

The Hungarian National Defense during the German Wars 1030–1052*

GYÖRGY SZABADOS



The young Hungarian Kingdom and the not much elder Holy Roman Empire's armed conflicts are consistent parts of our medieval history. During this time the monarchs often changed, though there were long periods of peace, as well. The German Empire and the opponent Hungarian defense caused these events. I will only refer to the essential diplomatic movements during my essay. I do not endeavor to mention all the details of the battles. Detailed descriptions can be found in the writings of many specialists.¹ I would only like to answer whether military or other factors facilitated the Hungarian triumph and how these elements appear in the written sources. I stand by what I have previously said; we need to know all the archeological details and especially the history of the climate. Furthermore, I used contemporary Hungarian and German chronicles and annals.

According to the Annals of Salzburg, the Hungarians and the Kabars were fighting in the vicinity of Vienna since 881, so they had extensive knowledge of the local Carpathian basin before they tried to occupy the country.² Until 955 the Hungarian offensive corps were the ones who most often passed through this country. The Eastern Frank State tried to stop them only once, in the summer of 907, without any success.³ The next offensive of the German Empire was in 1030 after 123 years of peace. Two Christian monarchies opposed; the difference was

* This study was supported by the Bolyai János Research Fellowship. Translated by Noémi Tóth.

¹ The most detailed description is to be found in J. Doberi Breit (Bánlaky), *A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme* [The Hungarian nation's military history] Vol. 3. Budapest 1929; new and shorter version is to be found in Gy. Kristó, *Háborúk és hadviselés az Árpádok korában*. [Wars and warfare during the Árpád period] Szeged 2003, 73–80. A few battles and campaigns are in A. F. Gombos, *Szent István király halálának kilencszázadik évfordulóján*. [On King Saint Stephen death's nine hundred anniversary] Vol. 2. Budapest 1938, 109–132; L. Négyesi, „A ménfői csata,” [The battle of Ménfő] *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 107: 3 (1994), 136–146.

² A. F. Gombos, *Catalogus Fontium Historiae Hungaricae*. 3 vols. Budapestini 1937–1938, 1: 754.

³ Referring to Kristó Gyula, with this win the enemy accepted the territory loss caused by the previous Hungarian conquest. Kristó, *Háborúk és hadviselés*, 25.

political not ideological. In 1024 a new dynasty ascended the throne with new expansion plans. Conrad II (1024–1039) overthrew the doge of Venice's – the Hungarian king Steven's brother in law – dominion and in the same year got the Bavarian duke's throne on behalf of the Hungarian king's son. He was within his rights to do this, because Imre – the Hungarian king's son – was originally a Bavarian duke on his mother's side. In 1027 Conrad's heir, Henry III (1039–1056) – that is, not Imre – obtained the head of the German province.⁴ The clash between the two empires was bound to happen.

The offensive was taken in the summer of 1030 which is recorded by Wipo – Conrad II's court historian – in a surprisingly precise way: „many conflicts arose between the Pannons [sc. the Hungarians] and the Bavarians, but these were at the Bavarian's instigation. That is why the Hungarian king Stephen invaded the Nordic land [sc. the Bavarian kingdom] several times and started to pillage. Emperor Conrad attacked the Hungarians with his huge army for this reason.”⁵ The mutual boundary quarrels convince us that king Stephen was prepared for the conflict. We do not have exact data from the line of offensive except for the fact that the emperor had fighting units near the River Fischa.⁶ Neither do we know which Hungarian contingents tried to stop the Bavarians. The Annals of Altaich gives us some information about the fact that the Hungarian military operations started at the end of June or the beginning of July.⁷ Wipo's next information is about the natural obstructions. “The emperor could not penetrate into the Hungarian kingdom because of the natural obstructions, but he revenged on the Hungarians by burning and looting in the frontiers and planned to come back in a more suitable time to accomplish what he previously started to do.”⁸ From the chronicle of Hermann of Reichenau we know a long line of the German army reached the country. “Emperor Konrad – who had conflicts with the Hungarian King Stephen for a long time – overran the Pannons and as long as the swamps and rivers let him to do this destroyed everything in line of the River Rába.”⁹ On the ground of these two data it is indisputable that the campaign stopped soon because of the natural obstructions by the eastern frontier. He was not able to reach the middle of the country. We know valuable details about the successful Hungarian response from the Annals of Altaich: “Konrad returned from Hungary without any success because his army was starving and the Hungarians oc-

⁴ About the reasons of the Hungarian-German wars in Gombos, *Szent István király*, 109–112; F. Makk, *Magyar külpolitika (896–1196)*. [Hungarian foreign policy] Szeged 1996, 63–64; Kristó, *Háborúk és hadviselés*, 73–74.

⁵ Gombos, *Catalogus Fontium Historiae*, nr. 2666.

⁶ Gombos, *Szent István király*, 127.

⁷ Emperor Conrad has spent the night in the abbey of Altaich on the birthday of Saint Alban – E. Oefele, *Annales Altahenses Maiores*. *Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum*. Hannoverae 1891, 18. – so the date must be around 21 June 1030.

⁸ Gombos, *Catalogus Fontium Historiae*, nr. 2666.

⁹ Gombos, *Catalogus Fontium Historiae*, nr. 1143.

cupied Vienna."¹⁰ First, I would like to mention the defense tactic of burning the land. That made it totally impossible to get new supplies from the occupied land. The Hungarian counterattack was a brilliant move, as well. However, it is not believable that the Austrian capital of today had a really good fortress at that time because Stephen's army conquered the town with their impetus, so to speak. After the peace negotiations, the Germans endured a loss of territory but it is only mentioned in one of the records from 1043 in the Annals of Altaich.¹¹ On the grounds of King Henry III's donation letter from 1051, Gombos proved that the Hungarians became occupied in two territory sectors, the alley of Lajta-Fischa and the Duna-Morva curve.¹² He concluded that the Hungarian army conquered a bigger area that they finally got. We do not know any other details about the case because the German chroniclers do not mention it more because they tried to disguise the serious fiasco. However, we do not have any Hungarian reports on these movements either.¹³ The chroniclers who lived at the same time only mention the defense: the natural obstructions, the ruin of the supply, the efficiency of fast counter-attack, and the inexpressible value of the knowledge of the local geography and climate.

The later authorities are significantly better at keeping records because the Germans had success that they could be proud of. The Hungarian successes are also found in these authorities. This helps us to create an objective opinion about the case. In October of 1042, the expelled Hungarian king Peter - the previous enemy - has found a refuge in the court of Emperor Henry III. The Hungarian conflict for the throne came just at the right moment for the German king because he could expound his goals by seeming to be an arbiter.¹⁴ King Samuel Aba called on Henry through his ministers not to protect his rival, but the emperor refused. To emphasize his request, Aba ravaged the Bavarian and Carantanian frontiers in the spring of 1042. In July Henry III began a military expedition against the Hungarians. According to the Annals of Altaich, he conquered nine Hungarian castles, but only held them for a short time. These castles were owned by a duke of

¹⁰ H. Wolfram has a new interpretation of the Annal of Altaich of the 1030 battle. A „*Conradus imperator... Rediit autem de Ungaria sine militia et in nullo proficiens, inde quod exercitus fame periclitabatur, et vienni ab Ungris capiebatur.*” Oefele, MGH SS. Rer. Germ. 18. His opinion is that the Hungarians did not occupy Vienna only because the German corps near to Vienna because the word 'Vienni' is not in a subjective case. H. Wolfram, "II. Konrád magyarpolitikája." [King Conrad II's Hungarian policy] in L. Veszprémy, ed. *Szent István és az államalapítás*, Budapest 2002, 514. It seems rational but not convincing because the Annal of Salzburg uses the same word for Vienna.

¹¹ Oefele, *Annales Altahenses Maiores*, 33.

¹² Gombos, *Szent István király*, 131. Miklós Kring has quoted another benefaction from this area. M. Kring, "Magyarország határai Szent István korában," [The Hungarian frontiers during Saint Stephen's dominion] Gombos, *Szent István király*, 2: 483.

¹³ Gombos, *Szent István király*, 130-132; Gombos, *Catalogus Fontium Historiae*, nr. 2666.; I. Szentpétery, *Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum*, 2 vols. Budapestini 1937-1938. (henceforth: SRH) 2: 389-390.

¹⁴ Makk, *Magyar külpolitika*, 72-73.

the Arpad House, probably by the later King Béla I (1060–1063). After the German army left, Samuel Aba ousted the duke easily.¹⁵ Herman of Reichenau has also recorded this attack. "This autumn King Henry attacked the Pannons, occupied Hainburg, Pozsony and the northern shore of the Danube River. As the southern shore and swamps protected him, he destroyed the country as far as the river Garam..."¹⁶ We do not know the exact names of these nine castles, but their lightning fast defeat shows us similar weaknesses as were previously seen in Vienna fortresses.

We have detailed information about our defense in the notes from 1043. In August, Emperor Henry III marched with his army to the River Rábca. Referring to the Annals of Altaich, "they reviewed the army, prepared the war machines against the protective obstructions on the river and decided to attack tomorrow." The annals use the Latin word '*opus*' that refers to the obstruction that was built by humans.¹⁷ The local annals use the word '*obstacula*' which means the same.¹⁸ The '*opus*' from 1043 is the first written note about the Hungarian frontier defense.¹⁹ In connection with this I need to mention the defense definition of the Hungarian word '*gyepü*'. We suppose that the Hungarian words '*gyep*' (grass, lawn) and '*gyepü*' (grassy) have the same routes. The oldest meaning of the word is the deserted land, which separates the Hungarians from other people or separates the Hungarian tribes from each other. During the eleventh century – when the frontier defense developed – the meaning has split. Since this time the word '*gyepü*' means artificial frontier defense. Unfortunately, we do not know exact details about the splitting process because we do not have contemporary Hungarian sources nor any foreign ones. We cannot find the Latin word '*indago*' – which covers the exact word '*gyepü*' – in the contemporary sources, just some similar references.²⁰ Nevertheless, the Hungarian and German sources fit this proposal. We have another important point of view expressed by Breit. He emphasizes the fact that the contemporary frontier is not the same exact line, which is used now.²¹ This important point clearly explains the result of the conflict of August 1043. We know from the source that they avoided armed conflict at this time. Instead of being engaged in war, the two sides agreed that King Samuel Aba would surrender the conquered land that had been occupied in 1030. And he would pay 400 gold *talentum* (sc. unit of weight) as well as the same amount of fur cloaks as a gift. He assumed an obligation that King Stephen's wife Gisella would receive

¹⁵ Oefele, *Annales Altahenses Maiores*, 32. Probably the duke was Béla who lived separately from his brothers Levente and András. Makk, *Magyar külpolitika*, 74.

¹⁶ Gombos, *Catalogus Fontium Historiae*, nr. 1143.

¹⁷ Oefele, *Annales Altahenses Maiores*, 33.

¹⁸ SRH 1: 329.

¹⁹ Gy. Kristó-F. Makk-L. Szegfű, "Szempontok és adatok a korai magyar határvédelem kérdéséhez," [View points and data to the early Hungarian boundary defense] *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 85:4 (1973), 639.

²⁰ Kristó-Makk-Szegfű, "Szempontok és adatok," 641.

²¹ J. Doberdóczy Breit, *A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme*, [A military history of Hungary] Budapest 1929, 3: 87–88.

everything back that was previously taken away from her by King Peter.²² We have two different comparisons of these serious points of peace. According to Rónai Horváth, Aba was not prepared for the battle, as he could hardly possess the gate of Moson and the line between Kapuvár and Abda. Furthermore, he could not set his army up behind the River Rába.²³ The other opinion is by Breit. He figures that the German Emperor was not aware of the strength of the Hungarian army. After he recognized the fact that he could only break through the Hungarian lines with great disadvantages, he preferred peace. Both of the opinions seem valid, though after referring to the Hungarian chronicles and other details we can come to different conclusions. The contemporary definition of the frontier was not the same as now. It was much more fluid, so it was not too difficult for the king (Aba) to surrender the 'safety territory' of the Lajta-Fischa-Morva region that had been conquered only 13 years earlier. We can prove from his later behavior that he considered it only temporary trouble and did not have to keep his original promise. He relied - maybe too much - on his royal power and the Hungarian defense line. The most important data from the year 1043 is the mention of using artificial defense in addition to the natural defenses. According to Wipo's and Hermann of Reichenau's report, the Hungarian swampy frontier south from the Danube River was impenetrable. The Hungarian defenders benefited much from the knowledge that had been inherited from their ancestors about the local geography and climate. By the summer of 1044, Henry III recognized that Aba would not want to keep his previous promise.²⁴ Much was at stake to prepare for the battle and we can state that the king relied on his victory. We know many details about the affairs from both the Hungarian and the German sources, so I need to mention the short definition of the chronicle researches. We know the German opinion from the contemporaneous Annals of Altaich. The Hungarian opinion is standing for the 'Chronicle composition' from the fourteenth century but it originally comes from a perished *gesta* from the eleventh century. It is indisputable that the old Hungarian *gesta* consumed parts of the Annals of Altaich but did not counterfeit it. Finally these two opposing viewpoints are equal with each other.²⁵ The Annals of Altaich stresses: "King Henry III has taken only two sections of his army away with him, the Noric and Czech. He only mustered support though his guardians from the court by refusing them supplies because of the bad crops. He did this against many premonitions. While on his journey, he greeted some deputies of Aba who reclaimed the escapees...

²² Oefele, *Annales Altahenses Miores*, 33. Cf. SRH 1: 329.

²³ J. Rónai Horváth, *Magyar hadi krónika*. Vol. 1, [Hungarian military chronicle] Budapest 1895, 36; Doberdói Breit, *A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme*, 45.

²⁴ Oefele, *Annales Altahenses Miores*, 34.

²⁵ B. Hóman, *A Szent László-kori Gesta Ungarorum és XII-XIII. századi leszármazói*. [The *Gesta Ungarorum* from the period of Saint Ladislav, and its descendants in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries] Budapest 1925, 81-87; L. J. Csóka, *A latin nyelvű történelmi irodalom kialakulása Magyarországon a XI-XV. században*. [The birth and growth of the Latin-written Hungarian historiography between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries] Budapest 1967, 348-351.

They tried to deter the king, but mostly to know the size of his army. They held back until the two armies were one day distant from each other. The people who urged peace also collected a huge company of their own. After all – even though both side of the opposition had members with placatory aims – they did not want to be unprepared. They agreed to fight three days later. On that day our hero arrived at the agreed place, but the opponent was not there. He decided to chase them across the River Rába, so he searched for a passable way through the river. His guides were Hungarians who were taken from their country. They rode along shore all night until the rise of day when they got over the ford. As soon as it was realized that they were coming, the guides escaped and left their supplies behind. The way was open for ours and they filled up their stocks.”²⁶ This new information confirms that the disloyal Hungarians, friends of Peter, used their knowledge of the land to eliminate the defensive advantage and exposed the deficiencies of the natural defense. The dormant passages were open. It is worthwhile to pay attention to some movements of cistern which mentions stagnant water (*stagnantibus aquis*) and defense works or fighting machines (*machinis*) which mean closeness by the usual method (*more solito*). This solution is frequently used in the *gyepü*-system. We can meet another frequent part of the defense system, the lurker deputy system. The Hungarian source *Chronica Picta* give us the line of the attack: “[Henry] pushed in at Sopron, but when he tried to cross at Babót near the River Rábca he could not do it because of the impenetrable obstructions: the flooding river, the chunky bush, and the swamp. The Hungarians who were loyal to Peter and the emperor rode all night up the riverside of the Rába and at the break of dawn crossed on a ford.”²⁷ The state soldiers trailed to Győr and on 5 July – by the reconstruction of Lajos Négyesi – clashed with Aba’s stronger army between the present-day towns of Ménfő and Gyimót.²⁸ The researchers fully analyzed the events in all aspects several times. Andrea Kiss, for example has given us a detailed review of the weather conditions of the era.²⁹ I will only reflect on the part of the sources that mention a new defense factor. The *Chronica Picta* tells us about Henry who “with many soldiers, stood against King Aba near the town of Győr at Ménfő and believed in his victory because some of the Bavarians told them that the emperor had only a few soldiers. As it is said, King Aba would be the victor if some of the Hungarians did not refuse to fight because they were still in a friendship with King Peter.”³⁰ Fortunately, the king’s Bavarian agents were part of the human department of the defense and they were sort of a ‘detached post’, a complementary intelligence service. Though they completed their tasks very well they did not have much influence on the

²⁶ Oefele, *Annales Altahenses Maiores*, 35–36.

²⁷ SRH 1: 331.

²⁸ Négyesi, „A ménfői csata,” 144; Oefele, *Annales Altahenses Maiores*, 36.

²⁹ A. Kiss, “Időjárási adatok a XI-XII. századi Magyarországról,” [Weather records in Hungary in the eleventh–twelfth centuries] in „Magyaroknak eleiről.” *Ünnepi tanulmányok a hatvanesztendős Makk Ferenc tiszteletére*, ed. F. Piti, Gy. Szabados, Szeged 2000, 256–257.

³⁰ SRH 1: 331.

outcome of the battle. On the contrary, the other group that stayed with Aba had a bigger influence on the conclusion. The secret unit of mavericks handicapped Aba by desertion. Many fighters died in the battle of Ménfő. It is understandable that the German annals tried to stress the Hungarians' loss and the Hungarian chronicle did the opposite. The latter told us a specific piece of information: "That day more Teutons died than could be counted. To this day, that location is named Ferlorum Payer by the Teutons and Vesztnemipti by the Hungarians. At that time and place, soldiers had killed so many people, for two months humans could hardly cross the land because of the stink of the corpse and archers killed everybody."³¹ (In order to protect the population against the epidemics because the battle was in the middle of the summer.) The defense was very efficient and effective and a summary of the incident can be found in the *Chronica Picta*. A view of this defense gives us very useful statistics. The light archers on horseback – the guardians of the *gyepű* – seemed to have regular point duty in contempt of anarchic policy. By the losing the battle – the first in the history of the Christian monarchy – the country was open to the enemy and they advanced to the middle, to Székesfehérvár.³² The second overthrow of Peter was accelerated by the faith oath that was sent to Henry III in the Pentecost of 1045. Accordingly, general displeasure started that swept away his dominion; this was unacceptable both to the Christians and pagans. King Andrew I (1046–1060), a very positive king from the Árpád dynasty, was enthroned after Peter and Aba who were the grandnephews of Saint Stephen on their mother's side. Soon Andrew had to face the issue that the German emperor would not accept the loss of the loyalty oath easily. He called his brother Béla home in 1047 or 1048 and prepared for the attack by building up the castle Magyarbrod at the Czech–Hungarian border in 1049. The Bavarian answer was the building up of Hainburg.³³ After the conflicts of the border in September 1051, Henry III attacked Hungary with his imperial forces. The *Chronica Picta* recalls the movement: „the emperor came to Hungary with his many warriors next to the streams of Zala and Zselic. He sent many ships with supplies to Hungary on the River Danube. The commander was his brother Bishop Gebhard. King Andrew and Béla heard this and burned all the corn. The population and all of the animals were relocated far away where the emperor planned to adjourn. When the emperor entered Hungary and saw the burned lands, he could not find any supplies for his soldiers or for the horses. He did not even know where his ships were, so he could not get any supplies at all. Despite the hunger of his forces, they crossed the forests until they arrived at the mountain of Bodajk. During this time, Bishop Gebhard arrived at Győr and sent a letter to Emperor Henry asking where he should wait for him.”³⁴ The offensive came in an unusual way and – what was brand-new – came from more ways. It is clear

³¹ SRH 1: 332–333.

³² Oefele, *Annales Altahenses Maiores*, 37; SRH 1: 333.

³³ F. Makk, "Megjegyzések I. András történetéhez," [Remarks on history of King Andrew I] in F. Makk, *A turulmadártól a kettőskeresztig*. Szeged 1998, 127–135.

³⁴ SRH 1: 347–348.

that Henry tried to avoid the Rába-Rábca *gyepű* and moreover his attack was a snap. He succeeded in reaching the middle of the country. He marched on to Bodajk in Fejér County; however, Simon Kézai's statement that he assaulted Székesfehérvár for five months is not true.³⁵ The only weak point of Conrad III's plan was the isolation of his army and the depletion of his supplies that occurred so soon. Gebhard's message was intercepted by Andrew's marauding soldiers and Bishop Michael counterfeited a letter in the name of the emperor with he used to recalled the fleet from the River Danube.³⁶ Beside the cumulative experience they had further disadvantages. "Furthermore, the Hungarians and Pechenegs persecuted them night and day and killed them with poisoned arrows. They kidnapped many of them by flexing ropes beyond their tents... fearing the dangers the Teutons dug themselves into the ground and covered themselves with their shields laid next to the corps like in a tomb."³⁷ As a legend of the fugitives in *Chronica Picta* we still name these mountains Vértes ('Shieldy'). Kézai uses the name Bársonyos ('Velvety') for the road from Bodajk to Győr as a way of remembering the scattered pillows.³⁸ We know the direction of the countermarch of the army from these two data. The German source the Annals of Altaich is quiet about their shame. The only thing what it mentions is that "the campaign against the Hungarians was totally unproductive and excruciating."³⁹ The German army reached the line of Vértes where it met with the tactics of the burned land and the light cavalry archers who were able to kill them because the mass of troops in the staging area was mobile. In 1052 King Henry III attacked again. By experience of the previous year's failure, this time the fleet and the army traveled together. The reference section of the *Chronica Picta* shows us totally contrary conflicts as in the movements of 1051: "That time the king of the Teutons with his huge army seized the castle of Pozsony because... he demanded that the whole Hungarian country be under his thumb. He used many siege machines but he could not conquer the castle even with eight weeks attack. The mentioned king arrived with his fleet to assault the castle of Pozsony. The Hungarians found a very good swimmer called Zothmund who was sent to the fleet of the emperor in the middle of the night. He dove under the fleet and drilled holes in all the ships so that they what filled up with water. The power of the Teutons' declined and they returned home. There were lots of knights in Pozsony but most notorious were Woytech, Endre, Vylungard, Urosa and Márton."⁴⁰ The brave diver foiled the German venture by drilling. His courage distracts from the fact that the siege of Pozsony proceeded by the fighting rules of Western Europe. We know by the

³⁵ Ibid. 179.

³⁶ SRH 1: 348.; Some of the researchers think that bishop Miklós is the author of the *gesta*. J. Horváth, *Árpád-kori latinnyelvű irodalmunk stílusproblémái*. [The style problems of the Latin literature in the Árpád period] Budapest 1954, 305-315.

³⁷ SRH 1: 348-349.

³⁸ Ibid. 179-80; Kristó, *Háborúk és hadviselés*, 79.

³⁹ Oefele, *Annales Altahenses Maiores*, 47.

⁴⁰ SRH 1: 346-347; *Annales Altahenses Maiores*, 48.

names of the knights of the castle that they came from abroad so they used their own native experience during the defense of the castle.

Pozsony's successful defense was the end of the eleventh century's German wars. After that time, King Andrew I, with brave and successful foreign policy, renovated the Hungarian-German relations as they were before 1024. Fortunately, King Henry III's sudden death helped him to arrange peace with the Germans.⁴¹ They signed the peace treaty in 1058 at the field of Morvamező and it was confirmed by the marriage of the Hungarian crown Prince Solomon and the German princess Judith. The effective result is mentioned with pettiness by Pope Leo IX's biographer. In his opinion the empire lost Hungary.⁴² After King Stephen, Andrew was the first who could convince the Germans. The researchers mention him as Stephen's policy representative,⁴³ though the previous opinion does not confirm that he noticed Stephen's policy because of the defeat of Ménfő.⁴⁴ On the one hand, Aba Sámuel's generals were not suitable to his tactics. On the other hand the era's challenges have appeared in a brand new way and the defense tactics were brand new, too.

In summary we can clearly find the human and physical elements of the defense in the written sources. The natural element of the frontier defense is local knowledge which is given from the beginning and inherited from father to son. The rivers and swamps stopped the enemy, at least the River Rába did so. However, the Hungarians could empty all the supplies from the staging area in time and the power of the counter attack was able to conquer a piece of new land at the western boundary (1030). At the northern shore of the River Danube some tinhorn fortresses can be found (1042). At the River Rábca there are some works made by people (1043). Fighting machines and spy service can also be found. The *gyepű* system is only vulnerable if the enemy finds the soft spots of the local relief, however, the request for the fall back of the guards was given. The archers' quarantine protected the population against the spread of the epidemics. (1044). The tactic of the burning the land can be used in a successful way in the middle of the country and completed with the attack of the cavalry archers (1051). Protectors to any siege of the castle of Pozsony were strong warriors and trained knights (1052). Cleverness can be found in bishop Miklós and the diver Zothmund.

Finally, I would like to pay attention to the social importance of the burned land tactics in 1051 which was successful through hundreds of kilometers which shows us the mobility of the society that is the result of the eastern nomadic lifestyle. Certainly, I do not want to say that the Hungarians lived the pure nomadic lifestyle in the 1050s because the *Chronica Picta* tells us about the farmers. The old traditions were fixed in the community's mind and still can be found in a travel book a hundred years later. In 1147 Bishop Otto of Freising has shown the coun-

⁴¹ Makk, *Magyar külpolitika*, 88–93.

⁴² Gombos, *Catalogus Fontium Historiae*, nr. 2466.

⁴³ Makk, *A turulmadártól*, 130.

⁴⁴ Rónai Horváth, *Magyar hadi krónika*, 41; Doberdói Breit *A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme*, 80.

try this way: “they have only a few villages and towns, their houses are usually made of wood and reed and sometimes of stones. They live in tents during the whole summer and autumn.”⁴⁵ All these facts prove that the national defense-organized by the Hungarian state-worked successfully, even in serious crises.

⁴⁵ Gombos, *Catalogus Fontium Historiae*, nr. 1767.