

**ACTA UNIVERSITATIS SZEGEDIENSIS  
DE ATILA JÓZSEF NOMINATAE**

**ACTA HISTORICA  
TOMUS CV.**

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## IGLESIA Y RELIGIÓN EN LA HISTORIA DE CUBA

Cuba es el país menos religioso de América Latina. Este hecho – el bajo nivel de religiosidad y la debilidad de las Iglesias – muchos lo imputan en primer lugar a la consecuencia de la revolución de 1959, al sistema socialista y a la política marxista, atea, practicada con respecto a la Iglesia. Este criterio puede encontrarse en Hungría, también, donde se ignora, prácticamente, los problemas de la historia religiosa y eclesiástica de Cuba. Salvo la versión húngara de entrevistas de *Frei Betto: Fidel y la Religión*, el lector que desee informarse no dispone de otra publicación de fondo.<sup>1</sup> Entre los especialistas que se dedican a estudiar la historia del país insular, sin embargo, es un criterio aceptado en general que la debilidad tiene raíces históricas que se remontan al pasado colonial<sup>2</sup>. La trayectoria histórica del cristianismo y de la Iglesia Católica, cuyo significado es determinante, constituyen *una excepción histórica en América Latina*, las condiciones y características de su evolución desde los albores de la época colonial hasta nuestros días han diferido del promedio latinoamericano en muchos aspectos.

El cristianismo y la Iglesia Católica en Cuba tienen ya un pasado de casi medio milenio. Es natural, por tanto, que sea imposible presentar en un ensayo corto y modesto todos los detalles de su evolución. Siendo así, asumiendo el riesgo de andar de prisa y ser somero, y remitiendo al lector a la literatura especializada en lo tocante a los pormenores, en este estudio nos proponemos ofrecer un bosquejo de las causas históricas de la debilidad del catolicismo cubano y de algunas características de su desarrollo<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Véase la edición húngara de BETTO, Frei: *Fidel y la religión* (La Habana 1985): *Fidel és a vallás*, Kossuth, Bp. 1987.

<sup>2</sup> Véase por ej. CRAHAN, Margaret E.: "Cuba: Religion and Revolutionary Institutionalization." *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 17 (noviembre de 1985), 319.

<sup>3</sup> Sobre la historia de la Iglesia Católica cubana ver: LEISECA, Juan Martín: *Apuntes para la Historia Eclesiástica de Cuba* (La Habana, 1938.); PORTUONDO, Fernando: *Historia de Cuba 1492-1898* (La Habana 1965.), las partes correspondientes; PRIEN, Hans-Jürgen: *La Historia del cristianismo en América Latina* (Salamanca 1985.); Intenta periodizar la época colonial Eduardo TORRES-CUEVAS: "Elementos para una periodización de la Iglesia Católica Cubana durante los siglos coloniales." Conferencia pronunciada en el VIII Congreso de AHILA, Szeged, Hungría, 1987., manuscrito. Contiene la posición eclesiástica oficial el *Encuentro Nacional Eclesial Cubano* – en lo subsiguiente: *ENEC – Documento Final e Instrucción Pastoral de los Obispos* (s.l. 1987). La obra cubana más abarcadora en cuanto al período posterior a 1959 es la de GÓMEZ TRETO, Raúl: *La Iglesia católica durante la*

## *El catolicismo colonial*

Uno de los rasgos determinantes del catolicismo colonial cubano - a mi parecer, el primer componente de su debilidad - es que la Iglesia (a diferencia de la América Latina continental pero de manera similar a otras islas caribeñas) *no pudo respaldarse en los indios como base de la evangelización y arraigo de la religión católica*. Pues la población aborígen (unos 100 000) desapareció en el término de algunos decenios a consecuencias de las epidemias que se habían introducida y la cruel aplicación del régimen de encomienda. Así, casi desde el mismo comienzo, en el catolicismo cubano *faltó el ímpetu misionero*. Por otro lado, faltó la inserción paulatina - desde luego, no libre de contradicciones - de los dogmas, ideales y valores católicos en la conciencia popular, lo que en el continente estuvo garantizado - incluso a pesar de la disminución de la población autoctóna - por la continuidad de las comunidades indias, por la transmisión a la era colonial de los modelos de socialización, de los conocimientos culturales y religiosos, etc.

En el siglo XVI también la atención de los colonizadores se alejó de Cuba, pobre en metales preciosos, dirigiéndose a México y el Perú, los países del oro y la plata del continente. La población de la Isla se reducía a algunos miles de blancos y a los esclavos negros llevados allí a la fuerza para suplir la mano de obra india, pero que en ese entonces no eran aún muy numerosos. Aunque el Episcopado de Santiago de Cuba fue creado ya en 1516, el grado de estructuración de la organización eclesiástica se correspondía con la insignificancia económica de la isla; incluso el obispado era con frecuencia "sede vacante". Según *la posición de hoy* de la Iglesia Católica de Cuba, lo positivo de la época es que: "Ha nacido una nueva realidad: la cultura criolla, sincrética y mulata."<sup>4</sup>

El robustecimiento de la Iglesia Católica fue cimentado en el siglo XVII y XVIII por el crecimiento económico producido en primer lugar por el incremento de la importancia del puerto de La Habana (base militar y de aprovisionamiento). En aquel entonces en la economía cubana dominaba el desarrollo agrícola de las regiones occidentales cercanas a La Habana, siendo el cultivo del tabaco lo más importante al comienzo, al cual se iba uniendo la ganadería. La colonización del territorio, que para la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII era ya casi total, se reflejaba en la multiplicación en número y bienes de los templos, las capillas y los monasterios en los nuevos poblados. En el siglo XVII se hizo popular entre los criollos la carrera sacerdotal. Significaba poder ascender y encerraba la posibilidad de alcanzar una posición. Para mediados de siglo casi todo el clero - en aquel entonces había en Cuba más de 200 sacerdotes y casi 100 monjas - era criollo.

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*construcción del socialismo en Cuba* (CEHILA 1988). Véase también: KUKOVECZ György: "The Church and the Social Challenges in Modern Cuba." Acta Universitatis Szegediensis... Acta Historica t. LXXXIX, Szeged 1989., 44-60.

<sup>4</sup> ENEC, 2., 29.



El período que podemos considerar "edad de oro" de la Iglesia colonial en Cuba dura desde el inicio del siglo XVIII hasta concluir el primer tercio del siglo XIX. En su preparación desempeñó un gran papel el obispo *Diego Evelino de Compostela*, quien trabajó en Cuba entre 1687 y 1704, creando una sólida estructura moral e institucional en la Iglesia. Su obra fue seguida por su sucesor *Gerónimo Valdés*. Valdés "fundó la casa de Beneficencia (1710), el Seminario San Basilio de Santiago (1722) y la Universidad San Gerónimo de La Habana (1728), encomendada a los Padres Dominicos. Valdés se puso de parte de los vegueros habaneros cuando éstos se rebelaron contra el gobierno español. A mediados del siglo XVIII de los 50 párrocos que había en Cuba, 46 eran criollos; 561 eclesiásticos atendían las necesidades espirituales de una población cien veces menor que la actual" <sup>5</sup>. A fines del del siglo, 484 sacerdotes diócesanos aseguraban la atención pastoral en 52 parroquias; 20 conventos albergaban a 496 religiosos. En La Habana por estos tiempos había 233 frailes, 200 monjas y 45 organizaciones religiosas seculares (congregaciones, cofradías). <sup>6</sup>

En el siglo XVIII, en la persona de *Dionisio Resino*, se nombró el primer obispo criollo, cubano. Según opina Fernando Portuondo, el aumento de la proporción de los criollos entre los clérigos "...se permitió una más estrecha identificación entre los encargados de la dirección espiritual del pueblo y el pueblo mismo. *El hecho tuvo importancia en el orden económico, pues impidió que gran parte de los caudales acumulados por obras pías salieran del país.*" <sup>7</sup>

La edad de oro del desarrollo eclesiástico dio varias destacadas personalidades a la cultura cubana. El obispo *Agustín Morell de Santa Cruz*, dominicano por nacimiento, se convirtió en el primer historiógrafo de Cuba. El padre criollo *Juan de Conyedo* ganó méritos en la enseñanza elemental. El obispo *José Santiago Hechavarría*, cubano de nacimiento, en 1772 fundó el Real Colegio-Seminario de San Carlos y San Ambrosio. De esta escuela salió la primera generación de los pensadores independistas del siglo XIX. Entre sus profesores encontramos incluso dos sacerdotes que desempeñaron un papel clave en promover el despertar nacional. Uno de ellos es *José Agustín Caballero*, llamado por José Martí "*Padre de los pobres y de nuestra Filosofía*", que en el desarrollo de la educación acumuló méritos imperecederos. El padre *Félix Valera*, venerado por cristianos y marxistas por igual como *el padre de la cultura cubana*, declaró por primera vez la necesidad de que Cuba se separe de la metrópoli, y más tarde, ya durante su destierro en la Florida, definió una de las causas principales de la supervivencia del sistema colonial en la Cuba del siglo XIX. Escribió que "los cubanos piensan más en sus cajas de azúcar que en la dignidad de la Patria. Se piensan salvar solos, sin darse cuenta que todos correran la suerte que corra la Patria." <sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> PORTUONDO: *op.cit.*, 162.

<sup>6</sup> ENEC, 35.; PRIEN: *op.cit.*, 960.

<sup>7</sup> PORTUONDO: *op.cit.*, 162.

<sup>8</sup> Cita: ENEC, 34.

Desde el tercer tercio del siglo XVIII hasta los años 1830 la agricultura cubana sufrió una profunda transformación estructural. En el término de medio siglo el dominio del tabaco fue suplantado por la hegemonía del azúcar ( el auge temporal del cultivo del café sólo dio un colorido más a este proceso). En el medio siglo subsiguiente la producción de víveres y las demás ramas del agro se vieron totalmente desplazadas a un segundo plano y para finales del siglo XIX se estableció el monocultivo azucarero que define hasta hoy el día el carácter de la economía cubana.

El surgimiento del ciclo azucarero planteó agudamente un problema que ya existía pero que hasta ese momento no se había revelado como un problema fundamental, a saber, las relaciones entre el esclavo y al cristianismo. Desde 1517 se empleaban en Cuba esclavos negros para suplir la fuerza laboral indígena y se calcula que hasta 1873 se había llevado al país a la fuerza aproximadamente medio millón de africanos. Durante largo tiempo la proporción de los habitantes de origen africano fue aumentando en forma moderada; al concluir el siglo XVIII el número de los negros era inferior al de la población blanca. Pero el ciclo azucarero creó una situación nueva, las plantaciones devoraban la fuerza laboral, año tras año se introducían a la Isla nuevas masas de esclavos. A comienzos del siglo XIX el número de negros ya era superior al de los blancos (sólo después de la abolición total del comercio de esclavos volvió a modificarse la proporción en favor de los blancos).

¿En qué medida la Iglesia Católica colonial fue capaz de responder al desafío que representaba la evangelización de los esclavos? Según el "Documento Final" del ENEC: "Ante los negros esclavos, en la mayoría de los casos, la evangelización fue precaria. La catequización y el bautismo de los mismos obedecía más bien a un trámite formal que a un sincero deseo de convertirlos, ya que existía pena de excomunicación para quienes llevaron esclavos sin bautizarlos." <sup>9</sup> El esclavo, por tanto, adoptó el cristianismo pero debajo del barniz católico seguían viviendo las tradiciones culturales y religiosas africanas, y se inició un proceso que condujo al surgimiento de sincretismos que caracterizan hasta el día de hoy la religiosidad cubana.

Según la acertada formulación del ENEC, "Esta es la religiosidad probablemente de la mayor parte de nuestro pueblo y cubre un espectro de contenidos de fe muy variados: en un extremo, más distante del núcleo cristiano, podríamos hablar de animismo africano y espiritismo; en el otro extremo, se trata de verdaderos cristianos católicos con adherencias superficiales que se remontan al animismo africano y al espiritismo." <sup>10</sup> Pensamos que no se trata primordialmente de que la cultura, y las religiones africanas hayan resultado más resistentes frente al catolicismo que las religiones indígenas sino que la resistencia religiosa del esclavo - resistencia que, en el hacinamiento de los barracones de las plantaciones, fue uno de los guardianes de su identidad africana y la "ideología" de la rebelión frente al sojuzgamiento - en los decenios del surgimiento del ciclo azucarero se refrescaba continua y masivamente con los nuevos cargamentos de

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<sup>9</sup> ENEC, 34.

<sup>10</sup> ENEC, 80.

esclavos que iban llegando. En cambio, en el subcontinente los pilares originales de la religiosidad indígena se iban atenuando paulatinamente en la memoria de las generaciones que se sucedían en los siglos del sojuzgamiento colonial sostenido y sistemático, aunque no desaparecieron del todo, como lo prueban los elementos sincréticos del "catolicismo indio".

La Iglesia Católica cubana fue incapaz de corresponder al desafío que entrañaba la supervivencia de la religiosidad africana en una era en la cual la *conciencia criolla* misma se transformó en *conciencia nacional cubana* de filo antiespañol, las tradiciones culturales y religiosas africanas se convirtieron en parte orgánica de la cultura nacional cubana que se estaba formando, irradiándose su efecto a la población blanca también.

Una de las características de la "edad de oro católica" del siglo XVIII fue el crecimiento de la identidad criolla. En cambio, desde el segundo tercio del siglo XIX la Iglesia cubana padeció una grave crisis de identidad, lo que - a nuestro juicio - tuvo un papel decisivo en el debilitamiento de las posiciones del catolicismo. La esencia de la crisis radica en la conducta de rechazo de la que la Iglesia regulada por el derecho patronal de la Corona española diera muestras frente a las aspiraciones independentistas. "España, advertida por su experiencia americana, trata de descunanzar al clero... y apartará de los altos cargos eclesiásticos a los sacerdotes cubanos. Hasta finales del siglo, la alta jerarquía de la Iglesia se mantendrá al margen de los grandes ideales independentistas del pueblo cubano. Es la etapa de la Iglesia desgobernada, empobrecida y manipulada. La desorganización pastoral y la degradación moral de una parte del clero serán una triste realidad" - dice la posición católica oficial de nuestro tiempo.<sup>11</sup>

También las medidas adoptadas en las etapas liberales de la política española que a mediados de los años veinte y a comienzos de los años cuarenta estaban dirigidas contra las órdenes religiosas y a la secularización de los bienes monasteriles resultaron en la disminución de la influencia eclesiástica y en la baja del número de clérigos. Sus efectos se pueden medir estadísticamente también. En 1817 había 1044 clérigos por 550 000 habitantes aproximadamente, mientras que en 1857 ya sólo 438 para una población que entre tanto había aumentado a 939 000 personas.<sup>12</sup>

En el periodo de las guerras de independencia, desde 1868 hasta 1898, la Iglesia llegó a desaparecer incluso físicamente de numerosas regiones del país. En muchos lugares las partes beligerantes quemaron o utilizaron de fortalezas los templos y los conventos.

### *La Iglesia católica en la "República neocolonial"*

A comienzos del siglo XX la mayoría de los cubanos consideraba a la Iglesia católica "como una cosa obsoleta" y al clero - debido a la conducta que había tenido en

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<sup>11</sup> ENEC, 37.

<sup>12</sup> PRIEN: *op.cit.*, 961-962.

la época de la guerra de independencia - como una fuerza anticubana. "La descristianización de las masas, el anticlericalismo y la indiferencia e incultura religiosa, fueron los principales retos de la época republicana."<sup>13</sup> Entre 1898 y 1902 las autoridades de ocupación estadounidenses alejaron y retiraron a los religiosos de la educación y de la mayoría de los hospitales. Se realizó *de facto* la separación del Estado y la Iglesia, santificada en 1901 por la Constitución y ratificada posteriormente en 1940 por la nueva Constitución.<sup>14</sup> Con el abierto apoyo de las autoridades de los EE.UU., comenzó la penetración de las Iglesias y sectas protestantes.

La Iglesia católica, que estaba en aprieto, respondió a estos desafíos con una reorganización global marcada por el espíritu de la *cubanización* y la *romanización* de la Iglesia. Entre los principales pasos estuvo la creación de seis diócesis por el Vaticano en lugar de los dos existentes en la época colonial (hoy ya hay siete) y se aumentó a dos el número de los arzobispados con sede en Santiago de Cuba y en La Habana. Se hicieron esfuerzos para extender la formación de sacerdotes y para recuperar las posiciones de la Iglesia en la enseñanza. En la formación sacerdotal sólo se lograron éxitos parciales y la Iglesia volvió a llenar los vacíos en la "plantilla" importando personal desde España. A partir de los años treinta arribaron al país muchos monjes de visión falangista también. En los años cincuenta el 80% de los sacerdotes y frailes eran españoles, no es casualidad que durante toda la existencia de la república neocolonial (1902-1959) se sostuviese el criterio de que la Iglesia era un cuerpo extraño en la sociedad cubana.

Para los años 1920-30 se fue perfilando la estrategia católica para reconquistar a los fieles. La Iglesia se volcó sobre todo a las capas medias urbanas y a la alta burguesía, prestando menos atención a los grupos sociales inferiores (obreros, campesinos, obreros agrícolas, etc.). Fueron las grandes urbes las que se convirtieron en escenario principal de sus actividades, mientras que en el interior del país la Iglesia Católica prestó verdadera atención sólo a las provincias occidentales (Pinar del Río, Habana, Matanzas). En éstas los pequeños terratenientes (minifundistas) dedicados al cultivo del tabaco y a la producción de víveres componían una parte notable de la población entre los cuales el catolicismo tenía tradicionalmente posiciones fuertes. En los pequeños poblados y en los bateyes centrales y orientales del país, en las colonias obreras de estos lugares, la población entraba en contacto con la Iglesia sólo esporádicamente. Fidel Castro, por ejemplo, le contó a Frei Betto que en el poblado donde había pasado su infancia el cura sólo pasaba una vez al año para los bautizos.<sup>15</sup> En las encuestas que realizara la Agrupación Católica Universitaria entre obreros agrícolas (1954 y 1957) sólo el 2% de los entrevistados se declaraba católico y el 41% se consideraba indiferente en cuanto a toda

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<sup>13</sup> ENEC, 39.

<sup>14</sup> Véase el artículo 26 de la Constitución de 1901 y el artículo 35 de la Constitución de 1940. In: PICHARDO, Hortensia: *Documentos para la historia de Cuba*, t. II., La Habana 1979., 79. y *Nueva Constitución de la República de Cuba*, Luz-Hilo, La Habana 1940., 27.

<sup>15</sup> BETTO, F.: *Fidel y la Religión*, La Habana 1985., 101.

religión. El 53,5% declaró que en su vida había tenido contacto con cura alguno, mientras que el 88% de los que se consideraban católicos jamás había asistido a misa. Esto no nos debe sorprender si tenemos en cuenta que hasta 1959 el 85% del personal eclesiástico católico se concentraba en La Habana.<sup>16</sup>

La Iglesia empleó con éxito tres tipos de instrumentos para reconquistar su influencia sobre las capas medias y la burguesía. Lo más importante fue la creación y expansión de la red de escuelas, de los colegios de enseñanza primaria y secundaria católicos. Antes de 1959 era en éstos esencialmente donde se formaba la élite social e intelectual del país. Según datos de John M. Kirk, en 1914 había 55 colegios católicos en el país, mientras que en los años cincuenta ya había 212 colegios católicos donde estudiaban 61 960 alumnos. A partir de 1946 comenzó a funcionar una universidad católica privada también, con cerca de 1000 estudiantes. La educación desde luego, no estaba sólo al servicio de la conquista intelectual sino que la Iglesia tenía además importantes intereses materiales en ella. El significado de la enseñanza en las actividades eclesiásticas se refleja bien, también, en el hecho de que en los años cincuenta una tercera parte de los religiosos sacerdotes (153 de los 461) y el 90% de los religiosos no sacerdotes (299 de los 329) y dos terceras partes de las monjas (1209 de las 1872) impartían clases en las escuelas religiosas privadas<sup>17</sup>.

La nueva generación de organizaciones de fervor religioso creadas en el espíritu de la *nueva cristiandad* y que reclutaban a sus miembros principalmente entre la juventud intelectual y las capas medias se convirtió en otro instrumento del crecimiento de la influencia eclesiástica. Así fueron, por ejemplo, los Caballeros Católicos (1925), la Federación de Juventudes Católicas (1928), la Agrupación Católica Universitaria (1931), los Caballeros de Colón (1939), etc. Las cuatro ramas de la Acción Católica se constituyeron en 1943.

El tercer instrumento esencial del incremento de la influencia, sobre el cual nos ha llamado la atención el estudio de John M. Kirk, estaba dado por el surtido sorprendentemente rico de las revistas divulgadoras de las enseñanzas sociales de la Iglesia.<sup>18</sup>

Desearíamos enfatizar que la reconquista parcial del prestigio social no fue acompañada de una considerable influencia o papel políticos directos. Hasta los años cuarenta las cartas pastorales episcopales hacían declaraciones sólo esporádicamente en relación con cuestiones políticas. En el debate en torno a la Constitución de 1940, en cambio, tanto la Iglesia como una parte de las organizaciones católicas asumieron un papel activo: atacando las propuestas de los comunistas.

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<sup>16</sup> Cita de Mateo JOVEN MARIMOR "The Church" en Carmelo MESA-LAGO ed.: *Revolutionary Change in Cuba*, Pittsburgh 1974., 400-401. Véase además: "Encuesta de los trabajadores rurales, 1956-57". In: *Economía y Desarrollo*, No. 12., 1972., 190-213. Compárase con: KIRK, John M.: "Ante el Volcán. La Iglesia en la Cuba prerrevolucionaria." In: *Revista Latinoamericana de Teología*, UCA, San Salvador, enero-abril 1988, 75-76.

<sup>17</sup> KIRK: *op.cit.*, 74.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*.

Tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial la Iglesia se adhirió a la política de guerra fría; sus declaraciones y tomas de posiciones, que atendían a instrucciones del Vaticano, atacaron al comunismo y a su representante local, el Partido Socialista Popular. En los años cuarenta se intentó incluso fundar un partido cristiano.<sup>19</sup>

En la época de la lucha antibatistiana (1952-1959) la "actuación política" más importante de la Iglesia católica se vincula al nombre de *Mons. Pérez Serrantes*, arzobispo de Santiago de Cuba, quien por consideraciones humanitarias salvó la vida de Fidel Castro en los momentos de la cacería humana que siguió al infructuoso asalto al cuartel Moncada. En los tiempos de la guerra de guerrillas (1956-1959) el cuerpo episcopal cubano, presidido por el cardenal *Manuel Arteaga*, trató de mantenerse neutral: no condenó ni a la dictadura ni a los guerrilleros. En 1958 en el cuerpo episcopal se dio una discusión sobre la suerte del régimen y algunos fueron partidarios de la renuncia de Batista.

El factor religioso, sin embargo, estuvo presente hasta el final en los diferentes escenarios de la lucha contra Batista, aunque no como un elemento dominante - muchos creyentes se unieron a los combates. *José Antonio Echevarría*, el líder estudiantil caído como mártir era un católico creyente. *Frank País*, destacado dirigente del Movimiento 26 de Julio, procedía de una familia protestante y fue un activo practicante de la religión. También se sabe que en las luchas guerrilleras de la Sierra Maestre al lado de los guerrilleros participó un cura católico; es cierto, no empuñando las armas sino predicando el Verbo a los campesinos de los montes, el padre *Gullermo Sardiñas* permaneció en el campamento de Castro desde 1957.<sup>20</sup>

### *Desde el conflicto hasta el diálogo: la Iglesia y la revolución cubana*

Demandaría un estudio aparte la evolución desde 1959 hasta nuestros días, de las relaciones entre la Iglesia Católica y la revolución, y entre el Estado castrista y la Iglesia, relaciones que en los primeros tiempos estaban caracterizados por la confrontación y sólo al cabo de un prolongado enfrentamiento se ha llegado en los fines de los años ochenta al comienzo de un diálogo. No nos es posible detallar este proceso debido a la extensión limitada del presente ensayo, pero desearíamos anotar que el tema no sólo fue elaborado por numerosos especialistas extranjeros sino que en la última década han nacido también valiosos análisis cubanos. Merece una mención aparte el libro, rico en datos, *La iglesia católica durante la construcción del socialismo en Cuba* del autor cubano *Raúl Gómez Treto* - un católico laico - que se esfuerza por ofrecer una evaluación ponderada. La Iglesia Católica cubana formuló su posición en el *Documento Final*, varias veces ya citado, del *Encuentro Nacional Eclesial Cubano* celebrado en 1986,

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<sup>19</sup> Véase in: WILLIAMS, Edward J.: *Latin American Christian Democratic Parties*, Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press.

<sup>20</sup> PORTUONDO, Yolanda: *El sacerdote comandante*, Ed. Cultura Popular, La Habana 1987.

mientras que la evolución de la opinión oficial del estado cubano y del partido comunista se refleja mayormente en las declaraciones de Fidel Castro y de las suscintas tomas de posición de los congresos del partido. Deseamos concluir esta exposición con algunas observaciones de carácter general, basadas en la literatura especializada de nuestro tema.

Raúl Gómez Treto divide en cinco etapas la evolución de las relaciones entre la Revolución y la Iglesia hasta mediados de los años ochenta:

"1-ra etapa: desconcierto (1959-1960)

2-da etapa: confrontación (1961-1962)

3-ra etapa: evasión (1963-1967)

4-ta etapa: reencuentro (1968-1978)

5-ta etapa: diálogo (1979-1985)" <sup>21</sup>

Es muy probable que desde los fines de los años 1980, es decir desde la derrota del campo socialista y, en el mismo tiempo, la reanimación de la lucha de la oposición cubana por la democratización del régimen y por los derechos humanos, la Iglesia cubana sobrevive una etapa nueva de relaciones con el Estado castrista.

La veloz radicalización de la revolución y su viraje a revolución socialista sorprendió y cogió de improviso a la Iglesia Católica. Al mismo tiempo, los dirigentes del Movimiento 26 de Julio carecían de una concepción política eclesial, sus pasos fueron determinados por el curso de la correlación de las fuerzas y caracterizados en los primeros tiempos, hasta cierto grado, por la improvisación.

La confrontación en los primeros dos años de la revolución condujo a que la Iglesia perdiera todas sus posiciones sociales ganadas en la época de la república neocolonial. La nacionalización de las escuelas, por ejemplo, no la privó sólo de su principal área de influencia espiritual sino también de una de sus fuentes de ingreso más importantes. La masiva emigración de los educadores curas que se habían quedado sin trabajo ya de por sí creó una situación crítica en lo que concierne al funcionamiento normal de la Iglesia, situación que sólo vino a agravar, en el momento de la culminación de la confrontación (septiembre de 1961), la medida adoptada por el gobierno, de expulsar del país a los sacerdotes políticamente más comprometidos (132 personas). A consecuencias de la confrontación el número de los sacerdotes y monjes que era cerca de 800 en la época prerrevolucionaria, se redujo a poco más de 200 personas, y también el de monjas que permanecieron en el país era similar. Este número se ha mantenido prácticamente sin variar en los más de tres decenios transcurridos desde la confrontación y la falta de clérigos amenaza a largo plazo incluso al funcionamiento normal de la Iglesia.

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<sup>21</sup> GÓMEZ TRETO: *op.cit.*, 26. Sobre la época véase además: KIRK, John M.: "Between God and the Party: The Church in Revolutionary Cuba, 1969-1985." In: *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, Vol. XI., No. 21(1986), 93-109. y CRAHAN, Margaret E. *op. cit.*, lo enfoca desde un punto de vista propagandístico GONZALEZ, Doria: *Iglesias y creyentes en Cuba socialista*, Ed. Cultura Popular, La Habana 1987.

Los rápidos cambios sociales, políticos y económicos que tuvieron lugar entre 1959 y 1961 *ab ovo* encerraban la posibilidad del conflicto pero tampoco se puede dejar de tomar en consideración que el choque fue iniciado por la jerarquía eclesial con cartas pastorales que anticipaban el peligro comunista y las declaraciones y acciones que criticaban y rechazaban las transformaciones revolucionarias. En su acción fueron los tradicionales reflejos anticomunistas los que tuvieron el papel decisivo y no la valoración sensata de sus propias fuerzas. Entró en el escenario político sin que tuviera un programa adecuado, base social y experiencias políticas, y su papel de sustituir a la oposición ya de antemano estaba condenado al fracaso porque el gobierno de Castro en estos tiempos gozaba del evidente e incondicional apoyo de las masas, mientras que el campo de la Iglesia - la burguesía y las capas medias - optaron por la emigración masiva.

Enfatizamos en este resumen la importancia de la etapa de la confrontación porque en la práctica siguió determinando al catolicismo cubano hasta los últimos tiempos, incluso pese al diálogo que va desplegándose desde los fines de los años 1980. Al cabo de este período los creyentes por largo tiempo se consistieron en sospechosos y fueron considerados como contrarrevolucionarios en potencia. Hasta el día de hoy sigue sin desaparecer totalmente la desconfianza mutua y el temor de los fieles al control policial. Es cierto que el gobierno siempre se ha preocupado por mantener los contactos, las relaciones diplomáticas con el Vaticano, y a partir del segundo lustro de los años setenta también por demostrar que en Cuba no existe persecución religiosa. La renovación del catolicismo latinoamericano, en particular las experiencias de la revolución nicaragüense, hicieron que Fidel Castro y la dirección del partido comunista cubano fueron receptivos a repensar el papel social de la religión. La esfera de acción de la Iglesia cubana, no obstante, continúa siendo extremadamente estrecha hasta los años noventa. Prensa católica, por ejemplo, hasta hoy no existe, mientras que las denominaciones protestantes tienen algunas revistas.

La confrontación y la *edad glacial de las relaciones* prolongada hasta fines de los años sesenta, acarreó la consecuencia eclesial interna de que la Iglesia cubana quedó fuera del proceso de renovación del catolicismo latinoamericano que se produjo después del segundo Concilio Vaticano. La apertura al mundo, el reconocimiento del sistema político socialista en los años ochenta y el *aggiornamento* eclesial sólo se hicieron posibles a raíz de los cambios acaecidos en la jerarquía cubana.

En los años ochenta la Iglesia Católica llegó a la revisión crítica de su propio papel histórico y a esclarecer sus tareas pastorales, teológicas, sociales, etc. de nuestro tiempo, y esto significa los fundamentos para la creación de un catolicismo cubano conforme al mundo moderno. También significa el fundamento moral de la Iglesia católica en su lucha de hoy por los derechos humanos.



## DIE KOSAKEN UND IHRE HISTORISCHE STELLUNG IM UNABHÄNGIGKEITSKAMPF DER UKRAINE

Die historische Beurteilung des Charakters und der Funktion der Kosakenschaft erlitt vom 17–18. Jahrhundert bis heute eine erhebliche Änderung. Es zeigten sich drei, grundsätzlich verschiedene historische Bilder in der Historiographie<sup>1</sup>: die sogenannte amtliche<sup>2</sup> oder die "hofgeschichtliche", die traditionelle sowjet-marxistische und die charakteristische Auffassung der kosakischen Emigration. Die die Zarenregierung vor Augen haltende "amtliche"<sup>3</sup> Tendenz betont in erster Linie die Loyalität der Kosaken gegenüber den russischen Herrschern sowie ihre enge Beziehung zum Adel. Der grösste Fehler dieses historischen Bildes ist die Ausserachtlassung der offensichtlichen Tatsache, nämlich dass die Kosaken bis zur Wende des 17–18. Jahrhunderts über eine von dem russischen Staat unabhängige Autonomie verfügten und in einer verhältnismässig selbständigen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft lebten<sup>4</sup>. Als sich dann das grossmachtpolitische Gleichgewicht im 18. Jahrhundert zugunsten Russland endgültig verlegte, beurteilte die Zarenregierung so, die Zeit sei gekommen, die über Selbstverwaltung verfügenden kosakischen Einheiten in die russische Armee zu integrieren. In der sowjetischen Geschichtsschreibung<sup>5</sup> wird auf die Untersuchung des "doppelten" Klassengegensatz unter den Kosaken einen grossen Nachdruck gelegt. Diese Auffassung hebt den sich zuspitzenden Konflikt zwischen dem Kosakenleiter und dem sogenannten kosakischen "Proletariat" sowie die gebietlichen oder regionale Verschiedenheiten zwischen den Kosaken der reicheren und der ärmeren Gebiete.

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<sup>1</sup> CARSTEN GOEHRKE: *Die russischen Kosaken im Wandel des Geschichtsbildes* in "Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte" 30 1980 S. 182–183.

<sup>2</sup> So z. B. A. N. PIVOVAROV: *Donskie kosaki*. Novocerkassk, 1892; A. POPOV: *Istorija o Donskom vojske*. Charkov, 1814–16; V. BRONEVSKIJ: *Istorija Donskogo vojska*. St. Peterburg, 1834; I. POPKP: *Terskie kasaki s starodavnich vremen*. St. Peterburg, 1880; K. K. ABAZA: *Kazaki, Doncy, uralcy, kubancy, tercy*. St. Peterburg, 1899; M. LJUBAVSKYJ: *Nacalnaja istorija malorussskogo kozacestva*. St. Peterburg, 1895; D. I. EVARNICKIJ: *Istorija zaporozszkyh kozakov*. Tom I–III. St. Peterburg, 1895.

<sup>3</sup> Die amtliche oder "hofgeschichtliche" Tendenz bildete sich in der Regierung Nikolaus des Ersten.

<sup>4</sup> Sie waren Die Donkosaken, die Saporoger Kosaken, Die Jaik- und Terek-Kosaken.

<sup>5</sup> So z. B. V. A. GOLOBUCKIJ: *Zaporozszkoe kozacestvo*. Kiev, 1957; I. SMIRNOV: *Vosstanie Bolotnikova*. Moskau, 1951; I. G. ROZNER: *Kazacestvo v Krestjanskaj vojne 1773–75 gg.* Lvov, 1966; A. I. BARANOVIC: *Ukraine nakanune osvoboditelnoj vojny serediny XVII veka*. Moskau, 1959; V. A. GOLOBUCKIJ: *Diplomaticseszkaja istorija osvoboditelnoj vojny ukrainskogo naroda 1648–54 gg.* Kiev, 1962; L. B. ZASEDATELEVA: *Terskie kazaki (seredina XVI-nacalo XX veka)*. Moskau, 1974.

Parallel zu der sowjetischen Theorie erschien die von subjektiven Elementen überhitze und die wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen ziemlich entbehrende Theorie der Kosakemigration, in deren Mittelpunkt ein eigenartiges Zukunftsbild, die Erschaffung eines selbständigen Kosakenstaates steht, im süd-östlichen Teil in der europäischen Hälfte von Russland.

Diese letztere historische Auffassung wird vielleicht am anschaulichsten durch die Kosakengeschichte von W. G. Glaskow<sup>6</sup> vorgestellt. Der Autor hält es für seine wichtigste Aufgabe, die Vergangenheit des Staates dieses "grundsätzlich zum Freiheit geborenen Volks"<sup>7</sup>, des "Kosakenland"<sup>8</sup>, aufzudecken. Gegenüber dem Standpunkt der russisch-sowjetischen Geschichtsschreibung, nämlich dass die Herausbildung der Kosakenschaft erst im 16. Jahrhundert begann, argumentiert Glaskow dabei, dass die Vorfahren der Kosaken das slawische Volk sein sollte, das sich in der Anschlagzone zwischen Europa und Asien im 10. Jahrhundert siedelte, dann im Jahre 948 unter kasarischer Oberherrlichkeit ihre "Republik"<sup>9</sup> Kosakenland gründete. Die während der Jahrhunderte erworbenen Rechte und Privilegien den "nationalen Charakter" nahm das russische Reich - Glaskows Meinung nach - mit Gewalt von den Kosaken, als Ergebnis eines langen Prozesses.

Als Tugend der Kosaken erwähnt der Autor ihr Verständnis demjenigen, die andere Meinung haben, sowie den Mangel des Rassen- und Religionsunterschieds in ihren Kreisen. Glaskow betont, dass die Kategorie Volk ohne Bedingungen für die Kosaken verwendet werden kann, welche seit Jahrhunderten seinen Gesetzen folgen und ausdauernd kämpfen, für eine in der Vergangenheit bestandene Unabhängigkeit und Freiheit. Er chronologisiert die kosakische Geschichte wie folgt: 1) 948-1720 - Zeit der eigenen Staatlichkeit und der Unabhängigkeit, 2) 1720-1917 - Provinzniveau innerhalb des russischen Reiches, 3) 1917-1921 - wieder selbständige kosakische Staatlichkeit, 4) 1921 - Annektierung zu der Sowjetunion. Für die Russen - wie der Autor den Gedankengang schliesst - war die Erwerbung von Kosakenland nicht nur aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen lebenswichtig, während der Geschichte waren hier die besten Schwarzerden, sondern für die Unterhaltung einer sogenannten Nord-Südlichen Achse ("Reichsachse"), die in diesem Raum eine grössere Aufsicht für sie ermöglichte.

Die Mehrzahl der Historiker sind einverstanden damit, die Benennung Kosak lässt sich auf einen türkisch-tatarischen Ursprung zurückführen, und die Kosaken hatten eine intermediäre Lage zwischen dem Adel und der Bauernschaft. Diese Kategorie wurde schon im 15. Jahrhundert für schwer disziplinierbare Gruppen verwendet, die "ausser

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<sup>6</sup> W. G. GLASKOW: *History of the Cossacks*. New York, 1972.

<sup>7</sup> GLASKOW: S. 2.

<sup>8</sup> Glaskow ist der Meinung, dass das Kosakenland im süd-östlichen Teil von Europa breitete aus. Dieses Land begrenzte von westen die Ukraine, von Norden das Russland, von Osten die Turkestan und von Süden der Kaukasus.

<sup>9</sup> GLASKOW: S. 60.

allerleien politischen Organisationen standen" <sup>10</sup>, sowie die eine eigenartige verhältnismässig unabhängige gesellschaftlich-politische Organisation ausbauten. Nach einigen Ansichten <sup>11</sup> kann die Lebensform und der Aufbau der Kosaken den Ritterorganisationen des Mittelalters geglichen werden. Sie brachten ihre eigenartigen Gruppen auf dem westlichen, ziemlich schwachbevölkerten Gebiet der Steppe von Eurasien zustande. Die Existenzmöglichkeit der Kosaken wurde durch das Machtvakuum dieser räumigen Steppe verursacht, welches sich zwischen den vorgeschobenen Stellungen von drei osteuropäischen Grossmächten – Polnisch-Litauischer Staat, Russland und das Osmanenreich – im 16–17. Jahrhundert ausbildete. Die grösseren kosakischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaften – Don-, Saporoger-, Terek- und Jaikkosaken – wurden zu einem determinierenden osteuropäischen politischen Faktor, trotz dessen, dass sich ihr Kampf für die vollkommene Unabhängigkeit erfolglos bewährte und somit die Hauptkriterien eines organisierten Staatsgebiets nicht erfüllte. In diesem Raum bildeten sich im 16–17. Jahrhundert zwei Formen der örtlichen Macht aus <sup>12</sup>: einerseits die durch ihren Ursprung überragte Grundaristokratie, andererseits die Gemeinschaften von den Peripherien (frontier), die mehr oder minder unabhängig von den umliegenden Staatsrahmen blieben, aber ihre Integrierung in die umliegende Reiche war nur eine Frage der Zeit.

Nach Philip Longworth <sup>13</sup> war die Ausbildung und Entwicklung der "westlichen Kosakenschaft" <sup>14</sup> (= Saporoger-Kosaken) anders als die der östlichen Kosakenschaft. Die Lebenskraft des ukrainischen Volks ist seiner Meinung nach auch darin zu sehen, dass es für seine Verteidigung zwei eigenartige Organisationen ausbildete und entwickelte: die sogenannten "religiösen Brüderlichkeiten" <sup>15</sup> und die Kosakenschaft.

Der hervorragende russische Historiker, V. O. Klutschewskij charakterisiert die Saporoger-Kosakenschaft – zutreffend – wie folgt:

"Die Kosaken waren Jäger, Fischer, Kämpfer, Räuber und Bauer zugleich. Nest der Bevölkerung war das *Sitsch* (= *kosakische Siedlung*), von hier überschwemmten sie die ganze Ukraine..." <sup>16</sup>

Die Kosakenschaft der Ukraine als neuer gesellschaftlich-politischer Faktor erschien in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts auf der Bühne der Geschichte. Unter ihren Mitgliedern waren die Vertreter fast jeder gesellschaftlichen Gruppen von den Leibeigenen bis zu den verarmten Kleinadeligen zu finden. In den 1540-er Jahren siedelten sie sich

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<sup>10</sup> Oskar HALECKI: *Borderlands of Western Civilization. A History of East Central Eurpoe*. New York, 1952; S. 186.

<sup>11</sup> So z. B. Leo OKINSHEVICH: *Ukrainian Society and Government 1648-1781*. München, 1978; S. 15; RAMBAUD Alfred: *Oroszország története*. Budapest 1890; S. 360.

<sup>12</sup> William H. MCNEILL: *Europe's steppe frontier 1500-1800*. London, 1964; S. 126.

<sup>13</sup> Philip LONGWORTH: *Die Kosaken*. München, 1973.

<sup>14</sup> LONGWORTH: S. 82.

<sup>15</sup> Axel SCHMIDT: *Ukraine. Land der Zukunft*. Berlin, 1939; S. 36.

<sup>16</sup> V. o. KLUTSCHEVSKYJ: *Russische Geschichte*. Bd. III. Berlin, 1925.

an den Wasserstürzen des Dnieprs, wo sie ihren "Kampfstaat" <sup>17</sup>, Saporoger Sitsch begründeten. Abweichend von der herkömmlichen Meinung der amtlichen sowjetischen Geschichtsschreibung, nach welcher man in der Saporoger-Kosakenschaft vor allem eine selbstbewusste "antifeudale" Gesellschaftskraft sehen muss, muss man auch erkennen, dass die Ausbildung und Unterhaltung einer beruflichen Soldatenschicht für die polnisch-litauische Regierung lebenswichtig war, die im Notfall nicht nur gegen den äusseren – türkischen, tatarischen –, sondern auch den inneren Feind – polnischen und litauischen *Panen* – eingesetzt werden kann und deren Unterhaltung nicht den Schatzamt belastet.

Bis zu den 1620-er Jahren kämpften die Kosaken vor allem für ihr eigenes Fortkommen, für die Verteidigung bzw. Verbreitung ihrer Rechte und Privilegien <sup>18</sup>, später traten sie mit der Führung ihres begabten Hetmans Petro Sahaidatschnyj <sup>19</sup> auch für die Verteidigung der Orthodoxie auf. Nachdem sie energisch die Ausserkraftsetzung der Religionsunion vom 1596 *Brest* erfordert hatten, begannen sie mit Recht zu fühlen, dass sie Verteidiger der Orthodoxie und des ukrainischen Volks sind. Zu dieser Zeit zog Saporoger Sitsch die ukrainischen Volksmengen immer mehr, für die das Leben unter den Kosaken die Freiheit selbst bedeutete. Genauso wie die städtische Luft im Mittelalter, machte hier einen der Status Kosak frei. Es muss auch betont werden, dass in der Ukraine unter polnisch-litauischer Oberherrlichkeit 3 Typen der Kosaken zu unterscheiden seien: die Privatgutsherren, die staatlichen und die freien Kosaken.

Die Regierung anerkannte nur die Rechte der staatlichen, sog. "registrierten" <sup>20</sup> Kosaken, die freien Kosaken waren aussergesetzlich. Die registrierte Kosakenschaft wurde für die 1630-er Jahre zu einem Soldatenvolk, das immer aktiver politisierte, trotz dessen, dass sie nur als Hilfstruppen an der polnischen "Adelsinsurrektion" funktionierten. Diese Zurückdrängung kann ein Grund dazu sein, dass die meisten geneigt waren, sich dem Aufstand der freien Kosaken anzuschliessen.

Ergebnis dieses Verhaltens war die Verordnung "Ordnation der Saporoger-Kosakischen Armee" von 1638, infolge deren die Kosaken ihr Selbstverwaltungsrecht verloren. Von nun an bestand der Unterschied zwischen den Leibeigenen und den Kosaken nur darin, dass diese letzteren nicht mit landwirtschaftlichem, sondern mit militärischem Dienst dem Staat dienen mussten.

Der hervorragende deutsche Kosakenforscher Carsten Kumke <sup>21</sup> argumentiert dabei, dass die ukrainischen Kosaken am Anfang keine gesellschaftliche Kategorie betrachtet

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<sup>17</sup> SCHMIDT: S. 38.

<sup>18</sup> Die Kosaken haben die folgende Privilegien: Die Beteiligung in der Regierung und in der Rechtsprechung. Sie können auch Grundbesitz haben und müssen kein Steuer zahlen.

<sup>19</sup> Petro Sahaidatschnyj war ein hervorragender Führer, dem durch einigen Jahren die Herausbildung einer teilweise unabhängiger Ukraine gelungen ist.

<sup>20</sup> Zum erstenmal im Jahre 1572 stellte den Kosaken – 300 Personen – der polnische König, Sigismund, der Zweite in den Staatsdienst, danach erhöhte Stefan Bathori das Register auf 6000 Personen.

<sup>21</sup> Carsten KUMKE: *Führer und Geführte bei den Saporoger Kosaken*. Wiesbaden, 1993.

werden können, nämlich für die ukrainische Bevölkerung war auch noch in der Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts eine verhältnismässig amorphe Gesellschaftsstruktur charakteristisch. Sie führt die Gründe der instabilen Grenze zwischen den einzelnen gesellschaftlichen Schichten einerseits auf den Mangel der Verbindung mit einer wirtschaftlichen Tätigkeit, andererseits auf die geographische und gesellschaftliche Mobilität zurück. Bis in die 1620–30-er Jahren konnte man nach seiner Meinung auch den Begriff Kosakenschaft und Bauernschaft nicht ganz unterscheiden: genauso oft wurden Kosaken zu Bauern wie gekehrt. Kumke nennt die Bevölkerung der Ukraine treffend eine "sich auf Selbstverteidigung eingerichtete Gesellschaft"<sup>22</sup> in der die Saporoger-Kosaken nicht als selbständige, auf der Steppe isoliert, zurückgezogen lebende Menschen zu betrachten sind, sie sind als eine Erscheinung aufzufassen, die sich mit der Entwicklung des ukrainischen Grenzgebiets zusammenhängt, ständig an Bedingungen verbunden ist und sich mit denen verflechtet.

Das Selbstbewusstsein der Kosakenschaft als dienstorientierter Gemeinschaft basierte auf einem selbständigen Wertsystem. Das ermöglichte, dass sie aus ihrer abhängiger Lage hervortreten und somit als selbständige Schicht betrachtet werden. Den ersten Schritt dazu gaben die Erfolge des durch Bogdan Hmelnyzkyj geführten Aufstandes.

Um die Wende des 17–18. Jahrhunderts erhielt die Kosakenschaft einen ganz anderen Charakter, was sich vor allem in der Spezialisierung der Tätigkeit und seiner Militarisierung offenbarte. Die Kosakenschaft, die fast ausschliesslich Militärdienst leistete, gab zu dieser Zeit den Anschein einer selbständigen, geschlossenen gesellschaftlichen Schicht.

Als wichtigstes Ergebnis der Bewegung von Hmelnyzkyj in 1648–54 kann das mit den Polen im August 1649 geschlossene Abkommen in Sborovo genannt werden. Im Sinne des Vertrags wurde das die Kiewer, Bratzlauer und Tschernigower Woiwodschaft enthaltene sog. "Kosakische Ukraine" autonom ausgesagt, in deren Hauptstadt Tschigirin eine hetmanische administrative Organisation ausgebaut wurde, die auch als Keim des selbständigen ukrainischen Staates betrachtet werden kann. Im Mangel von starken und zulässigen Verbündeten sankte aber die Bewegung hinab, auch ihre Einheit löste sich auf, deshalb wählte das ukrainische Volk am Pereiaslawer Rada vom 8. Januar 1654 auf den Rat von Hmelnyzkyj die russische Oberherrlichkeit. Im Donationsbrief vom 27. März 1654 wurde das neue Verhältnis zwischen dem russischen Staat und den ukrainischen Gebieten festgelegt. Die Interpretierung dieses Vertrags ist bis heute noch ein diskutiertes Thema in der Geschichtsschreibung. In diesem Fragenkreis bildeten sich grundsätzlich dreierlei Auffassungen: Die Historiker wanken zwischen den Kategorien Personalunion und Realunion sowie Patronat und Protektorat. Darin sind die meisten einverstanden, dass die tatsächlichen Herren der Ukraine die Kosaken wurden. Das von ukrainischen Gebieten ausgebildete Hetmanat – mit Bogdan Hmelnyzkyj an der Spitze – verfügte über eine ausgebreitete Selbstverwaltung. Die eigene amtliche Benennung des ukrainischen autonomen Staates wurde Saporoger Armee, d. h. mit

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<sup>22</sup> KUMKE: S. 61.

diesem Namen bezeichnete er die militärische Organisation und zugleich den Staat. Die Anzahl der registrierten Kosaken im russischen staatlichen Dienst wurde in 60 tausend Personen maximiert, die berechtigt waren, ihre eigenen Leiter zu wählen. Der Hetman erhielt Machtvollkommenheit in innenpolitischen Fragen, und sein Wirkungskreis in auswärtigen Angelegenheiten wurde nur derart beschränkt, dass er Verhandlungen, mit den ärgsten Feinden der russischen Regierung, mit dem polnischen und dem türkischen Staat nur mit der Zustimmung des Zaren durchführen konnte. Die Zarenregierung verkehrte am Anfang mit dem hetmanischen Amt über die *Aussenprikase*, dann brachte sie im Jahre 1663 die Kleinrussland – Prikase zustande. Es ist zu betonen, dass dieses russische Zentralorgan nicht direkt für die Steuerung der Ukraine zustande gebracht wurde, sondern es funktionierte als ein neues Amt für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, neben der *Aussenprikase*.

Den mit Moskau geschlossenen Bund hat auch schon Bogdan Hmelnitzkyj nicht als endgültige Lösung betrachtet. Das zeigt sich auch aus seiner Rede am Pereiaslawer Rada, wo der Zar "am wenigsten schlecht" von den vier möglichen Herrschern <sup>23</sup> ausgesagt wurde.

Im Zeitraum ab 1654 bis zu seinem Tod <sup>24</sup> suchte er auch nach anderen möglichen Verbündeten. Er nahm den Kontakt mit dem schwedischen König Karl Gustav auf, der für das gemeinsame Auftreten in Polen bereit gewesen wäre, den Fürstenstatus der Ukraine und den Fürstenrang von Hmelnitzkyj innerhalb des schwedischen Reichs zu anerkennen. Dem schwedisch-ukrainischen Bund schloss sich auch Brandenburg und Transsylvanien im Oktober 1656 an. Der Hetman arbeitete seinen Plan sorgfältig aus, der sich auf die Trennung von Russland und auf die Erschaffung eines tatsächlich selbständigen ukrainischen Staates richtete. Sein unerwarteter Tod im Jahre 1657 vereitelte seinen Plan. Das Werk des grossen Politikers blieb also unvollendet.

Die Zielsetzungen von Hmelnitzkyj blieben natürlich nicht im Geheim vor dem Zaren Aleksei Mihailovitsch. Die russische Regierung bemühte sich von Anfang an bewusst, die drei wichtigsten ukrainischen Vorrechte – Durchführung der freien Diplomatie des Hetmans, Unabhängigkeit der ukrainischen Kirche, Verbot der Stationierung von russischen Truppen in der Ukraine – stufenweise zu beseitigen.

Nachfolger von Bogdan Hmelnitzkyj im hetmanschen Stuhl war sein Sohn Iuri zwei Monate lang, den Iwan Wihowskyj (1657–1659) – nachdem er die Unterstützung der meisten kosakischen Leiter erworben hatte – von der Macht entfernte. Der neue kosakische Leiter behielt zwar am Anfang den Bund mit Moskau, aber wie sein grosser Vorgänger, liess er sich nicht von der Schaffung eines grossen und unabhängigen ukrainischen Staates abwendig machen <sup>25</sup>. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen begann er zuerst

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<sup>23</sup> Sie Waren der Khan von der Krim, der türkischer Sultan, der polnischer König und der russischer Zar.

<sup>24</sup> Nach der traditionellen Auffassung verursachte den Tod Hmelnitskyjs eine Vergiftung, die türkische Pforte verfügte.

<sup>25</sup> Boris KRUPNYCKYJ: *Geschichte der Ukraine. Von den Anfängen bis zum Jahre 1917*. Wiesbaden, 1963; S. 108.

mit den Schweden Verhandlungen durchzuführen, dann schloss er mit ihnen einen Vertrag gegen Polen, im Oktober 1657. Eine unerlässliche Bedingung des Erfolges von Wihowskyj wäre die Bewahrung der Einheit der Ukraine und die Verhinderung des weiteren Raumgewinns des Einflusses von Moskau gewesen. Zur gleichen Zeit versuchte der Zar nach dem Tod von Hmelnitzkyj, die Abhängigkeit der ukrainischen Gebiete zu steigern. Von der Hetmanregierung wurde gefordert, die Anzahl der Saporoger Armee auf 40 tausend Personen zu mindern sowie den Metropolit von Kiew dem Patriarch von Moskau zu unterwerfen. Unter diesen Umständen wurde das Verhältnis zwischen Wihowskyj und dem Zaren Aleksei Mihailovitsch äusserst scharf. Die Lage des Hetmans wurde auch dadurch schwerer, dass er sich im Bund mit den Schweden enttäuschte, weil der König Karl Gustav genug von der langen Kriegsführung hatte und regte Friedensverhandlungen mit dem polnisch-litauischen Staat an. Diese Erfolge bewegten Wihowskyj, seine aussenpolitische Richtlinie zu ändern. Er entschied sich für die polnische Orientation. Dank der diplomatischen Tätigkeit seines begabtesten Beraters Iuri Nemeritsch schlossen Polen und die Ukraine im September 1658 die Hadiatscher Union.

Aufgrund dem Vertrag wäre die polnische "Adelsrepublik" zur Föderation bzw. Personalunion von drei selbständigen Staaten – Polnisches Königtum, Litauisches und Ruthenisches Grossfürstentum – geworden, aber die Anzahl des Kosakenregisters hätte man auf 30 tausend Personen gemindert. Es ist endlich nicht gelungen, das Ergebnis zu realisieren, einerseits wegen dem bewaffneten Auftreten des russischen Staates, andererseits wegen dem heftigen Widerstand des ukrainischen Volks, in dessen Erinnerung noch stark die Folgen der polnischen Oberherrlichkeit lebten. Die Mehrzahl der ukrainischen Gesellschaft nannte Wihowskyj einen Verräter, und er war gezwungen, auf Aufforderung der kosakischen Leiter – *Starschina Rada* – von der Macht zurückzutreten. Sein Nachfolger im Amt Hetman war wieder Iuri Hmelnitzkyj, der sich für die russische Orientation neigte.

Die Zarenregierung gab im Oktober 1659 als Retorsion die sog. Pereiaslaw-er Artikel aus, die eindeutig dem Ziel dienten, in der Zukunft die eventuellen ukrainischen Verselbstigungsbestrebungen zu vermindern. Die wichtigeren Ordnungen des Dokuments beschränkten offensichtlich die autonomische Einrichtung der Ukraine: die diplomatische Tätigkeit des Hetmans wurde vollkommen unter die Kontrolle des Zaren gezogen. Der Saporoger Armee wurde verboten, ohne die Genehmigung des russischen Herrschers Krieg zu führen. Der Hetman konnte von seinem Amt nicht ohne Zulassung von Moskau entfernt werden. Der Hetman hatte nicht mehr das Recht, kosakische Leiter zu ernennen oder zu entheben. Ausser Kiew wurden noch in fünf grösseren ukrainischen Städten – Pereiaslaw, Tschernihow, Nezhin, Bratzlaw, Uman – russische Garnisonen errichtet.

Am Ende 1659 passierte die russische Armee den Dniepr, um die ukrainische Gebiete in polnischer Hand zu besetzen. Der vollkommen enttäuschte Iuri Hmelnitzkyj nutzte diese chaotische Lage aus und tritt zu den Polen über, das Hadiatsch-er Abkommen <sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> KRUPNYCKYJ: S. 115.

mit ihnen erneuert. Die Ukraine teilte sich: das Gebiet am linken Ufer des Dnieprs gehörte zu Russland, das am rechten Ufer zu Polen – unter diesen Umständen wäre nur ein energischer, dem Bogdan Hmelnitzkyj gleicher Leiter fähig gewesen, die Einheit der Ukraine zu bewahren und die Unabhängigkeit zu erkämpfen<sup>27</sup>.

Iuri Hmelnitzkyj, Hetman des rechten Ufers tritt in Kenntnis seiner Ungeeignetheit im 1663 von der Macht zurück und zog in Kloster. Zu neuem Leiter der Kosakenschaft des rechten Ufers wurde der "ehrgeizige und gewissenlose"<sup>28</sup> Pawlo Teteria<sup>29</sup> (1663–65) gewählt, der mit tatarischer Hilfe versuchte – erfolglos –, die Ukraine zu vereinen.

In der Ukraine am linken Ufer wurde die Lage der Zarenregierung fest und sie betrieb, Iwan Briuhowetzkyj (1663–1668), Anhänger der russischen Orientation zu Hetman zu wählen. Damit wurde die Ukraine unter den beiden kosakischen Leitern – Teteria und Briuhowetzkyj – bzw. Polen vollständig geteilt.

Der Hetman am linken Ufer wollte seine Treue dem Zaren beweisen, deswegen fuhr er mit der Begleitung der Mitglieder des Starschina Rada im Herbst 1665 nach Moskau, wo er ihm die ukrainischen bzw. kosakischen Rechte und Privilegien "vor den Füßen legte"<sup>30</sup>. Die russische und die ukrainische Regierung schlossen einen neuen Vertrag, der dem Zaren ausserordentliche Rechte in der Ukraine sichert. Von nun an gingen die ukrainischen Steuern direkt in das Zarenschatzamt ein, und damit nahm die partikulare finanzielle Autonomie der hetmanischen Regierung ein Ende. Von der ukrainischen Autonomie blieben nur noch die kosakischen Rechte und Privilegien.

In der Ukraine am rechten Ufer kam ein begabter und energischer Politiker Petro Doroschenko als Hetman (1665–1676), dessen offenes Ziel die Bekämpfung der vollkommenen Unabhängigkeit der Ukraine war, mit der Leitung der westlichen ukrainischen Gebiete. Für die Befreiung der ukrainischen Gebiete arbeitete er einen zweistufigen Plan aus. Zuerst wollte er die Ukraine am rechten Ufer von der polnischen Oberherrlichkeit befreien, unter seiner eigenen Leitung, dann hatte er die Absicht, den russischen Einfluss auch am linken Dnieprufer aufzuheben. Er hatte vor, die Hilfe der Tataren dazu in Anspruch zu nehmen. Sein Plan wurde dadurch vereitelt, dass die russische und die polnische Regierung im Jahre 1667 in Andrusowo einen Friedensvertrag schloss, der die Teilung der Ukraine realisierte. Saporoger Sitsch gelangte unter das gemeinsame Protektorat der beiden Staaten, aber die Kosakenschaft, die hier lebte, anerkannte nur die russische Oberherrlichkeit.

Die Bekanntgebung des Friedenschlusses erregte eine grosse Entrüstung auf den ukrainischen Gebieten am linken Ufer, der wurde als Verrat des Pereiaslaw-er Vertrages vom 1654 von russischer Seite betrachtet. Die hiesrige wachsende russenfeindliche Stimmung ausnutzend passierte Doroschenko im Sommer 1668 den Dniepr, er entfernte

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<sup>27</sup> KRUPNYCKYJ: S. 113.

<sup>28</sup> KRUPNYCKYJ: S. 115.

<sup>29</sup> Die bevölkerung der rechtsufriger Ukraine erkannte auch nicht Teteria als Hetman an.

<sup>30</sup> KRUPNYCKYJ: S. 115.



Briuhowetzkyj von der Macht und vereinigte Ukraine. Seine sich auf die ganze Ukraine erstreckende Hetmanschaft erwies doch nicht lang, im März 1669 war er gezwungen, die Ukraine am linken Ufer wegen dem polnischen Angriff am rechten Ufer zu verlassen, wo er vorläufig Demian Mnohohreschnyj mit der Macht betraute (1668–1672). Er hatte aber keine Möglichkeit mehr, zurückzukehren, weil Mnohohreschnyj mit der Unterstützung des Zaren zu Hetman wurde und gezwungen war, die Anzahl der Saporoger Armee auf 30 tausend Personen zu mindern. So ging die geschichtliche Entwicklung der beiden Ukrainen wieder auf zwei getrennten Wegen weiter.

Doroschenko musste zwar auf die ukrainischen Gebiete am linken Ufer verzichten, aber seinen ursprünglichen Plan gab er nicht auf. Im Jahre 1669 verlegte er die Ukraine am rechten Ufer unter das Protektorat des türkischen Sultans und führte mit der türkischen Armee einen gemeinsamen Angriff gegen Polen. Sie hatten die polnische Regierung in 1672 gezwungen, den Frieden in Butschatsch zu schliessen, wodurch die Ukraine am rechten Ufer in drei Teile geteilt wurde. Im Bund des polnisch-litauischen Staates blieben nur Halicz und Wolhynien, die übrigen Gebiete (Podolien, Bratzlaw, der Raum östlich von Kiew) wurden unter Doroschenko und dem türkischen Sultan geteilt.

Inzwischen trafen auch in der Ukraine unter russischer Oberherrlichkeit erhebliche Veränderungen ein. Eine Gruppe der kosakischen Leiter stürzte Mnohohreschnyj in 1672 und stellte Iwan Samoilovitsch (1672–87) an seine Stelle. Auch der neue Hetman am linken Ufer betrachtete die Wiederherstellung der Vereinigung der Ukraine als seine wichtigste Aufgabe, unter seiner eigenen Führung, deshalb gelangte er in Konflikt mit dem die Politik der türkischen Orientation vertretenden Doroschenko. Mit Unterstützung der russischen Truppen passierte Samoilovitsch den Dniepr und begann die Befreiung der Ukraine am rechten Ufer. Zu seinen Erfolgen kam in erheblichem Mass dazu, dass der Hetman von dem linken Ufer mit grosser Freude von der unter tatarischer und türkischer Oberherrlichkeit leidenden ukrainische Bevölkerung am rechten Ufer empfangen wurde.

So kam es dazu, dass die kosakischen Leiter in 1674 Doroschenko zur Abdankung zwangen und wählten Iwan Samoilovitsch in Pereiaslaw zu Hetman, der der Hetman "der beiden Ufer des Dnieprs" wurde, d. h. die ukrainischen Gebiete vereinigten sich wieder (bis 1676). Erfolge von Samoilovitsch dauerten doch nicht lange, nämlich der türkische Sultan eilte Doroschenko zur Hilfe. Doroschenko trieb mit Unterstützung der Krimtataren und der türkischen Truppen Samoilovitsch an das jenseitige Ufer des Dnieprs. Doch konnte er seine Macht nicht bewahren, es entwickelte sich ein Volksaufstand gegen ihn und die kosakischen Leiter sagten von ihm wieder los. Im Jahre 1676 musste er kapitulieren, der Sultan ernannte einen neuen Hetman, Iuri Hmelnitzkyj (1677– 81).

Die Sache der Besetzung der Ukraine entlöste einen russisch-türkischen Krieg, der mit dem Frieden in Bahtschiserei 1681 abgeschlossen wurde. Als Grenze der beiden Staaten wurde der Dniepr festgelegt, das Besitzrecht der Ukraine am rechten Ufer (früher unter polnischer Oberherrlichkeit) wurde von der Türkei befestigt, die aber das russische Protektorat der ukrainischen Gebiete am linken Ufer anerkannte. Der türkische Einfluss in der Ukraine war aber doch kurzlebig. Die gegen das Osmanenreich zustande

gebrachte Truppen der Heiligen Liga zwangen die türkische Armee zum Rückzug, demzufolge fang es an, die polnische Herrschaft am rechten Ufer des Dnieprs zurückzustellen. Dieser Vorgang wurde durch den zwischen der russischen und polnischen Regierung in 1686 geschlossenen "ewigen Frieden", in dem die in Andrussov-er Friedensvertrag festgelegten bestätigt wurden. Im Vergleich mit der Verordnung vom 1667 kam nur die Veränderung, dass Saporosie und Kiew ausschliesslich russische Interessiertheit wurden.

In 1687 wurde Iwan Mazepa, Sohn eines verpolnischten ukrainischen Kleinadeligen zu Hetman der Ukraine am linken Ufer (1687–1709). Laut zeitgenössischen Dokumenten war Mazepa äusserst begabt und politisch am besten gebildet unter den bisherigen Hetmanen <sup>31</sup>.

Im Austausch gegen seine Erwählung hatte er die ukrainische Autonomie weiter mässigenden Kolomak-er Artikel anzunehmen, in dem der russische Herrscher sehr streng für die Hetmanregierung vorschrieb, der Richtlinie der zaristischen Aussenpolitik zu folgen, und um das kontrollieren zu können, wurde ein Schützenregiment in der hetmanschen Residenz in Baturin einquartiert.

In Mazepa wurde schon wahrscheinlich damals der Gedanken der Trennung von Russland reif, er wartete nur auf einen geeigneten Zeitpunkt zur Durchführung ihrer Pläne zu der Unabhängigkeit. Die schwere Lage des durch die Schweden gedrängten polnischen Staates ausgenutzt, besetzte Mazepa im Jahre 1704 die ukrainischen Gebiete am rechten Ufer und vereinigte wieder die Ukraine.

Der Ausbruch des Nordkrieges brachte ihm endlich die günstige Möglichkeit, das russische Joch abzuschütteln. Nach dem Sieg 1700 in Narwa griff XII. Karl in 1708 wieder Russland an, mit der Absicht, dass er den russischen Staat in Fürstentümer aufteilt, an deren Spitze schwedische Freiherren gestellt werden. Die Ukraine hätte er dem vom schwedischen Staat abhängigen Polen zum Lehen gegeben.

Im September 1708 drangen die Truppen des schwedischen Königs bis zum Nordteil der Ukraine am linken Ufer vor, wo XII. Karl im Geheim Verhandlungen mit der Hetmanregierung anregte. In der Hoffnung der Erwerbung der Unabhängigkeit versprach Mazepa dem schwedischen Herrscher militärische Hilfe, er zeigte sich bereit, ihm die befestigten Städte, die unter seiner Oberherrlichkeit waren, zu übergeben und die schwedische Armee mit Lebensmittel und Viehfutter zu versehen. Als die Schweden im Oktober 1708 die Linie des Flusses Desna erreichten, tritt Mazepa offen der Seite der Schweden über. Zur gleichen Zeit gelangten die Leute des Hetmans in Saporosie die Herrschaft, aber am Ende des Jahres entschied sich das Glukhow-er Rat doch für die Aushaltung bei der russischen Regierung und wählten Skoropadskyj als Hetman anstatt des verräterischen Mazepa. So wurde Mazepa nur von einer kleineren kosakischen Truppe in das schwedische Lager begleitet.

Die Niederlage XII. Karl vom 1709 in Poltawa besiegelte eigentlich das Schicksal der Ukraine, aber besonders das des Saporoger Sitsch. Gewitzigt durch den Verrat von

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<sup>31</sup> A. SCHMIDT: S. 58.

Mazepa ernannte I. Peter einen russischen Inspektor an die hetmansche Regierung, der vollständiges Kontrollrecht über der Tätigkeit der kosakischen Leiter hatte. Das Zentrum der Ukraine wurde aus Baturin in Gluhow verlegt, was näher zu der russischen Grenze lag. Die tatsächliche Integrierung der Bevölkerung der Ukraine in der russischen gesellschaftlichen Ministrationstruktur erfolgte nach Abschluss des Nordkrieges.

Im April 1709 sandte I. Peter zwei zaristische Regimenter zur Bestrafung des Saporoger Sitsch. Das Sitsch war der russischen Regierung schon seit langem Dorn im Auge, weil diese Stelle als Brenn- und Ausgangspunkt von mehreren russenfeindlichen Aufständen diente. Die Retorsion war diesmal vollkommen, das bedeutendste Zentrum des ukrainischen Widerstandes hörte auf zu existieren. Ein Teil der Kosakenschaft schmolz in die russische Armee ein, die Mehrzahl siedelte in Aleschki auf dem Gebiet der Krimenkhanschaft um, wo sie ihr neues Zentrum begründeten. Leiter der hier lebenden Saporoger-Kosaken wurde Malaschevitsch im Jahre 1714, auf dessen Anregung die Kosaken den Kontakt mit der Zarenregierung aufnahmen und um die Zustimmung ihres Rücksiedelns in Russland nachsuchten. I. Peter wollte noch auch nichts wissen von ihnen, aber seine Nachfolger erteilten die Genehmigung. Das sog. Nowaia Sitsch (= Neues Sitsch) begründeten die Kosaken im Jahre 1734 im Raum Podpolnyj, etwa 6 km vom ehemaligen Saporoger Sitsch. Damit wurde ein neues Kapitel in der Geschichte der Kosakenschaft begonnen.

Die russische Regierung war in reinen damit, dass die Ukraine ein empfindlicher und verletzbarer Punkt des russischen Reichs ist. Die Zeit schien für sie angekommen zu sein, die Reste der ukrainischen Autonomie zu liquidieren. Im Jahre 1722 brachte I. Peter das Kollegium Kleinrussland zustande, dessen wichtigste Aufgabe die strenge Überprüfung der kosakischen Leiter war. Pawlo Polubotok, den Nachfolger des im 1708 in den hetmanschen Stuhl gelangten Iwan Skoropadskyj, unter dessen Regierung der Zerfall der Ukraine sich beschleunigte, ernannte der Zar selbst im Jahre 1722. Dieser Schritt des russischen Herrschers zählte als grobe Verletzung der kosakischen Selbstverwaltung, aber die ukrainische Kosakenschaft war nicht mehr in der Lage, das zu verhindern. In den 1720-er Jahren wurde nämlich eine reguläre Grenzschutzkette gegen die Krimtataren gebaut, was die Bedeutung der Kosaken wesentlich minderte. Im Verhältnis zur modernen Artillerie und Infanterie zählte die kosakische Reiterei als überholt, die die russische Regierung nicht mehr befürchtete, die aber sie brauchte, deshalb bestanden die unverbundenen Kosakenregimenter vorläufig noch weiter.

Ab Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts kann die allmähliche Verschlechterung der Lage der Kosakenschaft verfolgt werden. Wegen ihrer verhältnismässig grossen Anzahl konnte sie von der abhängigen Bauernschaft<sup>32</sup> nicht gefördert werden, deshalb waren die Kosaken gezwungen, selbst ihr Fortkommen zu sichern. Das macht teilweise die Instabilität der kosakischen Einheiten sowie die stürmische Abnahme ihrer Anzahl deutlich. Die Anzahl der Saporoger Armee im staatlichen Dienst war in den "Märzartikeln" vom 1654 in 60 tausend Personen festgelegt, diese Zahl wurde in den 1730-er Jahren zu 20 tau-

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<sup>32</sup> Die "Pidsusidki" waren solche bauern, die den Acker der Kosaken beackern halfen.

send. Die russischen Behörden versuchten, die Herabsenkung der Kosakenschaft zu verhindern, deswegen wurden sie in der Verordnung vom 1734 geteilt: die sog. "ausgewählten Kosaken" (vyborny kozaki) hatten Militärdienst, die "Hilfskosaken" (pidpomot-schniki) sicherten das Fortkommen ihrer kämpfenden Kameraden.

Trotz den einschränkenden Massnahmen des Zaren I. Peter bewahrte die Ukraine für den Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts ihre eigenartige verwaltungsmässige-politische Einrichtung, was der beste Beweis dafür ist, dass sich die hetmansche Regierung als starkes und lebensfähiges System erwies.

Bis heute noch ist die Frage unter den Historikern unentschieden, ob das Hetmanat eine Monarchie oder eine Republik war. Zur Klärung der Frage müsste man vor allem untersuchen, ob die Funktionen des Hetmans vorübergehend oder ständig betrachtet werden können, und was für eine Beziehung sie zu den zentralen Institutionen hatte. Das Problem ist auch deswegen schwierig zu entscheiden, weil die früheren Quellen den Wirkungskreis des obersten kosakischen Leiters nicht genau bestimmten, dessen Macht in grossem Mass das sog. Armee Rada (= Kosakische Allgemeine Versammlung) beschränken konnte. Während Iuri Hmelnitzkyj, Doroschenko und Teteria von den Hetman die Machtüberlegenheit dieser Versammlung anerkannten, regierten Bogdan Hmelnitzkyj, Iwan Samoilovitsch und I. Mazepa ohne die Armee Rada zusammenzurufen. Das Machtsystem der ersten kosakischen Leiter stand also der Form Republik näher, das der letzteren aber der Monarchie. Das muss anerkannt werden, dass sich für die Ukraine – in Kenntnis der geschichtlichen Tatsachen – der monarchische Typ günstiger erwies, nämlich die Zeit der drei "monarchistischen" Hetman fällt mit der Zeit des relativen Friedens und der Ordnung zusammen. Eine althergebrachte Monarchie konnten sie aber nicht zustande bringen, obwohl sie versuchten, ihre Macht ihren Familienmitgliedern zu vererben<sup>33</sup>.

Bis 1722 wurde der Hetman immer durch die Armee Rada gewählt, dessen Person auch die Zarenregierung anzunehmen hatte.

Gleichzeitig wurden auch sogenannte hetmansche Kapitel angenommen, die nicht nur als ukrainische Verfassung, sondern als neuer oder erneuter russisch-ukrainischer Vertrag funktionierten. Die erste Aufgabe des Hetmans war die Steuerung der Armee und der Aussenbeziehungen, aber ausserdem verfügte er über einen ausgebreiteten Wirkungskreis in der Verwaltung, der Gesetzgebung und als Richter. Er rief die Armee Rada und die Starschina Rada zusammen, er präsierte an den Versammlungen, er ernannte die hochgestellten kosakischen Offiziere. Nicht zuallerletzt verfügte der Hetman über den Wirkungskreis der Verteilung und Donation der Grundbesitze. Ab Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts wurde der Wirkungskreis der Hetman immer enger: zwischen 1722 und 1727 bzw. 1734 und 1750 genehmigten die Zaren der Ukraine nicht, einen Hetman zu wählen, oder wenn es doch einen Hetman gab, stand er vollkommen unter dem Einfluss der Zarenregierung.

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<sup>33</sup> z.B. Bogdan Hmelnitzkyj überliess die Macht seinem Sohn, und Ivan Samoilovitsch versuchte es auch.

Ein wichtiges Teil der Hetmanregierung war das schon erwähnte Armee Rada, das als Organ der direkten Demokratie betrachtet werden kann. Diese Versammlung hatte gleichzeitig auch Nachteile: einerseits war es schwierig, mit Teilnahme einer aus Zehntausenden bestehenden Menge Entscheidungen in wichtigen Fragen zu treffen, andererseits kam es auch vor, dass die unteren Volksschichten unter demagogischen Einfluss gelangten. Am Anfang wurden diese Versammlungen noch oft zusammengerufen, aber nach dem Anschluss zu Moskau rief sie Bogdan Hmelnitzkyj überhaupt nicht zusammen. Demian Mnohohreschnyj schaffte nach seiner Wahl in 1669 die Institution Armee Rada als überflüssiges ab.

In der Ukraine am rechten Ufer wurde die Kosakenschaft noch eine Zeit zur allgemeinen Versammlung einberufen, aber auch Doroschenko fand dieses Organ nicht mehr wünschenswert. Während des 18. Jahrhunderts wurde nur dreimal Armee Rada gehalten, das stufenweise sein Recht verlor, den Hetman zu wählen und seine Rolle wurde immer mehr zu Formalität.

Der Verfall der allgemeinen Versammlung der Kosaken lässt sich vor allem damit erklären, dass die neuen Hetman immer weniger oder gar nicht die Förderung der ukrainischen Bevölkerung genossen.

Das Starschina Rada (Rat der kosakischen Offiziere), das die hetmansche Macht am allermeisten beschränkte, konnte sich nicht vollkommen entwickeln. Es begann eigentlich nur unter der Regierung von Iwan Mazepa zu einem Klassenvertretungsorgan zu werden, aber diese Zeit zeigte sich viel zu wenig, weil I. Peter nach 1709 gegen jede Offenbarung der ukrainischen Autonomie drastisch auftrat. Die Institution selbst bestand auch noch im 18. Jahrhundert, aber nur als Marionettenfigur der russischen Regierung. Das Starschina Rada kann als ein Zweikammersystem betrachtet werden. Der sog. Rat der Beamten vertritt das "Herrenhaus", der mehrmals in der Woche eine Versammlung hatte und an der Versammlung auch die direkten Berater des Hetmans teilnahmen. Der erweiterte Rat der kosakischen Offiziere funktionierte als "Unterhaus" und seine Versammlungen wurden zwischen Weihnachten und dem Dreikönigstag sowie auf Ostern von dem Hetman zusammengerufen.

Unklar ist die Frage, ob die Entscheidungen des Starschina Rada durch Abstimmung oder durch Zuruf getroffen wurden. Der Hetman hat jedenfalls kein Sonderrecht zur Zustimmung der Entscheidungen, das war aber auch nicht nötig, er leitete ja die Versammlungen.

Die Form und der Charakter der Versammlungen des Starschina Rada veränderten sich im 18. Jahrhundert. Der Hetman war nicht mehr unter den Teilnehmern, die Beschlüsse wurden schriftlich festgelegt und von jedem unterzeichnet.<sup>34</sup>

Wie der Wirkungskreis des Hetmans ist auch die Funktion des Starschina Rada nicht genau umgrenzt. Im allgemeinen wurden die fertigen Beschlüsse von hier zum Armee Rada gebracht, wo diese "votiert wurden". Ausserdem hatte diese Institution auch bei der Diskussion von wichtigeren Finanz- und Justizfragen eine wichtige Rolle.

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<sup>34</sup> Früher registrierten nicht allen Entscheiden und Beschlüssen.

Die russische Zarin II. Katharina liquidierte das Hetmanat im Jahre 1764 endgültig und die Regierung der ukrainischen Gebiete am linken Ufer gelangte in den Wirkungskreis des neuen Kollegiums Kleinrussland. Der ukrainische Adel, um seine privilegierte Lage zu bewahren, erzeigte loyalisches Verhalten gegenüber der Zarenregierung und grenzte sich von den mit den Ordnungen der Zarin unzufriedenen Kosakenaufständen. Als Erwiderung verbreitete sie die dem russischen Adel gegebenen und im Donationsbrief vom 1785 zusammengefassten Rechte und Privilegien auch auf sie.

Im Jahre 1775, von der türkischen Front zurückgekehrt, besetzten die zaristischen Truppen unerwartet Saporosie, dann meldete die russische Leitung die Behebung des Sitsch amtlich ein. Die ukrainischen Kosakenregimente wurden nach Modell der ständigen russischen Regimenter umorganisiert, behebt dadurch ihre relative Selbständigkeit bzw. Selbstverwaltung. Die Reste der ukrainischen Autonomie wurden damit endgültig abgeschafft.

TANDORI MÁRIA

**THE REGENCY CRISIS  
AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES.  
ENGLAND, 1788–89**

In the autumn of 1788 a constitutional crisis developed in England. On first sight the problem was a very simple one: the health of the King, George III deteriorated rapidly. Already in the summer he suffered from several "bilious attacks" (according to his physicians), and his health worsened day by day. From the end of October there were some rumours about the King's growing madness<sup>1</sup>. On one occasion, in November, Sir George Baker, the King's physician was stopped by a London mob, and forced to report on the King's state of health. When he confessed the case to be serious, the mob nearly lynched him.<sup>2</sup> The doctors were absolutely bewildered; in the 18th century nobody knew about porphyria, the King's real malady. They had no idea about the real cause of the illness of the King, or if the recovery was possible. From early November onwards the King's condition became alarming: on the 6th William Pitt, the Prime Minister all night expected a messenger with an account of the King's death<sup>3</sup>. The messenger didn't arrive, but the King's state remained desperate for months.

In a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy, with an active government, it may not be a great problem: the competent authority appoints a regent, and the constitution remains intact. But in England and in this particular case the situation was much more difficult. This difficulty consisted by several elements: first, in the 18th century the royal prerogatives were more extended than nowadays<sup>4</sup>. Paradoxically, the events of 1688<sup>5</sup> and even more, of 1714<sup>6</sup> didn't weaken, but strengthened the Monarchy. The

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<sup>1</sup> Detailed in: DERRY, John: *The Regency Crisis and the Whigs*. Cambridge, Univ. P., 1963. 4–10. p. and: STANHOPE, Earl of: *Life of the Rt. Hon. William Pitt*, in 4 volumes. London, Murray, 1867. [hereafter: Stanhope: Pitt] Vol. 1. 383–394. p. with some citations of Fanny Burney's Diary (she was a lady in waiting for the Queen, and one of the closest witnesses of the events).

<sup>2</sup> STANHOPE: *Pitt*, 1. Vol., 383–394. p.

<sup>3</sup> STANHOPE: *Pitt*, 1. Vol. 390. p.

<sup>4</sup> For the royal prerogatives: HOLDSWORTH, Sir William: *A History of English Law in 16 volumes*. London, Methuen, 1903–1966. Vol. X., 339–363. p.; Alpaeus TODD: *A parlamenti kormány-rendszer Angliában*. I. kötet. Bp. MTA, 1876. *passim*. (hereafter: TODD)

<sup>5</sup> The 'Glorious Revolution': the catholic Stuarts were replaced by the protestant Queen Mary II and her husband, William III of Orange.

<sup>6</sup> After the death of Queen Anne, the latest protestant Stuart sovereign, in the spirit of the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement, the Hanoverian dynasty accessed to the throne.

goal of the politicians was not to weaken the monarchy, but to create a protestant one <sup>7</sup>. The King was the head of the legislative and the executive government. Without his assent there was no law. At this time he had still the complete right of veto. He appointed and changed the Governments, nearly at whim. Of the King's tyranny in December 1783 was the latest example, when - in spite of the vote of the Commons - the King dismissed the Portland government, without their formal and official resignation, and appointed William Pitt, who was in a small minority in the House. The King was the head of the diplomatic service, and of the foreign affairs: all the ambassadors consulted directly to him. His Civil List wasn't separated from the state's income <sup>8</sup>. He approved all the official nominations, and the creation of peers. All the pensions and the salaries were granted by him. All the government's papers could be changed at his wish; he could re-shape the diplomatic letters and the throne speeches. In the early 1780s great debates were held in the Parliament, concerning the royal prerogatives and the power of the Crown, but after 1783, the royal power remained entire. In Europe of the 1780s an absolute monarchy seemed to be a natural solution: there were such tendencies in England too <sup>9</sup>. From the accession of George III onwards there was a growing fear in parliamentary circles, for the completing of the despotism. In conclusion, the royal person was not a negligible actor on the political stage, and a sudden malady could interrupt the state affairs for weeks.

In this case there would be a great relief the person of an adult heir apparent. The Prince of Wales would have been the natural choice to become Regent. But for the second difficulty, the King, and the leading group of the British politicians were persuaded, that the Prince was not suitable for the regency. The disagreement between the King and his eldest son was a common situation in the history of the Hannoverian dynasty. But between George III and the later George IV this disagreement became a real animosity. George III was a good husband, a good father, with strong Christian ethics. All of his sons were of an other generation: they lived like the French aristocracy in the time of the ancien regime: they drunk, gambled, changed their girlfriends week by week. The royal couple could not bear this situation: the quarrels became an everyday scene within the royal family.

Of all the royal children, the Prince of Wales - whose peculiar nickname was "the first gentleman of Europe" - was the most infamous one. Though intelligent, and witty, he was extravagant, lazy, and selfish. In 1785 he married secretly with one of his lovers. This woman, Mrs Fitzherbert was a very pretty, beautiful, but unfortunately a Catholic widow <sup>10</sup>. By this marriage the Prince violated three great constitutional acts:

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<sup>7</sup> The source of this statement: CLARK, J.C.D.: *Revolution and Rebellion: State and society in England in the 17th and 18th Centuries*. Cambridge, Univ. Press, 1986. 89-90. p.

<sup>8</sup> Until 1782, when the Burke's Civil List Act started to separate the incomes of the state and the Royal Household.

<sup>9</sup> See: Edmund BURKE: *On the causes of the present discontents, passim* (there's a lot of editions).

<sup>10</sup> DERRY, John W.: *The Regency Crisis and the Whigs*. Cambridge, Univ. P., 1963. 32-36. p.



the Bill of Rights <sup>11</sup> and the Act of Settlement <sup>12</sup> forbade an English royal personage to marry with a "Papist", and the Royal Marriage Act <sup>13</sup>, approved in 1772 by George III, stated, that in the royal family marriages will be valid only by the King's agreement. If somebody would marry without the King's assent, he (or she) would be excluded from the order of succession. The Prince's Catholic marriage remained secret, but the King, and a narrow circle of the Government knew about it, and the public also heard some rumours.

A third aspect of the special difficulty was the situation of the Government and the Opposition. William Pitt the Younger, the Prime Minister, was only 29 years old, but he had been Prime Minister for five years. He was a brilliant minister, politician and Parliamentary orator. He became Minister when he was only 24, and proposed a large number of remarkable reforms, at the same time he remained constantly loyal to the King. He was an awkward, lone man, who felt only disdain for the noisy high society; he lived only for his work <sup>14</sup>. In 1788 Charles James Fox <sup>15</sup> was the head of the opposition. He was the absolute contrast of Pitt: he was at the centre of society: gambled every night, collected lovers and friends. He was also brilliant, but wasted his talents. Fox was the closest friend of the Prince of Wales; his bored lovers he passed to the Prince. The King was persuaded that Fox was the evil spirit of the Prince; that's why His Majesty have not given Fox any offices for more than twenty years. Fox and Pitt were the two great leading opponents in the Parliament from 1783 to 1806, and until Pitt's death, Fox could not get any offices. These two were not only controversial characters: they hated each other.

The fourth of these difficulties was that the Prince had a personal hatred to the Prime Minister. The long history of the Prince's political friendships, girlfriends, gambling habits and most of all, his growing debts, caused constant problems for the government. In 1787 Pitt settled the Prince's financial situation: 10 thousand pounds were added to his yearly Civil List, 20 thousand for the completion of the Carlton House, and 161 thousand pounds for paying his debts. This fantastic sum was not given without any conditions: the Prince was obliged to live regularly and to marry with a protestant Princess. The Prince didn't dare to confess officially his marriage, so he was

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<sup>11</sup> The text of the act: *English Historical Documents*, Vol. 9. London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1953. 122-128. p.

<sup>12</sup> The text of the act: see above, 129-135. p.

<sup>13</sup> The text of the act: *English Historical Documents*, Vol. 10. London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957. 107-108. p.

<sup>14</sup> For the personality of Pitt: EHRMAN, John: *The Younger Pitt. The Years of Acclaim*. Stanford, Univ. P., 1969. passim, or the biographies by Earl of Stanhope, Derek Jarrett, Robin Reilly, John Holland Rose.

<sup>15</sup> For Fox: John DERRY: *Charles James Fox*. London, Batsford, 1972, or the biography by Stanley Ayling.

forced to commit a bigamy. In this conflict Pitt triumphed over the Prince, and the Prince would never forgive him for this<sup>16</sup>.

When in November 1788, the King's illness became a public fact, a great game started: on one side the sick King, Pitt, and the Government, and on the other side: the Prince, Fox, and the opposition. William Pitt was well aware of the fact, that in the very moment of the declaration of the Prince's regency he would be a casualty. On the other hand Fox knew, that at the same moment he would be the Prime Minister. The King's condition was absolutely unpredictable: the members of the Government had taken the necessary steps: for example, Thurlow, the Lord Chancellor visited the Prince in Windsor, and he endeavoured to keep his office also in the next government. Pitt decided to return to his original profession at the Bar<sup>17</sup>, but first, he wanted to take all the possible steps to save his Government and office. A great debate started in the House of Commons: Fox urged the regency, and Pitt wanted to postpone it. From December 1788 to March 1789 Pitt temporized the final decision by brilliant handling of the affairs. We will examine this question by means of Pitt's Parliamentary speeches.

On 20 November, in the midst of the first embarrassment, when the Parliament met after the long summer holiday, Pitt obtained, the Prince's assent to adjourn the Parliament for two weeks. So the Parliamentary session opened on 4 December 1788, and the debate started on the 10th<sup>18</sup>. This first occasion defined the front-lines. After receiving the report of the physicians on the King's condition, Pitt proposed to create a committee to examine and collect the concerning precedents: he wanted to know whether similar occasions have occurred in the English history<sup>19</sup>. With this step he declared clearly, that the regency was not an automatic act. After Pitt's first speech Fox rose immediately, and stated, that Pitt's motion produced an unnecessary delay, and that it would be the duty of the House to arrange the situation as soon as possible. He suggested all the royal powers should be vested into the Prince of Wales immediately, because the Prince had a clear right to the power, if His Majesty would die. In his answer, Pitt made his famous declaration: "*That it would appear, from every precedent, and for every page of our history, that to assert such a right in the Prince of Wales, or any one else, independent of the decision of the two houses of parliament, was little less than treason to the constitution of the country.*" and: without the assent of the Parliament "*the Prince of Wales had no right (speaking of strict right) to assume the government, more than any other individual subject of the country.*"<sup>20</sup> Pitt stated also, that

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<sup>16</sup> BARNES, Donald Grove: *George III and William Pitt*. Stanford Univ. Press, 1939. 184. p.

<sup>17</sup> STANHOPE: *Pitt*, 1. Vol. 395. p.

<sup>18</sup> BARNES, Donald Grove: *George III and William Pitt*. Stanford, Univ. Press, 1939. 187. p. (hereafter: BARNES)

<sup>19</sup> The text of Pitt's speech you may find in: *Th Speeches of the Right Honourable William Pitt in the House of Commons*, in Four Volumes. London, Longman, 1806. Vol. 1. 373-378. p. (hereafter: *Pitt's Speeches*)

<sup>20</sup> *Pitt's Speeches*: 375. p.

the main question was whether the House had or had not the right to decide in this case. In his opinion one of the three branches of the English government <sup>21</sup> had fallen out, and in this case it was the duty of the other two to fill the first's place.

The English political public thought the situation to be very funny: concerning the Prince of Wales, the traditional roles of the whigs and tories had been reversed: Fox, the leader of the whigs, became the great defender of the ancient royal prerogatives, and Pitt, the tory, became the main champion of the whig ideas: defending the power of the Parliament, and restricting the power of the Crown. Looking at the debate Pitt was also amused by the change of Fox, and declared: "*I will unwhig the gentleman for the rest of his life*". <sup>22</sup>

On the second day (12 December) nothing new was added to the debate <sup>23</sup>. The examination of the precedents started. Everyone knew, that no important information about the precedents could be found, because there hasn't been a similar occasion in the English history. Apart from this fact, Pitt detailed lengthy the cases, and finally he stated the conclusion: the institution of the regency does not exist in the English history. Fox then in a long speech actually mentioned, that the Prince had the right to the regency, but he would not be able to exercise that right unless the parliament decide it to him. It was a marvellous opportunity for Pitt to pick a quarrel with Fox: according to Pitt, Fox said, if there wouldn't be a sitting Parliament, the Prince's right would be an automatic one. Pitt denied this: in this case – he said – it would be the Prince's duty to call together the parliament. "*It was subversive of the principles of the constitution to admit, that the Prince of Wales might seat himself on the throne during the lifetime of his father*" <sup>24</sup>. Pitt, on his part finished the debate with some propositions: (1) there should be an examination, whether the Prince of Wales had any right to the royal power; (2) whether the parliament had the right to decide or not; (3) whether the future regent would get all of the royal power or only a part of it; and at the end: what the procedure would be in the case of the King's recovery. These questions were the basis of the long-lasting parliamentary debates of the next two months.

In the midst of December, the opposition nursed sanguine expectations of coming soon into office. 15 December Fox wrote: "*We shall have several hard fights in the House of Commons this week and next, in some of which I fear we shall be beat; but whether we are or not, I think it certain that in about a fortnight we shall come in. If we carry our questions, we shall come in in a more creditable and triumphant way, but at any rate the Prince must be Regent, and of consequence the Ministry must be*

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<sup>21</sup> It's a common phrase in the 18th century English parliamentary language: the three branches of the government: the King, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. This three factors were identified in the system of "mixed government" with the monarchic, aristocratic and democratic principle.

<sup>22</sup> BARNES, 189. p.

<sup>23</sup> *Pitt's Speeches*, 378–384. p.

<sup>24</sup> *Pitt's Speeches*: 381. p.

*changed.... I am sure I cannot in conscience advise him to give up anything that is really necessary to his Government, or indeed to claim anything else as Regent, but the full power of a King, to which he is certainly entitled."*<sup>25</sup>

The debate culminated on 16 December. Pitt seemingly settled down for temporization: he spoke again on the theoretical questions of right, and on the already examined precedents. After the first phase of his long speech, Pitt proposed three resolutions, the second one was the following: "*That is the right and duty of the lords... and commons of Great Britain... to provide the means of suppling the defect of the personal exercise of the royal authority, arising from his Majesty's said indisposition, in such manner as the exigency of the case may appear to require.*"<sup>26</sup> This was clearly the key question, and again a violent debate started. The opposition made every effort to reach its object, for example they alluded to the not too heartily connection between the Prince and Pitt. To this remark, Pitt gave a very diplomatic answer, in which he alluded to his reservations for the Prince: "*As to being conscios, that he did not deserve the favour of the prince, he could only say, that he knew but one way, in which he, or any man, could deserve it; by having uniformly endeavoured, in a public situation, to do his duty to the king his father, and to the country at large.*"<sup>27</sup> At the end of the debate the Pitt's resolutions were carried by the vote of the House of Commons. In this debate the opposition made two serious mistakes: Fox described the situation of the King first as a real demise<sup>28</sup>, and after as a "civil death"<sup>29</sup>. These were good occasions for Pitt to retort, and also were offences to the King.

After this victory Pitt gained a great relief: in the parliamentary Calendar the second half of December and the first days of January is the time of the Christmas holiday. After the recess of the Parliament, the Speaker died – and because of he gained a few more days<sup>30</sup>. The problem remained, but the forum for the debates ceased its work. Pitt knew very well that this pause was only a temporary one, and in January he would have to create new arguments for the temporization of the decision. In the course of this month it became clear to the Government that the King's illness was not over, and they couldn't postpone the Regency much longer. They started to work towards the founding of the regency.

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<sup>25</sup> *Memorials and correspondence of Charles James Fox*. Edited by Lord John RUSSELL. (below: FOX: *Memorials*) Vol. 2. London, Bentley, 1853. 299–300. p.

<sup>26</sup> *Pitt's Speeches*, 400. p.

<sup>27</sup> *Pitt's Speeches*, 401. p.

<sup>28</sup> In the English law this indicate when the sovereign's natural body and his "political body" were separated – so called: the death of the King. see: TODD, Vol. 1. 213–214. p.

<sup>29</sup> It's also a category of the English law: when somebody is deprived of his political rights. It was not a temporary, but a final act, and related to criminals.

<sup>30</sup> TOMLINE, George: *Memoirs of the Life of... William Pitt*. London, Murray, 1821. Vol. 2., 433. p. (hereafter: TOMLINE)

In the new year, the session started on the 5, and the debate of the Regency Bill at 16 January<sup>31</sup>. Pitt had prepared his Regency Bill, and the House started to examine it. The most important feature of this act was the limitation of the regent's power. Pitt, in his introductory speech said the followings: [in the precedents] "*Was the regent of the country invested with full and unlimited power to exercise the royal authority? Undoubtedly not. In the three regency bills in the statute books to which he adverted, were there not limitations? There were in every one. All the powers might be given, but then they were not given to one person.*"<sup>32</sup> In consequence of this principle, the bill proposed the following limitations: the regent might not grant peerages (because this is the way to change the composition of the House of Lords, or the second branch of the legislature). The regent might not approve any bills: this function would be vested in a committee. This limitation would be merely a temporary one: if the King's health would be worsened, the Parliament will take away the restriction. The bill would prevent the regent from allowing any grant, patent, or annuity for life, excepting the nomination for example of judges. This point tried to restrain the patronage power of the Crown. The following clause prevented the regent's power over the King's personal property, and the last one entrusted the care of the royal person, during his illness in the guardianship of the Queen. (This item was probably the least important one.)

The Bill was passed in the House of Commons, and after that, at the 26 January, also in the House of Lords<sup>33</sup>, but its coming into execution became the source of the following debates. At the end of January the public opinion changed. In November, at the start of the crisis, the public opinion was undoubtedly on Pitt's side. The London public - watching Pitt's conduct - at the end of January came to the conclusion, that Pitt wants the power for himself. The caricaturist gave to Pitt the nicknames "Prince Pitt", or "King William" or "William the Conqueror"<sup>34</sup>. In spite of the public opinion, Pitt's power was seemingly strengthened.

Simultaneously during the hard Parliamentary debates the physicians made all the possible efforts to cure the King. As consequence of these efforts, or not, the King's health improved at the end of the winter. On 19 February, the Court hastened to announce in the House of Lords: the King has recovered<sup>35</sup>.

The fundamental problem was over, but the case had some further consequences. The first of these consequences was the strengthening of Pitt's government and the government in general. It was prove, that a clever Prime Minister could handle a long constitutional crisis, and after all, he could have his way. Also it was prove, that the King was - at least provisionally - not an indispensable factor in British politics. After

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<sup>31</sup> TOMLINE, 435-446. p.

<sup>32</sup> *Pitt's Speeches*, 414. p.

<sup>33</sup> TOMLINE, 450. p.

<sup>34</sup> Detailed with some interesting caricatures in: GEORGE, Dorothy: *English Political Caricature to 1792*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959. 196-201. p.

<sup>35</sup> FOX: *Memoirs*, 302-303. p.

this crisis, the King gave Pitt a free hand, because of his personal gratefulness. As a consequence of these events, the King's personal power started to decline.

The declining of the King's personal power was not a temporary event: during the reign of George III, there were repeating problems with the royal illnesses, and as consequence of this, the question of regency. This problem occurred for the first time in 1765<sup>36</sup>, when George III was a young man. The Government proposed to regent the King's mother. The Princess however was the well-known lover of the Lord Bute, that's why the Parliament didn't want to assent to this decision. In the midst of the controversies the King has regained his health. In the following twenty years the King made all the possible efforts to extend his power. These efforts have caused an another constitutional crisis, in the turning of the 1770–1780s. The American War of Independence, and finally the defeat, undermined the 18th-century English political machinery. A political crisis culminated in 1783, with following changings of governments. At the end of the year, with the despotic nomination of the Pitt government, the King seemingly regained his power, even strengthened it. But shortly afterwards, in 1788 became the great Regency Crisis. In spite of his published recovery, the King never convalesced absolutely and completely. Until 1811 the King's health remained the most uncertain factor of the English government. For example, in connection with the debates of the Union with Ireland in 1800, the King's hysterical action to prevent the Catholic Emancipation, was the strongest prove for the public of his irresponsible mind. In 1801, when William Pitt resigned from the Prime Minsiter's office, the crisis lasted for months, because the King was upset from the Irish question, and from Pitt's resignation and wasn't able to appoint Addington to Prime Minister. The government, the Parliament and the public of England for more then twenty years lived in a continous uncertainty about the King's mental state. This long and unfortunate situation considerably weakened the reputation of the King's person and his power. At the same time, the same situation strenghtened and made the government more independent.

In 1811 the King's malady again manifestated itself. As the illness seemed to be serious, the debate on the regency started again. The Perceval government – to simplifying the problem – took out the Pitt-made Regency Bill. This debate was a much more comfortable one, than the 1788/89s. Pitt and Fox were dead. The Prince was much older and earnest, and he had no reservations to the actual Prime Minister. The Regency Act of 1811<sup>37</sup> was created in a few weeks, at first for only a year, but in 1812 in was extended for indetermined time. It lastened till the death of George III, in 1820. After 1811 there was no English sovereign, (except for some of Queen Victoria's youthful actions) who wanted to extend the royal prerogatives.

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<sup>36</sup> MARSHALL, Dorothy: *Eighteenth Century England*. London, Longman, 1989. 347. p.

<sup>37</sup> The text of this act: *English Historical Documents*, Vol. 11. London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1959. 83–86. p.

ISTVÁN EÖRDÖGH

**A QUESTÃO DOS CAPUCHINOS  
NO BRASIL NO SEGUNDO IMPÉRIO  
(1840-1889)**

Foi julgado necessário estudar este tema, a questão das Missões dos Capuchinhos no Brasil no Segundo Império, por causa da sua grande importância pastoral e político-eclesiástica. Os testemunhos contemporâneos fazem conhecer uma ação missionária florescente no seu início e mais tarde condenada a uma agonia impressionante.

Serão conhecidas as causas desta decadência, que tem as suas raízes na tendência constitucionalista do Estado Imperial do Brasil, querendo degradar os homens de Deus da primeira linha a nível de meros empregados estatais, de banderiantes do interesse político-leigo.

A reação das Autoridades Eclesiásticas de Roma, diante desta usurpação do poder civil, fez abrir um longo período de diatribas entre os anos de 1843 e 1862, que deixa entrever o modo complexo de agir da Cúria Romana, às vezes vulnerável e contraditório, ao querer fazer respeitar os direitos da Igreja no exercício dos seus deveres.

O acordo final, que foi o único que se realizou entre a Santa Sé e o Governo Imperial, é mais uma demonstração, além do aparente sucesso eclesiástico, da vitória do utilitarismo leigo e das pretensões do Estado que pretende instrumentalizar a ação da Igreja missionária.

Mesmo assim, pagando o pessoal missionário capuchinho italiano um alto preço de sacrifício humano pela expansão da fé no Brasil, no século XIX, foram vivos sencíveis e perceptíveis os resultados positivos conseguidos por eles naquelas terras, resultados estes que continuam dando os seus frutos até nos dias de hoje.

Tudo começou quando em 1759 chegaram ao Brasil os decretos do João Sebastião de Carvalho, Marquês de Pombal que determinavam a expulsão dos jesuítas de todos os territórios do Reino. <sup>1</sup> Foram então banidos do Norte e do Sul do país 590 religiosos, que abandonaram 113 residências. <sup>2</sup> As consequências deste ato se fizeram logo sentir nos campos da cultura, da formação do Clero e das Missões. Começou a decadência da catequese dos índios, causada pelo fechamento dos colégios e pela ruína das missões nas aldeias. <sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Sobre a origem desta questão, ver PASTOR, Ludovico von, *Storia dei Papi*, vol. XVI, Roma, 1965, p. 313-317.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. AZZI, Riolando, *A evangelização no Brasil*, Belo Horizonte, 1956, p. 15.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. BRUNEAU, Thomas, *O catolicismo brasileiro em época de transação*, São Paulo, 1974, p. 44-47.

A campanha iniciada contra os jesuítas aos poucos se estendeu contra todas as ordens monásticas no século XIX. O Governo de Dom Pedro I suprimiu a Ordem Agostiniana da Bahia em 1824, a dos Carmelitas Descalços e a dos Capuchinhos de Pernambuco em 1830.<sup>4</sup> Foram então só os capuchinhos italianos que, embora com o pessoal bastante reduzido, continuaram a trabalhar nas missões.

### *1 - O ESTADO DAS MISSÕES CAPUCHINHAS ENTRE 1840-1860*

Em 1843, aos 21 julho foi aprovado pelas Câmaras o Decreto n° 285, depois de ter sido reconhecido a utilidade dos missionários nas sessões anteriores<sup>5</sup>, com os seguintes termos:

Art. 1° - O Governo de S.M.I. Dom Pedro II é autorizado a financiar as despesas necessárias para fazer vir da Italia missionários capuchinhos, os quais serão distribuídos nas províncias pelo mesmo Governo, havendo o centro deles na Corte.

Art. 2° - O Governo é autorizado também a distribuir 6 Lotes, para cobrir as despesas: da compra ou construção de um edifício destinado para a moradia dos missionários; da manutenção dos mesmos estabelecimentos juntamente com as suas igrejas e capelas; extraordinárias e indispensáveis pelo desenvolvimento das missões.<sup>6</sup>

Os capuchinhos italianos ficaram assim como os "Missionários officialis" do Império brasileiro.

"Medida providencial foi tomada pela Propaganda, de acordo com o Geral da Ordem, criando um Comissariado Geral a 3 de janeiro de 1847. Com ela visava-se dar aos capuchinhos do Brasil uma autoridade central, afim de impedir novas dissensões nas diversas prefeituras, ter pessoal mais pronto para as diferentes tarefas assumidas pelos missionarios da Propaganda no país. A sede do Comissariado ficou sendo o

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<sup>4</sup> "... no período de 1822 a 1833, o Governo suprimiu por conta própria Ordens religiosas no Brasil, proibiu qualquer alienação dos bens móveis e imóveis das Ordens, insistiu diversas vezes na proibição de se receberem noviços sem a licença da Assembléia Geral Legislativa". Cf. SILVEIRA, Ildephonsus, *O governo incentiva a Reforma das Ordens Regulares*, Excerpta ex dissertatione ad Lauream in Fac. Hist. Eccles. Pont. Univ. Gregoriana, Petrópolis, 1959, p. 39.

<sup>5</sup> "Este objeto he de summa importância, e por isso o Governo opportunamente solicitará de vós os meios necessários para tornar mais geral o beneficio que aquelles operários já tem feito ao País". SOARES DE SOUZA, Paulino José, *Relatório da Repartição dos Negócios da Justiça apresentado à Assembléia Legislativa na primeira sessão da quinta Legislatura*, Rio de Janeiro, 1843, 34-37.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. NEMBRO, Metódio da, *Storia dell'attività missionaria dei Minori Cappuccini nel Brasile (1538?-1889)*, Roma, 1958, p. 219-220.



hospício do Rio de Janeiro, capital do Brasil, e residência do Interúncio apostólico.<sup>7</sup> O primeiro a ser investido do cargo foi o exelente Frei Fabiano da Scandiano, que chegou ao Rio de Janeiro em setembro de 1846, exercendo o seu ministério até 1860, quando voltou para a Itália para ser procurador geral das missões da Ordem. Susce- deu-lhe o não menos digno Fr. Caetano de Messina a partir de 25 de junho de 1861, de grandes méritos, já prefeito do hospício de Pernambuco".<sup>8</sup>

O Comissário Geral, Fr. Fabiano de Scandiano, em 8 de agosto de 1853 mandou para Roma uma "Esposizione succinta..."<sup>9</sup> sobre as coisas principais das missões capu- chinhas no Império do Brasil. Este documento dá um quadro autêntico da situação Mis- sionária no país, na metade do século XIX. Aqui ele será apresentado através da divisão em vários períodos, de maneira resumida.

#### a) *O estado das Missões até fins de 1840.*

Até os últimos anos do século anterior, XVIII, o trabalho missionário tivera um bom sucesso. Mais de 50 Missões tinham sido entregues aos Bispos diocesanos para serem paróquias. Estas, já no ano de 1854 eram consideradas aldeias importantes. Logo depois, porém, começou a decadência total. As causas foram as seguintes:

- falta de pessoal missionário;
- dificuldades de transporte;
- problemas políticos nacionais e internacionais;
- proibição das pregações.

A Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro cessou de funcionar e foi privada do seu Hospício.

A Prefeitura de Pernambuco ficou muito prejudicada.

A Prefeitura da Bahia conseguiu sobreviver por causa do recurso do Padre Ambró- gio da Roccabruna ao Imperador Dom Pedro II° que garantiu e deu a sua proteção.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> O testemunho do Interúncio Mariano Falcinelli explica bem a importância que tinha esta resi- dência: "Se avesse colà un'abitazione destinata alla Nunziatura, come a Napoli, e Vienna! È veramente penoso dopo un lunghissimo e disastroso viaggio di venti e più giorni sul mare, giungere alla Capitale del Brasile, senza sapere a chi rivolgersi, e senza aver la sicurezza di un alloggio conveniente". Cf. Archivio della Congregazione degli Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari (em seguida: AES e a colocação da documentação será indicada por Ano, Posição e Fascículo, segundo o ordinamento feito antes de 1987), Br. 1858-65, P. 142, F. 182, f. 79v.

<sup>8</sup> RUBERT, Arlindo, "A Propaganda e o Brasil no século XIX", em *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria rerum 1622-1972*, vol. III/1, Freiburg, 1975, p. 645.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Archivio della Sacra Congregazione "de Propaganda Fide" (em seguida: S.C.P.F.), *America Meridionale* (Am. Merid.) 1854-1856, vol. 9, f. 88r-108v.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 88r-88v. Os missionários foram acusados de atividades de propaganda contra a Independência do Brasil.

Nos fins de 1840 funcionavam nestas três Prefeituras somente as seguintes Missões:

- São Fideles in Campos;
- Aldeia de S. José de Leonissa ou Aldeida da Pedra;
- Ferrados, ou Aldeia de São Pedro de Alcântara;
- Aldeia de Baixa-Verde;
- Albuquerque ou Missão da Mãe de Misericórdia. <sup>11</sup>

b) Desde 1840 até 1847.

Desde o ano de 1838 começaram a chegar novos missionários da Itália, mas desta vez não para serem destinados às Missões entre os índios. Diante das necessidades pastorais como a falta de sacerdotes diocesanos e, em consequência da catequese popular, foi praticado também pelos capuchinhos o uso das Missões Populares, com grande proveito espiritual. <sup>12</sup>

Segundo o testemunho do Ministro da Justiça, na sua Relação à Câmaras, em 1843: "São admiráveis os resultados conseguidos por alguns missionários capuchinhos italianos nas Províncias de Maranhão, Pernambuco e Sergipe e entre os Rios Tocantins e Araguaia". <sup>13</sup>

Entre os mais zelosos o Comissário cita alguns nomes para que não fossem jamais esquecidos: Fr. Doroteo da Dronero, Fr. Pier-Maria da Brá, Fr. Cândido da Taggio, Fr. Carlo da Porto Maurizio e Fr. Paolo da Panicale. <sup>14</sup>

Em 1841 foram mandados da Itália para a Província de Pernambuco 5 novos missionários.

*Hospícios.* Foi aberta de novo a Prefeitura de Pernambuco em 1840, por um Decreto da Assembléia Provincial. Começaram, então, ali o serviço missionário Fr. Joaquim da Fragola, junto com Fr. Gabriel da Malta, reconstruindo o estado miserável do Hospício. A Prefeitura da Bahia se conservou em boas condições. Em 1843 foi fundada a Vice-Prefeitura de Sergipe, cuja autorização foi dada pela Assembléia Provincial de 23 agosto de 1842. No Rio de Janeiro o Hospício foi destinado para um uso diverso e só em 1842 é que o Prefeito, Fr. Fedele, recebeu a ajuda do Governo para começar as construções de um novo edifício, terminando os trabalhos em 1847. <sup>15</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Cf. RUBERT, Arlindo, *ob. cit.*, p. 654-656.

<sup>12</sup> O. Fr. Caetano, sozinho, legitimou mais de 500 matrimônios, fundou um colégio com capacidade para 200 órfãs, reedificou 4 igrejas matrizes e 13 cemitérios durante as suas pregações. Cf. *ibidem*, p. 660-661.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. S.C.P.F. *Am. Merid.* 1854-56, vol. 9, f. 91r.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 91v.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 92r.

*Missões entre os Índios.* Três missões foram realizadas neste período: Pacífica, em 1843; Aldeia de São Joaquim de Jamimbu, cerca de 1848 e Aldeia de Faxina.<sup>16</sup> Foram planejadas mais outras duas: a primeira no interior da Província do Mato Grosso e a segunda no Grão-Pará, com uma nova Prefeitura na Foz do Rio Negro com o Amazonas.

Infelizmente tais projetos e o desenvolvimento das Missões em geral foram bloqueados pelo novo Decreto n° 373, de 30 de julho de 1844.<sup>17</sup>

Devido aos Artigos deste Decreto foi cancelada a ordem de partida de dois missionários da Itália: Fr. Eugênio da Genova e Fr. Francisco da Corigliano. Era desesperada a situação na Província do Pará, onde já se tinham estabelecido 8 missionários com o Prefeito, Fr. Luís da Belforte, tendo sido garantida a colaboração por parte do Governo Provincial. Mas, com a crise que se criou, os missionários foram obrigados a abandonar esta missão tão prometedora.<sup>18</sup>

*Novas Igrejas.* Foram construídas duas: uma pelo Fr. Gregório M. da Bene, em Queimado, e outra pelo Fr. Paulo Antonio da Casanuova em Itapemirim.<sup>19</sup>

### c) De 1847 até 1854.

Chegando o Fr. Fabiano da Scandiano no Brasil, em 1846, foi para ele difícil ter uma noção exata da situação, mesmo da Prefeitura da Capital porque, segundo a sua narração, o Hospício central não tinha deixado nenhuma Memória nem das suas coisas, nem das outras Prefeituras. Passaram-se anos até que o Comissário conseguiu ter algumas notícias sobre as missões existentes no Mato Grosso, Goias, Minas Gerais, Pará e São Paulo.<sup>20</sup>

Em 1847 foi feita pelo Comissário a visita nos principais Hospícios. As Prefeituras existentes eram neste período as mesmas antigas: Bahia, Pernambuco e Rio de Janeiro. As Vice-Prefeituras eram as seguintes: Aldeia de Pedra Branca e do Maranhão, dependentes da Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro; de Sergipe, dependente da Prefeitura da Bahia e a de São Paulo, independente por razões desconhecidas.<sup>21</sup>

Os *Missionários* em total nesta época eram 49 em todo o País, divididos no seguinte modo:

- 9 destes exercitavam o ministério como párocos, principalmente na Província de São Paulo, por falta de clero diocesano;

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<sup>16</sup> Cf. RUBERT, Arlindo *ob. cit.*, p. 156; 158.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. S.C.P.F., *Am. Merid.*, 1854-56, vol. 9, f. 94r-95r. A análise deste Decreto será feita a seguir sob a sigla b).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, 95r.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, 95r-95v.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, 96r.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, 99r.

- 22 eram os que trabalhavam com os Índios;
- 18 servem às várias Províncias nos 6 Hospícios existentes.

Desde 1847 o número total do pessoal missionário deveria ser de 66 mas, por causa da morte de 10 Frades, 5 que tinham voltado e mais um que foi mandado para Itália, o número deles ficou reduzido a 49 em 1854.<sup>22</sup>

*Missões Populares.* Esta atividade, muito bem aceita pelo povo brasileiro da época, continuou a dar os seus bons frutos também nesta época, nas Províncias da Bahia, Sergipe, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Ceará, Maranhão, Piauí, Minas Gerais e Pará.<sup>23</sup>

*Novas igrejas.* Foram construídas umas 10, segundo a Relação do Comissário.<sup>24</sup>

*Missões novas entre os Índios.* Durante estes sete anos foram estabelecidas as seguintes:

- Nossa Sra. do Bom Conselho, de 1847;
- Teresina e de Pedro Afonso, de 1847;
- Missão de Cujeté entre os Índios Puris, para onde foi mandado o Fr. Bento da Bubbio, em 1848;
- Colônia Indígena de Mucuri, em 1847;
- Aldeia de S. Antônio da Cruz;
- Missão de Catulé;
- Missão nas margens do Rio Pardo, de 1853, com o Fr. Luís Grava;
- Missão do Rio Tapajós;
- Missão de Andirá, de 1849;
- Missão dos Rios Vaupés e Içana;
- S. Pedro de Propriá;
- Missão de Rodelas.<sup>25</sup>

*Missões que fracassaram:* na Província do Espírito Santo, a chamada Aldeia Afoncinho; uma outra na mesma Província, nas margens do Rio Doce; uma terceira na Província de Minas Gerais, nas margens do Rio Mucury, com o Fr. Bernardino da Lagoneiro.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 99r-99v.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 100r-101r.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 101r.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 105r-107v. Para informações mais detalhadas cf. RUBERT, Arlindo, *ob. cit.*, p. 654-660.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. S.C.P.F., *Am. Merid.*, 1854-56, vol. 9, f. 108r-108v.

d) De 1854 até 1860.

Mais tarde, em 7 de maio de 1860, Fr. Fabiano mandou uma outra relação sobre as Missões capuchinhas no Brasil para a Sagrada Congregação "de Propaganda Fide". Nesta relação foi revelada uma decadência progressiva do estado dos estabelecimentos missionários. De um dia para outro cessaram de existirem as estações missionárias entre as várias tribus indígenas. A causa principal de tal deterioração foi o número desproporcionado dos missionários diante das necessidades da evangelização.

Os *Missionários*: neste período são em total 40 pessoas. A maior parte é doente e incapaz de trabalhar.<sup>27</sup>

*Províncias*. No Grão-Pará foram abandonadas as Missões entre os índios Uahupés, Manés e Munducurús, uma vez muito prometentes. Na Diocese da Bahia também várias Missões foram abandonadas por falta de pessoal missionário. Em Goiás, o Fr. Rafael da Taggia, por motivo de doença, foi obrigado a deixar duas missões em plena prosperidade nas margens do Rio Uruguay. Segundo o Procurador Geral da Ordem, pode acontecer o mesmo em breve com a Missão do Fr. Sigismundo da Saggia, que trabalha com os Índios Xavantes e Carijós. Nas Províncias de Mato Grosso e Paraná, onde o número dos Índios era mais abundante, era necessário a presença de muito mais missionários. Nas duas Províncias do Piauí e Maranhão neste período ficou um só missionário, o Vice-Prefeito. Nas três Províncias do Ceará, Rio Grande do Sul e Paraíba ficaram três missionários. A Prefeitura da Bahia esteve vaga por mais de dois anos, contando sempre a partir de 1860.<sup>28</sup>

As *dificuldades* eram numerosas: exaurimento total dos missionários; solidão e isolamento; falta de ajuda econômica; falta de assistência espiritual e sanitária dos missionários nas respectivas Prefeituras ou Vice-Prefeituras, que deviam ser Centros de regeneração das forças do espírito missionário; a avançada idade dos missionários; o número insuficiente dos mesmos; o bloqueio da chegada de novos reforços.<sup>29</sup>

Além destes, apresentaram-se também graves falhas no Governo das Missões. A ordenação das Missões e dos missionários era feita por várias autoridades, considerando que cada Prefeito podia ter a liberdade de se dirigir à Autoridade que queria. Por isto aconteceu muitas vezes que o Prefeito de Pernambuco escolheu o Núncio, enquanto que o da Bahia escolheu a Propaganda Fide, enquanto que, enfim, o Prefeito da Capital recebeu ordens do Comissário Geral para resolver os numerosos problemas.<sup>30</sup>

A verdadeira origem, porém, desta situação de decadência total das missões capuchinhas no Brasil foi a crise religiosa, causada pela interferência do Poder Civil nos vários setores da vida eclesiástica, paralizando-a e deixando-a privada da sua principal fonte vital, isto é, da liberdade.

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<sup>27</sup> Cf. S.C.P.F. *Am. Merid.*, 1860-1862, vol. 11, f. 136v.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 136r-136v; 138r-139v.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 137r-138r.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 193r-193v.

## 2 - O DECRETO IMPERIAL DE 30 DE JULHO DE 1844 E AS VICISSITUDES CONSECUTIVAS

Logo depois da Lei de 21 de junho de 1843, com a qual o Governo Imperial autorizou a vinda dos missionários capuchinhos da Itália, assumindo as despesas necessárias para poder exercer o seu trabalho no interior entre os Índios, seguiu-se uma restrição com o Decreto de 30 de julho de 1844, nos seguintes termos:

- Art. 1° - As missões permanecerão dependentes do Governo Imperial quanto à distribuição do pessoal missionário e à destinação para os diversos lugares onde possam ser mais úteis para a Igreja e para o Estado.
- Art. 2° - O Governo atendendo o pedido dos Bispos mandará os missionários para as Dioceses que tiverem necessidade.
- Art. 3° - Os missionários ficam dependendo dos Bispos e dos Superiores locais onde exercitarão o ministério sacerdotal.
- Art. 4° - Não podem ser chamados por Roma ou transferidos para outra parte não indicada pelo Governo, sem o seu consentimento.
- Art. 5° - Quanto à obediência aos Superiores, a execução das ordens recebidas dependerá do Beneplácito Imperial.<sup>31</sup>

A reação do Internúncio Ambrógio Campodonico<sup>32</sup> foi imediata, protestando em 18 de agosto de 1844 contra tal interferência abusiva do Governo nos negócios eclesiásticos e a ofensiva contra os direitos da Propaganda Fide. A Santa Sé aprovou a protesta, manifestando isto à Legação Brasileira em Roma, declarando que não seriam mandados mais missionários para o Brasil até que estivesse em vigor o Decreto acima citado.<sup>33</sup>

### a) A crise missionária.

Para poder compreender o estado das Missões analisado anteriormente, com os seus sucessos e com o seu declínio, é necessário conhecer detalhadamente as conseqüências que o Decreto de 1844 teve e as negociações que o seguiram.

A finalidade que o Governo Imperial perseguia com as Missões era somente utilitarista e nada mais. Quando ficou evidente que a civilização dos numerosos indígenas<sup>34</sup> e a descoberta do interior estava em perigo por causa da posição rígida da Propaganda

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<sup>31</sup> S.C. *Am. Merid.*, 1854-1846, vol. 9, f. 148r-148v.

<sup>32</sup> Em data 8 de junho de 1841, Mons. Ambrogio Campodonico foi nomeado Internúncio Apostólico no Brasil e Delegado Apostólico nas Republicas do Chile, Argentina, Uruguay e Paraguay. (Arch. della Canc. dei Brevi Ap., Gregorius XVI, vol. 4996, f.1). Cf. STAFFA, Dino, *Le Delegazioni Apostoliche*, Roma, 1958, p. 33.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. S.C.P.F., *Am. Merid.*, 1854-1856, vol. 9, f. 148v; 94r-95v.

<sup>34</sup> Segundo a Relação do Ministro da Justiça, de 27 de agosto de 1843, no Brasil existiam 74 tribus e o número dos índios era superior aos 80.000. Cf. NEMBRO, Metodio da, *ob. cit.*, p. 248.

Fide, bloqueando completamente o embarque dos missionários para o Brasil, quase dois anos depois do dito Decreto, aos 5 de março de 1846, a Legação Brasileira em Roma, por ordem do Governo Imperial, apresentou uma nota à Santa Sé, declarando que o Governo Brasileiro não tinha nenhuma intenção de ofender os Direitos da Santa Sé, pedindo a suspensão do embarque dos missionários para o Brasil.

A resposta foi dada à Legação Brasileira pelo Cardeal Giacomo Filippo Fransoni<sup>35</sup>, Prefeito (1834–1856) da Propaganda Fide, aos 15 de março de 1846, demonstrando a plena disponibilidade da Sagrada Congregação a respeito do Governo Brasileiro, no caso em que a liberdade das relações entre a Santa Sé e os Superiores dos missionários seja garantida pelo mesmo Governo, reconhecendo a competência jurídica da Propaganda a respeito das missões e sobre a disponibilidade do pessoal missionário.<sup>36</sup>

Mas o Governo durante anos não tinha feito nada para satisfazer às reclamações da Santa Sé. O Encarregado Pontifício junto à Corte do Rio de Janeiro, Mons. Antônio Vieira Borges, em 20 de junho de 1850, avisou ao Secretário (1848–1876) de Estado do Papa Pio IX<sup>o</sup> (1846–1878), Cardeal Giacomo Antonelli, de não mandar mais missionários para o Brasil, porque o Governo não tinha modificado minimamente o Decreto<sup>37</sup> e os abusos do Poder Civil eram frequentes. De fato, o Ministério da Justiça tinha chamado a atenção do Comissário Geral, Fr. Fabiano da Scandiano, porque em 1849 tinha dado uma simples licença – “a qual em nada obstava ao serviço da sua missão”<sup>38</sup> – a um missionário não pertencente ao Hospício do Rio de Janeiro. O Ministério tinha citando os parágrafos do Decreto de 1844, declarando que os missionários são empregados do Governo e que só o mesmo pode dar-lhes tais licenças.

Por parte dos Capuchinhos não faltaram as corajosas reclamações contra estas ingerências do Governo. O Ministro da Justiça, Eusébio de Queiroz, em 1852, no seu Relatório dizia o seguinte sobre os capuchinhos à Assembléia legislativa: “Infelizmente continuam ainda as suas lamentações contra o Decreto de 1844, e as suas exigências na parte relativa às isenções de subordinação aos Ordinários e ao Governo são de tal forma exageradas, que não me parecem admissíveis, a não ser, como espero, modificadas”.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Para a sua biografia, ver *Sacrae Congr., ob. cit.*, vol. III/1, p. 38–40.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. S.C.P.F., *Am. Merid.*, 1854–1856, vol. 9, f. 149r–149v.

<sup>37</sup> “In questo stesso tempo ugualmente: scrivo all’Em.mo Sig. Cardinale de Propaganda Fide perchè non mandi li Missionari Cappuccini per le Catechesi degl’Indigeni, che questo Governo domanda ora alla S.ta Sede, senza che prima non modifichi il decreto pubblicato a quattro anni, nel quale lesi i diritti della S.ta Sede e degli Superiori dei medesimi Missionari”. Cf. AES., Br., 1850, P. 78, F. 163, f. 47r.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. S.C.P.F., *Am. Merid.*, 1854–1856, vol. 9, f. 97r.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 97v.

b) *A primeira Concessão Apostólica para o envio dos missionários em 1850.*

Neste estado de tenção aconteceu que o Encarregado Interino da Legação Brasileira em Roma, João Batista de Figueiredo – na ausência do Ministro Mottinho – apresentou um pedido ao Procurador Geral dos Capuchinhos em Roma para obter seis missionários para as missões no Brasil. As tratativas foram feitas ignorando a competência da Propaganda Fide, que justamente neste tempo, no mês de setembro de 1850, tinha recebido o aviso de Vieira acima citado. O Secretário da Propaganda, Alessandro Barnabò (1847-1856)<sup>40</sup>, durante a Audiência Extraordinária de 18 de setembro do mesmo ano, expôs a Pio IX a delicada situação. Nesta altura já tinham sido concluídas as tratativas entre a Legação Brasileira e a Casa Generalícia dos Capuchinhos sobre o envio dos missionários e sobre as despesas necessárias para a viagem, como até a prenotação dos lugares num navio de carga.<sup>41</sup>

O comportamento incorreto da Legação Brasileira no seu modo de agir, transcurando a Propaganda Fide, foi evidente, como também o fato de o Governo não ter feito nenhum passo pela modificação do Decreto. Nesta situação comprometedora foi Pio IX pessoalmente que assumiu a responsabilidade da decisão, dando licença para a partida dos missionários “somente por aquela vez” e no mesmo momento autorizou a Propaganda Fide que em seu nome fizesse uma enérgica reclamação para que os direitos da Santa Sé fossem respeitados pelo Governo Brasileiro, advertindo-o que esta concessão não se repetirá.<sup>42</sup>

No dia 28 de setembro de 1850, conforme as disposições de Pio IX, o Prefeito da Propaganda Fide, Fransoni, escreveu uma longa carta ao Encarregado Interino J.B. de Figueiredo, mandando contemporaneamente uma cópia para o Mons. Vieira. Não houve nenhuma resposta de parte brasileira à esta carta mas, como se verá no parágrafo seguinte, ela produziu algum efeito.<sup>43</sup>

c) *O Projeto de Modificação em 1854 do Decreto de 1844.*

O Encarregado Apostólico Vieira, pela primeira vez, em 13 de junho de 1851, avisou a Propaganda Fide sobre a disponibilidade do Governo brasileiro de modificar o Decreto, anunciando mais tarde, em 20 de agosto de 1851, que tinha recebido do Ministro da Justiça um Projeto de Modificação e que as correções já tinham sido feitas por ele e pelo Comissário Geral, Fabiano da Scandiano, mandando de volta o Projeto ao Ministro para que sejam sancionadas as observações.

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<sup>40</sup> Para a sua biografia, ver *Sacrae Congr., ob. cit.*, vol. III/1, p. 40-58.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Archivio Segreto Vaticano (em seguida: ASV), *Segreteria di Stato*, 1856, R. 251, f. 64r-64v.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 65r.

<sup>43</sup> S.C.P.F., *Am. Merid.*, 1854-56, vol. 9, f. 50r.



O modo de agir do Mons. Antônio Vieira Borges nesta questão tão delicada, causou uma notável perplexidade na S.C. de Propaganda Fide considerando a competência exclusiva da Congregação neste caso, que foi transcurada completamente pelo Encarregado Pontifício e que a deixou fora das negociações.

No Congresso de 7 de novembro de 1851, foi tratado pela Propaganda a questão, demonstrando na decisão conclusiva compreensão por Mons. Vieira que por uma parte não agiu regularmente no seu proceder mas, por outro lado, fez o que podia para salvar os interesses da Santa Sé. Mesmo assim, a Propaganda achou prudente não fazer nenhuma comunicação a respeito das propostas de Vieira. De fato, por parte do Encarregado não chegou mais tarde nenhuma iniciativa a respeito desta questão.<sup>44</sup>

O Arcebispo Gaetano Bedini<sup>45</sup> (1806-1864) foi destinado para resolver este problema, certamente o mais importante nesta época para a Propaganda. Em data 5 de abril de 1853, recebeu Bedini as Instruções da Propaganda Fide, sobre o que fazer, na qualidade de Núncio, destinado ao Rio de Janeiro.<sup>46</sup> Mas a sua missão infeliz nos Estados Unidos determinou também negativamente todas as esperanças da Santa Sé em relação à Crise Religiosa no Brasil.<sup>47</sup>

Depois de diversas reclamações, em 11 de agosto de 1853, é que, enfim, o Governo se comunicou com o Comissário Geral, pedindo a sua opinião: "quais seriam os meios adequados para solicitar a vinda da Itália de um número suficiente de missionários?". A resposta de Fr. Fabiano foi imediata: "O Governo faça as modificações no famoso Decreto há tempo promessas". Aos 27 do mesmo mês o Governo pediu que nomeasse exatamente os Artigos que deveriam ser modificados. O Comissário Geral apresentou, resumindo em 9 parágrafos, as pretensões em relação à modificação do Decreto de 1844, informando sobre estes passos o recém-chegado Monsenhor Marino Marini<sup>48</sup>, como Encarregado Pontifício da Nunciatura do Rio de Janeiro.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 50r-50v.

<sup>45</sup> Gaetano Bedini, Arcebispo titular de Tebe, foi nomeado Núncio Apostólico do Brasil no dia 15 de fevereiro de 1853. Cf. STAFFA, Dino, *ob. cit.*, p. 34.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. S.C.P.F., *Am. Merid.*, 1854-1856, vol. 9, f. 49r-51r. Ver também *Sacrae Congr., ob. cit.*, vol. III/1, p. 622.

<sup>47</sup> O Arcebispo Bedini indo ao Brasil para tomar posse como Núncio no Rio de Janeiro, fez uma escala nos Estados Unidos, de 30 de junho de 1853 a 4 de fevereiro de 1854. A sua presença tinha provocado muitas contestações, principalmente nos Estados de Filadélfia e Buffalo, por parte dos liberais "trusteists" por causa das funções de Bedini durante a "Questão Romana". Até a vida de Bedini correu perigo por parte dos revolucionários imigrantes italianos e alemães, sendo ele por força das circunstâncias obrigado a embarcar em segredo, renunciando ao mesmo tempo à sua missão no Brasil. Cf. *ibidem*, p. 58-59. Ver também MARTINA, Giacomo, *Pio IX (1851-1866)*, Roma, 1986, p. 484-485.

<sup>48</sup> Marino Marini chegou ao Brasil, no Rio de Janeiro, aos 11 de dezembro de 1853, em qualidade de Encarregado Pontifício. Sobre a sua missão ver: EÖRDÖGH, István, *A crise religiosa no Brasil no período 1852-1861 e as tendências de reforma de Dom Antônio Joaquim de Mello, bispo de São Paulo*, Excerpta ex dissertatione ad Doctoratum in Facultate Historiae Ecclesiasticae Pontificiae Universitatis Gregoriana, Szeged, 1993, p. 14-18, 25-27, 42-43, 49-51.

<sup>49</sup> S.C.P.F., *Am. Merid.*, 1854-56, vol. 9, f. 98r-99r.

Mons. Marini, em 12 de junho de 1854, mandou para a Secretaria da Sagrada Congregação dos Negócios Eclesiásticos Extraordinários a comunicação oficial segundo a qual o Governo desejava estabelecer uma presença mais acentuada dos missionários capuchinhos no Brasil, autorizando o Encarregado Figueiredo da Legação Brasileira em Roma, de dar os passos necessários para obter da Santa Sé a licença para o envio de 40 missionários para o Brasil. Respeitando o Ministro da Justiça José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo as condições anteriormente propostas, em 11 de janeiro de 1854, mandou o primeiro Projeto de Modificação à Legação Brasileira, para ser apresentado à Santa Sé durante as negociações.<sup>50</sup>

O Projeto de Modificação consiste em 5 pontos, segundo os quais:

- 1 - O Governo Imperial é à completa disposição para a promoção catequética dos incrédulos nas Províncias do Paraná, Mato Grosso, Espírito Santo e Goiás, propondo tudo isto em larga escala. Em consequência, espera que o Santo Padre, tanto interessado pela evangelização destes povos, lhe dê o necessário apoio.
- 2 - O governo imperial compromete-se a financiar não somente a viagem, a aposentadoria e o salário do pessoal missionário, mas pretende cobrir também as despesas necessárias ao culto religioso e as da fundação e manutenção de novas aldeias.
- 3 - A administração governativa das aldeias civilizadas vai ficar dependendo exclusivamente dos próprios missionários sem nenhuma interferência das autoridades civis até que o Governo não considere as populações destas aldeias completamente estabilizadas e catequizadas. Os missionários deverão apresentar ao Governo por meio dos seus Superiores uma Relação no fim do ano sobre o estado geral das aldeias, sobre a instrução religiosa feita e sobre as necessidades e o balanço das despesas.
- 4 - Os missionários deverão prestar serviço pastoral nas dioceses somente no caso de absoluta necessidade, mas sem prejuízo da sua missão principal.
- 5 - O Governo vai estabelecer em todas as Províncias antes mencionadas uma cátedra de língua indígena. vai facilitar a correspondência e a comunicação dos missionários com os seus Superiores e, enfim, vai oferecer ajudas adequadas à segurança pessoal dos missionários.

Esta proposta de Araújo foi comunicada à Propaganda pela Secretaria da S.C. dos Negócios Extraordinários no dia 7 de setembro de 1854.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 147r-153r.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 152r-153r.

*d) A posição da Propaganda Fide diante do Projeto de Modificação.*

Do ponto de vista eclesiástico, segundo a Propaganda, o Decreto de 1844 devia ser modificado na seguinte maneira:

- Art. 1° - Será mantida a integridade do direito da Santa Sé e da Propaganda sobre as Missões, isto é, será reservada para estes a competência da distribuição e determinação dos missionários, tendo uma consideração especial pelas propostas do Governo quanto aos lugares por ele preferidos.
- Art. 2° - Deve ser modificado segundo os critérios do primeiro artigo.
- Art. 3° - Evidenciar que os Bispos são os únicos Superiores dos regulares, conforme estabelecido pelos Cânones e por várias Constituições Apostólicas, e não as Autoridades civis locais.
- Art. 4° - O transferimento dos missionários de uma missão para outra deve depender da autoridade dos Superiores das Missões e da Propaganda, que exercitará este poder através do Representante Pontifício, avisando o Governo sobre as transferências, o qual Governo não deverá opor obstáculos.
- Art. 5° - Devem ser garantidas as comunicações livres entre os missionários e seus Superiores, entre os Superiores dos missionários e a Propaganda e viceversa, porque as ordens dos Superiores tenham pleno efeito e a obediência do pessoal missionário não sofra interferências. Quanto à transferência de um missionário para a Europa, por qualquer motivo, será feita com um acordo comum entre a Propaganda e o Governo. O mesmo vale no caso de um transferimento por motivos políticos.<sup>52</sup>

Estas considerações da Propaganda foram expedidas aos 10 de janeiro de 1855 pelo Cardeal Fransoni para o Secretário de Estado, Cardeal Antonelli, com a observação de que os mesmos critérios foram apresentados várias vezes à Legação Brasileira, mas até o presente momento sem nenhum efeito quanto a uma admissível modificação do Decreto de 1844.

*e) A segunda Concessão Apostólica para o envio de missionários em 1854.*

O pedido para obter novos missionários foi mandado à Propaganda aos 29 de março de 1853, pelo Encarregado Figueiredo.

O comportamento da Legação Brasileira foi estranho, depois da comunicação de 28 de setembro de 1850, com a qual, como já foi tratando, a Propaganda expôs a sua posição, conforme as disposições de Pio IX, de maneira que um novo envio de missionários poderia ser atuado só depois de uma modificação adequada do Decreto de 1844.

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<sup>52</sup> Cf. ASV., *Segreteria di Stato*, 1856, R. 251, f. 69v-71r.

De fato, a Propaganda respondendo, não escondeu a sua surpresa diante de um tal comportamento, agravando ainda mais o caso, já que, até esta invadente solicitação, a Propaganda Fide não tinha ainda recebido nenhuma resposta para a sua comunicação de 28 de setembro de 1850.

Convencida a legação Brasileira de que a Propaganda não poderia chegar a uma conclusão positiva a seu favor sem respeitar as condições propostas já por ocasião da primeira Concessão Pontifícia para o envio de missionários ao Brasil em 1850, o Encarregado Brasileiro, Figueiredo, obteve uma Audiência Pontifícia de Pio IX, pedindo-lhe diretamente 40 missionários sem, porém, mencionar minimamente os antecedentes.

Informada a Propaganda sobre estes acontecimentos e sobre a resposta favorável de Pio IX ao Encarregado, sem recordarse dos antecedentes, a Sagrada Congregação deu também o seu consentimento, de que em julho de 1854 pudessem ser enviados quatro missionários para o Brasil. Solicitava, porém, o Governo brasileiro, em carta de 29 de setembro de 1854, para que fizesse as correções no odiado Decreto de 1844.<sup>53</sup>

A Legação Brasileira, naturalmente descontente com o pequeno número concedido, novamente apresentou o seu pedido em 29 de março de 1855, ao Cardeal Fransoni, Prefeito da Propaganda, para obter os 40 missionários mas, nas suas promessas autorizadas pelo Governo Imperial, a Legação não tinha nem sequer mencionado a revisão do Decreto de 1844, que permanecia sendo o principal obstáculo nas negociações.<sup>54</sup>

### 3 - O CONVÊNIO DE 1862 ENTRE A SANTA SÉ E O GOVERNO DO BRASIL SOBRE A QUESTÃO DAS MISSÕES

Como se viu, no período de 1854 a 1860, o estado das missões capuchinhas no Brasil era desastroso. Segundo a Relação oficial do Governo, em 1863 existiam somente 34 missionários capuchinos no País, distribuídos da seguinte maneira: 3 na Capital, 2 na Província do Rio de Janeiro, 1 no Espírito Santo, 1 no Maranhão, 4 em S. Paulo, 2 no Paraná, 7 em Minas Gerais, 3 em Goiás, 3 em Mato Grosso, 1 no Rio Grande do Sul e 7 em Pernambuco.<sup>55</sup> Além do número insuficiente dos missionários, agravou a situação a crise silenciosa que durante estes sete anos permaneceu imutável, sem nenhuma alteração, piorando assim uma situação já precária.

Só depois da Relação de 22 de julho de 1861, do Procurador Geral Fr. Fabiano da Scandiano, destinada ao Secretário da S. C. dos Negócios Eclesiásticos Extraordinários, Mons. Alessandro Franchi é que as negociações começaram a tomar uma linha conclusiva.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 66r-67r.

<sup>54</sup> S.C.P.F. *Am. Merid.*, 1854-1856, vol. 9, f. 45r-47r.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. AES., Br., 1863-65, F. 182, P. 143, f. 96r.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. ASV, *Segreteria di Stato*, 1861, R. 251, f. 158r-162v.

a) *A Proposta do Pe. Giuseppe Amato Lamant, lazarista, em 1860 ao Governo brasileiro, para poder assumir a evangelização dos Índios no Império.*

Na Relação o Procurador Geral dos Capuchinhos faz presente à Santa Sé que o Governo brasileiro, cansado pelas longas negociações para poder obter um número suficiente de Missionários para o seu País, está tratando na Assembléia Legislativa uma Proposta que o Pe. Giuseppe Amato Lamant, Superior dos Lazaristas<sup>57</sup> no Brasil, fez ao Governo para a normalização da evangelização e da civilização dos Índios.

Segundo esta Proposta, Lamant se ofereceu ao Governo para chamar da França os religiosos para as Missões no Brasil. Ele reconhecia o direito do Governo de determinar os lugares onde deviam ser estabelecidas as Missões, pedindo para si só a livre escolha do pessoal missionário. Aceitava também a condição de que o Governo possa remover o pessoal missionário segundo a sua vontade, com uma simples comunicação aos Superiores, especificando os motivos da mudança. Enfim, o Pe. Lamant propunha ao Governo um Noviciado, dirigido pelos mesmos Lazaristas, para serem preparados Missionários lá, aceitando também noviços brasileiros, com a finalidade de que depois de algum tempo o Governo possa dispor de missionários nativos, não necessitando mais a importação dos estrangeiros.<sup>58</sup>

A Proposta foi aprovada pelas Assembléias no dia 3 de novembro de 1860 e o Ministro da Justiça fez apenas duas modificações: que a aceitação dos Noviços poderá entrar em vigor quando o Governo dará licença para isto e que a evangelização e a civilização dos Índios pelos Lazaristas continuará durante o período que o Governo achar conveniente.<sup>59</sup>

Naturalmente esta proposta dos Lazaristas tocou em vários pontos os interesses dos Capuchinhos e toda a Questão, podendo causar conseqüências, como:

- prejudicar as negociações para que possam chegar a uma conclusão favorável para o melhoramento do estado das missões capuchinhas e anular 17 anos de resistência diante das pretensões regalistas do Governo;
- desanimar o pessoal missionário que durante este longo período permaneceu fiel aos seus deveres, na esperança de um melhoramento radical das condições de trabalho;
- chegado esta Proposta à execução, poderão ser impostas as mesmas condições às missões capuchinhas e, no caso de resistência ao Governo, eles poderiam perder todas as missões;

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<sup>57</sup> Os Lazaristas conseguiram penetrar no Brasil na primeira metade do século XIX. Estabeleceram-se inicialmente na Serra da Graça, em Minas Gerais. Seu número, porém, era muito reduzido. Aos poucos começaram a cuidar dos seminários, preparando a renovação católica da república. Cf. AZZI, Riolando, *ob. cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>58</sup> S.C.P.F., *Am. Merid.* 1860-62, vol. 11, f. 472r-472v.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 473r.

- a deplorável submissão dos Lazaristas poderia influenciar negativamente as relações entre a Santa Sé e o Governo brasileiro.

Em base a estas razões, o Procurador Geral dos capuchinhos pediu uma intervenção imediata da Santa Sé para que os Lazaristas desistissem do seu plano missionário até que não fosse concluído o acordo sobre o êxodo das missões capuchinhas, podendo depois entrarem em acordo com o Governo com as mesmas condições que fossem estabelecidas para os capuchinhos. Sublinhou também a urgente necessidade de apressar a conclusão das negociações mesmo com qualquer concessão, diante de um maior prejuízo.<sup>60</sup>

b) *A Declaração imperial de 14 de outubro de 1861 sobre a Modificação do Decreto de 1844.*

Fr. Fabiano da Scandiano, além da denúncia da Proposta dos Lazaristas, juntamente com as suas enérgicas observações à S. Sé, tomou uma outra iniciativa junto à Propaganda. Escreveu para esta Congregação, em 25 de outubro de 1861, descrevendo o estado de agonia das Missões capuchinhas no Brasil e pedindo a autorização da mesma para que ele pudesse, em seu nome, enviar alguns missionários, sem recorrer à ajuda material do Governo, para poder substituir deste modo os 25 missionários mortos pela febre amarela<sup>61</sup>, garantindo neste modo apenas a sobrevivências das Missões.

Certamente, a corajosa ação do Procurador Geral foi uma grande contribuição para que a Santa Sé fizesse a Proposição de uma maneira eficaz, sobre a Modificação do Decreto de 1844, à Legação Brasileira em Roma, no ano de 1861.<sup>62</sup>

A Declaração Imperial do Brasil sobre as modificações da Proposição da Santa Sé leva a data de 14 de outubro de 1861<sup>63</sup> e foi mandada pela mesma legação ao Cardeal Antonelli, Secretário de Estado. Nesta, o Governo brasileiro insistiu em especificar duas coisas:

- 1 - Complementar o Art. 3º com a seguinte declaração: "Resta, porém, entendido que estes Religiosos permanecem sujeitos à jurisdição ordinária e comuns por fatos de ordem temporal"<sup>64</sup> e
- 2 - Precisar o Art. 5º no que diz respeito á expatriação dos missionários por motivos políticos: "Mediante comunicação prévia aos Superiores no Império e ulteriores esclarecimentos à Santa Sé", porque o Governo achou contraditória a posição da Santa Sé que, embora reconhecesse o direito do Governo brasileiro de mandar

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<sup>60</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 474v.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 550r-552r.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 529r.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 529r-532r.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 529v.

embora do seu país missionário que compromettesse a ordem pública, anulava, porém, este direito com a seguinte formulação do mesmo Artigo: "Premissas a tal escopo as oportunas inteligências e os conceitos com o Representante da Santa Sé e da mencionada Sagrada Congregação." <sup>65</sup>

Neste ponto o Governo permaneceu rígido, exigindo o direito de poder mandar embora do País o Religioso cuja presença não era desejável, sem nenhuma interferência da Santa Sé nesta sua decisão. <sup>66</sup>

Além dos Cinco Artigos, que foram feitos de acordo com a posição da Propaganda Fide diante do Projeto de Modificação <sup>67</sup>, a Santa Sé apresentou também um outro Artigo Adicional no qual fazia depender a execução deste Convênio, de um acordo posterior no Brasil, entre o Governo e os Superiores locais dos Missionários, juntamente com o Representante da Propaganda Fide, que devia ser investido pela mesma Santa Sé só para esta ocasião, de Faculdades especiais para poder tomar as decisões para a solução definitiva da Questão. <sup>68</sup>

Aceitando isto, o Governo expressou também a sua esperança de que, na conclusão do Convênio, a Propaganda não demoraria em mandar os 40 missionários desde há tempos pedidos, por causa da urgente necessidade das Missões dos Índios no Brasil. <sup>69</sup>

As negociações sobre o direito, modo e circunstâncias da expulsão de um missionário, por causar desordem pública ou política, duraram ainda mais de um ano entre a Santa Sé e o Governo Brasileiro. Desconfiando a Santa Sé das promessas do Governo, por causa de tantos amargos antecedentes, com a sua última Nota preliminar, de 28 de outubro de 1862, antes da redação do texto definitivo do Convênio, especificou ainda diante da Legação Brasileira em Roma que, por um lado "se soube com prazer que em seguida às considerações aduzidas, o Governo Imperial não encontra dificuldades sobre a proposta de suprir com um ato separado à adição que ele requeria no 5º dos artigos concordados sobre as Missões Apostólicas para as tribus indígenas do Império". E, por outro lado, "... o abaixo assinado Cardeal Secretário de Estado... por meio da presente Nota declara que a S. Sé, reconhecendo perfeitamente o pleno direito pertencente aos governos de eliminar dos seus estados aqueles indivíduos que, ali vivendo, se tornem gravemente responsáveis por títulos de perturbação da ordem pública... entre os Religiosos que compõem as mencionadas missões, o Governo Imperial do Brasil teria o direito de afastá-los do seu território... e para isso sejam praticados: os acordos de bom respeito

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<sup>65</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 530r-531r.

<sup>66</sup> "C'est un droit incontestable qu'a tous les Gouvernements et qui ne souffre aucune restriction, de pouvoir renvoyer du pays un individu quelque soit sa position sociale dont la présence serait une cause de trouble ou de désordre". *Ibidem*, f. 531r.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 919r.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 532r-532v.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 532r-532v.

com as Autoridades Eclesiásticas, de quem depende o indivíduo que se deve expulsar..."<sup>70</sup>.

Figueiredo, Encarregado da Legação Brasileira em Roma, tinha respondido no mesmo dia à Nota do Cardeal Antonelli, sendo autorizado anteriormente pelo seu Governo a aceitar tais condições.<sup>71</sup>

Ficou então livre a estrada diante do passo conclusivo para resolver a Questão das Missões Capuchinhas, aberta há mais de 18 anos.

c) *A conclusão da Questão das Missões Capuchinhas com o Convênio de 28 de outubro de 1862.*

O acordo definitivamente estabelecido entre a Santa Sé e o Governo Imperial do Brasil, chamado Convênio, foi mandado ao Encarregado dos Negócios Eclesiásticos da Legação Brasileira junto à S. Sé, em Roma, pelo Cardeal Giacomo Antonelli, em 28 de outubro de 1862, por autorização de Pio IX, e era redigido nos seguintes termos:

"Art. 1º - O ordenamento e Governo das Missões Apostólicas são de plena competência da S. Sé, que o exercita por meio da S. Congregação de Propaganda. Consequentemente, à esta e ao seu Representante pertence tudo aquilo que concerne à distribuição e ao emprego dos Missionários. Por outro lado, a determinação dos lugares onde se devem estabelecer as Missões no Brasil, terá efeito depois das indicações e dos acordos entre o Governo Imperial e a S. Congregação de Propaganda e o seu Representante.

Art. 2º - Quando os Bispos façam instância para obterem Missionários para lugares das suas Dioceses, o Governo promoverá a sua vinda pedindo-os à S. Sé e provendo no modo melhor, segundo as circunstâncias.

Art. 3º - Os Religiosos encarregados das Missões nas aldeias do Império, dependerão dos seus respectivos Superiores Regulares nas relações das disciplinas interna e externa; salvo naquilo em que permanece a dependência destes Religiosos da Autoridade dos Bispos locais, no que se encontra contemplado nos Santos Cânones. Quanto ao resto, os ditos Religiosos, salvo a mencionada dependência, permanecerão a respeito da autoridade Civil na mesma condição dos outros Eclesiásticos estrangeiros que moram no Império.

Art. 4º - Quando acontecer o transferimento de Missionários de uma para outra Missão, terão livre curso as medidas que dependerão da S. Congregação de Propaganda, por meio do Representante Pontifício no Brasil, ou pelos Superiores das Missões com inteligência e acordo com o Governo Imperial. Os Missionários, porém, assim transferidos, serão prontamente substituídos por

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<sup>70</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 919r-919v.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, f. 919v.



outros, de maneira que não fique nunca abandonada ou extinta uma Missão sem que tenha consentido previamente o mesmo Governo.

- Art. 5° - Terão também livres efeitos as assim chamadas Obdiências e ordens dos respectivos Superiores aos Missionários, como também a mútua correspondência entre os mesmos Superiores e os seus subalternos e aquela entre a S. Congregação de Propaganda e os Chefes das Missões. - O mesmo se entende da resolução, que alguma vez deve tomar a mesma S. Congregação por graves motivos, de tirar das Missões e chamar para a Europa algum Missionário, premissos para tal escopo os oportunos acordos e entendimentos com o Governo Imperial.
- Art. 6° - Todas as questões relativas à execução da Convenção e à organização e governo das Missões, na parte que diz respeito ao acordo e consentimento do Governo Imperial, serão decididas no Brasil entre o mesmo Governo e os Superiores das missões e o Representante da S. Congregação de Propaganda; este, para tal efeito, será munido de análogas faculdades e nos poucos casos que exigissem a intervenção direta da S. Sé, será autorizando a tomar uma medida provisória para ser depois a coisa definitivamente resolvida pela S. Congregação e por outra competente Autoridade".<sup>72</sup>

O Cardeal Barnabó, Prefeito da Propaganda, recebeu a comunicação da Secretaria de Estado em data 10 de novembro de 1862, segundo a qual "... se poudo finalmente chegar à relativa conclusão: em virtude da qual o até aqui controverso projeto encontrase agora no estado de acordo combinado".<sup>73</sup>

Como juízo final sobre a importância deste Convênio, pode-se dizer que foi a única vitória da Santa Sé em matéria eclesiástica contra o Governo do Brasil Imperial, no período aqui estudado, conseguindo fazer prevalecer a liberdade da ação missionária, da comunicação a nível nacional e internacional entre os Missionários e seus Superiores, sem ser imposto o jugo do Beneplácito.<sup>74</sup> Mas, não se pode esquecer, que todo este sucesso pôde ser conseguido somente por uma razão, isto é, porque o Governo tinha um interesse político bem maior pela civilização do Interior do Brasil, à custa do sacrifício de tantos Missionários, os quais como operários lhe foram insubstituíveis naquela época para garantir a unidade demográfica do País.

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<sup>72</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 920r-921v.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 911r-912r.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. MARTINA, Giacomo, *ob. cit.*, p. 442.



ENIKÓ A. SAJTI

## THE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL SITUATION OF THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN YUGOSLAVIA 1918–1941

Between the 8th and 21st November, 1918, the Serbian and the Allied Forces occupied the area of Bánát, Bácska, and Baranya, and on 25. November the Great Slav Parliament in Újvidék declared the separation of these territories from Hungary and their union with the Serbian Kingdom. The military treaty signed on 13. November, 1918 in Belgrade, which had delegated the civilian administration of Voivodina (Délvidék) to the jurisdiction of the "local authorities", by the end of November became mere fiction.<sup>1</sup> The Yugoslavian military authorities were beginning the "nationalisation" of Voivodina with great impetus. This did not only mean the quick reduction of the Hungarian local administration and the conscious breaking of the political power of the Hungarians, but also the conscious crushing of Hungarian economic and cultural positions as well.<sup>2</sup>

*The influence of the change of national status on the economic situation of the Hungarians*

In the post-war years, not only the economic hardships inflicting the whole country, – among them the decline of industrial production, the shortage of certain products, the discontinuation of old commercial relations, the requisitions, the inflation, and the introduction of the new currency, the dinar – created an especially difficult situation for Voivodina, but also the economic policy dictated to this area by Belgrade. This economic policy was governed by two obvious aims: on the one hand to shift the burden of the economic policy of the new state and the reconstruction of the economy of Yu-

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<sup>1</sup> The complete text of the treaty is published in *Zapisni sa sednica delegaciji Kraljevine SHS na mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919–1920*. Priredili Bogdan KRIZMAN, Bogumil HRABAK. Beograd 1960. 311–312. A detailed discussion of the question in ORMOS Mária: *A belgrádi katonai konvencióról. Történelmi Szemle*, 1979. 1. 12–38. By the same author: *Padovától Trianonig 1918–1920*. Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1983. 60–74.

<sup>2</sup> The first article of the Belgrade Convention, which declared that on the territories under Allied rule the civil administration would remain at the local authorities, was interpreted by the Hungarian government that it was still responsible for the administration of Voivodina. The Great National Council in Újvidék, on the other hand, as legislative power, delegated the administration of these parts to a local government: the Bácska, Bánát, Baranya National Directorate (Nemzeti Igazgatóság).

goslavia, which suffered major economic and human losses, to Voivodina and, parallel to this, break the earlier economic dominance of the Hungarians, or the way it was put then: to nationalise the economic life of the area.

After the occupation, one of the first measures of the National Directorate (Nemzeti Igazgatóság) was the seizure of "alien" properties, and later their nationalization. By 1922, there were hardly any monetary institutions or companies owned by Hungarians left. The way it was achieved was that the properties of those who had not been the inhabitants of the occupied territories were taken away automatically, and the local Hungarian owners – using as pretext a decree that is unknown to date – were forced to elect reliable Serbians into the administrative boards of the monetary institutions and companies. If this procedure was refused, a government commissary was appointed, the costs of which had to be financed by the company itself.<sup>3</sup> Serbian was made compulsory as the language of business, thus many were forced to hire Serbian speakers "in their own interest". Stock corporations owned by minority groups could only increase their capital if the majority of the shares was in the possession of Serbians. Craftsmen's associations were dissolved, new elections were ordered and it was given who the new officials should be. By the end of the 1920's – in spite of Budapest's support – the 168 banks, bank branches, savings banks, credit unions earlier owned by Hungarians had gone bankrupt or had been repossessed by Serbians. This was the result of the recession and the nationalisation as well as the fact that first the demarcation line, later the border separated them from their earlier links with Budapest and Vienna. Small local credit unions, – originally their number was 150 in Bácska, Bánát and Baranya – initially joined the Central Credit Union of Torontál County (Torontálmegyei Központi Hitelszövetkezet, TKH), which was still Hungarian owned. This was possible because entitled by a political decision, the National Commercial and Credit Bank (Országos Kereskedelmi és Hitelbank) authorised the TKH to enforce payment of their claims. Although it did not have the desired results, it could still save 80 old credit unions in the 1920's. In spite of this, however, the financial situation of these credit unions – unlike the German credit unions in Bánát – could not be helped on the long run.<sup>4</sup> By the end of the 1920's, it was no longer possible for the Hungarian government to provide the life-saving 30 million dinars necessary for the consolidation of the monetary situation because of the serious financial problems of Hungary itself, and in the 1930's Budapest completely stopped supporting the Hungarian credit unions.<sup>5</sup> The hardships on the credit scene were, however, not limited to the minorities in Yugoslavia. Especially during the recession, interest rates became extremely disadvantageous in general, credits were restricted, while illegal interest rates soared.

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<sup>3</sup> Magyar Országos Levéltár (from now on MOL) K-437. Társadalmi Egyesületek Szövetsége Központjának iratai. 1922-8-732; 532.

<sup>4</sup> German credit unions formed their own centre in the Bánát, Agraria, in 1923.

<sup>5</sup> MOL, K-437 1928-5-262

The Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian state – keeping its promise made during the war – began the execution of the agrarian reform already at the beginning of 1919 (thus before the decisions clarifying the legal situation of the territory). On the basis of Regent Alexander's proclamation of 6 January 1919, in which he promised a "just" solution to the land question, the abolishment of the remnants of serfdom, and the elimination of the large estates, on 25–27 February, the decrees that were to prepare the agrarian reform were published. But even before these decrees, the military began the seizure of the estates of the Catholic church at several locations. Frederick Habsburg's estate in Baranya, the 110.000 hectare Bellye estate along with the sugar factory on its territory were sequestered, as well as lands owned by Hungarian banks and companies.<sup>6</sup> The basic intention of the agrarian reform that was aimed at the unification of the agricultural structure of the country was to spread the Serbian smallholder estate structure to the territory of the whole country, but already from the beginning also had nationalistic tendencies, even though the decrees themselves did not contain explicit anti-minority clauses. However, as only those with a citizenship could obtain land, because of the opportunity of option for citizenship, Hungarians were excluded from this initially.

The property situation in Bácska and Bánát was characterised by an odd duality: on the hand it was characterised by the dominance of the Hungarian (in Bácska), and the Hungarian and German (in Bánát) large estate, and at the same time in both areas also by the high proportion of Hungarians among those who did not own any land. The original decree applied to estates larger than 200 "holds" (1 hold = 0.57 hectares), but depending on local circumstances it made it possible to nationalize 100 to 500 "hold" large estates. On the basis of this, originally 410 large estates fell into this category in Bácska, 42.55 % of these being local authority property, 39.86 % private property, while 8.3 % church property. The rest was owned 4–1 % by the Hungarian state, towns and land communities, banks and foundations. 48.62 % of the landed property falling under the regulations of the agrarian reform was owned by Hungarians, 21.67% by Germans; 8.39% by Serbians, 7.76 % Jews, the rest by Italians (6.87%), Croatians (6.63%), and Rumanians (0.06%)<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, because of economic considerations, a decree was issued against the alienation and mortgaging of large estates in July 1919. In Voivodina, which had a developed agriculture, the large estates which would fall un-

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<sup>6</sup> For more details about this issue see: MILIVOJE Erić: *Agrarna reforma u Jugoslaviji 1918–1941*. Sarajevo, 1958; Nikola L. GAČEŠA: *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Bačkoj 1918–1941*. Novi Sad, 1968; by the same author: *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu 1919–1941*. Novi Sad, 1972. Archduke Frederic appealed to the International Court in the Hague about the nationalization of his estates. In his appeal he asked for the right to return to his estate. Živko AVRAMOVSKI: *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslavije. Godišnji izveštaji Britanskog poslanstva u Beogradu 1921–1938*. Knj. 1 Annual report 1928. 514; Annual report 1929, 606–607, Annual report 1930. 659.

<sup>7</sup> Nikola L. GAČEŠA: *Prilog proučavanju agrarno-posedovne strukture i agrarnih prilika u Vojvodini u vreme stvaranja Jugoslavije. Naučni skup u povodu 50- godišnjice raspada Austro-Ugarske Monarhije i stvaranja Jugoslovenske države*. Zagreb, 1969. 278.

der the scope of the agrarian reform were limited to larger estates bigger than 300 "holds" if it was plough-land, and 500 "holds" if it was any other category. As a result of this, the number of estates that were included in the reform decreased. Originally, the agrarian reform was going to effect 942.969 "hold" land (542.646 hectares), from which eventually 336.886 holds were given to 90.505 interested parties, in other words only 35% of the land available on the basis of the decree was distributed. The rest remained in the possession of the original landowners.

On the basis of the land reform, originally large estates between 100 and 500 hectares were to be distributed, later land that was allowed to remain in the property of the landowners was defined as between 174 and 869 hectares. Local claimers got 173.824 "holds" of the distributed land, less than 3 "holds" on average. The South Slav settlers were given 7 "hold" land, volunteers 8 "holds" on the average. Settlers and volunteers were given tax exemptions for a long period and later tax concessions, they also received considerable financial state support for the equipping of their farms. The "dobrovoljac" (volunteers in World War I.) were resettled in Voivodina from the agriculturally passive areas of Serbia, Crna Gora and Bosnia. Hungarians and Germans without any landed property did not get any land. Although the data are quite diverse about the national division of the land owned by small holders, according to the data most accepted by Yugoslavian historians: 60% of the Hungarian peasantry in Bánát would have been entitled to get landed property, in Bácska 41.41% of the 57.661 landless people were Hungarians. On the basis of the decree, also the group of Hungarians who had 1 to 10 "hold" landed property rightfully expected land. The number of these kind of properties was 28.279, and 35.26% of these (9.978 farms) were owned by Hungarians.<sup>8</sup>

If we want to sum up the effect of the agrarian reform on the Hungarian property situation, the following important figures should be noted: as we have already mentioned, Hungarian, and in general non-Slav claimers (Germans, Albanians etc.) did not get any land. Out of the 14 million hectares of land suitable for cultivation 2.5 million underwent change of proprietor, which is 17.8% of all cultivated land. The largest area of land was distributed in Bosnia: 1.286.227 hectares, in spite of the fact that because of the political pact, the Muslims – in return for their promise to vote for the Vidovdan constitution – could keep their properties. In Macedonia and Kosovo 593.111 hectares, and on the territories that had belonged to the Monarchy 555.137 hectares were distributed. On these latter territories 61 Hungarian opters lost 71.2 % of their land (90.062 hectares), while Hungarian landowners with Yugoslavian citizenship lost 38.6 % of their properties (20.622 hectares) So, altogether 110.684 hectare land originally owned by Hungarians was distributed, which means that 4.4 % of the land that was distributed in the agrarian reform had been originally owned by Hungarians. The land reform affected among others the following estates – names well known from Hungarian history: – the Slavonian estates of the Batthyányi, Majláth and the Khuen- Héderváry families;

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<sup>8</sup> Nikola L. GAČEŠA: *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Bačkoj*. 40–42.

- the Slavonian estates of the Batthyányi, Majláth and the Khuen- Héderváry families; the Csekonics family also had extensive landed property in Bánát, Archduke Frederick in Baranya, the Széchenyis had estates in Bácska. 364 estates owned by the state, local authorities, churches, foundations, and banks were distributed, altogether 247565 hectares, 36% of these estate types. Hungarians altogether lost 61,5 % of their land, the Germans 57%, the South Slav proprietors 40%.<sup>9</sup> In Bácska a 6.715 *dobrovoljac* families (other sources give the figure 6.912) were settled, on an area of 53,465 "holds", in Baranya 235 Slav families got altogether 5.927 "hold" land, in Bánát the number of the families settled was 8.384, who got altogether 27.312 "hold" land.<sup>10</sup> For comparison, it is worth mentioning that resettling on a similar scale took place only in the so called South Serbia.<sup>11</sup> In Kosovo - where mainly Albanians lived - 12.000 Slav families were settled, among them Serbians who opted for Yugoslavian citizenship from Hungary.<sup>12</sup> Not only the minorities were excluded from the land reform: in the course of the settlements there was discrimination made also among the South Slavs as well. As it was put also in the *dobrovoljac* decree of December 11, 1919, there were political objectives behind this. According to the decree, settlers were forbidden to take part in demonstrations against the state, otherwise they could lose their land, or their claim to the land. The settlements both in Kosovo, and in the north took place along the border, which also shows that the state was trying by all means to create a reliable Slav stratum in these areas. These strata were used by the power, especially in the 1920's, to have the minorities watched and intimidated. In Voivodina, the members of the extreme nationalistic organisation, the Serbian National Youth (Srpska nacionalna omladina SRNAO)<sup>13</sup> were mostly recruited from among them. It was by using this against them later, during the reannexation, that their lands were taken away from the South Slav settlers, as unreliable groups for the Hungarian state. Initially, they were thrown over the border to the part of Serbia that was occupied by Germany, then, as this possibility was no longer available for the Hungarian state, they were collected in concentration camps. Bukovina Székelys (3.279 families 13.200 people) and Moldavian Csángós (53 families, 161 persons) and people with the title "vitéz" (481 families, 2.325 persons) were settled in their place. The families of 46 soldiers who died in the battles in Voi-

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<sup>9</sup> Out of the 369 estates affected by the agrarian reform 142 were owned by Austrians, 126 by Hungarians, 50 by Italians, 8 by Czechoslovakian citizens, 4 by Rumanians, 3 by Germans, and 17 were owned by other nationalities. Altogether 310 estates out of the 369 were owned by people of foreign citizenship. Mijo MIRKOVIĆ: *Ekonomska struktura Jugoslavije 1918-1941*. Zagreb 1952. 81.

<sup>10</sup> A. SAJTI Enikő: *Délvidék 1941-44*. Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1987. 44-45.

<sup>11</sup> South Serbia meant for earlier sources the South parts of Serbia in the narrower sense: Kosovo and Macedonia.

<sup>12</sup> Branko HORVAT: *Kosovsko pitanje*. Globus, Zagreb, 1988. 40.

<sup>13</sup> Branislav GLIGORIJEVIĆ: "Srpska nacionalna omladina (Srnao)". *Istorijski glasnik*. 1964. br. 2-3. 3-38. The Macedonians and the Croats had extreme nationalist organisations as well as the Serbs. (VMRO, Hanao) In January 1929 all of these were banned.

vodina also got lands in Bácska. The new Hungarian settlers were given altogether 35,000 "hold" land.<sup>14</sup>

The structure of the Hungarian landed estate in Voivodina, according to a 1938 Yugoslavian survey (thus after the closure of the land reform) was the following: (The data are about the area of Bácska, Bánát, Baranya and Szerémség.) 14,13 % of all the cultivated land was owned by Hungarians, in the Bánát 8,25%, in Bácska 22,89%, in Baranya 19%, in Szerémség 1,86%. The Slavs owned 52 % of the cultivated land in Voivodina, Germans and other minorities altogether 33,4 %.<sup>15</sup> Unfortunately we have no data about the land owned by Hungarians, but on the basis of the above it is obvious that the land reform, which lasted for more than 10 years considerably weakened the strata of Hungarian large estate owners, while strata of others working in the agriculture did not gain anything in the reform. Although due to lack of data we cannot reconstruct the social composition of the Yugoslavian Hungarians precisely, we can venture to say that it was probably not much different from the general stratification of the given area. According to the data of the 1910 Hungarian census, more than 70 % of the population on the area which was annexed to Yugoslavia worked in the agriculture and 15% in agriculture linked industry and small industry, 2,8% were civil servants or self employed.<sup>16</sup> After the change of the national status, the civil servant stratum practically ceased to exist. Because of the exclusion of the Hungarians from the land reform, the 15.074 people that emigrated overseas or to other European countries between 1920 and 1930 were primarily from the village population. This was 10 % of the 150.000 emigrants who left Yugoslavia, which was considerably more than the proportion of Hungarians within the entire population. (3,9%)<sup>17</sup> The Home Affairs Ministry held the opinion about the emigration that "anti-national elements" did not have to be stopped from emigrating, only organised recruiting was seen as undesirable.<sup>18</sup>

The compensation of landowners whose estates were affected by the land reform was a complicated process mostly lasting for years. The compensation of Hungarians belonged to the so called opters' suit, associated with the name of Bethlen István, while that of the Yugoslavian citizens was regulated by the 1925 law about the so called optional redemption. Optional redemption meant that the land was let until the redemption, and then the new owner was entitled to buy it from the previous owner on the basis of a freely made agreement. Payment could also be made with state bonds. There are no comprehensive and reliable data about the compensation, but we know that there

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<sup>14</sup> A. SAJTI Enikő: *i.m.* 53–73. The same author: "Székely telepítés és nemzetiségpolitika a Bácskában – 1941". *Nemzetiségi füzetek* 6. Akadémiai Kiadó, 1984. 47–48., 53.

<sup>15</sup> Šandor MESAROS: *Madžari u Vojvodini 1929–1941*. Novi Sad, 1989. 363.

<sup>16</sup> Teodor AVRAMOVIĆ: *Privreda Voivodine od 1918 do 1929/30 godine s obzirom na stanje pre prvog svetskog rata*. Novi Sad, 1965. 19–20.

<sup>17</sup> Šandor MESAROS: *i.m.* 16.

<sup>18</sup> Arhiv Vojvodine (from now on AV) Torontalsko-Temiška zupanija 1918–1927. F. 77. 871/1923. The 1921 emigration law gave the concession of the transportation of emigrants over to foreign shipping companies. Živko AVRAMOVSKI: *i.m.* Knj. 1. Annual report 1922. 113.



was a moratorium on debts because of the increasing indebtedness of the peasants during the recession in 1932. In 1936 these debts had to be remitted altogether, more precisely some types of them were taken over by the state.<sup>19</sup>

Because of the severe war losses of the Serbian and some Dalmatian areas, and the historically differently developed economic levels and structures, viewed purely economically, it was probably an acceptable decision that different tax systems were introduced for the developed and for the underdeveloped areas. But because of the national composition of the country, and the greediness of the new, mostly Serbian economic elite the discrimination in the taxation was the source of constant grievances and discontent, controversies in the Parliament and in party politics, and thus a serious risk to the stability of the state. The population of Voivodina paid four times as much tax per capita per year in the 1920's than the Serbian population (290 and 70 dinars respectively). The comparable tax in Croatia was 100 dinars, in Slovenia 193 dinars. The standardization of the taxation was introduced – just as a lot of other bills of Parliament that proved to be unsuccessful because of the party struggles – during the royal dictatorship, in the form of a royal decree.<sup>20</sup>

#### *Educational policy and the Hungarian schools: the situation of the churches*

The schooling of the minorities was regulated in the beginning by the February 1919 decree of the National Directorate, which encouraged the general restarting of the education after the war, and ordained that children “must be taught exclusively in their mother tongue.”<sup>21</sup> Several school systems existed on the territory of the state, and the regulation of school attendance was diverse, not to mention the curricula, the structure, the density or the stages of the different school systems. In Serbia, Crna Gora and Bosnia for example the compulsory education lasted for 4 years, in Croatia 5, in Dalmatia and Voivodina 6, while in Slovenia 8 years.<sup>22</sup> The basis for the standardization was the Serbian elementary school law of April 19, 1904, which knew of two types of schools: state and private. On the territories that previously had belonged to the Monarchy on the other hand, there were four types of elementary and secondary schools: state, local, denominational and private. Legally, initially the educational policy of the Serbian-

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<sup>19</sup> Nikola L. GAČEŠA: *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*. 73–96. ; 378, MOL K–28 ME Kisebbségi o. 1941–R–18381.

<sup>20</sup> Stevan MEZEI: *Privredne ustanove i organizacije u Vojvodini između dva rata 1918–1941*. Novi Sad, 1954. 64–65.; While between 1925 and 1928, because of the serious political struggles in the skupština, the successive governments had managed to pass only 97 laws, in 1929 in the form of royal decrees there were 200 laws introduced. Živko AVRAMOVSKI: *i.m.* Annual report 1929. 590.

<sup>21</sup> AV F.I.1 Narodna uprava za BBB. Odsek za BBB Ministarstva prosveta 1919–1921. 305/1919.

<sup>22</sup> *Samouprava*, January 25. 1922. Even in the 1920's the rate of illiteracy was high in Yugoslavia. 51.5% of the population was illiterate. In South Serbia 83.88%, in Bosnia-Herzegovina 80.55%, in Crna Gora 65.91%, in North Serbia 65.44% in Croatian Slavonia 32.10%, in Voivodina 23.3%, in Slovenia, 8.85%. Ž. AVRAMOVSKI: *i.m.* Knj. 1. Annual report 1925. 330.

Croatian-Slovenian state relied on the following three sources: the minority treaties signed in Saint Germain, the Vidovdan constitution, and the Serbian elementary school (already mentioned) and secondary school (4. July 1912) laws. In accordance with the international treaty, the monarchy obliged itself to make it possible for those of its citizens who belonged to a racial, religious or language minority, similarly to the Slav citizens of the state, to finance and maintain from their own resources charity, religious and social institutions, schools and boarding schools. The treaty stipulated that a fair share (proportional to their number) of the local budget intended to be spent on local expenditure on education, religion or charity should be given to the minorities. The obligation of instruction in the mother tongue was ordained only on the elementary school level. The above mentioned item of the minority treaty applied only to the territories annexed to Yugoslavia after January 1. 1913, so not to Kosovo or Macedonia.<sup>23</sup> The Vidovdan constitution ensured the freedom of science and arts, and free state education. Pupils were to be educated in the spirit of national consciousness and national unity. Citizens "belonging to other races and speaking other languages" – this constitution did not use the term "minorities" – were to participate in elementary education in their mother tongues, with the favours granted by the law"<sup>24</sup> – reads the corresponding article in the constitution. The 1931 Oktrojalt Constitution did still contain this paragraph. The 1904 Serbian elementary school law consisted of 89 items, and, beside the already mentioned parts about school types, had for the Hungarians serious consequences, foremost the chapter which ordained education in the national consciousness. It was referring to this part that the teaching of even the minimum of Hungarian culture and history was abolished. The obligation of maintaining schools – with the exception of the costs of the salaries of the teachers – was delegated the local communities. The 1919 amendment to this law spoke about minority education. In areas where minorities lived, *parallel running* mother tongue classes had to be started with Serbian language being a compulsory subject. Geography and history were also taught in Serbian. Thus, the Serbian elementary school law – contrary to the international regulations about this – did not recognise the right of denominations and local authorities to maintain schools. The school law was one of the most painful grievances of the Yugoslavian Hungarians, its redemption was one of the main ambitions of the Hungarian Party formed in 1922. That was the reason why the minority saving strategies of the Hungarian leading elite were spoken of as school centred. The 1912 Serbian secondary school law was extended to Voivodina on July 13. 1920. This law also ordained as state task the maintenance of secondary schools, and tuition was to be free of charge. The law differentiated between three types of schools: "gimnázium, "reálgimnázium" and "reáliskola". The standardization of the Yugoslavian school system was a long process. The first Yugoslavian

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<sup>23</sup> GALÁNTAI József: *Trianon és a kisebbségvédelem*. Maecenas, 1989. 80. 97–98.

<sup>24</sup> MOL K-26 A miniszterelnökség központilag iktatott és irattározott iratai 1867–1944. 1921–XLI-6552. *The constitution of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Monarchy*. Article 16.

elementary and secondary school laws were passed only in 1929, after years of heated parliamentary debates about it, during the period of the royal dictatorship, when in effect the already existing practice was sanctified. Contrary to the 1927 Yugoslavian–Romanian minority school treaty, there was no such agreement reached between Hungary and Yugoslavia.

From the summer of 1919 – to use the expression used by the *Bácsmegeyi Napló* published in Szabadka – “war reports” could have been written about the school situation in Voivodina. The purpose of the “frontal attack” was admittedly the breaking of the Hungarian intellectuality and supremacy. In October 1919 the schools were nationalised, including the denominational schools of the Greek Orthodox church as well.<sup>25</sup> The denominations and local authorities that had maintained these schools had to declare if they were willing to hand the schools over to the state along with all the assets. In case they were not, they lost the publicity right of the school, in other words they could not issue certificates, the staff did not receive salaries from the state, even the lumber-allotment was held back. This regulation was the source of tragedies on a mass scale especially as the situation was already difficult enough after the war. In 1919 and 1920, before the peace treaty was signed with Hungary, similarly to civil servants, teachers were also encouraged by the successive Hungarian governments to deny the oath of loyalty to the Yugoslavian state, which meant their instant dismissal. The oath of loyalty was required on the basis of the 1907 XXVII. Apponyi article. The different laws and regulations could be replaced by new ones only gradually in other areas of life as well. Until the signing of the peace treaty, elementary school teachers had received their salaries from Budapest, which meant more and more difficulties. In 1919/20 the teachers did not get their salaries and other allowances for months.<sup>26</sup> Because of the dispossession and nationalization of denominational and local lands and other properties, school maintainers were forced to “offer” their educational institutions to the state at an accelerated pace.

Without doubt, the most ill-famed measure of the educational policy in Yugoslavia is associated with the name of Svetozar Pribicević, Minister of Education. According to the so called name analysis decree of June 1920, children had to be schooled on the basis of the names of their parents and grandparents. They had to be enrolled in a Serbian school even if they did not speak Serbo–Croatian. On the basis of this decree, it was possible to forbid Jews and Germans to attend classes where the instruction was in Hungarian.<sup>27</sup> Enrolment took place in official rooms, and the allocation of the pupils based on their names was done by a politically reliable Slav teacher, appointed for the

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<sup>25</sup> After the reannexation of 1941, the school network was taken over by the Hungarian state, but the restitution of formerly denominational or local or private schools did not happen.

<sup>26</sup> AV F. 81. 5926/1919.; 13504/1919.; 10501/1920.; 15397/1920. In case the maintainers of the school declared that they accepted the conditions of the state, they got their salaries from the Yugoslavian state.

<sup>27</sup> AV F. 81. 470/1920.

occasion by the local principal.<sup>28</sup> The introduction of the name analysis was justified by saying that this was a means to reverse earlier Hungarianisation, and to accomplish the cultural nationalisation of Voivodina. This decree was in effect until 1936–38, later with the mitigation that from 1932 the nationality and name of the father were the basis for the enrolling in schools.

In August 1920 the Hungarian secondary school system was also eliminated, as a compensation, the starting of Hungarian classes in the Serb–Croatian schools was allowed at some places. In 1920 the teachers in Hungarian schools and branches were given two years to pass an exam in the state language, otherwise they were to be dismissed. The Hungarian government was making considerable efforts in this situation also in Voivodina to at least slow down the process of the elimination with its financial support. In spite of these efforts, already at the beginning of the 1920's the Yugoslavian state managed to eliminate the Hungarian school system as it had functioned before the war. Although we do not have the exact data, we can presume that the summarizing data of the department of the Foreign Ministry that was preparing the treaty are usable. According to this, on the territories belonging to Yugoslavia, without Croatia, there were 896 elementary schools in 1918, 266 of them owned by the state and 631 of them denominational. The language of tuition was Serbian in 179 schools. Out of the 71 secondary schools 2 were commercial, 3 agricultural, and there was one Serbian and one German "gimnázium". In comparison, by the mid 1920's there remained only two Hungarian branches in secondary schools and one eight-form "gimnázium" in Szabadka and one four-form "gimnázium" in Zenta. According to some calculations 14,5 % of the Hungarian pupils attending secondary schools had the opportunity to be educated in their mother tongue.<sup>29</sup> According to Yugoslavian data, there were 1376 elementary schools in the Dunai Bánság in January 1930, which included 4233 branches. Out of these the language of education was the state language in 2931, German in 546, Hungarian in 528, Slovakian in 121 and Romanian in 89, and Ruthenian (Transcarpathian Ukrainian) in 18.<sup>30</sup> The number of Hungarian elementary school teachers also drastically decreased. Before the war their number was 1832, by 1941 there were only 250 left. In Baranya there was no Hungarian school left. In Croatia as well as in Bosnia, the well functioning school networks of both the Hungarian State Railways (Magyar Államvasutak, MÁV) and the Julian Association (Julián Egyesület) were eliminated. After the formation of the Croatian banate, there were 6 Hungarian elementary school branches permitted, while on the territory of the Ustashe Independent Croatian state between 1941 and 1945 there were no Hungarian schools at all.<sup>31</sup> As it was already mentioned,

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<sup>28</sup> AV F. 81. 11985/1920.

<sup>29</sup> MOL Filmtár (film archives) A Békeelőkészítő osztály iratai 12488. 16. title.; 12486. 211. title.

<sup>30</sup> AV F. 126. Krajevska banska uprava Dunavske banovine II. Upravno odeljenje. 30236/1930.

<sup>31</sup> MOL Filmtár (film archives) 12496. 210. title The Julian Association and the MÁV maintained altogether 88 elementary schools, out of which 59 were Catholic, 17 Calvinist, MÁV school 12. For more details about this issue see: BERNICS Ferenc: *A Julián akció (Egy magyarságmentő egyesület tevékenysége Horvátországban és Bosznia-Hercegovinában és a jelen 1904–1992)*. Pannónia

in December 1929 a new elementary school law was passed, which, beside sanctifying the already existing practices in connection with the minority branches in schools, raised the period of compulsory education to eight years. Instruction in the mother tongue was ensured also by this law only in the first four years, with the mitigation that the so called national subjects (history and geography) could be taught in the language of the given branch. In the upper forms of the elementary school the language of education was Serbo-Croatian.<sup>32</sup> In the second half of the 1930's there were 33 Hungarian nursery schools.<sup>33</sup>

Replacing retiring teachers caused serious problems, as in 1919 the Hungarian teacher training school in Szabadka was closed, and the training of Hungarian teachers in Belgrade started only in 1932. The reopening of the teacher training school in Szabadka could not be accomplished again, in spite of all the efforts of the Hungarians, as Szabadka, because of its national composition and strategic location played an important role in the education policy of the Serbian power. Furthermore a Hungarian teacher training centre counted as a "threat to the state and Serbian national interests".<sup>34</sup>

The German teacher training school was opened as an independent institution at the end of the 1920's in Újverbász (Vrbas), its boarding school was maintained from the donations of the Germans, and the teaching staff was exclusively German. The Hungarian teacher training school – as it was mentioned earlier – opened as the branch of the Serbian teacher training school in Belgrade. The boarding school was not financed from the donations of Yugoslavian Hungarians – which most probably had to do with the difference in the social structures, economic situations and cultural traditions of Germans and Hungarians –, but from the budget of The Centre of the Association of Civil Organisations (Társadalmi Egyesületek Szövetsége Központja)<sup>35</sup> The Catholic Church, clandestinely, also supported the mostly poor students with grants. Teachers graduating here were altogether between 250 and 300.<sup>36</sup> There had been no universities on the southern parts of the former Hungary, Hungarian professionals received their education in Hungary, which was supported by the government through the Saint Gellért Society (Szent Gellért Társaság). Since the degrees earned in Hungary were only rarely accepted by the Yugoslavian state, and only after the passing of new exams, for the majority only the local universities were a solution. Only about 500 Hungarians

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Könyvek, Pécs 1994. 31.; 40.; 59.

<sup>32</sup> Branislav GLIGORIJEVIĆ: "O nastavi na jezicima narodnosti u Vojvodini 1919-1929." *Matica sprska, Zbornik za istoriju*. sv. 45. 1972. 55.; Šandor MESAROS: *Madjari u Vojvodini 1929-1941*.

<sup>33</sup> KARDOS Béla dr: "Kisebbségi iskolaügy Jugoszláviában." *Kisebbségvédelem*, 1938. 1. 2-3.

<sup>34</sup> AV. F. 81. 20742/1920.

<sup>35</sup> Társadalmi Egyesületek Szövetsége Központja (The Centre of the Association of Civil Organisations) (TESZK) was founded by the Bethlen government in May 1921 with the objective to provide financial and moral support for the Hungarians who lived in Transsylvania, in the Upper Northern regions (In Czechoslovakia) and in Voivodina. More about the issue and the activities of TESZK see: BÁRDI Nándor: "A keleti akció". *Regio. Kisebbségi Szemle*, 1995. 3. sz. 89-134.

<sup>36</sup> CSUKA János: *A délvidéki magyarság története 1918-1941*. Püski, Budapest 1995. 398.

earned a degree at universities and colleges of Belgrade, Zagreb and Szabadka between the two world wars, approximately half of them in Zagreb, the majority earned degrees as Catholic priests, lawyers or pharmacists.<sup>37</sup>

Because of the decline of the Hungarian education situation it is understandable why the Hungarian Party and the Cultural Association paid a lot of attention to the organisation of anti-illiteracy courses. They tried to make up for the lack of the teaching of Hungarian geography and history by organising People's Universities.<sup>38</sup>

In Yugoslavia the constitution declared Serbo-Croatian as the official language of the State. And although by the end of the 1930's the rigid insistence on the state language became looser, at public institutions and railway stations there were still the difficult-to-ignore signs: "Speak the state language!" The use of the Hungarian language was confined to the following three areas: the first four forms of the elementary schools, cultural and public education associations and the private sphere. So, for the survival of the language, Yugoslavian Hungarian language *press* had a very important role to fulfil. Hungarian newspapers and periodicals, especially during the first period of the occupation and later at the beginning of the royal dictatorship, were in constant threat of being banned, and many times the securing of the financial background for the publication meant a serious problem. The daily papers, especially in the period of the parliamentary democracy, but also later, provided an accurate reflection on the division among the Hungarians in terms of religion and politics. The paper with the biggest circulation (18–22,000 copies) and with the highest standards, the *Bácsmegyei Napló* (Napló), founded in 1899 and published in Szabadka, was the centre of the emigration of the revolution of October 1918, the so-called Octobrists. The *Bácsmegyei Napló*, responding to the political consolidation within Hungary and the changes that took place in the politics of the Yugoslavian government towards the support of the Octobrists had lost its critical attitude towards Hungary, and it also lessened its criticism towards the activities of the Hungarian Party by the end of the 1920's. Another influential newspaper was the *Hírlap*, also issued in Szabadka, whose first issue came out on 6. December 1921, with considerable help from the Hungarian government, in a way to balance out the leftist *Bácsmegyei Napló*. We do not know its exact circulation figures. After the foundation of the Hungarian Party it was considered a semi-official party paper. It was also Budapest that supported the *Délbácska* (Reggeli Újság), issued in Újvidék in around 3000 copies, which claimed to be a spirited Christian and national paper. *A Nép*, founded by Nagy Iván, and issued as a weekly, was close to Zagreb and the Croatian federalist movement from the end of the 1930's. The official paper of the old county, the *Torontál* (Híradó), founded in 1871, in compliance with traditions, tried to take up the minority issues in a balanced tone. Its proprietor was close to circles of one of the leaders of the Hungarian Party, Várady Imre, who became later senator. It was published in the 1920's in 3–4000 copies. According to the not really comprehensive report

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<sup>37</sup> MOL Filmtár (film archives) 12486. 210. title.

<sup>38</sup> AV F. 126. II. 211140/1930.

of the office of the Yugoslavian cabinet, there were altogether 29 Hungarian language papers and periodicals, out of which 5 daily papers, 11 weeklies and 13 periodicals.<sup>39</sup> According to other calculations, there were 44 publications in Hungarian, with different profiles: literary, economic, union, political, sports, religious publications. Five of them were daily papers, 11 weeklies, the rest monthlies, periodicals and journals. The *Kalanyár*, which was founded in 1932, can be mentioned here as an example of the literary periodicals, as it is now of literary historical value, as well as the *Híd*, which was launched in 1934 and has been published to date.<sup>40</sup> The change of names of the daily papers (the new names are indicated in the brackets) had to be enacted in 1929, when even the daily papers had to avoid names referring to "tribal diversity", such as names referring back to historical or old administrative geographical units (Bácska, Torontál, etc)

The situation of the Yugoslavian circulation of publications from Hungary reflected the relations of the two countries. During the royal *coup d'états* or the assassination in Marseille, for example, the import of all papers from Hungary were banned, while the list of daily papers permitted was changing continuously. There were no official legal regulations for the import of books, formally it was never prohibited, but before delivery the books were censored. It was explicitly forbidden however to import school-books and – because of the Apostles' Creed –, prayer books.<sup>41</sup> The St. Gellért Association tried to circumvent the prohibition on the import of school books by changing the covers of the smuggled-in books in a printing house owned by Hungarians in Voivodina. There were no independent Hungarian publishing houses, the publication of Hungarian books, mainly fiction, was a matter of self sacrifice or business negotiations. The circulation of films with Hungarian subtitles was prohibited in 1929.<sup>42</sup>

Beside the Hungarian Party, which was founded in September 1922 – the activities of which we are not going to discuss here –, the old and new cultural and church organizations, the different peasant-, sports- and reading circles as well as the charity organisations played an important role in the preservation of the self identity of the Voivodina Hungarians. At the end of the 1920's, according to Yugoslavian reports there were 83 Hungarian organizations of different types.<sup>43</sup> Among others the traditional Hungarian Reading Circle (Magyar Olvasókör, Népkör), the then almost 60 year old Hungarian Public Education Community of Bánát (Bánati Magyar Közművelődési Közösség) and the Hungarian Public Education Community of Zagreb (Zágrábi Magyar Köz-

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<sup>39</sup> Šandor MESAROS: *i.m.* 367–371.

<sup>40</sup> CSUKA Zoltán: *A visszatért Délvidék*. Budapest, 1941. 227–238.; BORI Imre: *Irodalmunk évszázadai*. Forum Könyvkiadó, 1975. 132–134.;149–151.

<sup>41</sup> MOL K–28 Kisebbségi o. 1937–R–16317. Before the assassination in Marseille there were four daily papers imported from Hungary: *Magyar Hirlap*, *Esti Kurir*, *Az Est*, and *Népszava*, and people could subscribe to *Színházi Élet*, *Nyugat*, *Új idők* or the *Rádió Újság* as well.

<sup>42</sup> AV F. 126. II. 17913/1930.

<sup>43</sup> Šandor MESAROS: *i.m.* 365–367.

művelődési Közösség), formed in February 1940, to mention just a few. These organisations were making – many times almost heroic – efforts not only for the preservation of the Hungarian culture and language, but after the banning of the activities of the Hungarian Party on 6 January, 1929 they also tried to undertake the political representation of the minority Hungarians. Since after the introduction of the royal dictatorship it was entirely hopeless to renew the activities of the Hungarian Party, it was especially important that there should be a *unified* cultural organization. This was achieved officially on 30. October 1941, after the Yugoslavian–Hungarian friendship treaty was signed on 12. December 1940. Semi-officially the Yugoslavian Hungarian Education Association (Jugoszláviai Magyar Közművelődési Szövetség) had been operating since November 1940, with Újvidék as its centre. The aim of the Association was the “mental, aesthetic, moral, social, physical and cultural” strengthening of Hungarians, but its statutes also included the strengthening of economical positions as well. The importance of the fostering of Hungarian traditions and the mother tongue as well as the improvement of the school system were specially emphasised. The selection of the leaders of the Yugoslavian Hungarian Education Association reflected the openly admitted aim that the associations wished to unify all the trends of the Hungarians. Its president was Krámer Gyula, who had never taken any public roles previously, the Christian trends were represented by the two vice-presidents, Ágoston Sándor, Lutheran bishop and Korányi Elemér, Catholic parson and papal prelate. The political wing of the banned Hungarian Party was represented by Sántha György, who was honorary president. The inner circle of the leaders included also Count Biszinger Ernő, who had not taken any political roles before either.<sup>44</sup>

The increasing tolerance of the political circles in Belgrade towards minorities was indicated by the way the situation of the Hungarian theatres was solved, after the controversy about it had lasted for decades. It is worth quoting, however, what the arguments of the Home Ministry were in connection with the permission given to the starting of the Hungarian theatre company. According to these, the government should permit the operation of the theatre, because the 200 amateur companies in Voivodina meant a considerable threat to the state, since within them “Hungarian democratism is developing” and the “semi-illiterate Hungarian youth learn the Hungarian literary language in these companies”. The opening of a professional Hungarian theatre company – thus the argument – would make it possible to ban these amateur companies, and thus “we could get rid of the 200 active Hungarian national and cultural workers and exterminate these 200 light beams, which illuminate the Hungarian sky, and the active youth would be replaced by an audience which only listens, thus a passive crowd.”<sup>45</sup> After several unsuccessful attempts, the first Hungarian professional theatre company started

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<sup>44</sup> Šandor MESAROS: *i.m.* 219–226.; Aleksandar KASAS: *Madjari u Vojvodini 1941–1946*. Novi Sad, 1996. 21–23.

<sup>45</sup> A V. F. 126. Kabinet bana, poverljivi broj 221/1938.



to play in January 1940, in the Russian Home in Belgrade, on the basis of the concession of a Russian emigrant called Mihajlo Mangler.<sup>46</sup>

The Trianon Treaty had created new borderlines dividing not only political districts but also dioceses. In case of the Roman Catholic Church, this affected the Csanád, Pécs, and Szombathely dioceses. Most of the Alsóbaranya-Bács-Slavonia Calvinist diocese, which had belonged to the Dunamellék district, became part of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Monarchy, but also the Alsosomogy diocese belonging to the Dunántúl district, and the Békésbánát diocese belonging to the Tiszántúl district had lost some of their territories. The 1921 Yugoslavian constitution ensured the right to religion on the one hand, but stipulated that nobody could get exemption from citizenship or military obligations on the basis of their belonging to a certain denomination. The constitution also specially stipulated that the established and legally recognised denominations "are allowed to maintain connections with the heads of their church, in case the church constitutions of the individual denominations require this. The way and the means by which these connections can be maintained will be regulated by a separate law." Beside this, the constitution – in accordance with the spirit of the Saint Germain minority protection law – contained the guarantees of the financial support for the churches, put in the following way: "In case in the state budget there is expenditure aimed at denominational purposes, these are to be distributed among the established and legally recognised denominations according to the number and proportion of the followers, reflecting the extent these expenses seem to be genuinely necessary."<sup>47</sup>

The Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Monarchy meant a common framework for districts, people and economic units that had not shared a common state in the course of history before, not only in the national, economic, cultural and historical sense, but also in way of religion. According to the 1921 statistical survey, 46.67% of the 11,984,911 people of the country were Orthodox, 39.29% Roman Catholic, 11.22% Muslim and 1.91% Protestant (Lutheran and Calvinist) There were in small numbers Greek Orthodox Catholics (0.34%) and also Jewish people (0.54%).<sup>48</sup>

The Hungarian population belonged to three churches: the Catholic, the Lutheran and the Calvinist. There are no exact data about the proportional distribution of these three. The majority of the Catholics were the Croats, but also the Slovenians and in part the Germans, the Catholic Serbians, the Italians were Catholics, and there was a small Catholic Albanian community as well. The majority of the Protestants was from among non-Slavs, the Hungarians the Germans and the Slovaks belonged to this denomination. According to data from Hungary, the number of Protestants was altogether 216,847 (in the 1921 Yugoslavian statistics the figure was 229,517), out of which

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<sup>46</sup> MOL K-28 ME Kisebbségi o. 1940-F-15564.

<sup>47</sup> MOL K-26 1921-XLI-6552. The constitution of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Monarchy. Article 12.

<sup>48</sup> Ivo BANAC: *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji. Porijeklo, povijest, politika*. Globus, Zagreb, 1988. 57-64.

167,011 Lutherans (Slovaks, Hungarians and Germans), 49,826 Calvinist, (the majority of them Hungarians, and approximately a quarter of them Germans).<sup>49</sup> Because of the religious division of the Hungarians, and the dominance of the Croats and Slovenians within the Catholic church, the churches could not fill the central role in the preservation of the Hungarian language, culture and consciousness the way they did in Transsylvania for example. An exception to this was the Calvinist church, which had the lowest number of believers among Hungarians.

At the beginning of the 1920's the main problems of the churches and the Hungarian minority were roughly the same: they were in connection with the school policy dictated by Belgrade, and the land reform. As we have already mentioned, the church schools and foundation schools had been nationalised, and church estates were also included in the land reform. The loss of the church properties made it almost impossible for the churches to fulfil their cultural, social and schooling missions. The teaching of divinity within the school programs was prohibited, as well as the travelling of the elected Protestant ministers. Against the spirit of the constitution, it was made extremely difficult for the churches to maintain relations with Hungary. A lot of priests and ministers were deported. As we can read it in the memorandum of the Universal Convent of the Calvinist Church in Hungary, which was forwarded to the Yugoslavian government in 1922, the Calvinist old people's home in Vukovar was looted and its old age residents were dispersed by the occupying Serbian troops.<sup>50</sup>

The state did observe its international and constitutional obligations about the state subsidy of the churches, but the proportion of the financial support was the object of constant heated debates. The 1922/23 budget of the Ministry of Religion for example was distributed as follows: the Orthodox church got 67.1%, the Catholic Church 11.7%, while the Protestant Churches 0.2%.<sup>51</sup>

The relationship between Belgrade and the Catholic church was throughout this period determined by the Serbian-Croatian controversies and the Yugoslavian Italian relations, even if we know that Stjepan Radic, the leader of the strongest opposition party had explicit anti-clerical views, and unlike in Slovenia, in Croatia political Catholicism was not strong. It is not our task to discuss the Concordat in detail, but it has some bearing on the issues discussed here. Cabinet circles in the mid 1920's, in the course of the negotiations of the Concordat with the Vatican, made attempts to have Old Slav acknowledged as the language of the mass in Catholic churches. In Croatian Slavonia Rome already from the 1860's allowed the occasional use of Old Slav in the mass, but this time the efforts were about making it compulsory.<sup>52</sup> There were also serious debates about the right to appoint bishops. Belgrade, on the basis of the traditions of the Eastern Church, in order to extend its centralising efforts to the Catholic church, de-

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<sup>49</sup> MOL K-28 1926-R-89.

<sup>50</sup> MOL K-26 1926-XLI-2964.

<sup>51</sup> MOL K-437 1924-8-382.

<sup>52</sup> MOL K-63 1929-16/3-szn.; 3684.; 3708.; K-28 1927-R-35.

manded edictorial rights, while the Vatican intended to give only nostrification rights to the state. The Hungarian government unambiguously communicated through diplomatic channels to the Vatican that it was decidedly against the introduction of Old Slav as the language of the liturgies, since it was obvious that this could be the means of slavification among the Hungarian Catholics through the church. On the other hand, Budapest, agreeing with the Hungarian bishops, believed that the integrity of the old church districts in Voivodina should be maintained. The Yugoslavian government was not combatant about this issue during the negotiations with the Vatican, since, especially the radical governments of the 1920's thought that this issue had to be regulated in the Concordat, and in the meantime they accepted this as a temporary solution.<sup>53</sup> In this situation, the Hungarian government did not support the idea either that the Greek Orthodox church in Hungary should be separated from the Serbian church, and they accepted the 1921 decision of the Synod of the Orthodox Serbian Church about the governing of the church districts, which affected also the Greek Orthodox areas in Hungary.<sup>54</sup> In 1922, the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Monarchy and the Vatican reached a theoretical agreement in the question of the provisional governing of the Voivodina church districts, and the prospective formation of two new bishoprics: Szabadka and Nagybecskerek.<sup>55</sup> On the basis of this, the Vatican appointed Rafael Rodic as apostolic administrator of the Bánát, stationed in Nagybecskerek, and Ljudevit Budanovic as apostolic administrator of Bácska, stationed in Szabadka. The apostolic governors were subordinated directly to the Vatican, they could practice in the function of bishops, but they could not ordain priests until their promotions as bishops. The church districts of Baranya were annexed to the Djakovo bishopric, while the Muraköz and Murántúl to the Maribor bishopric.<sup>56</sup> According to the report of the Hungarian ambassador to Belgrade, both of the new church heads pursued a "cold bloodedly premeditated" policy, the aim of which was "to replace Hungarians and Germans, who were the majority of the Voivodina Catholics, by foreign emigrants to Voivodina, who did not know the language and culture and needs of the people living there, or the Catholic Serbians, whose numbers were small, but who - out of political considerations - were loyal to the purely Eastern Church oriented Belgrade governments".<sup>57</sup> While the Hungarians in Voivodina were politically, culturally and economically exposed to the pressure coming from the direction of Belgrade, in respect of the Catholic church, they had to defend themselves against a Croatian majority and their offensive efforts.

Unlike the Czechoslovakian government, the Yugoslavian governments did not disconnect the bonds of the Lutheran denomination to Hungary by means of decrees. Out of the Bácska Lutheran district 33, out of the Bácság 15, out of the Croatian Slavonian

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<sup>53</sup> MOL K-28 1927-R-35.

<sup>54</sup> MOL K-26 1922-XLI-8850.; 7979., 8945.

<sup>55</sup> Živko AVRAMOVSKI: *i.m.* Knj. I. Annual report 1922. 116.

<sup>56</sup> MOL K-63 1929-16/3-1590.

<sup>57</sup> MOL. K-63 1928-16/3-3968

deanery 15 congregations had found themselves within the borders of Yugoslavia, altogether 11 deaneries.<sup>58</sup> After five-year-long waiting in 1926, the Lutheran church got the permission to summon its Yugoslavian constitutional synod. In this the influence of the Protestant circles of England and the United States had an important role.<sup>59</sup> The Slovakian representatives did not take part at this constitutional synod, since they wanted to achieve the formation of a separate Slovakian Lutheran Church organisation. In this new situation, the Hungarian members of the Lutheran church were trying to form a joint church organisation with the Hungarian Calvinists. This, however was rejected by the Calvinist church, which at their constitutional synod in Zombor decided on an independent Yugoslavian Calvinist church district, with a dean as its head.<sup>60</sup>

The training of Catholic priests got completely out of the jurisdiction of Hungary, they were trained at the theology academies of the Monarchy (Zagreb, Versec etc.) Because of this, already in the 1930's the training of Hungarian speaking priests meant a problem, in spite of the fact that between the two world wars 75 Hungarian Catholics priests graduated at the university of Zagreb.<sup>61</sup> The situation in this respect was better for the Calvinist church, although they also had a severe shortage of ministers, but the Calvinist ministers were trained at the Hungarian Calvinist Theology Academies of Kolozsvár, Pozsony and Losonc. But also this state of affairs had its drawbacks as Ravasz László, Calvinist bishop of Dunamellék put it in one of his letters: they are "half blind, half deaf and almost completely mute" in the South Slav environment, they cannot communicate with the authorities, and they do not know "the mentality of the Serbs and their views on church policy."<sup>62</sup>

By the end of the 1930's it seemed as if the long negotiations with the Vatican were slowly reaching their goals. On 25 July, 1935, the Jevtic government and the Vatican signed the Concordat. The new, Stojadinovic government introduced it to the Parliament in November 1936, but it was taken off the agenda because of the protest of the Eastern Church. On the July 23 session of the Parliament it was finally to be passed with 167 votes against 129.<sup>63</sup> However, the government did not take it into consideration that – as put in the annual report of the British Embassy to Belgrade – the debates over the Concordat "have brought to the surface all the latent discontents which were provoked by the maintaining of the totalitarian measures of the dictatorship"<sup>64</sup> There were fierce anti-Concordat demonstrations in Belgrade, in the course of which the bishop of Sabac got in an unfortunate manner injured, which only added fuel to the fire. The leading circles of the Greek Orthodox church had objections primarily to the fact that

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<sup>58</sup> MOL K-26 1921-XLI-11013.

<sup>59</sup> MOL K-28 1926-R-89.

<sup>60</sup> MOL K-28 1933-R-1100.

<sup>61</sup> MOL Filmtár (Film Archives) 12486. 210. title.

<sup>62</sup> MOL K-28 1927-R-86.

<sup>63</sup> *Politika*, 1937. July 24.

<sup>64</sup> Živko AVRAMOVSKI: *i.m.* Kujiga druga (1931–1938) Annual report 1936. 518.

the Concordat – in their opinion – made the position of the Catholic church more favourable in its relationship to the state than that of the Orthodox church was. In the eyes of the Serbian public the acceptance of the Concordat was equal to treason. Finally, the negotiations with the Orthodox church had convinced the prime minister that it was hopeless to introduce the Concordat for ratification to the Senate, and abandoned this goal completely. Thus, the Yugoslavian State, which described itself as the inheritor of the Serbian State, because of the resistance of the Serb National Church could not implement the 1935 Concordat, contrary to the 1914 Concordat, which was reached by Serbia.<sup>65</sup>

As we have already pointed out, the Hungarians in Yugoslavia could not – despite all the efforts – regain their lost economic positions, and they could not reach a for them favourable revision of the land reform. However, recent research has pointed out that – contrary to what the research between the two world wars maintained with a basically defensive standpoint –, large estates in Voivodina, among them the ones owned by Hungarians (mainly because of economic considerations) – were distributed on a smaller scale. Those who opted for Hungarian citizenship had lost their property in greater proportions, while those who accepted Yugoslavian citizenship could keep significantly more land. The more serious problem was the total exclusion of the Hungarian peasants from the land reform, and the nationalization of the land belonging to local communities and churches, which had important cultural and educational roles to fulfil. Culturally, the drastic reduction of the Hungarian school network, the "name analysis" and the initial banning of cultural organizations were the most serious blows to the Hungarians in Voivodina, whose number was higher than half a million. While at the beginning of the 1920's the aim was to establish a nationally based political party and to take part in the parliamentary scene, during the royal dictatorship, since there was no other way but to accept the ban on the nationally based political organisations (among them the Hungarian Party), the emphasis was focused on cultural organizations. Paradoxically, the disintegration of the European order after the first world war, the increase of the influence of Hungary in Central Europe as a consequence of the territorial revisions and the loosening of the inside centrist unity, along with the intensifying of sense of danger of Yugoslavia in the way of foreign policy had together resulted in the widening opportunities for the preservation of the national existence of the Hungarians in Voivodina. This short several month long period was terminated by the military occupation and partitioning of Yugoslavia and the reannexation of Voivodina to Hungary.

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<sup>65</sup> Miloš MIŠOVIĆ: *Srpska crkva i konkordatska kriza*. Beograd, 1983. 146.

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Felelős vezető: Szőnyi Etelka kiadói főszerkesztő  
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