

**ACTA UNIVERSITATIS SZEGEDIENSIS
DE ATTILA JÓZSEF NOMINATAE**

ACTA HISTORICA
TOMUS CI.

**HUNGARIA
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ISTVÁN EÖRDÖGH

REFLECTIONS ON MARKO JAČOV'S SOURCE-BOOK

„Le missioni cattoliche nei Balcani durante la guerra di Candia” (1645—1669),

„Studi e Testi”, n. 352—353, Biblioteca Ap. Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 1992.

(The Roots of Modern Ethnic Conflicts in the Balkans)

Most of the ethnic conflicts on the Balkan peninsula until the end of the 17th century — declared Jačov — were rooted in the conflict between Islam and Christianity. The standard-bearer of Islam was the Ottoman army, which imposed this religion on the peoples of the Balkans by force.

The Christians of the Balkans who converted to Islam during the „fifteen-year-war” (1593—1606) were called „poturs”, that is, half-Turks, within their own country. The numerous Greeks, Serbs, Albanians, Bulgarians, Walachians, Moldavians, Croatians and Hungarians who converted to Islam and who fought in the Ottoman army during the war against Crete (1645—1669) and then, during the military expeditions of Vienna and the Peloponnesus (1683—1699), were called Turks. Jačov mentions that it was the first time when the status of religion had been identified with that of nationality.

As a consequence of the military expeditions of Vienna and the Peloponnesus — the author emphasizes — the conflict between religions was accompanied by the conflict of the different sects, that is, Catholicism and Orthodoxy. This is how the author explains conflicts that broke out later between Serbs and Croatians, basing his thesis on the well-documented example of the Court of Vienna identifying Serbs with Orthodoxy and Croatians with Catholicism only in the second half of the 19th century. However, previously there had been Catholic Serbs and likewise Croatian Protestants.

As the conflict between these two nations was regarded as the main reason of the contentions that broke out later, Jačov goes back to the 16th century in order to find those reasons that led to this total rupture.

As a matter of fact, the Ottoman Empire dominated every country of the Balkans in this period; including all the territories inhabited by Serbs and Croatians and two-thirds of the territory of the Hungarian State, while the remaining one-third became dominated by the Habsburg Empire. Only Zagreb and its neighbourhood remained in the possession of the Habsburgs from the countries that had belonged to Croatia.

Pasha Sinan, the Grand Vizier, when he was preparing for a new war against the Habsburg Empire (this war lasted from 1593 to 1606), promised to Sultan Murad to occupy not only the last remaining bit of Hungary but also Vienna together with Austria, and even the Imperial capital, Prague. Then he would have turned against Rome.

Pope Clement VIII, who was worried about the survival of Christianity in Hungary, organized and supported — both in financial and military senses — the resistance to the armies commanded by Pasha Sinan mentioned above. Hungarians from Transylvania, Saxons and Székellers, Walachians, Moldavians, Serbs, Croats and Bulgarians joined the Imperial and Papal troops that marched to the military area of the Balkans, while some thirty thousand Greek, Serb and Albanian Christians were fighting together against the Ottoman army among the Montenegrin mountains. The Ottoman army consisted of Muslims mainly from Greece, Albania and Serbia in these parts. According to the sources quoted by Jačov those newly converted to Islam, called „half-Turks”, were even more violent than the Turks themselves when they faced their compatriots who had remained constant to Christianity.

Jačov states that Jován, the Patriarch of Serbs and Bulgarians, driven by religious interests, turned to Clement VIII, and promised to „place a hundred thousand or even more selected soldiers” at his service. The Pope responded to the Patriarch’s letter on 10 April 1598. The union of the Holy See and the Serb Patriarchate was declared three years later, on 6 May 1601.

As the attempt to liberate the Balkans from Ottoman domination with the help of the fifteen-year-war (1593—1606) failed, almost a hundred thousand Serbs moved from Turkish territories into Habsburg regions at the end of the 16th century, under the guidance of their own officers who depended on the military authorities appointed by the Court of Vienna. As these new soldiers were sent to war with the purpose of defending the border between the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires, Emperor Rudolph II handed deserted land to them, including land in the neighbourhood of Zagreb.

These Serbs belonged to their national bishops from the point of view of religion and these bishops were consecrated in Rome according to the decree of Pope Clement VIII. His and his successors’ relationship with the leaders of the bordering bishopric of Zagreb, as is demonstrated by the sources quoted by Jačov, was friendly and fraternal. Their followers were good neighbours, too.

Turkey, after its success in the fifteen-year-war in Hungary, invaded also the regions dominated by Venice in 1645, more precisely Crete and Dalmatia. The former was occupied by Turkey, but they encountered resistance again in the Balkans.

In order to avoid persecution by the Turks, Jačov writes, almost forty thousand Christians of Serb and Croatian nationality arrived at Dalmatia dominated by Venice to settle down there. These new Venetian dependants expelled almost all those people who belonged to their own ethnic group but followed Muslim religion. These Muslims who did not want to leave their original homes in Dalmatia, although they were Serbs or Croats, too, were accused by people of their own nationality of being Turks and for this reason they were exposed to cruel massacres. The author declares that this was the first religious purification in the Balkans made under the excuse of national status and aiming the absolute extermination of an other religion.

During the following war which is known by historians as the war of Vienna and the Peloponnesus (1683—1699), the Republic of Venice liberated not only Dalmatia and the bay of Cattaro but also most of Lica, Herzegovina, Bosnia and Montenegro directly or by

sending troops to these places. Many Christian Serbs and Croats moved from these territories to Dalmatia and the neighbourhood of the bay of Cattaro dominated by Venice. Those who could not escape were „put to the sword” by their compatriots now Muslim. According to Jačov this was the second religious „cleansing” action in the Balkans done on ethnic grounds.

At the battle between the imperial and osmanli armies on Kosovo plain on 2 January 1690, Albanians were divided according to their religious status, too. Christian Albanians were fighting with the Imperial army, while Muslims were on the side of the Turks and the Serb lands of Kosovo and Metonia were given to them in compensation by the Ottoman Porte. At the same time Christian Albanians divided the fate of Serbs: they escaped, together with the Imperial army and Serbs in the direction of Belgrade after they had been defeated. They were preceded and followed by some thirty thousand Serb families who settled down to the north of the Sava and the Danube.

As the Patriarchal Seat had to be replaced from Pec (on Ottoman territory) to Szentendre (belonging to the Habsburgs and close to Buda), Arsenije Čarnežoveć, Patriarch of Serbia and Bulgaria made efforts to maintain good relations with the Holy See following the example of his predecessors. Lipot I, however, disapproved of Patriarch Čarnežović's relations with the Pope because — as Jačov writes — he wanted to deprive Serbs of all international support, facilitating this way their integration into his own state.

The Court of Vienna prepared for extending borders on the Balkan peninsula starting from this political conception when the Turks were forced to give up their conquests in Europe and to retreat into Asia. At the same time it did everything — Jačov says — to conquer the Adriatic coast, and for this reason it kept generating discontent in Dalmatia belonging to Venice.

As there were no ethnic conflicts at all in Dalmatia, a new „nation” had to be invented, which was called „Catholic”. This is how Vince Zmaievich's work (he was the Catholic Archbishop of Zara), titled „Dialogo tra serviano e cattolico” was created. According to the sources of the Vatican quoted by Jačov, it is a dialogue between a Serb of Latin rite (Catholic) and a Serb of eastern rite (Orthodox). The population of Dalmatia, two Catholic Archbishops of Spalato, Stefano Cosmi and Stefano Cuppili (both are Venetians), Stefan Ljubibratić Serb metropolitan and Alvice Mocenigo, Venetian vicar of Dalmatia and Albania (later became doge) were against this policy.

However, after the annexation of Dalmatia by Austria following the failure of Serenissima, the Court of Vienna made efforts to identify Orthodoxy (that is, the Eastern rite) with Serb nationality, while Catholicism (that is, the Latin rite) with Croats. This attempt was opposed by Catholic Serbs who often repeated in the contemporary newspapers: „We are Catholics but Serbs.”. And nationalist parties were born in the second half of the 19th century with the purpose of evoking ethnic intolerance: one party on the Serb and another on the Croatian side.

On the other hand, the Austrian authorities put strong pressure on Italians who had lived in Dalmatia before the settlement of Slavic people, especially after the establishment of Italian unity. The Italian schools, among others the famous secondary school of Zara, were obliged to study in Croatian and members of the Italian congregation were often

refused Holy Communion by Croatian priests. (This is what Giuseppe Praga states, too: *Storia di Dalmazia*, Milano 1981, 251.p). The conflict of Serbs and Croats in Dalmatia is rooted in this fact, in Jačov's opinion, while the situation in Croatia developed in a different way.

The Croatian and Serb troops that served His Imperial Majesty also took part in the suppression of the Hungarian revolt that broke out at the beginning of the 18th century. One and a half centuries later, in 1848, the Hungarian revolution was defeated by Austrian and Russian troops with the help of Serbs from Voivodina and Croats from Croatia. Serb Patriarch Josip Rajačić, who was seated in Sremski Karlovci at this time, enthroned Croatian governor Josip Jelačić, as a sign of this alliance and friendship.

However, the Serb—Croatian friendship might have been uncomfortable for the Monarchy under dual direction after the birth of the Austrian—Hungarian Monarchy. That is why they tried to do everything to set the two nations against each other. The historical sources quoted by Jačov do not write about conflicts between Serbs and Croats before this period. In fact, there are several examples of their peaceful life side by side and their common struggle against the Ottoman power.

It became an independent kingdom in the second half of the 19th century and intended to contact the Holy See again but the Court of Vienna made it impossible according to Jačov's research. He quotes a statement in this context, published by the bishop of Nis in 1882: „Austria will never endure the reunion of the churches because it would lose the only means to divide us: the difference in religion”. The Barnabian Cesare Tondini, who had been sent to the Balkans by the Holy See, informed Pope Leo XIII that: „The intention to identify religion with nation is far from the Serb government: students learn that the Serb nation can be divided into three sects: Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim.” „The identification of religion with nation — Tondini states in the text quoted by Jačov — exists only beyond the Sava and the Danube, and it is caused by the Catholic Austria. Austria tries to achieve the same thing in Serbia, which also signed the treaty in Berlin, to say to its confederates one day: Serbia, you did not keep your obligations accepted in the treaty signed in Berlin. The price of your independence was the formation of the equal protection of the laws of each sect in Serbia, too. As you continued identifying the Serb nation with Orthodoxy, you do not have any right of independence.”

On the other hand — as it becomes clear in Jačov's publications — the Russian delegate declared the right of his country to protect the Orthodox people of the Balkans, especially those who lived under Muslim domination. This was a clear sign of the intention that the Balkans would fall within the Russian borders in the event of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

Russia behaved as the protector of Orthodox people, while the Habsburg Empire played the part of the saviour of the Catholics, but both — Jačov arrives at the logical conclusion — systematically destroyed the unity of the peoples living in the Balkans, most of all the peaceful and fraternal coexistence of Serbs and Croats, two peoples that spoke the same language and went the same historical and cultural way.

The great number of documents preserved in the different European archives and libraries and quoted or partly published by Jačov demonstrate that most of the ethnic

conflicts are rooted not in the lack of understanding among the peoples living there but in the opposing interests of the contemporary Great Powers, especially those of the Habsburg, the Ottoman-Turk and the Russian Empires.

Another fact is discovered, which must be emphasized: the large population of Jewish people living in the Balkans and in Hungary played a peacemaking role between Christianity and Islam. It is enough to remember the fact that Muslim, Christian and Jewish people of Sarajevo decided in 1668, when the Imperial troops marched into Belgrade, not to turn against one another ever. Regarding Jačov's historical impartiality, it would be advisable to dedicate a complete paper to this fairly significant question.

„It would be too easy — as Alberto Monticone, one of the outstanding European historian of our times says rightly — to draw a parallel to the present problems when speaking about these questions or others detailed in Jačov's other works. Not only the scholarly character of his publications but also the nations of the Balkans would be damaged because they would be bound to the fate of conflicts and suffering of centuries.” I totally agree with Monticone's evaluation according to which „Jačov's work, on the other hand, must be interpreted as a serious contribution to our objective, to examine the events in their historical context, opening the way for the free and critically valid study of the modern history of the Balkan peninsula.”

Finally I would like to underline the fact that Jačov did not devote any studies or books explicitly to the problem of the ethnic conflicts on the Balkans. He examines the question in the context of the modern history of the Balkans without any reference to the actual events.

Reflexiók Marco Jačov szöveggyűjteményével kapcsolatban

„Le missioni cattoliche nei Balcani durante la guerra Candia” (1645–1669), „Studi e Testi”, n. 352–353, Bibliotheca Ap. Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 1992.

(A Balkán félsziget újkori etnikai problémáinak gyökerei)

Jačov szerint a Balkán félsziget etnikai problémáinak nagy része — a XVII. sz. végétől kezdődően — az iszlám és a kereszténység konfliktusában gyökerezik.

A Balkánon élő népek vallási hovatartozását meghatározták az ott zajló háborúk eredményezte kényszerhelyzetek. Ebből eredően súlyos konfliktusok származtak a hódítók hitére áttért „féltörökök” és a kereszténységhez hű honfitársaik között.

Súlyosbította a helyzetet a katolikus horvátok és az ortodox szerbek közötti ellentét, akiket, jóllehet ilyen etnikai és vallási besorolásban a XIX. század második felétől említ csak a bécsi adminisztráció, de mint a szerző szöveggyűjteménye bizonyítja, jelentős valláspolitikai tényezőként tartandó számon úgy a protestáns horvátok, mint a latin rítusú katolikus szerbek léte.

A sikertelen tizenöt éves háború után tömeges szerb kivándorlás indult meg a Habsburg tartományok felé. Zágráb környékén például a szerbek a Rómában felszentelt püspökök egyházi irányítása alatt álltak, és békében éltek együtt a horvátokkal a II. Rudolftól kapott területeken.

A Dalmácia térségében lezajlott startégiai változásokat követő és vallási hovatartozás miatt megtörtént első etnikai tisztogatások, öldöklések azonban egyszer s mindenkorra meghatározták a Balkán geopolitikai térségének békéjét.

A „Serenissima” bukását követően a bécsi udvar politikája nem kevésbé járult hozzá a már létező interkonfesszionális feszültségekhez azzal, hogy azonosítani törekedett az otodoxiát a szerb nemzetiséggel, míg a katolicizmust a horvátokkal. Nem hiányzott Bécs részéről az őslakos latin dalmátok elnyomása sem.

A szöveggyűjtemény fényt derít arra a fontos tényre is, hogy a hódítások eredményezte tagadhatatlan felekezeti feszültségeken túl, az újkori Balkán legtöbb etnikai ellentéte mégsem az ott élő, sokszor emigrációra kényszerült népek közötti meg nem értésből származott, hanem az érintett népek tragédiáinak valódi okai a korabeli nagyhatalmak, különösen a Habsburg, az oszmán-török és nem utolsósorban az orosz hatalomnak a térséggel kapcsolatos érdekeiben keresendők.

ISTVÁN LAGZI

THE NUMBER OF POLES HAVING ESCAPED TO THE TERRITORY OF HUNGARY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. FACTS AND DATA*

In autumn, 1939 several ten thousand Polish citizens were seeking safety in flight from the invaders. People started to rush abroad in the first week of the war. Realizing this tendency András Hóry, minister of Hungary in Warsaw, asked Hungarian authorities to help the Polish in their escape to Hungary. Reacting to the request, the border between Hungary and Poland was opened after the proposal of Count Pál Teleki, Prime Minister at that time. The benevolence of the Hungarian authorities significantly aided Poland fighting for its life and attacked by Germany and later, after 17 September, by the Soviet Union. The number of Polish refugees, civil and political, was more than 60,000 according to written records.

Within some days the majority of the Poles having arrived at Hungary became members of the „permanent camp staff”. Financially the refugees were supported by the Polish—Hungarian Committee for Refugees and the 9th Department of the Ministry of the Home Office. Military persons were taken care of by the 21st Department of the Home Office.

The organ of federation of military persons was *Predstawicielstwo Polskich Żołnierzy Internowanych w Królestwie Węgier* jako organ 21. oddział M. H. (Federation of Polish Soldiers Interned to the Hungarian Kingdom as the organ of the 21st department of the Home Office). The brigade general Stefan Dembiński, first commander of the federation had the title of Representative of the Polish Army Interned to Hungary.

Civil refugees were obliged to personally appear at police organs of the first instance at certain times.

Military persons were more severely treated. Members of the armed forces in Hungary were interned.

With the support of Hungarian military authorities several legal committees, courses and workshops were organized.

For the medical treatment of the military refugees some institutes were set up: a Polish hospital in Győr, a sanatorium at Letkés and a T. B. hospital at Eger. Civil refugees were cured by local doctors and hospitals.

* * *

* Supported by OTKA.

Concerning the number of military and civil Polish persons escaped to Hungary we had different data contradicting even to each other and wrong information for a long period. The often quoted publication of 1946 „Polish Refugees in Hungary during the War” (its preface was written by Minister Dr. József Antall) — as is well-known — provided data and arguments for the conciliation committee. The publication includes important statements but does not rely on actual sources concerning numbers. (The compilation of articles by Iván Boldizsár with the main title „The Other Hungary” detailed some questions of Hungarian resistance and the aid given to refugees from Poland, France and other countries. It was written for the conciliation committee, too, and with the purpose of informing foreign countries.) The publication with the preface by József Antall contains the first printed total numbers of Polish refugees in Hungary: „...Almost 140.000 Poles moved across the territory of Hungary during the Second World War, from whom ...100—110.000 people in the first year and 15—25.000 people capable of military service during the following years went into France, Great Britain, and the Near East and there were about 15.000 people who took advantage of the right of asylum so willingly provided by the Hungarian government and society during the whole period of the war.”¹

According to the editors of the publication „Polish Refugees in Hungary” „...the number of Polish soldiers and civil persons of military age who passed through the country and were boarded on their way or helped to proceed during the evacuation could have been 100—110.000. (...) Almost 110.000 people left Hungary during the mass-evacuation until June 1940. From the 30.000 persons who had remained here further 20.000 people left the country during the evacuation that continued in the following years but became slower, however, almost 5.000 new refugees arrived from Poland and Rumania; that is, *the number of those who remained in Hungary for the whole period of the war* (my italics, I.L.) could have been a round 15.000.”

The distribution of this number among military and civil refugees is:

military refugees:	7.000
civil (refugees) living in housing estates:	about 3.000
civils living in the capital and at other places as private persons (civil refugees):	2.000
Jews placed at Jewish religious communities in Hungary:	3.000
Altogether:	15.000 ²

Before the initiation of the archival examinations summarizing the whole of the topic and even for several years after the data mentioned above — far from reality and the possibilities of accomodation — were authoritative concerning the number of Polish refugees in Hungary.³

¹ *Lengyel menekültek Magyarországon a háború alatt. (Polish Refugees in Hungary during the War)*. Budapest, 1946. (With the preface written by DR. JÓZSEF ANTALL, Minister of Reconstruction), pp. 5—6

² *Ibid.*, pp. 26—27.

³ Cp: LÁSZLÓ MAROS: *Hadifogolyszökés és a németek háta mögött (Aiding the Escape of Prisoners of War behind the Germans)*. Új Magyarország, 9 October 1945.; GÁBOR DÓRÓ: *Magyarok a lengyelekért (Hungarians for the Polish)*, Új Magyarország, 5 January 1946.; ZDZISŁAW JAN ANTONIEWICZ *Najazd 120.000 Polaków. Dziennik Ludowy* 1968. 238., 236. sz.; „W tym stanie rzeczy nie znamy dokładnej liczby Polaków którzy

We got to know more and more data and facts during the archival examinations, and these data and facts contradicted in many respects to the data included in the publications of 1946. In the middle of the '70's it came to light that „few” Polish people had been boarded in the territory of the corps receiving Polish military refugees. Soldiers either „disappeared” or had not even arrived. At the end of September 1939, 10,365 persons were registered in the territory of corp II. in Székesfehérvár, while 6,927 military persons were taken into registration in the territory of corp VII. in Miskolc.⁴

The Ministry of Defense was prepared to receive hardly more than 25 thousand Polish military refugees in the second half of 1939, on the third day of the Polish Soviet war. (See: Table no. 1.) The first summarized statement derives from the VIIIth army corps headquarters: „... the number of Polish military persons escaped into the the country and interned here — according to the report made by the leading officer of Csap — already exceeded 40,000. Considering the constant movement and changes, it was necessary to involve an official expert (commissary; I. L.) proficient in registration and staff-management in the Department in order to provide the punctual recording of this number and the registration of the persons in question.”⁵

schronili się na gościnnej ziemi węgierskiej. Różne źródła podają liczby od 80 do 150 tysięcy. Według moich obliczeń było ich 10.000, z czego 60.000 dostało się na południe, do Francji, Jugosławii, państw bałkańskich i krajów Bliskiego Wschodu.” See: ANTONIEWICZ Z.: *Uchodźcza prasa na Węgrzech* (1939—1944). *Rocznik Historii Czasopiśmiennictwa Polskiego* XIV 2—3. 10.; GYÖRGY HAAS: *Harminc évvel ezelőti történet. A menekültek paradicsoma, Magyarország. (It Happened Thirty Years ago. The Refugees' Paradise, Hungary)*. Magyar Híradó (Wien), 1 September 1974. According to the article, the number of refugees was determined as 200,000, MADEJCZIK LESZEK: *Miasto na szlaku Polsko—Węgierskiej przyjaźni*. Zeszyty Tarnowskie, Tarnów., 1972, p. 105., ROLAND JÓZSEF ANTONIEWICZ: *Élet és Tudomány*, 9 April 1976, p. 691. „From among the 140,000 refugees, 60,000 people remained in our country for a longer period.” STANISŁAW PODLEWSKI: *Działalność duchowieństwa polskiego na Węgrzech*, WTK 14. II. 1971. r.

⁴ Hadtörténelmi Levéltár (War History Archives; hereinafter: HL), Honvédelmi Minisztérium (Ministry of Defence; hereinafter: H.M.): 1939 21—21—2107—3107—59130. Telegraph report of the 7th army corps headquarters to the 3rd troop headquarters of H.M. 27 September 1939. *Ibid.*, Telegraph report of the 2nd army corps headquarters of Székesfehérvár to the 21st Department of H.M., 28 September 1939. On the territory of the 3rd army corps of Szombathely there were 10,000 Polish refugees (already later, in November). See: HL H.M. 1939—21—21—3107—57421. Report by the 3rd army corps headquarters of Szombathely to the 21st Department of H.M., 9 November 1939. According to the sources quoted in Witold Biegański's study 4,553 officers, 31,686 soldiers and 862 relatives (altogether 37,283 persons) resided in Hungary on 29 September 1939 and the number of Polish refugees increased to 40,382 till 11 October. Cp: BIEGAŃSKI W.: *Polska emigracja na Węgrzech w latach 1939—1940*. Rola emigracji wojennej, Najnowsze dzieje Polski, 1939—1945, T. XII. 1968. 60.

⁵ HL H.M. 1939—21—21—3107—52,909. Department proposal, 9 October 1939. The document was presented and endorsed by the section head of HM. I. and at the reference of Department 10.

Table no. 1.

Internment camps planned for Polish military refugees
(19 September 1939)

I.

Gyöngyösapáti (rest-house) only for colonels and generals	60 persons
Győr (new infantry barracks)	500 persons
Eger (fortress barracks)	500 persons

II.

Internment camps of the rank and file

Komárom (fortresses)	3.000 persons
Rimaszécs (legion camp)	3.000 persons
Debrecen (agricultural machine factory)	3.000 persons
Érsekújvár (supplementary deport of the Hungarian Army)	2.100 persons
Sárvár (silk factory)	2.400 persons
Tapolca (leased property, only for emergency)	500 persons
Nagykanizsa (provision branch store) (hospital part)	1.000 persons
Esztergom (camp)	1.600 persons
Mosonmagyaróvár (Moiirt plant)	1.000 persons
Párkány (infantry barracks)	700 persons
Felsőhangony (frontier guard barracks)	300 persons
Vámosmikola (frontier guard barracks)	300 persons
Tompa (barracks)	250 persons
Püski (barracks)	200 persons
Mohács (barracks)	200 persons
Gara (barracks)	200 persons
Salgótarján (former frontier guard barracks)	200 persons
Bánréve (former frontier guard barracks)	200 persons
Csaroda (place of the 14th cyclist battalion removed to Nagyszőlős)	200 persons
Ricse (frontier guard barracks)	200 persons
Tornanádaska (frontier guard barracks)	200 persons
Hidasnémeti (customs officers' apartments)	200 persons
Rajka (barracks)	200 persons
Magyarcsanád (frontier guard barracks)	150 persons
Drégelypalánk (former frontier guard barracks)	150 persons
Mérk (former frontier guard barracks)	150 persons
Krasznokvajda (frontier guard barracks)	150 persons
Pácin (frontier guard barracks)	150 persons
Letkés (frontier guard barracks)	100 persons
Mándok (former frontier guard barracks)	100 persons
Záhony (empty barracks)	100 persons
Szeged-Alsóközpont (former frontier guard barracks)	100 persons

Altogether: 25.360 persons

We can find data on the number of Poles living in Hungary in several articles and studies. According to the special correspondent of the *Giornale d'Italia* until 21 September 1939 „...more than 70.000 Polish soldiers arrived in Hungarian territories. The number of the civil refugees is very low.”⁶ The article of the International Red Cross stated about the distribution of Polish refugees by countries that 45.000 Polish citizens resided in Hungary, 24.000 in Rumania, 16.000 in Lithuania and 2.000 in Latvia at the beginning of October 1939.⁷

Of course, articles, reports and news published by the Hungarian press during the military expedition of September mentioned part figures only. We have not got any information on numbers valid to the whole country. The number known by László Matolcsy, Member of Parliament, is really remarkable. He determined the *approximate number* of Polish refugees in Hungary in his interpellation of 18 October 1939 as 50.000⁸ instead of the 30.000 that was acknowledged by the government. According to the statement of 9 October 1945 made by Tamás Salamon Rácz 70.000 Polish persons crossed the border between Hungary and Poland.⁹ The number of the refugees was stated (ignoring archival data and summarizing reports) as 140.000 in 1946.

The number „140 thousand” went into the public opinion during the years after the Second World War. Endre Richer, (independent) representative also mentioned at the Parliament that Hungary „... received 140 thousand Polish refugees, among whom it provided 100 thousand people with the possibility to [...] fight against the Germans once again.”¹⁰

Personally, I took *the written statements, the facts* concerning accommodation and provision (the alterations of the number by decades and months) as my starting point, instead of the principle and approach „How many people arrived?”; instead of legends and the statements and data of propaganda that are never free from exaggerations. As a matter of fact, it is obvious that —besides Poles having diplomatic passports, travelling in secret and performing conspirational tasks — refugees *had to be provided with food and accomodation*. Provision and accomodation had financial consequences: the written records

⁶ Országos Levéltár (National Archives; hereinafter: OL), K. 428—820.MTI(Hungarian News Agency) Rome, 21 September 1939.

⁷ OL. K. 428 820. MTI Litograph. Genf, 7 October 1939. According to the data detailed in the issue of 20 February 1940 of *Wiadomości Polskie* 15 thousand Polish soldiers and 5 thousand civil persons got asylum in Lithuania, 40 thousand soldiers and 5 thousand civils in Hungary, 22 thousand soldiers and 15 thousand civil persons in Rumania. See: ÁDÁMNÉ PORCSALMI ÉVA: *A II. világháború lengyel sajtója a magyarországi lengyel menekültekről. Adalékok.* (The Polish Press of World War Two on Polish Refugees in Hungary. Additional material). In: *Tanulmányok a magyarországi lengyel emigráció történetéből 1939 1945.* (Studies from the History of Polish exile in Hungary 1939 1945). Editor: ISTVÁN LAGZI. Budapest—Szeged, 1979. p. 64.

⁸ *Országgyűlés Képviselőházának Naplója* (The Journals of the House of Representatives) Volume II, 18 October 1939, pp. 305—306.

⁹ *Új Magyarország*; 9 October 1945.

¹⁰ OL. B.M. Journals of the National Assembly, 1947. 134th session of the National Assembly, 25 April 1947. (slip 78)

made by the authorities and camp headquarters preserved the actual contemporary situation. That is, they are facts. They are ineludable sources for the scholar.

Colonel Zoltán Baló, leader of the 21st Department of the Ministry of Defence, — beside many other statements — had a detailed muster-roll broken down into headquarters and camps

made, which was revised by himself. He took it out from among the official documents and took it home in the middle of 1943 when he was dismissed. The valuable and undoubtedly authentic document got back to the War History Archives at the beginning of the '60's.

According to the documents found in Zoltán Baló's bequest the *recorded maximum numbers* of Polish military refugees in the autumn of 1939 were: 12 generals, 762 field-officers (majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels), 4.185 officers (and candidate officers), 3.620 warrant-officers, 35.735 soldiers and 911 relatives of military persons, that is, 45.225 persons altogether.¹¹

The number of civil refugees — as we will see later — was about 14.000. The *recorded* maximum number of refugees in Hungary was 59.225, that is almost 60.000. There remained several statements concerning this number, contradicting even to each other. Because of the inaccuracies experienced so far and the chaos in connection with this number, it is worth thinking over the most important moments of this question.

According to the prospectus made on 11 January 1940 in the Ministry of Defence with the purpose of informing military attachés of the Hungarian chancelleries, the numbers of Polish military persons in Hungary were: 5.000 officers and 32.000 soldiers, that is, 37.000 people *altogether*; furthermore, 500 relatives of military persons and 400 military (civil) officers.¹² The number of civil refugees was determined, with reference to the Home Office (B.M.), as 14.000 with the specification that the number of civil refugees „...is increasing with 100—150 persons every day, even today.”¹³ Another statement contradicts, to some extent, to the numbers mentioned above. According to a much earlier account made by the officer of the Home Office sent to North-East Hungary in order to receive military persons and organize their forwarding [...] 4.792 officers, 34.710 warrant-officers and people serving in the ranks, that is, „40.382 Polish citizens arrived altogether

¹¹ HL H.M. 1940—21—21—3205—504138. In this context see: ÁGNES GODÓ: *Magyar—lengyel kapcsolatok a második világháborúban. (Hungarian—Polish Relations during the Second World War)* Budapest, 1976. p. 208.

¹² HL H.M. 1940—21—21—3552—944. Information for the Hungarian Royal Military Attachés about Polish refugees interned in Hungary. 11 January 1940. „... together with military and civil refugees 50.000 persons had to be distributed in the whole of the territory of the country... and accommodation had to be found for exactly 5.000 officers and 32.000 persons serving in the ranks...”. In context of the number see also: HL H.M. 3553—957/79/pol.—1940./ Polish complaints in connection with Poles escaped into Hungary. The letter of Jenő Ghyezy, head of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the H.M. 5 January 1940. Strictly confidential.

¹³ *Ib.*: Henry C. E. Baau, French diplomat, was informed about similar data. See: HL H.M. 1940—21—21—3553—957. The letter sent by lieutenant general Emil Barabás to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. 20 February 1940. Cp.: HL H.M. 1940—21—21—3553—957/918/pol.—1940./ Hungarian Embassy in Paris.; 550/pol.—1940. Budapest, 13 February 1940. /Official communication by the Foreign Minister to the H.M./

between September — 11 October 1939.¹⁴ The authors of the publication „Encyclopedia of the Second World War” took the number mentioned above (40.382) as their starting point.¹⁵ Ágnes Godó accepted and took this number (40.382) as real, too, although she referred to the statements of other authors and sources as well.¹⁶ According to the manuscript memoirs of Colonel Jan Korkozowicz, 4.975 (mainly military) persons arrived in Hungary at the beginning of 1940 (between January and April).¹⁷ This moment has been left out of the calculations so far. That is, we have to add, by all means, the number of those who arrived later but at least of those who can be pointed out officially, to the number 40.382 mentioned above several times: thus the number of people arriving in Hungary is completed to 45.375 *military persons*. The number of refugees changed significantly at the end of 1939 and at the beginning of 1940. In addition to the data by Zoltán Baló we can find written data broken down into army corps and camps only in the muster-roll of 6 December 1939. According to the summary made on the basis of the camp headquarters' reports there resided 1.023 officers, 3.829 soldiers and 156 relatives in the territory of corp I, 1.160 officers, 8.835 soldiers and 95 relatives in the territory of corp II, 532 officers, 8.026 soldiers and 14 family members in the territory of corp III, 447 officers, 998 soldiers and 43 family members in the territory of corp IV, 17 officers, 1.888 soldiers and 1 family member on the territory of corp V, 1.413 officers, 4.210 soldiers and 146 family members in the territory of corp VII, 250 officers, 142 soldiers and warrant-officers on the territory of corp VIII. That is, the total number of Polish military persons *at the beginning of December 1939* included 4.842 officers (and candidate officers), 27.548 soldiers (and warrant-officers) and 455 relatives of military persons. *The total number of military persons was determined as 32.845*. According to the summarized muster-roll made on 1 January 1940 only (!) 4.096 officers, 23.353 soldiers and warrant-officers and 372 relatives were registered, that is, the total number was 27.821.¹⁸ (See: Table no. 2.)

¹⁴ HL H.M. 1939—21—21—3205—504138. Quoted by GODÓ, p. 88

¹⁵ Cp.: *Encyklopedia II wojny światowej*. Warszawa 1975. Obozy internowania żołnierzy polskich. 381. 1. and Polscy uchodźcy wojenni. 451. 1.

¹⁶ Cp.: GODÓ, p. 88.1. See also: Juchniewicz Mieczysław *Polacy w europejskim ruchu oporu 1939—1945*. Warszawa, 1972. pp. 154—156. According to GODÓ (p. 157) the total number of Polish people in Hungary could be 45—50.000, 25—30.000 got to the West (France and Africa), a few thousand returned to Poland and about 10.000 people remained in Hungary.

¹⁷ JAN KORKOZOWICZ: *Wojsko Polskie na Węgrzech 1939—1945*. (Manuscript) Warszawa, 1962. WIH, relacja sygn. V/21/33. 30. „Masowy ten ruch, dokonywany wśród warunków zimowych poprzez Karpaty trudny jest do uchwycenia w liczbach, jednak dane pochodzące ze źródeł najnowszych ustalają, że od stycznia do kwietnia 1940 r. przyszło na Węgry 4905 osób, z tego 412 oficerów, 497 podoficerów i podchorążych, 2305 szeregowych oraz 761 ochotników w wieku poborowym.”

¹⁸ Cp.: GODÓ, p. 113. See: HL H.M. 1939—21—21—3205—504138.

Table no. 2.

Statement about interned Poles in the territory of the army corps
1 Januar 1940

Army corps	guard		accomodation		existing number			
	officers	soldiers	officers	soldiers	officers	soldiers	woman	children
I.	40	998	—	—	1028	3252	97	78
II.	44	834	10445-	824	888	7454	63	116
III.	27	1003	24	8598	473	6646	12	5
IV.	16	337	368	1000	355	908	—	—
V.	5	95	40	640	14	145	1	—
VII.	30	973	1230	3977	1124	3705	—	—
VIII.	9	256	320	1760	214	1243	—	—
Altogether	171	4496	3526	16779	4096	23353	173	199

HL H.M. 1940—21—21—3207—516740.

Significant disagreements emerged in the estimation of the number of Polish soldiers and civil persons of military age as well. According to the report made by Tamás Salamon Rácz participating actively in aiding the escape, the number of the Poles evacuated from Hungary was 45.000.¹⁹ According to the statement made by József Antall, who was one of the best-informed contemporaries „...we have helped...50.000 soldiers...from the 100.000 (!) Polish refugees staying in Hungary to cross the Yugoslavian border.”²⁰ However, the publication with the preface written by József Antall titled „Poles People in Hungary during the War” already stated the number of evacuated military persons as 100—110.000 or 130.000. László Dömötör declared in his article without referring to the source: „Almost 120.000 Poles of military age got across Yugoslavia to different territories of military importance of the Allied Forces with the help of the Hungarian people.”²¹ Ferenc Szombath, at the same time, overbid even the number mentioned above: he estimated the number of Polish people evacuated from Hungary at 140.000²², similarly without naming his source. Jerzy Robert Nowak propagated the data published in 1946 in his articles and both of his books, too.²³

¹⁹ Új Magyarország, 9 October 1945.

²⁰ LÁSZLÓ MAROS: *Hungary aided the escape of 50.000 escaped Polish soldiers to the armies of the allied forces in Africa and Italy*. Statement by Dr. József Antall. Új Magyarország, 2 October 1945.

²¹ LÁSZLÓ DÖMÖTÖR: *Lengyelek Magyarországon (Poles in Hungary)*. Magyarország, no. 30., 1968, p. 30.

²² FERENC SZOMBATH: *Adatok a sárvári lengyel gyűjtőtábor történetéből (Data from the History of the Collection Camp of Sárvár)*. Vasi Szemlé, no. 1. 1971, p. 31.

²³ JERZY ROBERT NOWAK: *Węgry 1939—1963*. Warszawa, 1971, item: the second edition of the book in 1975.

Witold Biegański pointed out the differences of attitude towards this number as well. In his opinion the numbers 40.382 (military refugees) and 14.000 /civil refugees/ reflected reality. He rightly counted with those persons who had returned to Poland during the war; he took into consideration even this „triviality” in his calculations.²⁴

In the first phase of my research of the number of Polish refugees in Hungary I took the data from 1946 as my starting point, too.²⁵ Later, on the occasion of the archival researches, it was proved that the number of Polish military and civil refugees could not have been 140.000²⁶; in Ágnes Godó's book we can find several statements that question — in possession of the sources — the authenticity of the numbers „140 and 110.000”.²⁷

The impossibility of speaking about either 45.000 or 120.000 persons in connection with the *evacuation* follows unambiguously from the number of the arriving persons. Why? On the one hand, because the number of Polish units set up beside the Western Allied Forces included „only” 7.887 officers and 78.422 soldiers, that is, 86.309 persons altogether in June 1940 according to Wincenty Iwanowski.²⁸ On the other hand, according to the statement made by *Kornaüs*, lieutenant-colonel of general staff and head of the Office of Evacuation in Budapest, altogether 18.567 persons left Hungary until 11 May 1940. According to his report the number of people evacuated from Hungary was 8.670 between 20 September 1939 and March 1940, 3.967 in March 1940, 4.469 in April, 1.469 until 11 May; that is, 18.567 persons in all.²⁹

Colonel *Jan Korkozowicz* published similar numbers, comparing obviously contemporary data and later publications. According to him 1.019 people left Hungary until 30 October 1939, 7.655 in the following four months, that is till February; 3.967 in March, 4.461 in April, altogether 17.402 persons until 1 May 1940. *Korkozowicz's* memoirs contain some data on the following period as well. 3.206 people were evacuated in May

²⁴ BIEGAŃSKI: pp. 60—61.

²⁵ ISTVÁN LAGZI: *Adatok az 1939 őszén Magyarországra menekült lengyel katonák evakuációjának történetéhez* (Data on the History of the Evacuation of Polish soldiers escaped to Hungary in the autumn of 1939) /1939—1941/. *Hadtörténelmi közlemények*, no. 3. 1973., pp. 692—693, 703, 719. I. I expressed the same opinion in my other studies as well. See: ISTVÁN LAGZI: *Lengyel menekültek Somogy megyében a második világháború idején. Tanulmányok Somogy megye múltjából* (Polish Refugees in County Somogy during the Second World War. Studies from the Past of County Somogy. Editor: JÓZSEF KANYAR). *Levéltári Évkönyv* (Archival Annual). ISTVÁN LAGZI: *Lengyel menekültek Sopron környékén a második világháború első éveiben* (Polish Refugees in the Neighbourhood of Sopron during the First Years of the Second World War). *Soproni szemle* no. 3. 1973, p. 252.

²⁶ ISTVÁN LAGZI: *Lengyel menekültek Zala megyében a második világháború idején* (Polish Refugees in County Zala during the Second World War). *Zalai Gyűjtemény*, volume 3. (Editor: ALAJOS DEGRÉ). Zalaegerszeg, 1975., p. 94.

²⁷ GODÓ: pp. 155—158.

²⁸ WINCENTY IWANOWSKI: *Z dziejów formacji polskich na zachodzie 1939—1945*. Warszawa, 1976., p. 56.

²⁹ HL H.M. 1940—21—21—3555—23695. Dr. Jan Kornaüs's (lieutenant colonel of the general staff) report to the Minister of War and his deputy (Lieutenant colonel of the general staff) in Paris, 13 May 1940. Lieutenant colonel Dr. Jan Kornaüs's report to the first deputy of the Minister of War in Paris. Hotel Regina. 28 May 1940. /Budapest/.

1940 and it can be demonstrated that 20.608 people left the country until June.³⁰ (We have to emphasize here and now that a part of the people involved in the evacuation — a few thousand people — did not get to the destination of their journey, that is, they were not registered.) But let us continue examining the numbers!

The following statement made on 8 June 1940 by general Henryk Werth, chief of general staff, deserves particular attention: „... there have been significant changes in the number of the Poles recently: their number was 16.561 on 1 May 1940 — 2.553 officers, 13.669 warrant-officers and soldiers, and 339 relatives of military persons — ; while their number was 12.994 on 21 May ...” We do not have the summarized data of 21 May but we do know the total number of Poles being in military provision in Hungary. Accordingly, the provision of 1.861 Polish officers, 9.601 warrant-officers and soldiers, and 254 Polish civils being in military provision was guaranteed on 1 June 1940.³¹

According to *Biegański's* study, almost 21.000 people arrived in France from Hungary till the *middle of June* 1940.³² 22.308 people were evacuated according to the data published (adopted) in *Korkozowicz's* memoirs.³³ Remaining at the question of the evacuation, we can undoubtedly prove the fact that relatively few people were evacuated in the summer of 1940, that is, it did not result in number-changes of several ten thousands of people.

Table no. 3.

Numerical statement about interned Poles
in military provision from 1 October 1939 to 1 May 1943

Year month/day	officers	men of the rank and file/warrant- officers	civil persons			altogether
			men	women	children	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1939.						
X.1.	5330	28263	1717	[?]	[?]	35.310
XI.1.	4947	29270	1139	[?]	[?]	35.356
XII.1.	4653	25758	593	[?]	[?]	31.004

³⁰ KORKOZOWICZ: p. 30.

³¹ HL. H.M. 1940—21—21—3556—23.707.

³² BIEGAŃSKI: p. 58.

³³ KORKOZOWICZ: p. 36

Year month/day	officers	men of the rank and file/warrant- officers	civil persons			altogether
			men	women	children	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1940.						
I.1.	4485	23797	714	[?]	[?]	28.996
II.1.	4006	22772	254	516	39	27.587
III.1.	3677	20562	85	491	38	24.853
IV.1.	3225	18868	38	430	37	22.416
V.1.	2553	13669	43	256	40	16.561
VI.1.	1861	9601	33	206	48	11.749
VII.1.	1829	8217	54	324	27	10.451
VIII.1.	1686	6362	89	321	24	8.482
IX.1.	1617	4276	44	381	84	6.402
X.1.	1680	4100	36	394	7	6.217
XI.1.	1696	4093	2	403	6	6.200
XII.1.	1682	4351	2	409	6	6.450
1941.						
I.1	1688	4194	3	411	6	6.302
II.1.	1649	4109	18	411	5	6.192
III.1.	1639	4084	7	409	6	6.145
IV.1.	1588	3991	35	410	6	6.030
V.1.	1593	3901	33	406	6	5.939
VI.1.	1610	3869	26	325	97	5.927
VII.1.	1686	3853	7	388	134	5.902
VIII.1.	1681	4047	7	249	179	6.163
IX.1.	1675	4035	7	256	180	6.153
X.1.	1632	3859	6	250	135	5.882
XI.1.	1627	3859	7	254	134	5.881
XII.1.	1624	3843	30	259	128	5.884

Year month/day	officers	men of the rank and file/warrant- officers	civil persons			altogether
			men	women	children	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1942.						
I.1.	1631	3835	8	259	115	5.851
II.1.	1627	3839	9	261	109	5.845
III.1.	1618	3886	6	259	109	5.878
IV.1.	1612	3893	2	255	109	5.871
V.1.	1636	3852	6	248	108	5.850
VI.1.	1622	3861	12	260	164	5.919
VII.1.	1665	3855	3	259	175	5.957
VIII.1.	1634	3810	4	260	178	5.886
IX.1.	1632	3823	8	260	181	5.904
X.1.	1325	3820	7	261	140	5.853
XI.1.	1634	3829	14	252	143	5.872
XII.1.	1625	3789	16	250	143	5.823
1943.						
I.1.	1629	3781	3	252	149	5.814
II.1.	1621	3792	1	252	147	5.813
III.1.	1616	3787	1	253	148	5.805
IV.1.	1622	3767	3	250	143	5.785
V.1.	1622	3756	8	247	142	5.775

HL. H.M. 1942—21—21—6116. Documents without number. Zoltán Baló's bequest. Accession register no.: 53/1963.

On the basis of details published in Korkozowicz's memoirs the number was 15.927 concerning military persons (2.229 officers, 13.700 soldiers and warrant-officers).³⁴ According to the muster-roll made by Department 21 of the Ministry of Defence in September 1940, the number of refugees in military provision in Hungary was: 2.100 officers, 12.500 soldiers and 450 relatives, which make 15.050 altogether.³⁵ According to other summarized data, 6 generals, 450 field-officers, 2.023 officers and

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ HL H.M. 1940—21—21—3558. Zoltán Baló's bequest, without number. Report on the Polish collection camps and their staff. September 1940. In connection with the previous number see: HL H.M. 1940—21—21—3556—23707 (no. 3938. eln. 1. vkf. — 1940). Henrik Werth's (chief of general staff) letter to Károly Bartha, Minister of Defense. 8 October 1940.

candidate officers, 1.220 warrant-officers, 11.060 soldiers and 385 relatives lived in Hungary from the autumn of 1940.

It follows from the data mentioned above that — if almost 30.000 people left Hungary until the middle or autumn of 1940 but the number of military persons was about 15.000 in September 1940 — the recorded maximum number of Polish military persons arrived in Hungary was *not* 40.382 or 37.000 but 45.225, in harmony with Zoltán Baló's data.

The number of Poles people changed significantly until the middle of 1941 because of the „Ewa—B”-action (the second wave of evacuation) partly defeated by the Germans and owing to the fact that many people returned to Poland (partly because of their escape to Hungary). 1.792 officers, 406 warrant-officers, 4.420 soldiers and 405 relatives, *altogether* 7.023 persons were registered in the middle of 1941.

The number went on decreasing till the middle of 1942. 1.777 officers and candidate-officers, 335 warrant-officers, 4.065 soldiers and 450 family members belonged to the category of military refugees at that time; the total number was 6.197. This number changed to a very slight extent during the following periods. Lieutenant Colonel Aleksander Król mentioned 1.500 officers, 3.900 soldiers (and warrant-officers) and 420 relatives of military persons, that is, altogether 5.820 people in the middle of July 1943. Engineering lieutenant colonel Król was more precise already when he claimed footwear: he requested help for 1.480 officers, 3.900 soldiers and 380 relatives of military persons.³⁶

When Polish civil refugees were taken into military provision, 5.612 military persons were registered in 1944 in the proposal of the cabinet's session concerning refugees. The numbers of military refugees during the period in question were: 1.430 officers, 334 family members, 3.741 soldiers and warrant-officers, 94 relatives and 12 civil persons. The number of civil refugees was given as 2.835. That is, the summarized number of military and civil refugees was 8.447 in the middle of 1944 and as we can read in the proposal: „... Polish Jews of about the same number”³⁷, that is, some more than 15.000 Polish citizens lived in Hungary. It is problematic to determine the number of Polish Jews in Hungary, too. (See: Table no. 4.) Summarized statement was not probably made and cannot even be drawn up afterwards.

³⁶ HL H.M. 1943—21—21—6756—495363., HL H.M. 1944—21—21—6823—554495. See also: HL H.M. 1943—21—21—6116. Zoltán Baló's bequest, without number.

³⁷ OL B.M. 1944—IX—15—4026/no. 3780. eln. ÁVK.—1944/. Proposal to the Council of Ministers, 21 June 1944.

Table no. 4.
Number of people
declaring themselves Jews
in the Hungarian civil internment
camps in May 1944

Camp	Number
Szentendre	12
Karmacs	6
Várvölgy	5
Keszthely	19
Karád	9
Balatonkiliti	22
Ságvár	2
Bálványos	2
Balatonszárszó	7
Ádánd	3
Tab	27
Kadarkut	11
Balatonboglár	5
Homokmégy	15
Szakmár	8
Dusnok	21
Ebed	15
Nagyszakácsi	4
Marcali	2
Böhönye	2
Sükösd	1
Altogether:	198

The list of names was sent to the VIIth Department of B. M. (Home Office)

Source: OL B. M.—IX—10—4021—560818(9428—1944. VII. res.)

Summarizing the study of the numbers and data we can conclude that, according to summarized data of the Ministry of Defence, 45.225 military and almost 14.000 civil persons, that is, *altogether* some 60.000 persons were registered in Hungary during and following the military expedition of September. The number of Polish refugees in the territory of Hungary was approximately 15.000 at the end of the war, in June 1944.³⁸ These are the actual facts and numbers confirmed by archival data that accord to and coincide with other data on the number of Polish military forces.³⁹

³⁸ Cp.: ISTVÁN LAGZI: *Magyarok és lengyelek „egymásnak vetett háttal”. A magyar—lengyel kapcsolatok, a barátkozás és a barátság ezer éve.* (Polish and Hungarian People „Back to Back”. The Thousand Years of the Hungarian—Polish Relationship, Fraternization and Friendship). Tiszatáj, no. 6., 1980, pp. 81—82.

³⁹ Cp.: IWANOWSKI: p. 56; *Walki formacji polskich na Zachodzie 1939—1944.* (Editor: WITOLD BIEGAŃSKI: Warszawa, 1981. 40—41.; ISTVÁN LAGZI: *Uchodźcy polscy na Węgrzech w latach drugiej wojny światowej.* Warszawa, 1980.

Lagzi István

A második világháború idején Magyarországra menekült lengyelek létszámáról. Tények és adatok.

A Magyarország területére menekült lengyelek tényleges létszámáról hosszú ideig különböző, egymásnak ellentmondó adatokkal találkozhattunk. 1946-ban került publikálásra a 140 ezer fős adat. A magyar területen keresztül a nyugati szövetségesekhez menekített katonák és önkéntesek számát 110 ezerben állapították meg. Volt olyan szerző is, aki a lengyelek számát mintegy 200 ezer főben vélte megállapítani. A levéltári kutatásokból azonban kiderült, hogy 1939 szeptemberében a magyar hatóságok alig több mint 25 ezer menekült fogadására készültek fel. A Baló Zoltán ezredes hagyatékából előkerült részletes kimutatás szerint 1939 őszén a lengyel katonai menekültek írásba foglalt legmagasabb létszáma 45 225 személy volt, a polgári menekülteké 14 ezer főt tett ki.

ENIKŐ A. SAJTI

HUNGARIAN—CROATIAN INTERSTATE RELATIONS (1941—1944)

The displacement of the international balance of forces in favour of Germany at the end of the '30's basically changed the historical possibilities of Central European nationalities. The Versailles-system, which caused and restricted these nationalist efforts at the same time, collapsed. Reversionist movements rooted in Trianon lost their global character disturbing European order owing to the weakening of the Western democracies and the superiority of Germany and they seemed to be solvable within the frames of a regional conflict restricted by Germany. The new power-relations had a similar effect on the Croatian efforts for autonomy that had been thrashing windward politically for centuries. The German and Italian interests behind the „punishment” of the refractory Yugoslavia opened the way for the right-wing radical nationalist forces that had been exiled until that time and had been forced into a marginal position from political point of view even within the Croatian national movement, that is, the ustasas between the two World-Wars. They were driven to the stage of history not by the social, political or cultural forces of the movement but by the wind of foreign affairs and the tempest of the war.

The first modern Hungarian—Croatian interstate relations were created by and, at the same time, confined within limits by this European background shortly described above both in chronological and qualitative senses.

The diplomacy of the two states were interested, almost exclusively, in two questions from the very beginning: the question of the status of Muraköz and — through its prism — the problem of minorities living in this territory. As is well known, the Italian—German agreement recording the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, concluded on 24 April 1941 stated that Croatia bordered on Hungary along the Drava and besides Bácska and Banat, which were finally placed under German military administration, Muraköz and the region beyond the Mura belonged to Hungary, too. However, the two countries were obliged to make bilateral contracts concerning these two latter regions.¹

The Hungarian army marching into Muraköz was ordered by Henrik Werth, chief of staff — owing to the disorder — to treat Croatian inhabitants, unlike Serbians living in Bácska, „in a friendly manner”; they could not organize ceremonies of marching in, either,

¹ Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije. (Hereinafter: ZDNOR) Dokumenti Nemačkog Rajha 1941. XII. 1. Beograd, 1973., document No. 23., pp. 72—75. To the Hungarian attitude towards MURAKÖZ, see *Diplomáciai iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához. (Diplomatic documents to the Foreign Affairs of Hungary)* 1936—1945 (Hereinafter: DIMK) volume V. Compiled by GYULA JUHÁSZ. Edited by GYULA JUHÁSZ and JUDIT FEJES. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1982. doc. No. 752, p. 1068., doc. No. 773., pp. 1091—1093.

and the introduction of Hungarian military administration was postponed to a later time than in Bácska.²

At the cabinet-meeting of 21 April 1941, Prime Minister Bárdossy, referring to the fact that „there had been numerous incidents” during the occupation of Muraköz and that further worsening of the situation could be expected, suggested initiating negotiations as soon as possible and the Parliament agreed to this. They accepted the point of view according to which Hungary would maintain its conceptual sovereignty in Muraköz, however, they were ready to pass administration to Croatia on set conditions, but by any means temporarily. The railway „Murakeresztúr — Csáktornya — German border” would belong to Hungary and Hungarian companies could extract oil in Muraköz. Extensive right of peage should be provided for the railway traffic between Gyékényes—Šušak—Fiume, including the right of access for Hungarian trains and the establishment of fuel-depots. They demanded a free zone and the establishment of Hungarian storehouses in the port of Šušak. Besides, the negotiations would have to decide how Croatian authorities would ensure the protection of property and compensate against possible damages. According to the government's point of view conceptual agreement should be achieved in the matter of the navigability of the river Drava and its opening for Hungarian ships. Finally, the Hungarian border should be along the middle line of the channel of the Drava and the Danube. They related this formula to the idea of the mutual exchange of population.³

The Croatian point of view was first detailed by Poglavnik Ante Pavelić, leader of the Independent Croatian State, to László Bartók, Hungarian chargé d'affaires in Zagreb. In the beginning Pavelić considered the position of the Hungarian government to be acceptable and expressed his hope that the region would be passed to Croatia as soon as possible and he would have been ready to renounce Gola and Dalya belonging to Croatia in exchange, but he definitely opposed the idea of the exchange of population, and not without reason. As a matter of fact, if he had accepted it, Croatia would have weakened one of its winning cards, the Croatian ethnic composition of the region. The Croatian government argued on the basis of the ethnic principle and historical right. The former was based on the dominantly Croatian character of the population of Muraköz, while historical arguments were based on the fact that Muraköz had been a part of Hungary until 1918 but it had been under the control of Croatia between 1848 and 1861.⁴

The Croatian attitude, however, had lost most of its flexibility by the time of the negotiations that began in Zagreb on 28 May: they were not willing to give any compensation for the administration of the region any more.⁵ In my opinion, this can be

² HIL (Archives of the Institute of War History) VKF 1941—1. eln. No. 1. Confidential military command of administration. 11 April 1941.

³ OL (National Archives) K—27. Minutes of the Cabinet's session of 21 April 1941.

⁴ OL K—63. Küm. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) res. pol. 1941—67. a—293., 301. The conversation with Pavelić is published by: DIMK, vol. V. doc. No. 788, pp. 1118—1120.

⁵ HIL VKF 1941—15263 pres. doc. and *A Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország. Német diplomáciai iratok Magyarországról 1933—1944. (The Wilhelmstrasse and Hungary. German diplomatic documents on Hungary 1933—1944)* compiled, edited and the introductory study is written by: GYÖRGY RÁNKI, ERVIN PAMLÉNYI,

explained also by the fact that Muraköz was upgraded in the eyes of the Croatian government because of the defeat in the Italian—Croatian border-negotiations. On the other hand, they judged that Hungary — unlike Italy — was not in the position that its claims should be granted without reservation.

Both partners got support from Germany after the failure of the negotiations. However, the actual leaders of Croatia, Siegfried Kasche, German ambassador in Zagreb, and Glirse von Horstenau, the German general, unambiguously declared that they did not intend to play the part of a judge, which meant — in this case — that the status of Muraköz could not be subjected to debates and the agreement on the problem of the administration depended on the two parties. For purposes of emphasis the general reminded Pavelić that the Führer would approve of a solution of this kind, too: the attention of Hungary was mainly directed to the fact that serious German interests were tied up with the consolidation of Croatia, that is why they had to make concessions in the question of the Croatian compromise claimed (railway traffic towards the Adriatics, a free zone in the port of Šušak, the question of the navigation on the Drava, the exchange of population).⁶

The negotiations took a new turn in June. Secretary of Foreign Affairs Lorković brought up the idea of the common possession of the region. However, László Marosy, the ambassador's deputy objected to condominium on behalf of his government and he suggested the expression: „the state border is the Drava, the administrative border is the Mura” instead. Marosy tried to make the Croatian Secretary of Foreign Affairs Mladen Lorković accept the Hungarian point of view by expressing uncompromisingly: if a decision is not made shortly, his government cannot choose but to eliminate the „intolerable temporary situation”. Pavelić, in opposition to Lorković, did not even want to hear about the condominium of the region and declared in a theatrical tone of voice not surprising from him at all: „he can always stand with head erect in front of the Croatian people if he can refer to the Hungarian military occupation as the manifestation of violence rather than entering into a bargain with Hungary on this question”.⁷

The intention to negotiate of the Hungarian government — if there was any in a serious form at all — disappeared completely by the end of June. Marosy's attention was called to the fact that — from that point on — he was authorized only to inform the Croatian government that „the intention of maintaining Muraköz is getting more and more definite in Hungarian public opinion” and he was not allowed to enter into any negotiations.⁸ On 28 June the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed Döme Sztójay, ambassador in Berlin about the Hungarian—Croatian negotiations, the reasons of the failure and the planned introduction of military administration. They asked him to pay special attention to the following: this information „cannot be like a request for the agreement of

LORÁNT TILKOVSKY and GYULA JUHÁSZ. Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1968. (Hereinafter: WIL). doc. No. 421, p. 600., doc. No. 434, p. 613.

⁶ OL K—63. Küm. pol. 1941—67—3559.

⁷ OL K—63. Küm. res. pol. 1941—67. a—363., and DIMK vol. V. doc. No. 824. p. 1159., WIL doc. No. 434.1. p. 613.

⁸ DIMK vol. V. doc. No. 815. pp. 1150—1151., doc. No. 824. p. 1159., doc. No. 868. p. 1215.

the Imperial government or cannot have the form as if we wanted to leave the question of Muraköz in the hands of the axis powers in our measurements".⁹ This also meant that the matter of the exchange of population was removed from the agenda for a while, too. Sztójay met Ernst Woermann, German deputy undersecretary of Foreign Affairs once again at the beginning of September and — in order to avoid occasional misunderstandings, repeated the point of view of his government: they regarded the negotiations with Croatia on Muraköz as definitely finished and they did not see any chance in the future of changing the situation in question within the framework of a possible agreement. Woermann took notice of Sztójay's statement and repeated the „reserved” attitude of the German government.¹⁰ This meant that Germany had practically understood the unilateral annexation of Muraköz to Hungary. Croatia was defeated in the question of the border by its Hungarian neighbour, too. In spite of this, Croatian governments hoped all the time that there would be some opportunity for rearranging the border, if not at some other time, after the victorious end of the war. Until this time arrives — as Lorković detailed to Bartók several times — „the most important desire of the Croatian government is not to touch the ethnic composition of the regions mentioned above”.¹¹

Hungarian—Croatian relations became definitely worse after the failure of the negotiations. Mutual frontier outrages were frequent and negative change occurred in the ethnic policy of the Hungarian government concerning Croats. The census and expulsion of the so — called „settlers” and immigrants, that is, persons who had settled down after 1 December 1918, started here, too. Not only expulsions but also the activation of nationalist organizations operating with official support in the territories of the two countries were sources of debate. The press of neither of the two countries spared each other. Croatian newspapers attacked the annexation of the region to Hungary fiercely, while the Hungarian press was proving violently that „Muraköz” was not inhabited by Croats but by Sokac and Bunyevác (Catholic Serbian) people who spoke the so-called „Muraközi” language.¹²

After the one-sided solution of the debated question of territory it was not in the interest of the Hungarian government to further strain relations between the two countries, so much the more as they were worried about the approach of the two little states established with the help of Germany, that is, of Slovakia and Croatia to Rumania; they regarded this fact as giving rise to the possibility of the establishment of a new Little Entente. Croatia had to accept the facts, although it did not renounce Muraköz. It did not get any support not only in the annexation of Muraköz but the Croatian effort to deepen the situation was also suppressed in Berlin.

⁹ DIMK vol. V. doc. No. 890. p. 1244.

¹⁰ WIL doc. No. 422. pp. 618—619.

¹¹ OL K—63 Küm. pol. 1942—67—59.

¹² OL K—428 MTI (Hungarian News Service) Litograph. 1132. 18 July 1941. OL K—149 BM (Home Office) res. 1942—2—8376., 10429., OL K—28 ME (Prime Minister's Office) Kisebbségi o. (Dept. of Minorities) 1942—R—19705.

The new Prime Minister and Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Miklós Kállay ordered the ambassador Marosy right after taking up his post to make efforts to advance in the ethnic question on mutual terms and to make initiating steps in this direction. The note sent to the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the ambassador on 12 March 1942 listed the offences committed against Hungarian people in Croatia, the wrangling of the permission of the Hungarian Cultural Community in Croatia, the activities of nazis in Osijek, and the question of schools, and definitely called the attention of the Croatian government to the danger that „the way of treating Hungarian people in Croatia would have consequences on the position of Croats in Hungary”. Marosy had a longer conversation with Secretary of Foreign Affairs Lorković when he passed him the note. The latter defended himself by saying that, although he had not actually permitted the operation of the Hungarian association, its members could organize themselves without restriction. When Marosy's partner blamed him for the fact that no Hungarian school operated in Croatia while teaching was in progress in 13 so-called Croatian—Hungarian, 5 Wendish-Hungarian, 7 Bunyevác-Hungarian and 15 Sokac-Hungarian mixed schools in Hungary, the secretary of Foreign Affairs defended himself by saying that it was not his fault but that of the previous Yugoslavian governments, and that the intention of the Croatian government to change this situation is „unconditional and serious”. At the same time he expressed his disagreement with the division of the Croats in Hungary into Sokac and Bunyevac people because, as he said: „national name serves as a link in the spiritual life of a nation and if there is no possibility to acknowledge it freely, this fact brings about the spiritual estrangement and secession of that fraction of the nation”.¹³ He also referred to the fact that education was not in Croatian but in the „Muraközi” language and, while Marosy could maintain relations with Hungarians in Croatia, Gaj, the Croatian ambassador in Budapest did not have any possibility for that.¹⁴ The Croatian government prohibited the activity of the nazis in Osijek after a long period of wrangling and permitted the operation of the Hungarian Cultural Community. According to the Croatian Ministry of Education 12 Hungarian sections were set up in Croatian primary schools in the academic year of 1942—43.¹⁵ Croatia profited from this favourable result and suggested a Hungarian—Croatian cultural agreement following the example of the Croatian—Rumanian agreement already existing. The Hungarian government, however, definitely evaded this proposal. The only thing that happened in this context was the fact that the Hungarian ambassador, Arnold Van der Venne suggested the revision of textbooks from the point of view of ethnic policy in the autumn of 1944. Although the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs received this suggestion „with great benevolence”, they thought that „its realization in practice is not possible in our critical times”.¹⁶

After the failure of the plan of population — exchange the Hungarian government came up with a new idea; they initiated the repatriation of scattered Hungarian people in

¹³ OL K—63 Küm. pol. 1942—67—31.,32.

¹⁴ Ib.

¹⁵ OL K—63 Küm. pol. 1942—67—105.

¹⁶ OL K—63 Küm. pol. 1942—67—104., 1944—67—102.

Bosnia „exposed to peril” by the Croatian government. Marosy and Lorković signed the agreement on this in April 1942. According to this the Croatian government assumes to buy the possessions of the transmigrating people who could take their countervalue with them. In response, the Hungarian government modified its earlier order on the basis of which Croatian people exiled from Hungary or leaving the country voluntarily could not take even their personal property with them. The agreement included the resettlement of the population of four Bosnian villages stricken by civil war: Gunja, Vučinjak, Brčko and Bjelina.¹⁷

Ambassador Marosy tried to provide solemnity for the relocation, following the example of the colonization of Székely people in Bácska, but his intention was disconcerted by the Croatian civil war and the German „cleansing” actions directed against partisans. The German—Hungarian agreement, according to which Hungarians „had to demonstrate their national status with small Hungarian flags” during the German cleansing activities, can be called tragi-comic. As a matter of fact, there were many occasions when even Hungarian people planning to move out became the victims of German military actions. During the relocation which finished in September 1942, altogether 395 families, 15,552 persons were removed into former Dobovljac villages of Bácska, among the Székely people who had settled there before from Bukovina. People from Gunja were settled in Hadikliget (Vetermik), people from Brčko were relocated in Hadiknépe (Sirig), while for the new home of the population of Bjelina they nominated Hadiknépe and Horthyvára (Stepaničevo).¹⁸

The Kállay-government brought up the idea of the exchange of population again in February 1944 and they imagined to make only a „momentary exception” to it, with respect to the situation in Croatia, that is, the war. The Croatian government had already given up its negative attitude by that time and only insisted on the claim that Croatian emigration to Hungary had to be bound to a term of several years. The Croatian government undoubtedly wanted to create a favourable atmosphere for the re-examination of the question of Muraköz with this attitude and the Hungarian government brought up the question again — in the given situation — not in hope of a quick solution, either, but in the hope (which was already rather vain) that they could strengthen their territorial position in the Southern parts referring to the legal apparatus of the agreement in case of a post-war rearrangement. These negotiations, however, became negotiations on refugees soon because of the changing of the military situation, and the Hungarian government had to apply the formula of „momentary exception”. During the negotiations which finished in May the main object of debate between ambassador Marosy and his partner, Gaj, leader of the Political Department of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the question of treating refugees as emigrants who leave the country for ever (this was Gaj’s idea) or allow

¹⁷ OL K—28 ME Kisebbségi o. (Dept. of Minorities) 1942—R—24333.

¹⁸ A. SAJTI ENIKŐ: *Délvidék 1941—1944. A magyar kormányok délszláv nemzetiségpolitikája* (ENIKŐ A. SAJTI: *The South 1941—1944. The Southern Slav Ethnic policy of Hungarian Governments*) Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1987. p. 102. More detailed information about the settlement of Székelys in Bácska: ib. pp. 53—73 and A. SAJTI ENIKŐ: *Székely telepítés és nemzetiség-politika a Bácskában — 1941.* (ENIKŐ A. SAJTI: *Settlement and Ethnic policy of Székelys in Bácska — 1941*) Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1984.

them, for a definite period of time, to return to their original home. It turned out during the negotiations that — in opposition to the principle accepted already — Croatia wanted to treat refugees as emigrants leaving the country permanently and asserted a right to their property. Marosy succeeded in achieving Gaj's approval of determining a definite period for returning and regarding refugees as real emigrants only after this period of time. Further problems emerged owing to the fact that Gaj was dismissed as a result of the usual and frequent replacements of staff in the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His successor, Rieger was completely uninformed about the matter and came up with a new proposal. Marosy and Rieger signed the Hungarian—Croatian agreement on the matter of refugees finally, on 4 May. According to the agreement the matters of the emigrants would have been treated by a mixed committee and Croatian emigrants could have returned to their original home within two years, while those who intended to remain could assume Hungarian citizenship. They could have taken their property with them, too. The order prohibited the admission of Jewish and Greek Orthodox people and only those Hungarians would have been admitted who had joined the Hungarian Cultural Community. The agreement, however — owing to the development of the military situation — could not have been realized in practice.¹⁹

After the German occupation of Hungary Croatia thought that the time for making reminder steps in the matter of Muraköz in Berlin had arrived. When Marosy blamed Djordje Perić, Croatian Secretary of Foreign Affairs for this, „he declared, without any embarrassment, that he had considered opportune to remind Berlin of the fact that Muraköz belonged to Croatia according to the Croatian point of view”. Then he criticized the policy of foreign affairs of his predecessor Lorković, who — in his opinion — had renounced the triangle of Baranya from the very beginning and thus, as Lorković mentioned, the Croatian government did not hold „trump card” to be played in the question of Muraköz. At the same time he tried to calm Marosy by saying that his step made in Berlin did not mean open discussion on the problem of the region at all.²⁰ Of course, it did not depend on the Croatian government but rather on the fact that Germany repressed the Croatian attempt counting on possible Hungarian—German conflicts again. It is important to note that Germany was not in the position to redraw the map of Europe already.

The concluding moment of Hungarian—Croatian relations was the idea of co-operation in military actions against partisans which was brought up by Glaise von Horstenau, German general in Zagreb. According to the plan both armies could cross the border in a 30- km-distance during the battles. The Sztójay-government negotiated the question of the Germans at the cabinet-meeting of 17 August 1944. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs detailed the plan that Germany should call upon the Croatian government to turn directly to the government of Hungary with this claim. However, the Hungarian government could play a part that would have served the defence of the borders of the

¹⁹ OL K—63 Küm. pol. 1944—67—13., 18., 36., and OL K—74 I. Bejövő számjeltávirat (Incoming code — telegram) Zagreb. 5 May 1944.

²⁰ OL K—63 Küm. pol. 1944—67—40.

country even in this case and „could not assume to take part in actions like this reaching as far as the coast of Dalmatia”. The Minister of Defence detailed his conception that the line determined by the government could not reach more than 10 km from the border. According to Minister of Finance Reményi—Schneller the government could argue well towards Germany with saying that they wanted to avoid evoking the impression in Croatian public opinion that Hungary intended to rearrange the empire of Stephen I by crossing the borders. The Cabinet finally accepted the following decision: Hungary is ready to supply troops against Croatian „gangs” only upon the application of the Croatian government and enters into battle in a 10 km — distance from the Hungarian—Croatian border. Hungarian military forces would enter deeper only in case of „the conclusion of a new agreement on this matter between the governments of Hungary and Croatia interested in this situation”.²¹

Pavelić was not enthusiastic about the German general's idea, either. He was afraid of the possibility that Hungary would interpret the principle of crossing the border in a special way and utilize it to satisfy its territorial claims. He might have remembered the earlier German plan made before the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, which counted with Croatian autonomy achieved with the help of the Croatian Peasants' Party under the aegis of Hungary. This would have meant practically, as he detailed it to Ciano, Italian Secretary of Foreign Affairs that he would not preserve his power even for twenty-four hours.²²

If we evaluate the question of Muraköz exerting basic influence on Hungarian—Croatian relations within the whole of the Southern policy of the Hungarian governments, we can conclude that this policy was characterized by a special kind of dualism in the beginning, especially at the time of the government of Bárdossy. Strong-arm policy, internments, mass expulsions and punitive razzias against Serbs in Bácska²³, and the „distinguished”, friendly treatment of Croats in Muraköz. These, of course, were motivated by clear and explainable reasons: by the existing and exaggerated „Yugoslavism” of the Serbs in Bácska, the over-estimation of the actual strength of partisan-movements in this region and — owing to the lack of Serbian statehood, there was no risk of potential revenge, and there was not any significant Hungarian minority in the territory of the remaining Serbia. It was not the impatient trend of Hungarian nationalism, represented mainly by military circles at this time, that became dominant in the Croatian ethnic question like in Bácska but its tolerant traditions. The existence of the mother-country belonging to the federalist system of Germany, evoking the impression of autonomy, played an undoubtedly important role in this. That is why — beside the significant difference in the number of Hungarian and Croatian nationalities living in the territory of the two countries —, the policy of reciprocity proved to be a feasible way in spite of the difficulties mentioned above. The solution of the debates concerning the regional questions of Muraköz, as I mentioned earlier, depended mainly on the attitude of Germany and not on the two governments, in spite of appearances.

²¹ OL K—27 Minutes of the Cabinet's session of 17 August 1944.

²² OL K—74 I. Incoming code-telegram. Zagreb, 9 September 1944., Tajni arhivi grofa Ciana (1936—1942) Beograd, 1962.501.

²³ ENIKÓ A. SAJTI: *The South 1941—1944*, pp. 11—53., 128—168.

The problem of Muraköz was not arranged as a regional matter, in accordance with German interests after the war, but according to the global European interests of the winners. Because of the anti-German struggles of partisans the problem of Muraköz was not brought up as a self-contained Croatian or Hungarian question at the peace-negotiations but as the territorial claim of Yugoslavia struggling by the side of the Allied Forces.

The idea of the independent Croatian statehood went a similar way, too. The image of the Independent Croatian State was filled exclusively with negative contents during the short period of its establishment and existence in contemporary international opinion and not without reason. The new and radical change of international forces, the end of the cold war and the collapse of the two-pole world were necessary for the old and new Great Powers to forget it and for the Croatian efforts for independence to get historical follow-wind instead of the headwind under completely new external—internal conditions and not independently from the internal and structural problems of Yugoslavia.

Magyar—horvát államközi kapcsolatok (1941—1944)

A szerző az európai nemzetközi erőter változásával, valamint a magyar kormányok délvidéki politikájával összefüggésben tárgyalja az első, modern kori magyar—horvát államközi kapcsolatok létrejöttét és alakulását. Abból indul ki, hogy a hosszú idő óta történelmi ellenszélben vitorlázó horvát függetlenségi törekvések a háború idején a náci Németországtól kaptak politikai, katonai támogatást. Ez azt jelentette, hogy a horvát nemzeti mozgalmon belül eddig marginális helyre szorult extrém nacionalizmus, az usztasák jutottak rövid történelmi szerephez. E kronológiai és minőségi értelemben is korlátok közé szorított kapcsolatok centrális kérdése a Muraköz hovatartozásának kérdése, valamint ennek prizmján keresztül a két ország területén élő kisebbségek problémája volt.

A tanulmány részletesen kitér a Jugoszlávia felosztását rögzítő bécsi német—olasz megállapodás alapján folytatott magyar—horvát határtárgyalásokra, ezek kudarcának okaira, a német kormány ezzel kapcsolatos magatartására. A német „semlegesség” lehetővé tette, hogy Magyarország 1941. július 1-én egyoldalú lépéssel az ország részévé nyilvánította a Muraközt, s bevezette a katonai közigazgatást. A tárgyalások kudarca miatt érezhetően megromlottak a magyar—horvát kapcsolatok. Gyakoriakká váltak a határincidensek, s negatív változás következett be a két ország kisebbségpolitikájában is. Magyarországon, a Bácskához hasonlóan, megkezdődött a délszláv telepesek és az ún. bevándoroltak kiutasítása. Horvátországban pedig hivatalos sugallatra aktivizálódott az ottani magyar nyilasok tevékenysége. A tanulmány további részében a szerző kitér a két kormány lakosságcserére vonatkozó álláspontjára, az ennek kapcsán folytatott tárgyalásokra. Megállapítja: mivel az usztasa Horvátország soha nem mondott le a Muraközzről, ragaszkodott a terület „népi állagának” megőrzéséhez, így e tárgyalások egészen a háború végéig nem mozdultak ki a holtpontról, amikor is menekültügyi tárgyalásokká váltak. De a reciprocitásra építő magyar álláspont sem volt alkalmas a megegyezésre, mivel szándékosan nem vette figyelembe a két ország területén élő horvát, illetve magyar kisebbség eltérő létszámából fakadó különbségeket. Magyar kezdeményezésre egyedül a boszniai magyarok hazatelepítését sikerült elérni.

Az 1941—1944 közötti magyar—horvát kapcsolatok záróakkordját a németek által felvetett közös magyar—horvát partizánellenes katonai együttműködés gondolata képezte. Tanulmánya végén megállapítja: a Muraköz hovatartozása a háború után a győztesek globális érdekeinek rendelődött alá, nem önálló horvát vagy magyar kérdésként vetődött fel, hanem a szövetségesek oldalán harcoló Jugoszlávia területi igényeként. Hasonló megítélés alá esett a Független Horvát állam rövid fennállása alatt negatív tartalommal telítődő független horvát állam gondolata is. A nemzetközi erőter újabb, gyökeres átalakulásának kellett ahhoz bekövetkeznie, hogy nem függetlenül Jugoszlávia belső, strukturális válságától, egy regionális háború következményei között, történelmi ellenszél helyett ismét történelmi hátszelet kapjanak a horvát függetlenségi törekvések, felvetve egyúttal a magyar—horvát államközi kapcsolatok újraépítésének szükségességét.

LÁSZLÓ KARSAI

JEWISH DEPORTATIONS IN CARPATHO-RUTHENIA IN 1944

Today we know a great deal, although certainly not enough, of what happened in 1944 to the Jews who lived in Carpatho-Ruthenia*. As both György Ránki and Randolph L. Braham, following Jenő Lévai's work, have concluded, at the time immediately after 19 March 1944, neither the Germans nor the government of Döme Sztójay had a detailed plan for the fate of Hungary's Jewry.

In this respect, three circumstances deserve special attention: 1. Unlike in Western European countries, for example, Hungary at this time had a relatively large number of Jews compared to the total population.

2. Their fate was gravely influenced by the unfolding military situation.

3. Closely related to this was the fact that the Germans could not afford to release significant forces for this task, as is shown by the relatively small size of the Adolf Eichmann Sonderkommando.

In these circumstances, a lot depended on the attitude of the Hungarian authorities toward the „Jewish question.” Miklós Horthy decided to withdraw, giving free hand to the Sztójay government in this matter as well. The Parliament was suspended, the government ruled by decree, thus Miklós Horthy was spared even signing the orders for the systematic robbing, internment in ghettos or collection camps, and the eventual deportation of several hundred thousand Hungarian citizens.¹

How ill-prepared this operation was, how it lacked a coordinated central command is born out by the papers of the Government's Commissioner's Office in Carpatho-Ruthenia for the year 1944. To date, researchers have made little use of these documents. We have known that barely a week after the occupation of Hungary the German authorities declared all Hungarian territories east of the river Tisza to be military zones under German jurisdiction, effective immediately.² At first the occupiers treated the Hungarian army with distrust, companies were surrounded and confined to their barracks; furthermore, the Tisza served as a military demarcation. On 26 March, Miklós Horthy had already asked for the

* [Carpatho-Ruthenia (Kárpátalja), NE Hungary at the time, now in Ukraine.]

¹ GYÖRGY RÁNKI: *1944. március 19.* Budapest 1968., pp. 157–159

² Veessenmayer's report of 25 March 1944 to the German Foreign Ministry. (In: *A Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország. Német diplomáciai iratok Magyarországról 1933–1944.* (*Wilhelmstrasse and Hungary. German Diplomatic papers from Hungary, 1933–1944.*) — hereinafter: *Wilhelmstrasse* — Eds.: GY. RÁNKI, E. PAMLÉNYI, L. TILKOVSKY, and GY. JUHÁSZ. Budapest 1968, p. 800.)

lifting of the cordon, claiming that all communications with the eastern half of the country had been disrupted.³

The old regent had both the opportunity and the power to shunt aside the Germans' original candidate, Béla Imrédy, and appoint his own man (or so he thought), Hungary's former ambassador to Berlin, Sztójay, as Prime Minister. The Third Reich's plenipotentiary in Hungary received his instructions directly from Adolf Hitler:

„...see to it that the country's administration — including the time during which German troops are stationed there — is carried out by a government under his direction, with the purpose of maximum utilization of the country's resources, first of all its economic capabilities, for our mutual strategic goals.”

Further, Hitler informed his Hungarian deputy:

„For the purpose of carrying out the tasks in Hungary by the SS and the Police with the help of German forces — PRIMARILY POLICE MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE JEWISH QUESTION (my emphasis—L.K.) — a Higher SS and Police Leader will be assigned to the staff of the Reich's plenipotentiary, who WILL CARRY OUT THE POLITICAL INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PLENIPOTENTIAR.” (my emphasis — L.K.)⁴

The final solution of the Hungarian Jewish problem is very significant, as German Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop informed all his subordinates who served abroad, preparing them for possible official protests by representatives of neutral countries. According to Ribbentrop, the Western powers in Hungary, relying on influential Jewish and certain other circles, were trying to create a „defeatist anti-Axis attitude.” „It is well known that a certain portion of the Hungarian press etc., has already fallen victim to this influence”, Joachim Ribbentrop remarked.⁵

The concern of the German authorities proved to be groundless. On 31 March, Edmund Veesenmayer wrote in his report, some what surprised, that the Hungarian government with its latest regulations, „...has proved that it has taken seriously the solution of this question (i.e. the Jewish question — L.K.) ACCORDING TO OUR INTERPRETATION (my emphasis — L.K.). Considering local conditions, this development may be called unusually rapid.”⁶

The hierarchical order seemed to work: Edmund Veesenmayer directed the government of Hungary and Döme Sztójay was accommodating; his enthusiasm was surpassed only by that of László Baký and László Endre, the two newly-appointed under-secretaries of the Ministry of the Interior who „turn night into day” as they „labor” — according to their own admission, too — on the solution of the Jewish question.

It seemed, however, that the first Jewish decrees did not satisfy all expectations that sooner or later all Jews would indeed be removed from Hungary. In the National

³ Veesenmayer's telegram of 26 March 1944 to Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister. (*Wilhelmstrasse*, pp. 803—804.)

⁴ Veesenmayer's certificate of appointment, 20 March 1944. (*Wilhelmstrasse*, p. 789.)

⁵ Ribbentrop's conference-telegram of 22 March 1944 to all German foreign missions. (*Wilhelmstrasse*, p. 793.)

⁶ Veesenmayer's report of 31 March 1944 to Ribbentrop. (*Wilhelmstrasse*, p. 907.)

Archives I have found traces of hitherto unknown plans for operations against the Jews worked out by lower levels of the German and Hungarian authorities. It is possible that we are dealing only with the private actions of an overenthusiastic clerk.

On 1 April 1944, the commander of the German SS in Kassa sent the following request to the local commander of the gendarmerie:

„In light of the special situation in the territory of Kárpát-Ukrajna, we request that Jews from the villages in this territory be resettled in the cities of Munkács, Ungvár and Beregszász, already secured by the police and the Gendarmerie. Within the next five to six days Huszt will also be secured, and at that time it, too, will be ready for the same purpose.”⁷

The SS Major's request was received with sympathy. The very next day, at 11 o'clock in the morning of 2 April, Gend. Col. Győző Tölgyesy, commander of the VIIIth Gendarmerie District (most of the Felvidék⁸ and Carpatho-Ruthenia belonged to this district) contacted Géza Halász, advisor to the Ministry of the Interior and assistant head of the Government's commission in Carpatho-Ruthenia. Not only did Győző Tölgyesy enthusiastically endorse the SS Major's request, he also added one of his own suggestions: In addition to the cities mentioned above, „Huszt and Nagyszőlős could also be used for the purpose of resettlement.” Gend. Col. Győző Tölgyesy was obviously aware that nearly 200.000 people were about to be transferred and/or taken away to ghettos or collection camps, and so he made further proposals. He set the deadline for gathering the Jews for 6 April and suggested a rather simple mode of accomplishing it: he raised the possibility of „administratively” asking the Jews to „resettle.” In other words: the Jews should place themselves into ghettos...⁸ More precisely, the Colonel meant to resettle only those who may have been left behind after the expiration of the deadline.

The most interesting fact in this whole matter is the reaction of the highest officials in the Ministry of the Interior. Halász telephoned Gend. Col. Gyula Király, head of the VII. Public Security Department of the Ministry of the Interior who returned the call on the same day, at noon on 2 April and told Halász that at the instruction of the Minister of the Interior „the request is to be granted.”⁹

Neither the Minister of the Interior, Andor Jaross, nor Géza Halász or Győző Tölgyesy bothered about the fact that at this time no law or decree prescribed the segregation or confinement of Jews in ghettos or internment camps. One SS major snapped his finger and within twenty-four hours Hungary's Minister of the Interior agreed to the forced removal of nearly 200.000 Hungarian citizens.

⁷ Országos Levéltár (National Archives) — hereinafter: OL Kárpátaljai Kormányzói Biztos Hivatalának iratai (Papers of the Office of the Kárpátalja Government Commissioner) — hereinafter: KKBH.i. — K 774—1944, p. 3. Statement of the SS and SD company commander on duty in Kassa, dated 1 April 1944, to 1st.Lt. Kökényi, District Commissioner of the Gendarmerie.

⁸ (Upper Province, i.e. today's Slovakia)

⁸ OL, ibid. Protocol, Ungvár, 2 April 1944, signed by Géza Halász.

⁹ OL, ibid.

This operation failed in the end. Brigadier General Zoltán Algya Papp discussed the German major's request with leaders of the 1st Hungarian Army assigned to the Carpatho-Ruthenia district, and on the same day, at four in the afternoon, conveyed the following to Halász:

„...the transfer of Jews would seriously impede the army's deployment, now in progress, especially in counties along the border; further, in Munkács our headquarters and attached units are in need of every available accommodation, therefore the resettled Jews could not be directed there.”¹⁰

Officials of the Ministry of Defense in Budapest must also have protested, because two days later on 4 April, Gend. Col. Király repeatedly telephoned Halász (it is remarkable that in these fateful days and weeks, the same bureaucrats, usually such sticklers for formalities, issuing and demanding written documents complete with stamps and signatures, so easily and enthusiastically switched to informal transactions), and said:

„...according to German authorities in Budapest, Jews in the border region of Kárpátalja may be removed only with the agreement of the army command there, while the removal of all the Jews of Kárpátalja, i.e. for a larger scale resettlement (sic!) the consent of the German Central Command in Budapest is necessary.”¹¹

The „rounding up” of the Jews, to use a contemporary terminology, began at dawn on 15 April 1944. The mere facts were summarized the following way in the above-mentioned document:

„The Jews gathered together, approximately 195.000 persons, were placed in the collection camps set up in Munkács, Ungvár, Varjúláros, and Beregszász, and in the designated ghettos of Huszt, Máramarossziget, Kassa, Mátészalka, Nyíregyháza, Nagyszőlős, Sátoraljaújhely, Kisvárd, and Beregszász. The amount of the money collected and the worth of jewelry and other valuables are unknown.”¹²

With brutal frankness, the summary mentions that „during the round-up a few suicides occurred, but compared to the large number of the assembled Jews, these were negligible.” They were not talking about people, but rather about negligible, alien, and hostile beings who had to be removed.

On 10 April, even in the most remote mountain villages, cut off from radio and newspapers, the Jews of Kárpátalja learned that they were to establish „Jewish committees.” On this day, Tölgyesi once again gave verbal instructions to the administrative authorities, and this time in accordance with the Jewish decrees that had been piling down like rain since 29 March, that they are to make public the following:

„1. No Jew may receive cooking-fat coupons. In case these have already been issued for a long period, they are to be revoked. 2. All trade licenses for Jews are to be revoked, with the exception of localities where the same trade is not practiced by a Christian. 3. Works by Jewish authors must be weed (sic!) out of every library. 4. Stores

¹⁰ OL, *ibid.*, Géza Halász's notes, 2 April 1944.

¹¹ OL, *ibid.*, Géza Halász's notes, 4 April 1944.

¹² OL, BM (Ministry of the Interior, — hereinafter: BM) res. K 148. 1200 cs. Summary report of the Gendarmerie, 30 May 1944, 8929/B. kt. p. 325.

owned by Jews must be marked by a yellow star, or by the conspicuously displayed and easily legible words „Jewish store.” 5. In every town where Jews reside, Jewish committees are to be formed, and these committees will be responsible for the behavior of the Jewish population. 6. All persons above the age of six who are classified as Jews must display the badge of the yellow star on their outer garments at all times. Failure to comply with this order will result in immediate arrest by the Gendarmerie!”¹³

On 5 April, Baky, with a „strictly confidential” order, had dispatched the Head and entire personnel of the State Security Center’s (Államvédelmi Központ = AVK) Investigation Department to the VIIIth Gendarmerie District, „to prevent possible accusations and abuses that may arise later during the solution of the Jewish question.” At the same time he ordered the AVK Investigation Department’s Head to „...personally supervise, with the help of the Investigation Department’s staff, the execution of police regulations put in effect against Jews.”¹⁴

I would like to make clear that the investigators of the AVK were not called out to threaten the Jews. Their main worry was the ownerless, abandoned property that had been „left behind.” Within too short a time too many Jews were torn from their homes, and there were not enough trained people available, neither was there enough time, to officially receive the Jews’ valuables or to seal all the empty apartments. It was not only the poor, and often the not-so-poor of the cities and villages, who covetously eyed the abandoned possessions. Baky sent out the AVK detectives to restrain public officials, policemen and the Gendarmerie.

The rounding up of Jews in the VIIIth Gendarmerie District was also begun on Baky’s confidential order 6163/1944, bearing his signature, and issued on 7 April.¹⁵ But local administrative, police and gendarmerie authorities were unable to comply with certain points of the order. Therefore, within his own jurisdiction, and without any hesitation, Halász sent off his own instructions, modifying those of the Ministry of the Interior, to all the commanders of the Carpatho-Ruthenia Gendarmerie. He claimed that since „Kárpátalja is a military zone in which the deployed army may need every available accommodation, the above-quoted order from the Ministry of the Interior, concerning the locking and sealing of Jewish apartments, cannot be carried out, especially in the light of our experience of resettling Jews in 1941, when the population, despite the seals, broke into and robbed the abandoned houses...”¹⁶

Géza Halász referred to the Jewish deportation of August 1941. Mostly from Carpatho-Ruthenia, but also from some larger towns, they collected all the Jews whose

¹³ OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 15. Report of the Chief Administrative Officer of Nagyberezná, dated 10 April 1944, to the head of the Local Administrative Office of Ung, no. 1880/1944.

¹⁴ OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 26. For the complete text of the Ministry of the Interior’s order BM 6137/1944. VII. res, dated 5 April see: *Vádirat a nácizmus ellen (Indicting Nazism)* — hereinafter: *Vádirat* — Vol. I, pp. 106—107. Budapest 1958. Eds.: I. BENOSCHOFSKY and E. KARSAI.

¹⁵ For the complete text, see: *Vádirat*, Vol. I. pp. 124—127.

¹⁶ OL, KKBH.i. k 774—1944, p. 38. The Government Commissioner’s directive, no. 162/1944. biz. sz., dated 13 April, to the wing-commanders of the Gendarmerie.

„citizenship was not in order.” Altogether about 18.000 people were deported from the country. Most of them were butchered by the Nazis and their Ukrainian collaborators in Kamenyec-Podolszk.

On 15 April 1944 the Police Chief of Ungvár held a conference in his office on „the subject of executing the Jewish laws.” In the record of this conference, called an „Official Memorandum”, the Chief summed up the essence of Halász's modifying instruction: The various valuables confiscated from the Jews are not to be sent the Munkács branch of the National Bank, but to the Police Headquarters of Munkács. The Ungvár section of the VIIIth Gendamerie District in Kassa was also informed to whom to address the shipments: Dr. Lajos Meggyesy, AVK, Attorney, Delivery Committee. Valuables meant: money, silver, gold and all other precious metals, gems, savings accounts, bonds, securities, typewriters, cameras, and watches. Military materials (meant) skis, ski boots, bicycles, binoculars, leather, rubber goods, cars and car equipment. All these are to be stored at the station of the Gendarmerie, summed up the head of the Ungvár Section of the Gendarmerie. He also noted that valuable textile goods, bolts of fabric and linen, quality paintings and rugs (Persian, oriental) are to be handed over to the town's council for „storage and safekeeping.”¹⁷

If the gendarmes and police would let them, then theoretically, according to the already quoted order no. 6163/1944 of the Ministry of the Interior, the Jews would have been able to take only the clothes on their backs, one overcoat, at most two sets of underwear, food for no more than fourteen days per person, baggage of no more than fifty kilograms that would have to include everything, even bedding, blankets, mattresses, etc.¹⁸

In many places however, those in charge would not allow enough time for the Jews to pack even their most essential belongings. A lot was left in the abandoned Jewish houses which the local population began to plunder. Already on 1 May 1944, quoting his order no: 162/1944, Halász sent new instructions to the authorities of Carpatho-Ruthenia. He stated that in spite of this order „there have been many instances where possessions have been removed from abandoned Jewish houses and apartments, and therefore he directed the authorities to carefully gather and guard Jewish possessions.”¹⁹

Following the advice and instructions of German SS officers with long experience all over Europe, the rounding up of Jews and confining them in ghettos was carried out by Hungarian officials. An interesting episode of this harmonious cooperation tells a great deal about the atmosphere in which events took place in the spring of 1944 in Carpatho-

¹⁷ OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 14. Official Memorandum at the Ungvár police headquarters of the conference held on 15 April; also: the strictly confidential report of the VIIIth (Kassa) Gendamerie District's Ungvár section, no. 244/kt. 1944, dated 15 April, to the sub-prefect of Ung. county. OL, Miniszterelnöki Levéltár (Archives of the Prime Minister), Északkeleti Hadműveleti Terület Polgári Kormánybiztossága (The Civilian Government Commission of the Northeastern Theater of Military Operations) 1944. sz.n., pp. 5—6.

¹⁸ *Vádirat*, I. p. 126.

¹⁹ OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 19. Géza Halász's directive, dated 1 May 1944, to the heads of every Local Administrative Office, and Orphans' Court, to all Chiefs of County Administrations, District Notaries and Town Clerks of Kárpátalja.

Ruthenia. At 11 o'clock in the evening of 17 April, the Mayor of Ungvár, Dr. László Megay, telephoned the police and told them that an unknown perpetrator, or perpetrators, had fired five shots at his apartment and smashed his window. According to the police, Dr. László Megay also called Teofil Dannecke (sic!), SS Hauptsturmführer who, referring to the murder, also by unknown persons, of a German soldier earlier the same day in the city, called the Police Chief of Ungvár and instructed him to round up 100 prominent Jews by 5 a.m.; he would want to have them executed. Before complying, the Chief of Police dispatched investigators to investigate the two reports. It turned out that the murdered soldier was in fact a woman of easy virtue who was found by them in the bathroom of a German military barracks with a bullet hole in her head. She had a revolver in her left hand, but the bullet entered her right temple... As to the Mayor's window: it was smashed by stones. Vitéz^{***} György Thurzó, Police Chief, made his report to the proper authorities; the SS officer then told him that he did not insist on executing the 100 Jews since he was stationed there only as an „observer and advisor” anyway. Incidentally, SS Hauptsturmführer Theodor Dannecker (that was his real name) had already made that statement at a meeting held in the Mayor of Ungvár's office on the morning of 17 April... As a point of interest, Theodor Dannecker was a member of Adolf Eichmann's staff and played a significant role in the „settling” of the Bulgarian Jewish question. With his assistance 4,150 Thracian and 7,144 Macedonian Jews were deported to the Treblinka concentration camp where most of them perished.²⁰

On 23 April Edmund Veessenmayer reported with satisfaction that: „The ghettoization in the Kárpát area began on 16 April.”^{****} They have already detained 150.000 Jews... Negotiations about transportation are underway, and starting on 15 May we plan the shipment of 3.000 Jews per day, mostly from Kárpátalja... Destination Auschwitz.”²¹

In the most important part of his report, Edmund Veessenmayer called the attention of his superior in Berlin to the following fact:

„In order to avoid endangering the execution of our operation, it would seem expedient that the 50.000 Jews in forced labor battalions, which I have requested and the government has promised, be directed somewhat farther away from the area of Budapest.”²²

We must understand well what the Reich's plenipotentiary in Hungary was saying: It was much more important to deport the Jewish elderly and babies, the lame, and even

^{***} (Order of valor)

²⁰ OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 13. The report of Ungvár's Chief of Police, dated 18 April 1944. About Th. Dannecker, see R. L. BRAHAM's article: „A csailós államok és az antiszemitizmus” (*The Satellite Countries and Anti-Semitism*) (*Világosság*, 1990, n. 12, p. 921.)

^{****} According to the Gendarmerie report quoted in Note n. 12, ghettoization in the VIIIth Gendarmerie district was begun on 15 April. The lack of primary archival sources makes the settling of this contradiction in dates impossible.

²¹ Veessenmayer's report of 23 April 1944 to the Foreign Ministry. (*Wilhelmstrasse*, p. 836.)

²² Ibid.

the mentally ill of Carpatho-Ruthenia than the already assembled Jewish inmates of forced labor camps who could be well used in the German war industry.

In a telegram sent on 18 April, the head of the foster home in Munkács asked the government's representative in Carpatho-Ruthenia what should happen to Jewish children placed with Jewish foster parents; whether they should be taken back into the care of the state or along with their foster parents, should they be sent to the camps? There could have been no doubt about the reply: the „final destination” of these Jewish orphans was also Auschwitz.²³

Until 15 May the main concern — for the authorities — consisted of the feeding and the solution of health, especially epidemiological problems, of the Jews now herded together in large numbers. It was quite easy to herd together the obedient and frightened multitude. Guarding them was not difficult either; they did not try hard to escape. On the contrary, there were places where the Jews were guarding themselves. At least this is what we learn from the morning report for 19 April 1944 of the assistant commander of the collection camp at Ungvár. The report tells us that in this camp of 40.000 square meters, only 12 guards were on duty. They would have to keep an eye on 6.152 Jews. There was no fence or wall; it would not have been difficult to escape at night between the guards positioned at every 300 or 400 meters. The report speaks of the possibility of „mass escape, nay, breakout.” But „naturally,” nothing like that had happened. According to the report, „the mood of the detainees is generally satisfactory, reassuring. The delivery and reception of the detainees is progressing smoothly. There are no disturbances. To establish order within the camp, 100 Jewish police have been press (sic!) into service,” writes Károly Oszényi, Inspector of the Hungarian Royal Police, Assistant Commander of the Jewish collection camp at Ungvár.²⁴

In the collection camps, „organized” in brick factories and lumber yards, the mayor concern was the solution of health/epidemic problems. On 18 April the military physician of Ungvár inspected the Jewish collection camp in Felszabadulás Street along with his colleagues. He stated in his report that in the collection camp planned for 20.000 people, one-and-a-half liters of drinking and cooking water and five liters of water needed for washing should be provided for each person per day. The camp's two latrines are insufficient even for the current population (appr. 4.000 people), concluded Dr. Károly Biringer, military physician, referring to the fact that the weight of per capita daily excrement is approximately 130 grams, and the volume of urine is 1.200 cm³. To prevent contagion, the epidemic of typhoid fever, Dr. Károly Biringer asked that 30.000 liters of drinking and 10.000 liters of washing water be secured daily, as well as 15.000 cm³ of vaccine with the appropriate number of syringes be supplied.²⁵

²³ OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 42. Telegram sent by the principal of the foster home in Munkács, dated 18 April, to the Government Commissioner of Kárpátalja in Ungvár.

²⁴ OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 86. Morning report of the Assistant Commander of the collection camp at Ungvár, for 19 April 1944, no. 169/11—1944 biz. sz., sent to police headquarters at Ungvár.

²⁵ OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, pp. 76—77. Report n. 217/lül 1944 of Dr. Károly Biringer, military physician, dated 18 April, to the Mayor of Ungvár.

„Naturally” these rational requests could be satisfied only in part by the Mayor. As we learn from his report to the Minister of the Interior, at Dr. László Megay’s instruction the city’s watermain was equipped with a 1.000 meter long pump suction pipe that allowed the supply of 300 liters of water per minute to the camp. However, the most serious problem was still not solved. Dr. László Megay wrote to Jaross:

„... the camp has no sewer system and the daily excreta of 20.000 people cannot be disposed of. There is no lime in the city, hence disinfection is impossible. Since the warm weather is here, the city’s Christian population is greatly disturbed that presently an epidemic might break out in the camp that could infect the entire city area and there would be no human power to prevent it from spreading.”

„I respectfully request that your Excellency take urgent steps so that the Jews, collected and now kept at Ungvár, be taken away as soon as possible.”²⁶

It is unlikely that the conditions in the Ungvár ghetto were unusual; according to testimony from other sources and from recollections, they represented rather the average hell.

In the middle of April 1944, when they began to round up the Jews of Carpatho-Ruthenia, the German and Hungarian „appropriate authorities” did not exactly know when they would deport these people from the country. Dieter Wisliceny, Adolf Eichmann’s right hand man, who had already „distinguished himself” in 1943 in settling the Jewish question in Slovakia, at a meeting held at Ungvár on 15 April, was able to tell the Hungarians in charge only that „in all likelihood” the Jews in the brick factory in Felszabadulás Street will remain there for 30 to 45 days.²⁷

The removal of the Jews was prevented not by the lack of the Germans’ „readiness to receive them,” but by the lack of available transportation. At the beginning of May the RSHA, i.e. the Reich Security Main Office, informed the German Foreign Ministry that on 4 and 5 May there would be a „timetable conference” in Vienna whose results would be conveyed to the Hungarian authorities as well. Organizing the „timetable” of trains transporting and deporting the Jews caused no small headache. A German Foreign Ministry report at the time calls attention to three serious problems: „For military reasons, use of the railway through Lemberg is limited; shipments cannot be sent on the Budapest—Vienna line because we want to avoid alarming the Jews of Budapest; the embassy in Bratislava considers transports via Slovakia to be risky.”²⁸

The final timetable for the deportation of the Jews of Carpatho-Ruthenia was given to the local Hungarian authorities in Munkács on 12 May by Gend.Lt.Col. László Ferenczy. In his capacity as Gendarmerie officer in charge of ensuring the cooperation of German and Hungarian authorities, particularly in the area of „settling” the Jewish

²⁶ OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 79. The Mayor of Ungvár’s petition, n. 112. eln./1944, dated 24 April, to the Minister of the Interior.

²⁷ OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 14. Official Reminder of the conference held at the police headquarters of Ungvár on 15 April, 1944.

²⁸ Telegram of Ehrental von Thadden, sent to the German Embassy in Budapest on 5 May 1944. (*Wilhelmstrasse*, p. 841.)

question, László Ferenczy announced that the Jews, except for foreign citizens, were to be taken out of the country; the first transport was to leave on 14 May. One hundred ten trains were to take the Jews to Kassa where the German police would take them over. The markings on the trains were to read: DA-Umsiedler (resettlers): Removal of German laborers. One train (45 freightcars) was to carry 3.000 people, each freightcar on the average holding 70 people and their baggage. Severely ill Jews and their relatives were to go with the last group. The Mayor was to supply bread for two days, this meant 400 grams per person for the two days. Coffee or water was also to be provided. Gend. Captain Dr. László Uray, one of the participants at the conference, noted:

„...if necessary, 100 people may go in one car. They can be packed in like herrings, since the Germans need hardy people. those who can't take it will drop. There is no need for dandies in Germany.”²⁹

Gend.Lt.Col. László Ferenczy failed in his attempt to exempt Jews of foreign nationality from deportation. As a contemporary German summary report wrote: „The local commanders of the Hungarian Gendarmerie... demonstrate such extreme zeal, that they consider this to be a question of honor; if at all possible, they wish to report no foreigners present.”³⁰

Although it may seem strange at first glance, in the matter of foreigners even the Germans had failed to control the Hungarian authorities. On 3 May 1944 Prime Minister Sztójay informed the members of his government that in early April a high-ranking SS officer had visited the Ministry of the Interior and tried to convince the Hungarian authorities to treat foreigners, (Jews and non-Jews) as the Germans had. Special attention was called to the various ways of „handling” citizens of neutral countries and those of belligerent states, i.e. at war with the Axis powers. In Germany, for example, American and British women and children were not interned. Of course, this was true only of non-Jewish women and children. On the other hand, in Hungary, as we learn from the protests that were received at the Foreign Ministry, not only citizens of enemy countries, but — in the countryside and in the capital as well — citizens of neutral countries were detained, some in their homes, some at the KEOKH (Central National Office for the Supervision of Foreigners), and were sent to collection camps. As Döme Sztójay remarked: „In their protests, foreign embassies took particular exception to the removal of citizens of enemy countries to places (Csepel) where they would be in danger of being bombed.”³¹ In this matter the Germans had one motivation: They asked, indeed demanded (in vain!) from the Hungarian authorities more sensitivity and caution regarding foreigners (Jews and non-Jews) because they feared retaliation against German citizens living abroad. Still, the Ministry of the Interior's order of 3 May calling for the separation of foreign and stateless

²⁹ Minutes of a meeting held in Munkács on 12 May 1944, recorded by the Mayor of Nagybánya, no. i. 34/1944 eln. The complete text of the minutes was published in R. L. BRAHAM's *The Politics of Genocide*. New York, 1981., Vol. II, pp. 601—603.

³⁰ Thadden's 26 May 1944 report to the Foreign Ministry. (*Wilhelmstrasse*, p. 855.)

³¹ Minutes of the Cabinet's session of 3 May 1944; for the portions dealing with Jews see: *Vádirat*, Vol. I, pp. 286—289.

Jews, was not heeded.³² Adolf Hezinger, one of Edmund Veesenmayer's colleagues, on his random inspection tour of Jewish camps and ghettos in May 1944, found a large number of foreign Jews there.³³

On 21 May Ferenczy reported from Munkács that 94.667 Jews had been taken away on 29 trains from the area of the VIIIth, IXth, and Xth Gendarmerie Districts (Felvidék, Kárpátalja (Carpatho-Ruthenia), and Észak-Erdély (North Transylvania) by that date.

„The empty trains arriving from the Reich”, László Ferenczy noted, „are positioned on the departure tracks one day before leaving. As a result, loading follows the timetable; departures and the trips to the border have thus far passed without a hitch.”³⁴

We also learn from Von Thadden's report, already mentioned above, that about one third of the Jews deported were capable of work. The clerk failed to mention that those considered unfit were gassed after their arrival in Auschwitz and that their bodies were burned in the crematoria.³⁵

EPILOGUE I

On 13 June Edmund Veesenmayer sent his final report to Ribbentrop: „The transporting of Jews from Kárpátalja and Transylvania was completed on 7 June. All told we transported 289.357 Jews to their destination in 92 trains, each consisting of 45 cars. The original target number of approximately 310.000 could not be achieved since in the interim some of the Jews were called up by the Hungarians for defensive forced labor service.”³⁶

Looking at the accounting, we can see that Ferenczy and Veesenmayer had every reason to be satisfied. Since 1938 nowhere had the Nazis and their cohorts ever managed to gather so many Jews within such a short period, rob them of their possessions and deport them. From Carpatho-Ruthenia and Transylvania, four trains, on the average, left daily for Auschwitz with deathly punctuality, with 69.8 persons in each freightcar. Of course some cars had more and some had less, but the goal was achieved: The majority of the Jews were annihilated in these parts of Hungary, too.

EPILOGUE II

The deportation of the Jews did not leave the non-Jewish population unconcerned. At the beginning of June 1944, the Investigation Section of Kassa reported that in and around Nagyszőlős rumors were circulating that after the Jews the Carpatho-Ruthenians would be deported. The Central Investigation Command of the Hungarian Royal

³² For the complete text of the Ministry of the Interior's decree, no. 7233/1944 VII.res., see: *Vádirat*, Vol. I, pp. 290—293.

³³ See Note n. 30.

³⁴ The originals of László Ferenczy's reports from 1944 are found in the archives of the Ministry of the Interior, attached to the records of Ferenczy's trial.

³⁵ See Note n. 30, pp. 855—856.

³⁶ Veesenmayer's telegram to Ribbentrop on 13 June 1944. (*Wilhelmstrasse*, p. 865.)

Gendarmerie suggested to the Head of the Public Safety Department of the Ministry of the Interior that he „put into effect some informational and counter-propaganda operations.”³⁷

EPILOGUE III

The Carpatho-Ruthenians' fear was baseless. For the Jews, however, there would have been much more reason for fleeing in panic. However, while daily thousands, tens of thousands, of their coreligionists were being deported, the Jews of the capital still believed that they were not in danger. According to Von Thadden, the Jewish Committee informed the Jews that „...the regulations concern only the Jews of the eastern territories who, as opposed to other, assimilated Jews, have kipt their Jewish characteristics...Be that as it may”, Von Thadden added, „whether because of this propaganda or some other reason, the Jews of other territories, despite the beginning of the deportations, have been calm.”³⁸

³⁷ OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 9. A report on the people's mood designated as n. 8950/B:kt. — 1944, recorded under 10. 173/1944. VII. res. sz.

³⁸ See Note n. 30, p. 854.

Zsidó deportálások Kárpátalján 1944-ben

A tanulmány elsősorban eddig még szakemberek előtt is ismeretlen dokumentumok segítségével megkísérli összefoglalni a kárpátaljai zsidóság 1944-es deportálásának történetét. Az Országos Levéltárban található a Kárpátaljai Kormányzói Biztos Hivatalának (KKBH) iratai. Ezt az iratanyagot eddig még senki sem dolgozta föl szisztematikusan, annak ellenére, hogy rendkívül sok érdekes és új információt tartalmaz, többek között a magyar zsidó Holocaust történetével kapcsolatban is. A tanulmány vázolja a magyar zsidók helyzetét 1944 elején, a magyar és német hivatalos zsidópolitika általános kereteit, majd azt vizsgálja, hogy milyen körülmények között zajlott Kárpátalján 1944 áprilisában—májusában a zsidók megbélyegzése, kifosztása, gettókba, majd gyűjtőtáborokba terelése, végül deportálásuk. Bőven idéz a korabeli német diplomáciai iratok mellett az egykorú magyar csendőri, tisztiorvosi jelentésekből is. A dokumentumok elemzéséből világosan kiderül, hogy a magyar és német hatóságok harmonikusan együttműködtek a zsidókérdés „megoldásában”, maguk a zsidók pedig képtelenek voltak ellenállást tanúsítani.

LÁSZLÓ J. NAGY

THE MOROCCAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT FORMING AROUND THE SULTAN (1946—1952)

There were several similarities in the two North-African French protectorates concerning the political situation after the Second World War but some significant differences can be observed as well. Political human rights were more restricted in Morocco than in Tunisia. Political parties may not be legally formed here, either, but they were tolerated to a certain extent. However, their press was strictly controlled; more numbers were suppressed than issued. Moroccans could not either found trade unions.

Their interests were represented and protected by CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail). In 1946, when it became the General Union of Moroccan Trade Unions /Union Générale Des Syndicats Confédérés Marocains — UGSCM/, keeping close relations with the French trade union centre, it had 40 thousand European and 20 thousand Moroccan members.¹ Parties were the least developed here among the three Maghreb countries from the aspect of organisation, as they had hardly any historical and military experiences and they could hardly declare their formation towards the end of the Second World War, they were proclaimed already, thus their structural establishment did not even have the relatively favourable possibilities provided by the restricted legality. The weakness of the parties also contributed to the fact that the ruler, Muhammad Ibn Yusuf could become the integrating factor and leader of the trends and organisations of the national movement. His authority was reinforced by the facts that he had met Roosevelt in 1943 and he had been received with distinct attention by de Gaulle in 1945, who had rewarded him with the order of resistance. America exerted the most profound and most conspicuous influence exactly here among the three North-African French colonies; the military bases established after the disembarkation of 1942 were henceforward maintained, in fact, their number increased. This is the country where the nationalist movement — more precisely the Istiqlal Party — first chose the United States of America as its international confederate and this was the first country to recognise the significance of the U.N. in the anti-colonialist struggles.

It was the Istiqlal among the existing three parties that influenced significantly each social layer; neither the Communist Party nor the Democratic Party of Independence /Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance — PDI/ could take real and deep roots in Moroccan society; their influence reached only the fragments of certain layers. The views of the three parties, although communists were really far from the two nationalist parties from ideological aspect, were identical on some basic political questions. None of them was satisfied with the existing reforms improving the political system of the protectorate. This

¹ OVIED, GEORGES: *La gauche française et le nationalisme marocain 1905—1955*. Vol. II. p. 228. Paris, 1984.

fact was expressed, the most explicitly, by the Istiqlal Party when refusing the reforms of the summer of 1947, it declared: „The first real reform will be the abolition of the protectorate” („La première réforme véritable c'est l'abolition du Protectorat.”)²

Each of the three parties approved the territorial integrity of the country (including the Spanish Sahara as well) and the re-establishment of the unity of the dismembered Morocco. Each of them regarded the Sultan as the symbol of Moroccan unity and they agreed on the plan to keep close relations between the independent Morocco and France.

In spite of the reprisal of January 1944 the Istiqlal remained the most significant party of the country, although it operated rather as a movement than a party, similarly to the Neo-Dustur Party, but in a less organized way. It was still based, first of all, on the bazar, that is, the merchant-bourgeoisie of the cities, mainly Fez and Rabat, while its influence in Casablanca that became the economic and commercial centre of the colony was rapidly increasing both on the layer of Moroccan entrepreneurs attracted there by the fast economic growth and on the circle of the marginalized half-proletarian mass of the suburbs.³

The Istiqlal did not have any opportunity to organize mass-actions after the war — the memory of January 1944 made it pre-cautious, too — thus it made efforts to obtain its purpose by using legal frameworks and bombarded the colonial authorities (resident general, foreign minister) with petitions and memoranda. This is the way it wanted to enforce negotiations with the French government. Its program for 1947 was basically unchanged, more precise in certain aspects. According to this, only the profound revision, practically the invalidation of the contract of the protectorate could be the basis of the normal French—Moroccan relations and the starting point of the negotiations in the future. It declared explicitly that constitutional monarchy would be the political system of the independent Morocco, where Islam was the state religion but also persons of other religions could take state positions. It did not mention social questions, similarly to the program of the nationalist Maghreb-parties.⁴ The Istiqlal sent a memorandum to the U.N. already at the end of 1947, which detailed the historical, political, economic and cultural position of the country. According to its basic conclusion, the Moroccan nation was „a coherent political system” („une constitution politique cohérente”), which had already existed before the arrival of the French and this fact made the institution of the protectorate completely illegal. That is why it could be regarded as a sovereign nation by the U.N. and the world's public opinion.⁵

It acknowledged the ruler's directing role in the national movement only gradually, exactly the way how Muhammad Ibn Yusuf bound himself more and more consistently to defend national interests in the political struggles.

² *Egalité*, 18 July 1947.

³ MARAIS, ECTAVE: *La classe dirigeante au Maroc*. *Revue française de sciences politiques* 1964 no. 4., p. 716.

⁴ *Egalité*, 23 May 1947.

⁵ *Egalité*, 21 November and 5 December 1947.

The other party, the PDI (led by Wazzani), whose roots go back to the division of 1937, mainly collected Francophile intellectuals and was closest to the Algerian UDMA. According to their program, they were struggling for the absolute independence of the country, which was, however, „not a simple ideal, but the sine qua non of Moroccan national development” („non seulement an marocaine”) ⁶ for them. In contrast to the Istiqlal, it wanted to establish „a political and social democracy” („une démocratie politique et sociale”). Consequently it considered the Left to be its confederate: „the PDI is a national liberal party explicitly oriented to the Left” („le PDI est un parti national libéral nettement orienté vers la gauche”). ⁷ It kept very good relations with the Socialists.

The Moroccan Communist Party (MCP) passed through the same way as its Algerian and Tunisian sister parties. Also the turning point in the political directives of the party took place in the summer of 1946. On 4 August, at the meeting of the Central Committee the party rejected its former strategical purpose and approved of national independence, the re-establishment of the territorial integrity of the country and the formation of a national assembly created by general and secret ballot. „in order to establish a free and independent Morocco against every imperialism, a parliament and a Moroccan government, responsible for the matters of the country, must be formed immediately” („Pour établir un Maroc libre et indépendant à l'égard de tout impérialisme, il faut créer immédiatement une assemblée et un gouvernement marocains gérant toutes les affaires du Maroc.”) ⁸ Still in the same month, the ruler received his representatives in audience and declared after the meeting that „the class of workers belongs to the nation as well and the time of democracy has arrived for everyone...” („...la classe des travailleurs s'appartient aussi un peuple et les temps de la démocratie sont venus pour tous.”) ⁹ The party suggested to the Nationalists establishing a National Front. The Istiqlal rejected this suggestion as it did not regard the MCP as a national party and the communion would have restricted its freedom of action. „As a matter of fact, there is no Moroccan Communist Party. There is a communist party whose secretary-general is a French person who was born in Algeria” ¹⁰ and which has many French and only a few Moroccan members... It suggested to us forming a national front. We have not done anything in this matter so far. We would rather preserve our liberty towards each party.” („Il n'y a pas à proprement parler de Parti Communiste Marocain. Il y a un Parti Communiste dont le secrétaire général est un Algérien naturalisé Français et qui a comme membres beaucoup de Français et quelques rares Marocains... Il nous a proposé alors la constitution d'un Front national. Nous n'avons

⁶ *Egalité*, 30 January 1947.

⁷ *Egalité*, 10 April 1947.

⁸ Quoted by: AYACHE, ALBERT: *Le Maroc*. Paris, 1956. p. 351.

⁹ *Bulletin d'informations du Maroc* 8 September 1946.

¹⁰ The parents of the secretary-general of the MCP, Ali Jata were from Kabyle and moved to Tanger at the end of World War I. Ali Jata was born here in 1920. He joined the nationalist scouting movement early and became a member of the MCP in 1944. He applied for Moroccan citizenship several times but did not get it during the period of the protectorate because it was easier to convict him and expel him from the country. *Liberté*, 15 March 1951., p. 22.

rien fait dans ce sens jusqu'à présent. Nous préférons conserver notre liberté d'action vis-à-vis de tous les partis.")¹¹

It is a fact that the MCP did not have many Moroccan members but it did have a strong influence on the circle of secular intellectuals and — through the trade unions — on wage labourers. In fact, it could win even Fellah people over in certain regions. The actual reason for rejecting co-operation was of an ideological nature. Similarly to the Neo-Dustur Party, the Istiqlal was a strictly anti-communist party. The ideological contrast became even wider later because of the orientation of foreign affairs of the nationalists. On the other hand, the Istiqlal regarded, to a certain extent, the communists as a rival party and tried to do everything to suppress its influence. Allal al Fassi wrote a few years later that his party had succeeded in eliminating communist influence on peasants living in the neighbourhood of Tadla. „It was thanks to our Tadla branch that this influence was counteracted. (i.e. the communist influence — L.J.N)... to us and to the Islamic principles which are our guide."¹² The relation of communists to nationalists was the worst in Morocco among the three Maghreb-countries. The Istiqlal wanted to obtain absolute power within the national movement; although it accepted PDI but assigned a subordinate role to them. Colonial power, on the other hand, accepted only the Sultan as a negotiating partner, who stepped on the political arena in 1947 with, so to say, great spectacle and causing almost traumatic effects.

In April he travelled to Tanger through the Spanish Zone where he was greeted with reverence due to rulers. No Moroccan ruler had visited the city since 1889. Muhammed Ibn Yusuf wanted to demonstrate the unity of Morocco with his visit. The resident general permitted this visit only with difficulty and with the final intervention of the American consul in Tanger. The ruler was received by a huge crowd demanding independence in this city of international status. Abdelhalek Torres, disappointed with Franco, greeted him as a ruler „who increases our hope in independence."¹³ In his speech of 9 April the Sultan expressed his regret for the backwardness of the country and encouraged his compatriots to improve the results of modern techniques. He expressed his confidence not only in the ability of Moroccan people „to learn" technical civilization but also in his hope that they would become conscious politically. „The people will awake finally and will be conscious of their rights and they will follow the most effective way of regaining their position among nations... the legitimate rights of the Moroccan people cannot get lost and will not get lost ever." („Le peuple se réveille enfin, il prend conscience de ses droits et il va suivre la voie efficace pour retrouver sa place parmi les peuples... Aussi les droits légitimes du peuple marocain ne peuvent — ils se perdre et ne se perdront jamais.")¹⁴ The representatives of colonial power present were astonished already by the statements encouraging national consciousness, just like by the fact that the

¹¹ Conférence de presse donnée par la délégation du Parti de l'Istiqlal à Paris le 30 août 1946. Bureau de documentation et d'information du Parti. Paris, 1946. 13.

¹² AL-FASSI, ALLAL: *What is Istiqlal?* The Islamic Review, 1951. no. 5., p. 39.

¹³ *Egalité*, 17 April 1947.

¹⁴ *Bulletin d'informations du Maroc*. 18 April 1947.

Sultan, in contrast to the practice, did not say a word about the results of the „civilizing mission” of the French, but even more by those statements that had not been included in the original text given to the press for publication before. Muhammed Ibn Yusuf praised the Arabian League which enabled Arab leaders to unite their voices and march together towards moral development, the powerful Islam and the glory of Arabians.¹⁵ The ruler declared his statements to the press when he was travelling from Tanger to Rabat and expressed his desire that the links between Morocco and the Near-East would become continually closer, especially after the fact that the Arabian League became an institution and played an important role in international politics. At the same time he declared that Tanger was a Moroccan city and that „Morocco is united and the throne is the symbol of this unity” („Maroc est une entité dont le symbole est le trône.”)¹⁶

The Tanger speech was an event of great significance, it can be regarded as a milestone in the history of the Moroccan national movement; the Sultan declared explicitly that he joined the forces struggling for national development and freedom; what is more, he would become their mediator. The speech was the starting point of the unity of the nationalist movement and the throne.

Paris responded to the Tanger speech by summoning the resident general; he was blamed for the things that happened. General Alphonse Juin was appointed to his post, who was a staunch adherent of the maintenance of the empire and behaved as a „feudal baron” opposing even the occasional flexible attitude of the French government during his four-year „proconsular” activity in Morocco.¹⁷ He rejected real negotiations and judged the reforms initiated up to that time to be satisfactory. He continued restricting the activity of the nationalists, enforced their leaders to leave the country. They tried to organize international support in the Maghreb office in Cairo, at the U.N. and in the United States, where in New York, the Moroccan Informational Bureau was opened at the end of 1947. The communists made efforts to connect the struggle for national independence with the aims of the peace movement. However, they could not achieve even those results in this respect as Tunisian communists did, although the peace movement — as there were American military bases in the country — could have been the most effective here. Yet the Istiqlal and the ruler, as he detailed it to the American consul during his visit to Tanger, did not oppose military bases because „the American presence lessens a little the French pressure on us.” („la présence américaine ici, nous considérons qu'elle allégeait un petit peu la pression française sur nous.”)¹⁸

The political situation was relatively calm in Morocco between 1947 and 1950, but social conflicts were rather intense. The social struggle guided by the UGSCM had several results: they achieved wage increases and in fact, the trade union membership of Moroccan

¹⁵ *Le Monde*, 12 April 1947.

¹⁶ *Le Monde*, 15 April 1947.

¹⁷ JULIEN, CHARLES-ANDRÉ: *Le Maroc face aux impérialismes*. Paris, 1986., p. 214.

¹⁸ BENJELLOUN, ABDELMAJID: *Les relations entre le mouvement nationaliste marocain de la zone Nord et les Américains de 1945 à 1956*. In: BENJELLOUN, ABDELMAJID: *Approches du colonialisme*. Editions ODAD Rabat, 1988.

people became acknowledged theoretically in 1948 and also Moroccan wage-workers got child bounty with certain restrictions. Having recognised this fact, the Istiqlal became interested in the trade unionist movement through Ferhat Hased and under the pressure of the CISL. The party acknowledged the role of the movement in the struggle for national liberation and wanted to establish „a free and independent trade union”¹⁹ As it did not succeed in causing a split in the UGSCM, it suggested to its members joining the union. Thus the Istiqlal, even if enforcedly, took notice of co-operation in this respect with the communists who did want to „Moroccanize” the trade union. The UGSCM was guided by a French and a Moroccan secretary from 1946 and by a Moroccan from 1951. However, it did not bind itself to participate in political struggles, therefore the UGSCM will break up when the country becomes independent and a new national trade union will be established under the guidance of the nationalists.

The ruler realized his theoretical Statements in 1950. In the summer he decided to travel to Paris and initiate negotiations with the French government. Although the effectiveness of his mission was endangered by the North-African conference held in August in Paris (the conference held on 12 August, under the chairmanship of Prime Minister René Plevén, the governor of the three North-African colonies. With respect to the international situation caused by the war in Korea, they decided to slow down reforms in the three countries)²⁰ he still travelled to the capital of France in October. One day after his arrival, on the 11th he set a memorandum to the President of the Republic, Vincent Auriol, in which he demanded fundamental structural reforms stating that „the Moroccan problem emerged today is not the matter of the partial reforms of the present administration and superficial personal changes any longer but the problem of a nation which demands changes extending to the basis and the details and this is what the actual circumstances demand, too.” („le problème marocain qui se pose aujourd'hui n'est plus une affaire de réformes fragmentaires ou de remaniements superficiels des rouages de l'administrations portant sur le fond et les détails, ainsi que la nécessite la conjuncture actuelle.”)²¹

Beside the actual demands including details as well (e.g. the acknowledgement of the right of Moroccans to form trade unions) he urged, first of all, the construction of an agreement which determines „the basis of the future and the ultimate purposes”. The French response of the 31st caused absolute disappointment because it did not respond to any of the demands in essentials. The ruler travelled home without any French—Moroccan common statement signed. Debates and struggles continued at home in the political institutions of the protectorate characterized by a rather restricted sphere of jurisdiction. At the beginning of December the Istiqlal members criticized sharply the system of the protectorate when resident general Juin removed them from the hall. However, they were received by the Sultan who demonstrated his approval this way. This is the point when the resident general decided to destroy, at any cost, the alliance between the ruler and the

¹⁹ Statement by Bouabid, member of the governing body of the Istiqlal: *Algérie libre*, 15 April 1949.

²⁰ *Année politique*, 1950, p. 172.

²¹ Quoted by JULIEN, CHARLES-ANDRÉ: *Le Maroc face aux impérialismes*, p. 232.

Istiqlal that was gradually strengthening. First he turned to the classical dividing tactics, recalling the „Berber policy.”

Hajj T'Hami, the leader of the Glawi tribe and the pasha of Marrakesh has had a grudge against the ruler for a long period because he did not prefer religious matters but bound himself more and more in political struggles. In December 1950 he openly accused the Sultan of Istiqlal-communist friendship and brought out Berber tribes — with the resident general's knowledge — in the neighbourhood of Fes in order to exert pressure on the Sultan and to prevent the formation of an alliance between the throne and the national movement. The Istiqlal and the ulamas of Fes, however, branded the pasha of Marrakesh as antipatriotic and conservative and started to defend the Sultan, who could not be convinced even by Juin — in spite of any threat — to confine himself openly from the nationalist party. The wakening of the „Berber policy” brought about great indignation in the Arab countries. The Arabian League asked for the intervention of the United States. The American government got into an uncertain situation. It did not want to criticize its strategical confederate explicitly, especially when they were negotiating on the increasing of its military bases in Morocco. According to the agreement signed on 12 July 1951 the United States built five air bases in the country, which „are important” — according to the document — „from the point of view of the protection of North-Africa and the American superiority in the Mediterranean.”²² At the same time the American Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned Paris through the French ambassador in Washington to find a compromise with the Istiqlal supported by the two-thirds of the population and to avoid creating a situation which would, sooner or later, provoke a new Indo-Chinese war in order to achieve long-term stability.²³ Atlantic solidarity is still valid but the agreement between the interests of the United States practising global policy in the region and France, unable to part from the traditional treatment of the colonial problem, is becoming more and more difficult.

Strong — arm policy established — for the first time since 1936 — the united front of the nationalist parties of the French and Spanish Morocco, producing an effect which was exactly the opposite of the purposes. Two French Moroccan parties — the Istiqlal and the PDI — and two Spanish Moroccan parties — the Reformist Party and the Party of Moroccan Unity — signed an agreement on 9 April 1951 in Tanger, in which they declared not to enter into any negotiations before the acknowledgement of the independence of the country. They also agreed on not creating a united front with the communists.²⁴ They tried to find international confederates first of all. They attributed, invariably, great significance to the U.N. Their hopes and, to some extent, their impatience were increased by the fact that the organization could arrange the matter of the independence of Libya. The national government of the former Italian colony was established in March 1951 and it declared the independence of the country later; on 14 December. The leaders of the Istiqlal confirmed

²² *Année politique*, 1951. p. 190.

²³ Quoted by LACROIX-RIZ, ANNIE: *Les protectorats d'Afrique de Nord entre la France et Washington*. Paris, 1988. p. 102.

²⁴ *Année politique*, 1951. p. 109.

A szultán körül kialakuló marokkói nemzeti mozgalom (1946—1952)

A három észak-afrikai francia gyarmat közül Marokkóban volt a legkedvezőtlenebb a politikai légkör a nemzeti mozgalom számára. A nemzeti pártok legális tevékenységét — a világháború befejezését követő 2—3 évet kivéve — a cselekvésképtelenségig korlátozták. Így az a sajátos helyzet alakult ki, hogy a nemzeti mozgalom élére az uralkodó, Mohammed ben Juszuf állt. 1947-ben, Tangerben elmondott beszéde valóságos nacionalista programmal ér fel. Tárgyalások útján próbálta elérni Párizsban az 1912-es protektoráusi szerződés eltörlését. A francia kormány azonban hajthatatlan marad, aminek következtében a nemzeti mozgalom is radikalizálódik 1952-től: a politikai eszközök mellett megjelennek a fegyveres gerillaharc formái is.

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