

BALOGH, PÉTER PHD

balogh@ocio.u-szeged.hu

lecturer (University of Szeged, Department of Sociology)

Cooperation in conflict

Investigating the patterns and outcomes of coalitions in the field of organized violence



ABSTRACT

Social embeddedness may ensure a facilitating context for cooperation and the opportunity of individual actors to harmonize their interests. In a corresponding social setting coalitions can be formed that have the potential to support goal-attainment. By outlining a brief theoretical frame we intend to apply the concept of social embeddedness and cooperation in the rather specific field of international conflicts. We introduce two case studies investigating the structure of the global coalition of the war on terrorism, and the long-term trends of terrorist attacks and the international cooperation network of terrorist organizations. Based on the results of the case studies we seek to shed some light empirically on the patterns and outcomes of cooperation and coalition building.

KEYWORDS

social embeddedness, cooperation, coalitions, war on terrorism, terrorist attacks

DOI 10.14232/belv.2018.4.7 <https://doi.org/10.14232/belv.2018.4.7>

Cikkre való hivatkozás / How to cite this article: Balogh, Péter (2018): Cooperation in conflict. Investigating the patterns and outcomes of coalitions in the field of organized violence. *Belvedere Meridionale* vol. 30. no. 4. 108–123. pp.

ISSN 1419-0222 (print) ISSN 2064-5929 (online, pdf)

(Creative Commons) Nevezd meg! – Így add tovább! 4.0 (CC BY-SA 4.0)
(Creative Commons) Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0)

www.belvedere-meridionale.hu

1. RESEARCH TOPIC AND CONCEPTUAL REMARKS

In his economic sociological program Mark GRANOVETTER (2006) introduced a concept to efficiently understand economic action, outcomes and institutions. The approach of *embeddedness* investigates economic issues from a network perspective: individual actions tend to be integrated into wider social relations. The outcomes and success of economic action depend not only on the characteristics of the actual relationship between the actors (*relational* aspect of embeddedness), but the overall patterns of the participants' network play an important role. This latter; *structural* aspect of embeddedness highlights the diverse social composition of individual goal attainment (GRANOVETTER 2006. 34–36.). The issue of the structural dimension of embeddedness had been widely raised in the frame of structural balance theory, and from an analytical perspective it has been explicated by SZÁNTÓ (2008) as a specific instance of a three-agent configuration of the prisoner's dilemma. In this argument there can be distinguished four stable and four imbalanced socio-matrices (SZÁNTÓ 2008. 326–328.) which reflect the problem of cooperation in a social context when there can be one actor who – by the decision to join one of the others – might disrupt balance between the two others and this cooperative act might lead to the emergence of a coalition. After two agents linked together and formed a *coalition*, they have a majority in the *triad* against the third actor and an asymmetric relationship emerges in which the two joining ones might have better perspectives in the process of goal-attainment.

This particular cooperation form and the problem of coalition is the central topic of this paper which attempts to empirically investigate the pattern and outcomes of cooperation and coalition building with case studies in the specific field of international conflicts.

The nature of violent conflicts and the features of warfare seem to be remarkably changed in the beginning of the new millennium. Various disciplines of the social sciences interpret these changes under the paradigm of new wars (KESTNBAUM 2009. 240–241., MALEŠEVIĆ 2008. 98–100.). In accordance with the cross-border tendencies of the new millennium – integrating the world into an inter-connected system (ROSTOVÁNYI 2002. 72.) in a major extent due to the information logistics and replacement system covering more than one continent (JÓZSA 2002. 100.) – conflicts; security and terrorism also took a new form (HASKÓ 2002: 14–15.). A global space (KISS 2002. 39.) and global threats (ROSTOVÁNYI 2002. 77.) emerged, in which the challenge caused by the cross-border terrorist networks became more remarkable (KISS 2002. 40–42.). That is, in accordance with the global changes, wars after the end of the 20th century differ from the earlier ones in several dimensions. A wider social scientific approach argues that the new warfare can be represented by two different – but fundamentally related – types of wars. The form of (1) *parasitic/predatory war* is based on the ruins of states that have been fallen behind in the fierce process of global economic liberalization due to their lack of abilities to keep up with their competitors. In these failed states then privatization of violence – among others – appears. In the process of global economic liberalization (2) *technologically advanced western form of warfare* is employed to facilitate to gain new markets worldwide and sanction or force potential adversaries of the global course. This latter form of war is linked generally to the developments of the military system and the technology applied: the dominance of air power, increase of precision, the possibility to carry

out operations from a distance and so lessening the risk of experiencing remarkable casualties (MALEŠEVIĆ 2008. 100.).¹

The concepts of asymmetric warfare, fourth generation war, gray zone conflicts and new terrorism can be regarded – at least partially – as responses to these processes in the discipline of military science. *Asymmetric warfare* refers to the changes and innovation in war by distinguishing particular dimensions of asymmetry in the field of the power and the cost of the threats and the time factor, but most of all asymmetry in the methods and objectives (RESPERGER 2015. 14–15.) is particularly important from the perspective of this paper. The adversary in an asymmetric conflict seeks to apply *new methods* to attack and/or resist. It is also noteworthy that the participants in this new form of war are primarily not states (SOMKUTI 2015. 50.) as the nation-state has lost its monopoly of violence (KISS 2015. 71.).

In the concept of *fourth generation war* decentralisation as one of the distinctive features is emphasized, and the role of initiative – inherited from third generation war – becomes even more significant. The emergence of non-state opponents and the lost monopoly on war are key points in this case as well. Furthermore, a return of the role of culture in the sphere of conflicts must also be mentioned (LIND 2004). A remarkable ‘innovation’ (SCHUMPETER 1980.) can be observed in the organisational dimension of confrontation: beside decentralisation, a *self-organizing network structure* appears and the processes indicate that networks tend to be less and less concentrated and dense (KISS 2015. 71.). It proves to be a commonly accepted assumption that international terrorism is one of the most visible forms of fourth generation war (SOMKUTI 2015. 60.) and the connectedness of asymmetric warfare and terrorism is also acknowledged (RESPERGER 2015: 14.).

The issue that the state has lost its monopoly of violence broadens the spectrum of international encounters. The concepts of *gray zone* or *hybrid* conflicts (OSKARSSON 2017; BRANDS 2016) refer to the cases when a rather complex compilation of methods, tactics and strategic thinking is present in an actual situation. This unique way of war proves to be an essential part of the approach followed by the USA – represented by the unconventional warfare methods applied by special operations forces (VOTEL et. al. 2016; BRANDS 2016. 3.; FREIER et. al. 2016; OSKARSSON 2017. 16.) –, although the most active state and non-state gray zone actors are considered to be Russia, China, Iran, North Korea; the Islamic State and Boko Haram (BRANDS 2016. 2., OSKARSSON 2017. 5–6., VOTEL et. al. 2016. 102., FREIER et. al. 2016. 33–40., 41–55.). Since the international order as it exists today is advantageous for the United States and the Western world, contemporary gray zone activities fundamentally aim to modify or rather to oppose this status quo (BRANDS 2016. 2., 6., OSKARSSON 2017. 6.). Besides the traditional hard power (HLATKY 2016), further unconventional tactics and methods play a significant role – e.g. cyberattacks, information warfare, propaganda, political warfare, economic coercion, the use of proxy fighters, misinformation, deception – forming a challenge that is political and military at the same time and relies heavily on the social effects (BRANDS 2016. 2., 6., OSKARSSON 2017. 6–7., VOTEL et. al. 2016. 102., HLATKY 2016. 1.).

¹ In the sense of technological supremacy of the methods applied the *global war on terrorism* could be seen as a proper example of a globalizing or technologically advanced western form of war. Considering, however, the thorough critical review of the new wars paradigm it might be more appropriate to say that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – included in the global war on terrorism – were much less globalizing ones; ideology and geopolitics could have played an essential role (MALEŠEVIĆ 2008. 103–110.).

Scholars of terrorism also argue that certain noteworthy changes could be observed in the market of terrorism (TÁLAS 2006. 8.). One of the concepts interpreting these developments introduces the notion of *new terrorism*, distinguishing it from the former (old) type (NEUMANN 2009). This new pattern of terrorism is regarded as a more diffuse, de-territorialized one, and involves transnational networks. Its further characteristics are that the motivation is based on religion, attacks tend to be more violent, and mass-casualty aggression becomes more frequent. Although some also argue that it might be more proper to distinguish between the *network approach* and the organizational aspect while studying the further progressions in the field of terrorism (TUCKER 2008).

2. CASE STUDIES

2.1 The global coalition of the war on terrorism

The international coalition against terrorism – initiated at the end of 2001 – can be considered a rather multifaceted one – at least if we examine the participants involved: the overall number of belligerents is 181. 132 countries from all regions of the world fought or fight against 49 terrorist organizations, insurgent groups and even pirates in several international missions. Eleven international missions and operations are² analysed, from 2001. 10. 07. (the starting date of the Afghanistan operations) to the Operation Inherent Resolve.


We investigate the cooperation network of the states based on their participation in the missions and operations. It needs to be stated that the network we could draw from this research does not necessarily reflect the actual importance of the states in direct combat activities.³ It could rather be interpreted as a nominal or *symbolic* partnership among nation states to overcome the global threat of terrorism. The structure of the cooperation network proves to be rather complex, and notable differences can be observed among the participants (Graph 1). According to some quantitative indicators the United States of America plays the most important and central role in the cooperation, that is, the highest level of involvement can be measured in the case of the initiator. The mean value of degree centrality – the number of ties or links towards other countries in the cooperation network – is 96,4 coupled with a standard deviation of 54,8. Considering the distribution – in the light of the value range defined by the mean and the twofold \pm standard deviation statistics – further countries can be identified as ones highly embedded in the network structure (e.g. Australia, United Kingdom, Spain).⁴

As for the characteristics of the top members of both the collaborating countries and the enemies it can be assumed that the first ten percent – the first 13 of 132 countries and the first five of the 49 enemies (Graph 2) – of the participants cover approximately one-fifth of the overall links.


² NATO-ISAF, Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-A), Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P), Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), Operation Enduring Freedom – Pankisi Gorge, Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), Operation Enduring Freedom – Kyrgyzstan, support for the Northern Alliance, Multi-National Force – Iraq, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve.

³ It is particularly true if we consider that the objectives of some of the missions and operations included in the analysis were solely training (e.g. Operation Enduring Freedom – Pankisi Gorge), capacity building (e.g. Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa) or access to physical infrastructure (e.g. airbase; Operation Enduring Freedom – Kyrgyzstan).

⁴ These measures are calculated for the sub-graph of the participating countries, the data of the enemies' is not taken into account.



GRAPH 1 Cooperation network of 132 countries against 49 enemies in the global war on terrorism. Legend: white circle = countries; grey square = enemies (Source: own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)



GRAPH 2 The sub-graph of the top countries and top enemies. Legend: white circle = countries; grey square = enemies (Source: Source: own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)

The top countries participating in the global coalition – besides the USA including ones from Western Europe, Africa and even Eastern Europe – possess 17,2 percent of the relations, while the most remarkable enemies – dominated by the two greatest ones; Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) – acquire exactly 20 percent of the ties (Table 1).

#	Top countries	% of ties	Top enemies	% of ties
1	United States of America	1,8	Al-Qaeda	5,1
2	Mali	1,5	ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)	5,0
3	Somalia	1,4	Boko Haram	3,7
4	Spain	1,4	Abu Sayyaf	3,2
5	United Kingdom	1,4	Aal-Nusra Front	3,0
6	Morocco	1,3		
7	Tunisia	1,3		
8	France	1,2		
9	Germany	1,2		
10	Australia	1,2		
11	Georgia	1,2		
12	New Zealand	1,2		
13	Ukraine	1,2		
Sum		17,2	Sum	20,0

TABLE 1 Share of the top countries and top enemies from the links (Source: own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)

Considering the structure of the differences among the participating countries in the global war on terrorism, macro-level organizational integration seems to be a clear factor as both in the case of European Union member states and the NATO member countries significantly higher level of involvement can be measured: compared to the mean value (96,4) the average degree centrality indicator of the EU member states is remarkably higher (147,1), and the NATO countries show an even greater level of participation with an average value of 162,3 relations (Table 2).

It is also a clear empirical pattern that the status of the participating country in the globalized world order is roughly proportional to its position in the coalition against global terrorism. Investigating the Global Connectedness Index⁵ a moderate positive correlation ($R = 0,53$) can be observed indicating the tendency that the higher the rate of globalization, the higher the involvement in the global cooperation against terrorism is of the countries participating (Figure 1).

⁵ Mean values for the time period between 2005–2015 for that data is available. Source: own calculation based on the data of Ghemawat, P – Altman, S.A. "DHL Global Connectedness Index 2016" Deutsche Post DHL, November 2016., http://www.dhl.com/en/about_us/logistics_insights/studies_research/global_connectedness_index/global_connectedness_index.html#.VFft5MkpXuM

A similar positive relationship – although a much lower correlation coefficient ($R = 0,22$) – can be measured in the case of the global firepower of the countries (Figure 2). The general pattern shows that the higher the level of military potential⁶ of the country, the higher its degree centrality in the network proves to be. However the rather low correlation value expresses that there

	Degree centrality (number of relations)
Not EU member states	83,4
EU member states	147,1
Not NATO member states	78,7
NATO member states	162,3
Mean	96,4

TABLE 2 Higher involvement of EU and NATO states in the global war on terrorism (Source: own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)




FIGURE 1 Involvement in coalition of the war on terror and global connectedness (Source: own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)

⁶ In order to make the general positive correlation recognizable between global fire power and the involvement level in the cooperation network against global terrorism I transformed the initial fire power index values which originally indicate higher military potential with lower – closer to zero – fire power index. I calculated the inverse values of global fire power (GFP) according to this function: $GFP_{inverse} = (GFP)^{-1}$.

is a remarkably less intense connection which might be – at least partially – explained by the apparent outliers at the lower value range of the horizontal axis. That is, these countries are characterized by approximately the highest level of global fire power coupled with degree centrality values belonging to the lowest value range.⁷

We might conclude from this brief empirical overview of the global war on terrorism that a great number of countries from all over the globe allied in a complex coalition against a smaller group of various enemies. Both the leading participating countries and the top enemies could be identified, and further interesting tendencies could be explored: a higher level of involvement in the international cooperation network can be observed in the case of EU and NATO member states, the more globalized countries, furthermore the states possessing armies with more significant fire power.

However, the more important question from the perspective of this paper is the outcome or success of the cooperation. That is, whether this rather monumental global coalition managed to overcome – or even eliminate – the threat of international terrorism. In our second case study we wish to empirically shed some light on this latter problem.




FIGURE 2 *Involvement in the coalition of the war on terror and global firepower (Source: own calculation and edition based on complex dataset)*

⁷ Russia and China can be identified as the two outliers which implies that two of the main gray zone actors of the world (see BRANDS 2016: 2., OSKARSSON 2017: 5–6., VOTEL et. al. 2016: 102., FREIER et. al. 2016: 33–40., 41–55.) are integrated – at least in a certain level and with a specific kind of ‘friend and foe’ pattern – into the USA-led coalition against global terrorism.

⁸ In order to make the different trends more apparent we calculated the three-year moving average values from the raw frequency data and visualized it on the time-series figure.

2.2 Global network of international terrorism

Based on the long-term time-series of the terrorist attacks there could be revealed three different trends (Figure 3):⁸ the period ranging from the beginning date of the database (1970) until 1989 can be characterized by relatively small but increasing number of terrorist actions. After the fall of the bipolar world structure and before the announcement of the global war on terrorism – that is, in the period between 1990 and 2001 – the number of terrorist attacks seem to be decreasing. Whilst in the present phase a remarkable growth of the terrorist attacks can be observed, specifically after the first decade of the new millennia.

It is also indicative for the disproportional distribution of the terrorist attacks that in the first period almost one-third (28,9 percent) of the total number of actions can be found, in the second period less than one-fourth (22,9 percent), while in the third period starting after the emergence of the global war on terrorism, nearly half of all the terrorist attacks (48,3 percent) is contained.

That is, according to this simple temporal distribution of the number of terrorist incidents it could not be stated that after the international coalition to fight global terrorism was formed, the presence of the threat had been mitigated. Actually, the opposite can be observed: since the announcement of the global war on terrorism, the number of terrorist attacks seems to continue to increase.

Nevertheless the period of the war on terror proves to bring further developments in the field of international terrorism – the one we intend to highlight in the second part of this case study is the emergence and diffusion of *cooperative terrorist attacks*.

In the light of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) the share of the attacks carried out collaboratively by at least two terrorist groups is 0,7 percent of the total in the period investigated:




FIGURE 3 Number terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2014 (Source: own calculation and edition based on GTD data)

930 cases can be identified as cooperative attacks. The temporal dynamics and regional differences of the diffusion process is worth to be given a brief description. As for the dynamics of the evolution process, only approximately one-tenth (11,1 percent) of the 930 cooperative terrorist actions occurred before 1990. Furthermore, by the end of the century they still comprise only less than one-fourth (23,4 percent) of the total. So it seems that – considering the temporal process – *cooperation as the part of the tactics of the terrorist organizations becomes truly notable in the new millennium*. Cooperative terrorist attack proves to be an innovation from the North American region as the first terrorist case of this kind in the database for the period can be found in this area (Figure 4). However the regional distribution of these cooperative actions shows that it is not the North American region where this particular kind of terrorism proves to be dominant. It might be rather stated that the rate of the cooperative terrorist attacks prove to be the highest in the South Asia and Middle East-North Africa regions. The two regions – with nearly equal numbers of cooperative terrorist attacks – account for nearly three-fifths (58,6 percent) of all such attacks. In the regions of South America and the Sub-Saharan Africa the proportion of the cooperative form of terrorism is also relatively higher (13,8 percent and 10,0 percent, respectively) compared to the areas of Southeast Asia, North America and Western Europe, where the share of cooperative threats is at around 5 percent, while in the rest of the world the presence of the collaborative manner among the terrorist groups seem to be insignificant.




FIGURE 4 Regional diffusion of cooperative terrorist attacks (Source: own calculation and edition based on GTD data)

Considering the separate diffusion processes in the various areas, there seems to be an approximately steady growth in the South America region where the number of cooperative attacks exceeds 120 by the end of the period, although it might be more remarkable that the most rapid pace of growth can be observed in the South Asia, Middle East and North Africa regions.⁹ That is, the cooperative form of terrorist attacks seems to flourish mostly in the areas where the operations of the war on terrorism were executed.¹⁰

The significance of the terrorist actors from the South Asia and Middle East and North Africa regions also appears in the global terrorist network as both in number (Table 3) and in relative importance (several of) the terrorist groups of the area seem to have an outstanding role (Graph 3).

Region	Frequency	(%)
North America	18	4,1
Central America and Caribbean	14	3,2
South America	29	6,7
Southeast Asia	17	3,9
South Asia	126	29,0
Central Asia	4	0,9
Western Europe	48	11,0
Eastern Europe	10	2,3
Middle East and North Africa	112	25,7
Sub-Saharan Africa	55	12,6
Australasia and Oceania	2	0,5
Total	435	100,0


TABLE 3 *Regional distribution of cooperative terrorist organisations (Source: own calculation and edition based on GTD data)*

⁹ It is also notable that these extremely intense growth processes in these regions seem to emerge in a specific accordance with the diffusion process in the North America region. Namely, since the late 1990s or the early years of 21st century there has been no further increase in the number of cooperative terrorist attacks in North America, and approximately the same time – the cooperative form of terrorism has emerged and begun to quickly spread in the South Asia and the Middle East-North Africa regions. So, the latter regions seem to show a *delayed, but intensively growing adaptation*, resulting in a terrorist practice characterised by a remarkable portion of this organizational innovation of violence originated in the North American area.

¹⁰ Furthermore considering the diffusion processes in the South Asia and Middle East-North Africa regions it is also important that by the end of the period investigated in this analysis the curves representing the cumulative number of terrorist attacks carried out in a collaborative manner do not seem to lose their steepness; the diffusion processes do not prove to reach a saturation level. That is, it cannot be expected – considering the processes explored from the time series data – that this intensive progress would slow down, i.e. a further increase and importance of cooperative terrorist attacks might follow in the South Asia and Middle East and North Africa regions.


¹¹ The network includes a total number of 435 terrorist groups and organizations that could be clearly identified and recognized as relevant. That is, the name of the organization is known, recognizable and relevant (the cases in the database nominated as ‘other’ or ‘individual’ were excluded from the analysis) furthermore the regional affiliation of the group can also be ascertained (both the lack of information and the indefinite affiliation information in the database was treated as missing case).

Terrorist organizations from the regions of Australasia–Oceania and Central Asia prove to be the least involved in cooperative terrorist actions as only a tiny number and very low rate can be measured in these areas.¹¹ In the case of Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia and the regions of the American continent (Central America and the Caribbean, North America, South America) the share of the terrorist groups involved in actions carried out in a collaborative manner is also low, not reaching ten percent. The terrorist organisations in Western Europe and the Sub-Saharan Africa areas incorporate above ten percent (11,0 percent and 12,6 percent, respectively) of the cooperative terrorist groups, and more than the half of the organizations (54,7 percent) carrying out terrorist attacks in cooperation belong to either the Middle East and North Africa region (25,7 percent) or the South Asia area (29,0 percent).



GRAPH 3 Network of cooperative terrorist organisations (Source: own calculation and edition based on GTD network data)

One of the structural characteristics – beside the composition regarding regional affiliation of the groups – of the network built among certain terrorist organisations through cooperative attacks is a kind of fragmentation: the interacting groups of Australasia and Oceania are completely isolated from the other actors of the network, and an analogous situation can be observed in the case of the groups and relations of the Eastern Europe region (Graph 4). The central area of the American continent (Central America and Caribbean region) and the North America region prove to be similar to the former Eastern Europe area in the sense that these consist of also basically few and less significant organisations, however it should be noted that in these regions *bridging ties* (GRANOVETTER 1991) connecting organisations from other regions can already be observed.



GRAPH 4 Network of cooperative terrorist organisations (regional clusters) (Source: own calculation and edition based on GTD network data)

The most remarkable regions in the global network of cooperative terrorist actors are inevitably those of the South Asia and the Middle East-North Africa as these two areas supplemented – as densely linked – with the groups of the Sub-Saharan Africa and Central- and Southeast Asia regions. Aside from the regional differences of the composition, frequency and relative importance of the particular elements of the terrorist network arisen from the cooperative actions, another structural characteristic is a global integration. As there can be observed, several ties which connect organisations from different areas of the world resulting one single interregional, globally embedded terrorist network.

It has been shown, that – essentially after the beginning of the war on terrorism – by the middle of the 2010's through the diffusion of cooperation among terrorist groups a *globally linked and integrated network of terrorist groups has evolved*. This consequence can be regarded as a brand new threat, particularly if we investigate the benefits of cooperative terrorist attacks.

As the results of data analysis suggest, cooperation provides a noticeable advantage for the organisations involved. The success rate of the terrorist attacks is higher in the case of the actions carried out with a partner (multiple, cooperative attack) compared to those implemented by a single organisation alone (single attack). Considering the latter type of attacks, 90,9 percent of the terrorist actions appear to be successful (Table 4), while in the case of the multiple (cooperative) ones the share of success is 93,9 percent – a relatively small but statistically significant difference.

	Share of remarkable material damage (%)	Success rate (%)	N. of killed (average p.)	N. of wounded (average p.)
Single attack	2,6	90,9	2,29	3,02
Multiple (cooperative) attack	8,2	93,9	6,39	10,25

TABLE 4 *Benefits of cooperative terrorist actions (Source: calculations by the author; based on GTD)*

However cooperation not only raises the success rate itself, but also proves to increase both the physical/infrastructural and the social/human destructive potential of the successful attacks. In the case of the multiple (cooperative) terrorist events a higher rate of remarkable material damage can be measured in contrast to the single attacks (8,2 percent vs. 2,6 percent respectively). Considering the human dimension, cooperative terrorist actions are characterised by more casualties. In the attacks carried out by a single organisation on average 2,29 persons get killed,¹² while in the case of the cooperative terrorist actions the average number of persons killed is 6,39; significantly higher. The same pattern, but an even greater difference can be measured in the number of wounded persons: in a single terrorist attack approximately 3 persons become wounded on average, and cooperation increases the number of wounded innocent victims to 10,25 persons on average. That is, as a general tendency it can be said that cooperation – to mention only the most important outcomes – nearly triple the average number of persons killed in the terrorist actions and increases more than three times the average number of wounded persons and the share of significant infrastructural damage.

Considering the main outcomes of the case study it can be argued that after the launch of the global war on terrorism the number of terrorist attacks have not decreased – actually it has risen, furthermore by the middle of the first decade of the new millennia the overall network of the cooperative terrorist attacks encompasses the whole globe linking the different regions and this embeddedness proves to be beneficial also on micro-level for the violent organisations as the collaborative forms of terrorist threats are characterised by higher success rate and superior destructive capacity.

3. CLOSING REMARKS

In this paper we introduced the results of two case studies investigating the patterns and outcomes of cooperation and coalition building in the rather specific field of organized conflicts. The outcomes of the research imply that a reasonably complex structure has evolved through the participation of several countries in the global coalition of the war on terror to fight some of the most violent terrorist organizations and other types of adversaries. We described the composition and the differences of both the cooperating countries and the pursued violent organizations, furthermore outlined some connections between the integration level of the countries in the coalition and their position in the global sphere. However, studying the long-term time-series of terrorist actions there could

¹² The number of terrorist killed in the attack – if relevant – is excluded from the analysis.

be explored different tendencies of this specific form of international violence and in the recent period a noteworthy growth could be measured. Furthermore it could also be confirmed in the second case study that in the field of terrorist cooperation a global network has also emerged, characterized by participants and attacks with more remarkable destructive potential. So considering the impact of the global coalition, it could be stated that the war on terrorism could not succeed to abolish, not even to mitigate or reduce the global threat of terrorism. That is, it might be argued that the coalition of the war on terrorism had been counterproductive, resulted in counter-final consequence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- BRANDS, HAL (2016): Paradoxes of the Gray Zone. *Foreign Policy Research Institute* 2016. <http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/>. Last accessed: 2018. 10. 11.
- FREIER, NATHAN P. – BURNETT, CHARLES R. – CAIN, WILLIAM J. – COMPTON, CHRISTOPHER D. – HANKARD, SEAN M. – HUME, ROBERT S. – KRAMLICH II, GARY R. – LISSNER, J. MATTHEW – MAGSIG, TOBIN A. – MOUTON, DANIEL E. – MUZTAFAGO, M. S. – SCHULTZE, JAMES M. – TROXELL, JOHN F. – WILLE, DENNIS G. (2016): Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, A Report Sponsored by the Army Capabilities Integration Center in Coordination with Joint Staff J-39/Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Branch. *Strategic Studies Institute – U. S. Army War College Press*. <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1325>. Last accessed: 2018. 10. 11.
- GRANOVETTER, MARK (1991): A gyenge kötések ereje. A hálózatelmélet felülvizsgálata. In ANGELUSZ RÓBERT – TARDOS RÓBERT (eds.): *Társadalmak rejtett hálózata*. Budapest, MKI. 371–400.
- GRANOVETTER, MARK (2006): A gazdasági intézmények társadalmi megformálása: a beágyazottság problémája. In LENGYEL GYÖRGY – SZÁNTÓ ZOLTÁN (eds.): *Gazdaságszociológia*. Budapest, Aula Kiadó. 32–45.
- HASKÓ KATALIN (2002): A terrorizmus történeti fejlődése. A „modern” terrorizmus történeti megjelenése és társadalmi kötődései. In TÁLAS PÉTER (ed.): *Válaszok a terrorizmusra. Avagy van-e út az afganisztáni „vadászattól” a fenntartható globalizációig*. Budapest, SVKH-CHARTAPRESS. 13–24.
- HLATKY, STÉFANIE VON (2016): *NATO’s Public Diplomacy in the Grey Zone of Conflict*. USC Center on Public Diplomacy. <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/nato%E2%80%99s-public-diplomacy-grey-zone-conflict>. Last accessed: 2018. 10. 11.
- JÓZSA LÁSZLÓ (2002): Globális terrorizmus – fogalmi keretek. In TÁLAS PÉTER (ed.): *Válaszok a terrorizmusra*. Budapest, SVKH-CHARTAPRESS. 85–104.
- KESTNBAUM, MEYER (2009): The Sociology of War and the Military. *Annual Review of Sociology* vol. 35. 235–254.
- KISS J. LÁSZLÓ (2002): Az „új terrorizmus”, avagy a biztonság és a háború metamorfózisa. In TÁLAS PÉTER (ed.): *Válaszok a terrorizmusra*. Budapest, SVKH-CHARTAPRESS. 39–56.

KISS, ÁLMOS PÉTER (2015): Generációk a hadviselésben – a negyedik generáció. In RESPERGER ISTVÁN – KISS ÁLMOS PÉTER – SOMKUTI BÁLINT (eds.): *Aszimmetrikus hadviselés a modern korban. Kis háborúk nagy hatással*. Budapest, Zrínyi Kiadó. 13–47., 66–80.

LIND, WILLIAM S. (2004): Understanding Fourth Generation War. *Antiwar.com* 2004. <http://www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=1702>. Last accessed: 2018. 10. 11.

MALEŠEVIĆ, SINIŠA (2008) The Sociology of New Wars? Assessing the Causes and Objectives of Contemporary Violent Conflicts. *International Political Sociology* vol. 2. no. 2. 97–112.

NEUMANN, PETER R. (2009): Old and New Terrorism. *Socialeurope.eu* 2009. <https://www.socialeurope.eu/2009/08/old-and-new-terrorism/#>. Last accessed: 2018. 10. 11.

OSKARSSON, KATERINA (2017): The Effectiveness of DIMEFIL Instruments of Power in the Gray Zone. *OPEN Publications* vol. 1. no. 2. 1–16. <https://www.openpublications.org/single-post/2014/05/01/The-Effectiveness-of-DIMEFIL-Instruments-of-Power-in-the-Gray-Zone>. Last accessed: 2018. 10. 11.

RESPERGER ISTVÁN (2015): A XXI. század fegyveres konfliktusainak hatása a hadtudományra. In RESPERGER ISTVÁN – KISS ÁLMOS PÉTER – SOMKUTI BÁLINT (eds.): *Aszimmetrikus hadviselés a modern korban. Kis háborúk nagy hatással*. Budapest, Zrínyi Kiadó. 13–47.

ROSTOVÁNYI ZSOLT (2002): A terrorizmus és a globalizáció. In TÁLAS PÉTER (ed.): *Válaszok a terrorizmusra*. Budapest, SVKH-CHARTAPRESS. 71–84.

SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. (1980): *A gazdasági fejlődés elmélete*. Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó.

SOMKUTI, BÁLINT (2015): A negyedik generációs hadviselés. In RESPERGER ISTVÁN – KISS ÁLMOS PÉTER – SOMKUTI BÁLINT (eds.): *Aszimmetrikus hadviselés a modern korban. Kis háborúk nagy hatással*. Budapest, Zrínyi Kiadó. 48–65.

SZÁNTÓ ZOLTÁN (2008): Bizalom és együttműködés. Strukturális kiegyensúlyozottság és bizalom koevolúciója ismétlődő kooperációs helyzetekben. In S. NAGY KATALIN – ORBÁN ANNAMÁRIA (eds.): *Értékek és normák interdiszciplináris megközelítésben*. Budapest, Gondolat Kiadó. 317–330.

TÁLAS PÉTER (2006): *Kelet-Közép-Európa és az új típusú terrorizmus. Tálas Péter (ed.): A terrorizmus anatómiája. Tanulmányok*. Budapest, Zrínyi Kiadó. 5–42.

TUCKER, DAVID (2008): Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy: Why the Conventional Wisdom is Wrong. *Homeland Security Affairs* vol. 4. no. 2. <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/122>. Last accessed: 2018. 10. 11.

VOTEL, JOSEPH L. – CLEVELAND, CHARLES. T. – CONNETT, CHARLES T. – IRWIN, WILL (2016): Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone. *Joint Force Quarterly* vol. 80. no. 1. 101–109. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-80/jfq-80_101-109_Votel-et-al.pdf. Last accessed: 2018. 10. 11.