

AMERICAN PROPOSALS TO REVISE THE HUNGARIAN–YUGOSLAVIAN BORDER OF TRIANON, 1943–1944

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ABSTRACT

President Franklin Roosevelt founded the organization “Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy” in December of 1941, shortly prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The chairman of the committee was Secretary of State Cordell Hull, with its members and experts coming from two circles: they were diplomats from the Department of State and university professors of social sciences. Under various names, the committee was active during the war and produced tens of thousands pages of situation analysis. A significant part of these studies was about the potential state borders of East-Central Europe after the war. To minimize ethnic–national hostilities, the Committee strove to synchronize linguistic and political borders.

On the basis of the Committee’s documents, this paper presents the ideas that resulted from these efforts, focusing on the Treaty of Trianon (1920) borders between Hungary and Yugoslavia.

DEBATES OF THE REGIONAL SUBCOMMITTEE

The Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy set up a so-called Regional Subcommittee, in order to investigate and form a standpoint about border issues. This Subcommittee discussed the Yugoslavian–Hungarian border on February 12,

1943 for the first time,⁴ with Cyril Edwin Black, a young historian (associate professor) of Princeton University, submitting the problem. Black examined the Yugoslavian–Hungarian border of Trianon (1920) and distinguished five disputable border sections:

1. North-West Area 1: Prekomurje (Muramente in Hungarian)
2. North-West Area 2: Medjumurje (Muraköz in Hungarian)
3. North-East Area 1: Baranya
4. North-East Area 2: Bácska
5. North-East Area 3: Bánát

Black described North-West Area 1 (Prekomurje or Muramente) as having a population of some 90 thousand people, the vast majority of whom being Slovenian and only 12 thousand Hungarians lived there. However, these 12 thousand Hungarians lived in 25 settlements that were very close to the Hungarian–Yugoslavian Trianon border; in addition, railway lines ran oriented Southwest–Northwest, so the Hungarian border would not cross them. As a consequence, these 25 villages could be separated from the Yugoslavian state and be given to the Hungarian state, with no disadvantage caused, neither ethnically nor regarding traffic, to the Yugoslavian state. Black also pointed out that there were three villages with a German majority population near the border – Kramorovci (Határfalva), Ocinje (Gedőudvar), Fiksinci (Kismáriahavas). These could also be easily separated from Yugoslavia. It must be noted that, though the documents contain no information about this but it is probable, these three German villages were to be annexed to the Austrian state and not to Hungary.

As to the North-West Area 2, Medjumurje (Muraköz), Black argued that the region was almost exclusively inhabited by Croats, there were no settlements with a Hungarian majority, there were 6 thousand Hungarians altogether, so the Hungarian minority accounted for a mere 7% of the population. (It is to be noted here that Black found the numbers about the 7% and 6 thousand people of the Hungarian minority in the data of the 1910 Hungarian census; a background material dated February 9, 1943 cites the data of the 1920 Yugoslavian census, mentioning only 2 thousand Hungarians. See *Table 1.*) Nevertheless, as Black continues, the Hungarian army occupied Muraköz in 1941, on the argument that it had belonged to Hungary before. But there were neither ethnical arguments nor strategic reasons for letting Hungary keep Muraköz after the war.

In the case of the three North-Eastern areas, Black first intended to give an ethnic description as follows: about North-Eastern Area 1, Baranya, he argued that there is no such county within the region where any of the three linguistic groups (Hungarian, German and Yugoslavian) had a majority.

In the case of North-Eastern Area 2, Bácska, there were two counties where one linguistic group was in majority, and it was the Serbo–Croatian in both cases.

Black pointed out that the ethnic picture was even more varied in the case of North-Eastern Area 3, Bánát, where there were counties with Romanian majority as well, in addition to those of Hungarian, German and Serbian majority.

It must be noted here that some days before the February 12, 1943 session of the Regional Subcommittee, on February 9, 1943, a background material was made about the ethnic relations of the disputed territories of the Yugoslavian–Hungarian border. Black later used the numbers of this background document, somewhat generously rounded, for his February 12 document. These figures are summarized in *Table 1*. It is also worth mentioning here that the committee members used the various national-ethnic categories rather inconsistently, speaking of Yugoslavs or South-Slavs or Serb–Croats in their discussion. To provide an example: the population of Muramente is referred to as Yugoslavs in the February 9 background materials and they are called Slovenes in the minutes of the February 12 debate.

Table 1. The ethnic relations of the disputed territories


Nationality	Muramente	Muraköz	Baranya	Bácska	Bánát
Hungarian	14 000	2000	17 000	261 000	99 000
Yugoslavian	74 000	94 000	15 000	246 000	241 000
German	3000	1000	17 000	174 000	126 000
Romanian	–	–	–	–	68 000
Other	–	–	–	54 000	28 000
Total	91 000	97 000	49 000	735 000	562 000

Source: Author's own data

After providing the ethnic picture of the three North-Eastern regions, Black emphasized two issues. On the one hand, the region had an extensive network of ship and railway traffic. The Danube, the Tisza and the Franz Joseph Channel were international waterways, so regardless of the future state authority, transport and traffic in the region would remain unhindered. On the other hand, he stated that the real value of the region was the production of wheat, so its possession was more important for the Yugoslavian state than for the Hungarian state, as Hungary was able to produce sufficient wheat even within its Trianon borders. Following this introduction, Black said that there were three potential ways of solution for the three North-Eastern territories:

1. Bácska, Baranya and Bánát would be fully reclaimed by Yugoslavia. The reasons include Yugoslavia's positive role in the war and satisfaction of the wheat demand of the Yugoslavian state.
2. All three territories would be annexed to Hungary because the Hungarian state demands so. No ethnic or economic arguments would be in favor of this, though.
3. The region would be divided between Hungary and Yugoslavia. The division could happen according to the 1919 border proposal of the American delegation. In other words, in the 1943 session of the Regional Subcommittee, Black revisited an American proposal from 24 years earlier.

This division would have meant that Hungary could have retained a 6000 km²-large area of Voivodina after World War 2. On the basis of Black's calculations, *Table 2* presents what the ethnic picture of Voivodina would have become after the division. It is worth mentioning that Black projected the data of the 1921 Yugoslavian census to the 1919 border proposal.



Map 1. The Yugoslavian–Hungarian border proposal of the 1919 American peace delegation

Source: Romsics, 1992. Maps

Table 2. Ethnic consequences of the border proposal of 1919 (number of inhabitants)

Nationality	Ethnic relations of territories to Hungary	Ethnic relations of territories to Yugoslavia
Hungarian	227 000	150 000
South-Slav	174 000	328 000
German	79 000	238 000
Romanian	–	68 000
Total	480 000	784 000

Source: Author's own data based on Black's proposal of February 9, 1943.

Black's argument in favor of the 1919 border proposal was that this solution would leave a Hungarian minority of 150 thousand people in Yugoslavia, while resulting in 175 thousand Yugoslavians within the borders of the Hungarian state. This would be important, as Black argued, because the situation could induce three further scenarios. Firstly, it could provoke a forced population exchange but secondly, it could lead to a voluntary exchange of populations, and thirdly, it could result in the creation of a Yugoslavia–Hungarian minority protection treaty. Actually, the Hungarian side argued before WW2 that there would be no use of having a minority protection treaty with Yugoslavia as there was no significant Yugoslavian minority in Hungary. In other words, between the two World Wars the Yugoslavian state had had no interest in creating and enforcing a minority protection treaty with Hungary.⁵ However, Black argued that if there was a nearly as large Yugoslavian minority in Hungary as there were Hungarians who lived within the boundaries of the Yugoslavian state, then both states would have in their interest to create a functioning minority protection treaty.

At this point, we have to stop momentarily and draw the attention to the first two of Black's three scenarios, as the question arises: Why did Black consider a forced or voluntary population change as being positive?

The answer is simple: the Committee intended to define borders in Central Europe so that political and ethnic boundaries would more or less coincide. If such borders could not be defined for some reason, then a population exchange (whether voluntary or forced) or a minority protection agreement, as a last resort, could minimize ethnic conflicts. These efforts are clearly detectable in Black's proposal, which refers back to the 1919 border proposal.

In the last section of his draft, Black discussed the matter of Romanian minority in South-Banat and proposed that the Romanian-inhabited territories should be annexed to Romania.

After Black's proposition, members of the Subcommittee disputed among themselves about the possible ways of solution. Several officials of the US Department of State, Adolf Berle, Cavendish Cannon and Leo Pasvolsky, attacked the ethnic principle that was the basis of Black's document; they emphasized that Yugoslavia was fighting on the Allied side in the war with Hungary being an enemy belligerent which "broke its word in 1941 and misbehaved". The Berl-Cavendish-Pasvolsky standpoint gained the upper hand by the end of the session and the Regional Subcommittee decided that there was no good reason for the US to propose a border revision regarding the Trianon borders of Yugoslavia and Hungary. The decision was unanimously accepted with no votes against.

THE PROPOSITION OF THE DIVISION OF POLITICAL STUDIES

By the summer of 1943, the work of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy had advanced significantly, thus Secretary of State Cordell Hull reorganized the peace committee and in order to summarize the actual propositions, he set up the Division of Political Studies. The office's summaries on the Hungarian borders were done by January of 1944. As to the Hungarian-Yugoslavian border, the summary was completed on August 6, 1943.⁶

The document, handed in by Black again, was divided into two parts. The first section described the ethnic situation of the disputed territories as shown in the following table:

Table 3. Ethnic data of the August 6, 1943. proposition

Nationality	Baranya	Bácska	Bánát	Altogether
Yugoslav	15 604	246 598	240 213	502 415
Hungarian	16 638	260 998	98 471	376 107
German	16 253	173 796	126 530	316 579
Other	957	53 725	96 744	151 426
Total	49 452	735 117	561 958	1 346 527

Source: Romsics, 1992. p. 200.

Two things were emphasized in the conclusion of the first section: One was the fact that Baranya-Bácska-Bánát were the best cereal-growing areas of Yugoslavia and were therefore much more important for Yugoslavia than for Hungary. The other was Hungary's referring to primarily historical arguments with only secondary regard to ethnic or economic reasons.

In the second part, Black presented the three potential suggestions for solution that emerged during the debates of the Regional Subcommittee. The first solution

was to give back the disputed territories to Yugoslavia, favored by the Subcommittee in the past discussions, as Black explained. Two facts would determine this decision. On the one hand, the disputed region had a crucial role in the Yugoslavian state economy since it greatly contributed to the grain supply of the state. On the other hand, as Hungary had decided to attack Yugoslavia in 1941 and committed cruelties on the Yugoslavian population, the country lost its right to modify the Yugoslavian–Hungarian border.

The second solution was to cede the territory in question back to Hungary. The argument in favour of this was that the summed numbers of Hungarians and Germans exceeded the number of South-Slavs in Bácska and Baranya (See *Table 3.*) the Germans being likely to vote for joining the Hungarian state in the case of a referendum.

However, the Subcommittee agreed on the issue that the Hungarian ethnic arguments are insufficient for annexing the territory to Hungary. What is more, the fact that Hungary had broken its treaty with Yugoslavia and was fighting for the Axis powers further justified the refusal of the Hungarian demands.

The third was a solution of compromise. “*No subcommittee had discussed this solution*” – were Black’s surprising introductory words to the issue. It was surprising, because as we have seen, the February 12, 1943 session of the Regional Subcommittee had closely discussed and rejected the proposed compromise solution. Black was not much disturbed by that and he argued on August 6 that the essence of the solution was that the Hungarian and South-Slavic ethnic groups must be separated by such a dividing line that leaves more or less the same number of Hungarians under Yugoslavian authority as Yugoslavians under Hungarian rule.



Map 2. Black's proposal of August 6, 1943.

Source: Romsics, 1992. Maps

Black suggested the following particular ideas about the regions to be given up to Hungary:

- The 25 villages of Muramente with 12 400 Hungarian inhabitants of the region shall be annexed to Hungary.
- There is no reason to modify borders in the case of Muraköz.
- In Baranya, Hungary shall have the greater part of Kiskőszeg village.
- In Bácska, Hungary shall have the settlements of Zenta and Topolya, a part of Zombor municipality, and the three towns of Szabadka, Magyarkanizsa and Zenta. However, the town of Zombor and the Zombor–Óbecse railway shall remain in Yugoslavia.
- In the Bánát region, Hungary shall have the towns of Törökkanizsa and Nagykikinda and a part of Módos but not the village of Módos itself.

The final result of Black's above proposition was not really different from that of the February, 1943 proposition. (See *Table 2*.) The proposition of August 6, 1943 differed from the February proposition in that the population of the Hungarian-bound territories decreased from 480 000 to 435 000, with South-Slavic population decreasing from 174 000 to 146 000. Meanwhile, the number of Hungarians who would remain under Yugoslavian authority would have grown from 150 000 to 160 000.

LATER DEVELOPMENTS OF THE AUGUST 6, 1943 PROPOSAL

The August 6, 1943 proposal of the Division of Political Studies entered a higher level of the hierarchy and was examined by the Inter-Division National and Regional Committees. The plural is due to its being composed of several smaller partial committees; matters of the Hungarian borders were handled by the Inter-Division Committee of the Balkan-Danube Region. On its April 19, 1944 session, the office accepted Black's proposition of August 6, 1943, suggesting that they favored the concept that the Northern part of the Baranya–Bácska–Bánát region should be annexed to Hungary.⁷

However, just half a month later, on May 1 of 1944, when the Inter-Division Committee of the Balkan-Danube Region completed its large summative report titled "*Handling the Hostile States: Hungary*",⁸ the following statement was made regarding the Hungarian–Yugoslavian border (its importance allows to cite the text in full):

"4. The Hungarian–Yugoslavian border

The population of the territories disputed by Hungary and Yugoslavia and partially occupied by Hungary in 1941 is about 1 500 000. About 40% of them are Slavs, 26% Hungarians and 21% Germans. The United States argues that the 1940 borders should be restored, but the US is not biased against any compromise solution that may be agreed between Yugoslavia and Hungary. While the greater part of the

Hungarian minority in Vojvodina lives in the Northern territories neighboring Hungary, the presence of Slavs is also significant. In general, ethnic situation is so varied that from the involved 24 administrative areas, only eleven has an ethnic majority.”⁹

The above statement of the Inter-Division Committee of the Balkan-Danube Region is clearly a step back, compared to the August 6, 1943 proposal of the Division of the Political Studies. Especially considering the part where the document discusses the US supporting the compromise solutions “*that Hungary and Yugoslavia are willing to make*”. In other words, the US would not suggest a territorial revision, but would just support the agreement in case the Hungarian and Yugoslavian parties make a deal. There was not much chance for such a compromise, however, as all three of the major Yugoslavian power factors – the emigrant government, the chetniks and the Yugoslavian Committee of Liberation, led by Tito¹⁰ – definitely favored the restoration of the Trianon borders. What is more, both the Communists and the chetniks pondered even the modification of the Trianon borders in favor of Yugoslavia. The chetniks intended, for example, to annex the entire Baranya, along with Pécs, to Yugoslavia.¹¹

The above cited May 1, 1944 recommendation of the Inter-Division Committee of the Balkan-Danube Region was elevated to the next and higher hierarchy level in the peace-preparation process of the US, before the so-called Committee on Post-War Program, chaired by Secretary of State Cordell Hull himself. On the basis of the various received recommendations – the issues of which included the Hungarian–Yugoslavian border, the Hungarian–Czechoslovakian border, the Hungarian–Romanian border and internal politics – the office agreed on and accepted a statement, which was the systematic definition of the American policies to be followed in Hungary’s matters. The statement was modified only with regard that its length was reduced to four pages on July 26, 1944, and then to one and a half pages on September 1, 1944.

Due to the abridgements, the passages about the particular border sections were significantly shortened. The four-page document, which was created on July 26, 1944, summarized the intended US policy towards Hungary and, regarding the Yugoslavian–Hungarian border it stated the following under chapters 5 and 17: “*5. In theory, the US is supposed to support the restoration of the 1939 borders between Yugoslavia and Hungary. None the less, the US is supposed to be favorable toward any border revision that may be achieved by Yugoslavia and Hungary, through free and direct negotiations or by any other peaceful means. ...*

17. In accordance with the general principle of not recognizing any forceful territory gain, the US government is to support that the territories taken by Hungary from Czechoslovakia in 1938/39 and from Yugoslavia in 1941 be restored to these countries, immediately after their liberation. Giving these back to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the transitory period must not influence any later actions, as stated in points 3, 4 and 5.”¹²

One and a half page long, the document from September 1, 1944 was even more concise about the Hungarian–Yugoslavian border. It reads: “*a) we shall support the restoration of the territories taken by Hungary from Czechoslovakia in 1938/39 and from Yugoslavia in 1941, immediately after these countries are liberated ... c) [the US]... shall be favorable toward any revision of the Yugoslavian–Hungarian border revision that is achieved by the two countries through free and direct negotiations or by any other peaceful means.*”¹³

When President Roosevelt left for the so-called second Québec conference in September of 1944, the text of the above cited September 1 document was included in the presidential information material, which was compiled by the Department of State. In our opinion, this minimized the chances of the Yugoslavian–Hungarian border revision in favor of Hungary and supported by America. The quotations clearly present that US officials did not wish to be initiative in the case of these borders, though they would possibly support it if some voluntary agreement could form between the Yugoslavian and Hungarian states. The supposed technical details of this included the restoration of the Trianon border between Yugoslavia and Hungary once the war ends, as a first step. Then the Yugoslavian and the Hungarian sides could peacefully negotiate a potential border revision.

The standpoint of the US was rather erratic, which is shown by the following: despite the statements from July 26, 1944 and September 1, 1944, the US delegation suggested at the Potsdam meeting in July of 1945 that the Yugoslavian–Hungarian border should be modified in Hungary’s favor, on the basis of the ethnic principle.¹⁴ However, the suggestion quickly disappeared from the agenda, with the Allies agreeing that the Yugoslavian Trianon borders were not to be revised. Thus, in the September 1945 meeting of several ministers of the exterior in London, the great powers unanimously decided to restore the 1938 situation in the case of the Czechoslovakian–Hungarian border and the Yugoslavian–Hungarian border. With that, the issue of revising the Yugoslavian–Hungarian border permanently left the agenda of the US Department of State.

CONCLUSION

Our paper investigated the standpoints that were adopted by the US peace-preparation offices of various levels with regard to the Yugoslavian–Hungarian border of Trianon. On the basis of these, it seems clear that the different offices in the hierarchy, working on the peace-preparation project, had an inconstant standpoint about the Hungarian–Yugoslavian border. Sometimes they stressed that the Trianon borders were not to be changed, sometimes they made an explicit proposition to change the borders. The question arises: Whence this uncertainty?

Our opinion is that the inconsistency can be traced back to two causes. One is that these offices were unable to reconcile the various principles that emerged during the war and defined the US foreign policy. One of these basic principles was ethnic correctness or ethnic fairness in other words. The consistent realization of the principle meant the synchronization of the linguistic and political barriers, that is, to create borders that minimize the national minorities that are left within the states. But there was another principle opposing the ethnic one: when defining a disputed border (section) it must be taken into consideration on which side were the two involved states fighting in the war, if they were enemies or allies of the USA.

The confrontation of the two principles is precisely detectable in the case of the Yugoslavian–Hungarian border, as the Yugoslavs fought on the Allied side and Hungary was on the side of the Axis Powers, but there was a significant – more than half million – Hungarian minority living under Yugoslavian authority between the two World Wars. This posed a severe problem to the various US peace-preparation offices. Indeed, supporting the territorial demands of an enemy state (Hungary, in this case) against an allied state (Yugoslavia) is a critical moral issue as well. Then again, these political experts knew that if Hungary's ethnic demands were ignored, then the long-term peace of the region could be threatened. The controversy was solved by the various peace-preparation bodies in a way that they simply ignored either of the principles. The session of the Regional Subcommittee shows this, where the ethnical principle was questioned and they decided that Yugoslavia, the ally, is to be supported against Hungary, the enemy.

Our opinion is that personal factors significantly contributed to the inconsistency of the opinions of the various offices. Let us observe two examples: a positive and a negative one, from a Hungarian viewpoint. The positive example: The minutes provide evidence that Cyril Edwin Black, as an expert, continuously supported the idea that the Hungarian–Yugoslavian border should be defined on an ethnic basis. Thus, as the presenter of the proposal, he had a significant part in the turn that the Division of Political Studies advised to annex the Northern part of Baranya–Bácska–Bánát in the August of 1943.

The negative example: At the February 12, 1943 session of the Regional Subcommittee, several officials of the US Department of State – Adolf Berle, Cavendish Cannon and Leo Pasvolsky – attacked the ethnic principle and emphasized instead that Yugoslavia was fighting on the Allied side while Hungary was an enemy state. They had the debate result in the Subcommittee deciding that there was no reason for the US to propose border revision in the case of the Yugoslavian–Hungarian border of Trianon. The next level of the hierarchy, the Division of Political Studies accepted Black's border proposal on August 6, 1943. This accepted proposal was brought before the Inter-Division Committee of the Balkan-Danube Region, which

practically rejected Black's proposition on its May 1, 1944 session. This is interesting as Adolf Berle, Cavendish Cannon and Leo Pasvolksy were present and voting members at this session. It is only a pleasantry from bureaucracy and the hierarchy of American foreign policy-making how and why these members of the Regional Subcommittee joined an office two levels higher in the hierarchy. Here, they were practically enabled to overrule the decision of an office – the Division of Political Studies – that had overruled the previous decision of the Regional Subcommittee. This way they could override an office that had overridden their own original decision.

Based on the above negative and positive examples, it can also be claimed that the personal constitution of each of the peace-preparation bodies heavily influenced the standpoint of the given body.

NOTES

- ¹ Abstrakt: "Under various names, the committee was active during the war and produced tens of thousands pages of situation analysis" – Romsics, Ignác: *Az 1947-es párizsi békeszerződés*. Budapest, 2006. pp. 50–56.
- ² Abstrakt: "A significant part of these studies was about the potential state borders of East-Central Europe after the war." – For plans and records related to the borders of Hungary see Romsics, Ignác: *Amerikai béketervek a háború utáni Magyarországról*. Gödöllő, 1992. (Henceforth: Romsics, 1992.)
- ³ Abstrakt: "On the basis of the Committee's documents, this paper presents the ideas that resulted from these efforts, focusing on the Treaty of Trianon (1920) borders between Hungary and Yugoslavia." – For details of history of the Yugoslavian–Hungarian borders see Gulyás, László: *A magyar–délsláv határ története. Trianoni határaink története IV. Kapu*, Year 1992, Issue 11. pp. 70–75.; Gulyás, László: *Hogyan lett a szerbeké a Délvidék?* Nagymagyarország, Year III. (2011), Issue 1. pp. 4–9.; Gulyás, László: *A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája 1. Az első évek 1919–1924*. Máriabesnyő, 2012. pp. 16–18.; Gulyás, László: *Az első jugoszláv állam felbomlása. Államszerkezeti és etnikai következmények 1941–1944*. Mediterrán és Balkán Fórum, Year VII. (2013), Issue 1. pp. 24–35.
- ⁴ For records of the Subcommittee see Romsics, 1992. pp. 118–130.
- ⁵ Vizi, László Tamás: „Hiszem és remélem, hogy... hamarosan visszatérhet a régi barátság és megértés” Horthy Miklós mohácsi beszéde és a szerb orientáció alternatívája a magyar külpolitikában. *Közép-Európai Közlemények*, Year VI. (2013), Issue 4. pp. 7–38.; Vizi, László Tamás: *The Hungarian Effort to Dissolve the Unity of the Little Entente in 1926*. Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, Year 2013, Issue 2. Prague (–Vienna) pp. 134–150.; Gulyás, László: *A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája 2. A húszas évek második fele 1924–1931*. Máriabesnyő, 2013. pp. 40–52.
- ⁶ For full summary see Romsics, 1992. pp. 200–202.
- ⁷ Romsics, 1992. p. 34.
- ⁸ The summative report, Romsics, 1992. pp. 230–239.
- ⁹ Romsics, 1992. pp. 233.
- ¹⁰ About these three groups see Lampe, R., John: *Yugoslavia as History. Twice was a country*. Cambridge, 1996. pp. 197–228.; Juhász, József: *Volt egyszer egy Jugoszlávia*. Budapest, pp. 84–111.
- ¹¹ Hornyák, Árpád: *Péccsel Baranyával. Délsláv területi követelések 1941–1947*. Rubicon, Year 2007, Issue 1–2. pp. 16–19.
- ¹² Romsics, 1992. pp. 240–241.
- ¹³ Romsics, 1992. p. 243.
- ¹⁴ Haas, György: *Második Trianon*. Budapest, 1995. pp. 25–49.; Fülöp, Mihály: *A befejezetlen béke. A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a magyar békeszerződés 1947*. Budapest, 1996. pp. 32–40.