate benefit from all this. Protestantism as an historical current was at first (Luther) directly hostile to philosophy. A long time was needed before the deep principles of Christian freedom of conscience matured the profounder thought that freedom of religious conscience leads inevitably to liberty, that is, the autonomy of intelligence. So we find that philosophy continues for a while to be only a means in explaining and corroborating the doctrines of the new theological thinking. Aristotle is the password and chief authority for Protestant orthodoxy until he is found to fetter the mind, and it is only gradually and not without frictions that philosophy recovers or fights out its autonomy.

And so we see the process of the previous period repeated. The Latin gives our scholars again the easy possibility of taking part in the work of the new world, all the currents of which we find divulged and disputed in our country too; the theological ones of course more prominently, *e. g.* the movement of *Cocceius* or the independentism. But philosophy too had her intercessors, and according to Joh. *Csimor Decsi* de Baranya philosophy was so highly appreciated that one was not called a scholar if he was not at least initiated into that branch of learning. Peter *Csókás de Laskó* attracted much attention by his work, *De Homine* (Wittemberg 1585), where he shows influences of the *Cusanus* (idea of macrocosm and microcosm); nor are theology and psychology missing either. We have an antagonist of *Bruno* and *Campanella* in *Skalikh,* the author of the first encyclopaedia on the Aristotelian basis. George *Csipkés de Komárom* follows Aristotle too in his „De potentia et actu", and Stephen *Csengery* does not fail to call Aristotle „the Dominus". John *Pósaházy* belongs to the same Aristotelian line with his *Ars Catholica vulgo Methaphysica,* Patakini 1662. Philosophy has no higher aims than to give an

apology for the theological conceptions, and scholasticism seems to reign undisturbed. The common Latin language opened the way abroad for our scholars, as well as rendering it possible for us to invite foreign scholars to our higher schools. So Bisterfeld, Alsted, Piscator, and Basire were brought by Gabriel Bethlen to Gyulafehérvár, and Comenius to Patak by George Rákóczy. Paul *Jászberényi* opened a school in England in 1658 and wrote „A new torch to the Latin tongue", 1664, (four editions in six years). Nicolas de *Tótfalu* of Transylvania received an invitation to the printing-office of the pope.

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Meanwhile the new philosophy found its way to us too; — *Bacon* in Joh. *Bayer* (Filum labyrinthi, Cassoviae 1662) against Aristotle; Petrus *Ramus* in Mich. *Buzinkay* and George *Mártonfalvy* (1661), the worthy professors at Patak and Várad, banished by the raving Roman Catholic counteraction. The Logic of Ramus was edited by Joh. *Nadányi* (1666) under the significant title of „De scientiarum incrementis". Ramus himself was invited by King Joh. Szapolyai (1570), but the St. Bartholomew night (1572) put an early end to this brave scholar whose teachings mark the beginning of the campaign against Protestant scholasticism. One of the most devoted warriors of this new thought is our Joh. *Tolnay Dali* at Patak.

But the most outstanding figure of the new philosophy is Johannes *Csere de Apácza* (near Brassó, Transylvania), a real pioneer and „ice-breaker", as Bod puts it, — a prophet and apostle whose delicate body comsumed itself in the burning zeal of his fervent soul. He bears all the features of a tragical hero, not because he determined to do the work of a whole academy amidst the unintelligence of an unprepared world, but because he overlooked the laws of real life. He hoped to be able to condense the task of two generations into a few years and to raise a full culture out of some rather scanty elementary presuppositions of one. He measured his environments by his own exceptional measures, and he could not but fail in it. But he made philosophy speak Hungarian at a time when — unlike the case of Bacon and Descartes — his voice sounded almost as a voice in the wilderness. He had only one forerunner: Joh. Füsüs of Patak.

Apáczai is like a lonely peak in a desert. One cannot but look devoutly upon him. Our philosophy has to thank him for the endeavour to shape for the first time terms the most fundamental notions, and he had, as *Kornis* remarks, to create almost out of nothing. No wonder then that he is sometimes harsh and uneven and that in this first period our philosophy, as Kornis rightly says, shows „a lack of the colour of life, which only the mother tongue can give to it through its original windings".[6] Truly, it took a long time for our native tongue to be able to fight out its emancipation from the suffocating tutelage of the Latin, and it is impossible to trace the unconscious steps leading to this final goal.

Many sciences besides philosophy begin their history with Apácai — biology and the medical sciences, mathematics — as Nic. *Bethlen,* the first to acknowledge the great merits of his master and ideal, gratefully remarked in his autobiography. The stock-book of all these worthy and noble commencements is his *Encyclopaedia,* a work indeed faithfully mirroring the unsettled spirit of the age, full of curious naivities, something like a medieval collection of topics of a childish admiration. But do we not find tokens of the same state of mind even in Bacon, in spite of all his assurances as to having left behind the primitive age of the *Sapientia Veterum* and the spell of the *Idola?*

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The mutual influence of philosophy and of literature in general on each other was thereby begun. The narrow circle of Latin-writing scholars widens in proportion as national literature begins to accustom readers to a larger circle of themes set forth in the native tongue. The chief problem of the XVII century was, — which denomination has the right of claiming to be the true Christianity? Theology is accordingly the ruling subject of literature and the chief reading throughout Europe, and this originated a common training of the mind, which, through the carefully wrought out philosophy of Aristotle, enables, as *Pintér* puts it, „the Belgian Catholic priest and the

[6] *Kornis,* Jul. The evolution of the Hungarian philosophical Terminology, in the „Magyar Nyelv" (Hungarian Language), vol. III. (1907), p. 101.

Swiss Reformed pastor to step forth and behave in the same spiritual armours as the Hungarian Jesuit or the Calvinist of Transylvania" (III. 537).

The XVIII century brings the turning of the general bent of interest. Voltaire and the French spirit give the predominating features to the age through the famous *Encyclopaedia.* Rousseau, Montesqieu, and their fellows make their influence felt on our authors, as did also the English — Milton, Young, Pope, Ossian, and Shakespeare; and Hobbes and Locke find their intercessors and propounders, as well as Shaftesbury, Burke, and Hugh Blair. How deeply the new currents permeated spiritual life, we may judge by the one single fact that the library of Francis Rákóczy II. contained Jansenist books (Pintér IV. 289). And the aim of Faludy was to counterbalance the Enlightenment in general. (In his *Noble Lady,* and *Noble Young Man* he uses as a pattern the works of *Darrel* in some weak translation.) We witness again all the movements and moods of taste and thinking and behaviour, from the Gothic and Renaissance to the rather unnatural flourishes of the Baroque, owing to its maintaining the big forms of the previous mighty Renaissance without its mighty inner powers, and to the more lovely artificialities and refined naivities of the Rococo and the Empire and the Biedermeyer.

Georg *Bessenyei* is the worthiest representative of this new era in his endeavours to unite our neglected life to that of the rich West. We may righty claim him for philosophy too, as Beöthy did, though his writings did not all appear in print in his lifetime. Philosophy as a special study had not yet originated a fully wrought out system in our country. Before we could live ourselves into one of the systems developing out of another so opulently, says Erdélyi, we had to grasp after the new one. „Systems came as visitors, and went as visitors, and we had to be glad if we were able to gather some ripe fruit as seed to sow" (97).

We must not, however, undervalue the services of this scholar work. The great result of it was just the ever-deepening interest of literature in the most profound questions. And this mutual influence of each on the other, gives the truth to the fine remark of Kornis, „Hungarian poetry is the sister of philo-

sophy. On her breast philosophy was reared; she bore Kölcsey as our noblest moralist, Eötvös as our greatest analyser of the soul, Madách as our deepest metaphysical genius, — all in the garb of poetry, not in the toga of scholarly expertness" (356). One can scarcely measure the significance of the fact that the philosophical terms were gradually wrought out so that in 1720 a member of the circle of Fr. Rákóczy II., Francis *Kis*, could write a „Hungarian Philosophy", a series of essays on some virtues as piety, patriotism, modesty, truthfulness, diligence, audacity, etc., and in 1772 Bern. *Sartorius* wrote his „Philosophy in the Hungarian Language".

We may take then as a real turning point, that the person or figure of the philosopher appears in literature. This happens in Bessenyey's play, „The Philosopher", — a vivid token that the public desired it and therefore found it a natural and familiar literary topic. As a matter of fact, philosophy became an integral part of education, and permeated the whole nation. No wonder that in the year the *Ratio Educationis* appeared, the organ of the intended Germanization of Hungary's education (1777), Bernh. *Benyák* at Buda began to teach philosophy in Hungarian, and Ádám *Horváth of Pálócz*, the poet and musician, wrote a Hungarian Psychology in 1792, where he employs the most happy principle of deriving all the shades of a common meaning out of the same etymological root.

A deep feeling for uniformity and the final stabilizing of the terms of the scientific world begins to spread at this time, and is to be heard in philosophy too. Stephen *Márton* complains in his „Christian Ethics" (1796) of the want of a body endowed with legislative authority, something like an academy to supply this need. Samuel *Köteles* at Nagyenyed did a fine work to this end by criticizing and remodelling the beginnings of Apáczai. Then in Jos. *Ruszek* we witness a „renovator with fire and sword". The zeal of our reformers of the language, which opens one of the most remarkable periods in our literary life, extends over to science and philosophy as well, and what the romantic enthusiasm of a *Bugát* begins in the natural sciences, is followed in philosophy by Joh. *Imre*, one of the most influential and successful teachers at Buda, filling it with the boldest terms, not seldom over-shooting the mark.

The stabilizing work of the Academy was indeed very much needed, and the task was taken up as soon as the Academy was established. The „Dictionary of Philosophy" of 1834 endeavours to gather all that is valuable in the old and the new, — a task which was all the more necessary as under the influence of German idealism, especially of Romanticism, the most phantastical and artifical word-formations flooded in. The school of Hegel *e. g.* wished the system of the master together with his language, — an impossible task for the Hungarian language. The result was that philosophy almost lost its credit just when beginning to appeal to the intelligence of a wider circle of readers.

The widening of this circle grew almost as if of itself owing to the powerful currents of thought spreading about the beginning of the XVIII century. All the main systems found their convinced spokesmen or their adversaries, from Leibniz among the older ones, (in Alex. *Hoványi),* to Herbart or Lotze or Herbert Spencer. It is a noteworthy fact that the influence of *Kant* was the widest and deepest, though the most striking was that of the Hegelian system. How deep and wide the effect of the Kantean philosophy must have been is shown in the fact that its teaching was prohibited at the university in Buda by a paternal government which thought it rather dangerous to accustom readers to a free critical behaviour towards their final problems of life. So Kant had to seek shelter in the high-schools of Protestant schooling, at Pápa where J. *Márton,* and at Nagyenyed where Sam. *Köteles* were his worthy interpreters.

Hegel found his devoted followers also at Pápa in Louis *Tarcy* and Charles *Kerkápoly,* minister of finances in our great Liberty War of 1848, and one of the most model Puritan characters our history ever saw, — both of them professors at the old college at Pápa. Schelling too had a sympathetic pupil in George *Aranka,* inclined to the same poetizing conception of Nature. Herbart's paedagogical merits, without the handicapping dry metaphysical framework of his conception, found a fine interpreter and a wise developer in Maurice *Kármán* who for a long time modelled and directed the organization of our public education.

At the time philosophy lost its credit after the general

bankruptcy of the Hegelian speculation, materialism too, this vile and tedious thing, could find a weak echo in Francis *Mentovich.* As a return to sober knowledge and wisdom, we have to mark the enterprise of the „Magyar Filozófiai Szemle" (Hungarian Philosophical Review 1880—90) to enfold the mighty system of the *positive philosophy* of Aug. *Comte.* The mystical suggestions of Comte (in his *System* de la philosophie positive) found almost no echo at all. — *Wundt* exercised then a greater influence with his methods of psychological research. About the end of the last century, Herbert *Spencer* closed the line of the systems which had a part in our philosophical development, as shown by the translations of his works.

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Meanwhile the time seemed to have come for the interesting attempt made by two worthy men to work out a genuine Hungarian philosophy. These were Joh. *Hetényi* and Gustav *Szontagh.* The noble intention suffered, however, an inevitable shipwreck since both of the founders deemed it sufficient to use an eclectic way to their „harmonized" philosophy. Hetényi was a preacher rather than a philosopher. He preferred to be so practical a preacher that he neglected theory. Szontagh, formerly a military captain, kept his soldierly positive mind in his philosophy too. He is the more philosophical since he endeavours to harmonize notions, not life. He uses the Kantian basis as found in Krug, but he abandons it and turns towards Schelling and Hegel when he maintains that the laws of thinking are the laws of beings too.

The always original Samuel *Brassai* (1799—1899), the last polyhistorian (mathematician, linguist, and philosopher) gave some very interesting hints of a scheme of a new philosophy which in reality exhibited much resemblance to Fichte and philosophers influenced by him (Maine de Biran, etc.). It is a pity they remained fragments.

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The really serious part Hungarian genius had to play in general philosophical culture, was distributed by Providence to other representatives of our nation. In the „fulfilment of time" indeed, as the ripe fruit of all preceding evolution came the life-work of *Charles Böhm* (1846—1911), professor at Kolozs-

vár. He set himself consciously to build a system for his country, and one cannot read the private notes of his diary without being touched, so mightily does the zeal of the young theologian break forth, condensing itself into the pledge not to know rest until he presents his nation with a new philosophy of her own. The results of this avowal is the fundamental work of Böhm, „The Man and his World" (T. I. vol. 1883, V. vol. posthum. 1928).

The forming influences of this work cannot be measured, of course, by exact measures. The great suggestive force by which it gathered a group of thinkers around Böhm, — and this not only from his personal pupils — is not the only one way in which a great genius fructifies his time and the coming times. It is a still nobler gift to be able, to raise the level of the general evolution of systematical thinking to a higher plane, so as to help thereby even opposite views in unfolding themselves, — if they possess the main supposition for a really working force, the germinating idea which is able to organize the manifold notions into a unifying system. And viewing our philosophy in this way, I do not think we make a mistake in holding that the other great work of our philosophical culture, that of Ákos *Pauler* (1876—1933), may be duly reckoned into the harvest of Böhm's sowing, as well as those belonging to his immediate school.

If we try now to classify the type of philosophizing of these two deep thinkers, we may properly say that the prototype of Böhm is Platon and the line leading to Kant; that of Pauler is Aristotle. — Platon's position, standpoint, and whole behaviour is that of a soul which has discovered that it is put into a chaos, and that it is only by the work of its own mind that it can and must form a cosmos, an *ordered world* out of this chaos. And the task of philosophy, properly speaking, is just to seek the rules and laws of the mind which changes this chaos into a cosmos. This is precisely the opinion which Böhm holds regarding philosophy, with a fuller consciousness of this nature of its task. „It is the artist in man which began to interest me", he says, alluding to I. G. Fichte, — the artist building his own world.

There is a network of self-evident fundamental principles, existing in themselves, independent of any acknowledgement of

any mind; and philosophy has to trace lines of this network. This is essentially Aristotle's idea of philosophy, and this is the conviction of Pauler too. Should we wish to compare these conceptions? Nothing could be more desirable, indeed, for the welfare of mankind, than the knowledge of those world-deep threads of everlasting validity which hold the realities of our experiences and deeds.

But there is a hitch in this so self-confident enterprise. There is no answer in it to the question of how those independently existing principles permeate reality, — or how the meaning gets to reality. And yet it should be evident that unless we find the key to this riddle, philosophy is nothing more than an interpret of things, — wanting the interpret for its own meaning. And if philosophy, as according to the happy conception of *Windelband,* means in reality the *thinking-out-to-the-end, (Zu-Ende-denken),* then it is easy to perceive that this *end* cannot be found within Aristotle. The school for this task of intelligence was opened by Plato and accomplished by Kant, and nobody can inculpably pretermit or neglect this high school of pure thinking.

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It would be an inviting topic now to enter into a detailed scheme of our present philosophical currents originated by these two main sources. But however rich the reward would be, I must here break off this survey, which aimed at nothing more than just giving the outlines of the evolution of our philosophical culture in the general frame of our literature. A discussion of the present movement would make a separate study and must be left over for another essay.[7] For the present, I have only to add a few words on the old question of the national character of philosophy.

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[7] A general survey of Hung. Philos. is to be read in *Überweg*'s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philos., XII. Aufl., by (the late) Prof. L. *Rácz.* — *Pauler*'s *Logik* and Introduction may be read in German under the title: *Grundlagen der Philosophie,* Walter de Gruyter, 1925. *Böhm*'s smaller articles in the „Archiv für systematische Philosophie", Band 21, 1915, Heft 3. u. 4., „Über die Aufgabe und das Grundprobem der Werttheorie" and „Das Verstehen als centrales Moment des Erkennens", — and in the „Zeitschrift für Philos. und phil. Kritik", Band 136, translated by the present author.

Does philosophy show at all national features? The question seems somewhat forced and bizarre. Has not philosophy to deal with general notions beyond all particular and temporal forms? Certainly. But does not history exhibit a long line of witnesses to the fact that the human mind cannot solve this sublime task otherwise than by dividing itself into great individual units where a great personality holds and exhibits the characteristic features of his nation? It is impossible not to remark the fine intrinsic differences which separate French philosophy as represented *e. g.* in Descartes or Comte from the English of Bacon or Spencer, or the German philosophy from Italian. Philosophy as a theory of the most general ideas human mind is capable of, exists, as a matter of historical fact, in the form of nationally determined framings of the same and logically identical fundamental conceptions.

May we venture now to think or even to foretell that Hungarian philosophy too will show some special traits discriminating it from any other historical form of philosophy? It may seem a boldness; and yet we can easily find the germinating roots out of which the frame of a christalization of ideas may originate. The problems of practice, that is, *of values,* have permanently been the interest of Hungarian meditation. The „primacy of practical reason" (Kant) has been the theme it seems to illustrate. The problems of values which give a content and weight to life, give it a meaning thereby in general. Is not existence as experienced by man in his own personal life faced in this central problem of all problems? And was it a mere chance that Böhm crowned his life-work by laying the foundation of a general *Theory of Values?* (1906). Values as they permeate intrinsically the reality: — is there not a whole programme schemed here? What is reality? What is experience? What does this existence mean? How do values rank realities in a system which ought not *eo ipso* to cover that of first-hand experience? Do not these formings of questions promise a new way of thinking-to-the-end of the old problems?

The old problems which are ever new! — for as *Paulsen* liked to assure us, philosophy has no new or old problems. It has only eternal problems which it has to trace always deeper and to explain always more truly. Would it be an unheard-of

turn if Hungarian thinking, unhandicapped by worn-out barren views, should ripen a new fruit on the ever green tree of philosophy which has been tended by so many husbandmen and now at last has still another, after a time of long apprenticeship?