

ENGLISH SUMMARIES

Andrea Szabó: *Social situation of the Hungarian students*

The study aims to present the socio-demographic characteristics of the sample. Hungarian college and university students represent the social elite of Hungarian youth. However the study demonstrates that this part of society is not without social inequalities.

The starting point of the analysis is Pierre Bourdieu's theory about the process of transformation of people's symbolic or economic inheritance into cultural capital. The study examines how each type of capital accumulation appears among certain groups of students.

In this study, we accept as a fact that in the Hungarian education system the selection of students, the reproduction of inequalities takes place especially in primary and secondary schools, but higher education also contributes to the reproduction of the positive or negative status positions of the family.

Rita Csőzik: *Transformed Rebellion. The Hungarian college student's political socialization change*

After the political transition in Hungary the society fell into a social psychological crisis, which permeated political institutions. Although in this new process old social and political attitudes live on at an individual level, the differences between generations can also become perceptible from time to time. But we cannot speak about a generation of college students in the traditional sense. The rebellion of today's youth can be considered rational, lacking any collective, common action, so as individualistic interests and life strategies, according to which one has to exploit fully the opportunities offered by the society come into focus, a new generation appears in front of us. The relationship between young people and our political life today is highly ambivalent, and we can speak much less about disillusionment than indifference, which may be coupled with a lack of knowledge. Their rebellion is not confrontational, not against the power, but it is a kind of withdrawal. Our research can contribute to pinpointing the complex relationship of the 21st century Hungarian university youth to the political system, and their related representations.

In this present theoretical study we summarize the theories and prior research results describing the changes in the life long processes of political socialization and the development of political values, identities, behavioural patterns and political culture. The study aims to provide a conceptual framework and background for those studies that are included in this volume. In our opinion the problem of political socialization is behind all those significant processes that are mentioned by the authors. Behind party preferences, not denying the importance of cognitive and rational elements, there are cultural representations, agents of socialization, and such value patterns that are handed down from generations to generations.

The democratic political socialization pattern that emerged following the political transition has a dualistic nature, similarly to that in the Kádár era, whereas a serious contradiction or tension arises between how the individual experiences life and the official self-definition of the 'existing democracy' (coined after the term of 'existing socialism'). The consequences of the escalation of this tension can be very serious, and possible scenarios can cover either the withdrawal of citizens' loyalty or even the break out of an explosive social and political crisis.

What is happening in colleges and universities is a very interesting, but still neglected question. To what extent could a higher educational institution correct possible socialization defects? Do higher educational institutions offer democratic socialization patterns at all?

The dissatisfaction that is characteristic to almost half of the youth has been amalgamated in the negative attitudes towards the whole of the new capitalist system. The functioning of the new democratic rule and power structure arouse fundamental dissatisfaction among the youth, according to whom the anomalies of the system are related to the fact that in Hungary the functioning of the democratic bodies is not smooth and fully developed. On the other hand the functioning of the political life lacks transparency and is too complicated for them, so their aversion and feeling of ineffectiveness is very much understandable. There is a stereotype that politicians represent only particular interests and they act without the inclusion of the majority of citizens. There is an intensive distrust in the democratic institutions. The democratic system that has emerged after the political transition does not constitute a good frame of reference for self-identification for the youth. Recently there has been multiple attempts to mobilize young people as a generation by Jobbik on the one hand and LMP on the other. They therefore speak about the 'Kurucinfo' and 'Critical Mass' generations. According to research, young people tend to stave off the responsibility of involvement as a citizen; as far as democracy is concerned they expect the state to fulfil its obligations as a welfare services provider, meanwhile social activism, and self-organizations and civil initiatives are not at all or far less attractive for them. The majority hope that democracy will guarantee personal safety, which means for them essentially the equality before the law and the respect of private life, and only at the very least the multiparty system and the protection of the rights of minorities. The age group between 25 and 35 do not add up to a uniform generation and they revolt by not revolting at all. The majority of young adults struggle with an identity problem and can balance their life only with great difficulties. The number of young people who have difficulty in self-identification is very high, primarily because more than one essential factors of self-identification are incomplete. They do not know the history of their own family, and they are not familiar with Hungary's past either. The deficiencies of secondary school history education are the most palpable concerning the past sixty years. Before many young people there is no predictable, relatively safe career, stable community, reference group, and many of them have stepped outside time and space.

In reality a rational revolt takes place, which lacks emotional charge, romanticism and redemption. Those who are in higher education do not turn against the value preferences of their parents, only utilize and exploit the opportunities provided by the society. The practical realization of the withdrawal option proposed by Hirschman (1995) can make way multiple manners. If they think that in this country there is nowhere or no reason to move forward, they take on a job or build an existence abroad, while those who stay in this country, since they are unable to build a future, spend their income on consumer goods and entertainment by which they keep themselves occupied, and take their mind off the problem that their generation is condemned to passivity. Withdrawal, keeping a distance from politics will determine the individual's scope of action, and the possibility of protest will vanish, yet this withdrawal can be beneficial from the point of view of the individual. It is also possible however that the existence of withdrawal as an option creates an obstacle for the development of protest techniques.

The research of Andrea Szabó and Tamás Kern indicates that the relationship of young people to politics is partly system independent, nevertheless, political events, macroeconomic and macro-social processes have an impact on the realization and character of socialization processes. The processes of political socialisation that have evolved during the years that have elapsed since the political transition are fundamentally deficient. It seems that those agents of socialization that had already functioned in an insufficient manner in the Kádár era during the past two decades have started to show even more obvious signs of dysfunctional operation. This partially explains on the one hand young people's lack of interest in politics and inactivity and on the other hand their „fall-out”, and not departure, from the political society. But indifference concerning political questions does not imply that this youth are satisfied with their circumstances and opportunities in life. Youth that have entered adulthood since the political transition are not pioneers, rather followers, and do not play an active role in shaping events, rather passively suffer them. The political transition has largely failed to engender a new political generation, if at all.

Not every age group becomes a generation, and it is still an open question – as a number of studies in this volume point it out – if the people in this age group will be able to become one. What will be the guiding principles and the modality of their revolt? How will this revolt impact society? Will this revolt be able to create such strong and durable personal bonds, through which they can make their voice heard, will the self-identification of this age-group be achieved? Will such new elite emerge through this rational revolt that would help this age group to be taken more seriously by the political class? Will their demands, aspirations leave a more significant mark on political, economic and social political decisions?

Andrea Szabó – Dániel Oross: *Trends of political participation among hungarian university and college students*

The results of Hungarian youth studies indicate that Hungarian youth is characterized by low degree of political affinity and moderate political activity. According to the data on the electoral participation in 2010 among the Hungarian citizens under 25 years it is recorded that higher than average is the willingness to participate. The subject of our analysis is a special group of youth, full-time university and college students. While this volume contains studies exploring party related motivations behind this trend, the present study aims to determine changes in the electoral participation via socio-demographic factor analysis. When approaching young people's willingness to participate, the study points at factors linked to the growth of new opportunities offered by the internet and new forms of participation opportunities. By approaching the question of individual political participation from the resources necessary for participation (VERBA–SCHLOZMAN–BRADY 1995) online political participation does not require a lot of money, nor license, nor formal affiliation with an organization, it can be resumed any time and place. Therefore online political participation requires the reconsideration of earlier concepts on opportunities for political participation. Unlike previous typologies, the present study distinguishes three groups of acts related to political participation. Under the notion of „traditional” forms, the participation we defining activities requiring lot of resources (membership fee, time, capacity) conscious, durable and continuous commitment. „Direct democratic” participation is defined as activities requiring personal involvement of citizens in actions that do not require long-term commitment. We consider these two forms of participation as „activity by feet” since they definitely require physical performance. Compared to these two forms we define the concept of „new” or virtual participation that we actively call ‘like’. This „New” participation is multilateral participation based on activities, encompassing involvement in both traditional and direct forms of action via internet as a generic interface.

The results of our analysis indicate that:

The validity of the earlier trend that interest in politics is set persistently at low level was not confirmed by our data on full-time university and college students. An important result of the research is that in terms of traditional socio-demographic factors, there are no significant differences detected in the electoral participation of students and the Hungarian adult population as a whole. Students attending social science courses, humanities, legal and administrative studies are the most interested in politics, while the lowest affinity to political issues was detected among sports science students, students of medical and health sciences and students attending faculties of engineering. According to political preferences students are extremely interested in public issues among the supporters of „Jobbik” and Democratic Coalition.

In our research, we have tested if there is empirical evidence to justify the different understanding of the concept of „interest in political” and „interest in public issues”

among full-time university and college students. The results indicate that the two areas are very similar, but not completely blurred together in the attitudes of young people. Interest in public issues is higher.

We observed if there is a difference between the preferences of the various forms of political participation according to the political orientation of the students. We assumed that the difference between the preferences of direct democratic and new participation may be that participation in the former is preferred by right-oriented, while participation in the latter is preferred by the left-oriented students. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the left / center-left oriented students are members of online communities in a much larger proportion than right or center-right oriented students.

Our analysis identified the demographic features of the traditional, direct and new participation.

Three-tenths of the Hungarian college and university students do not participate in any political action or did not give a valid answer to our questions.

It is important to note that independent participation is very rare (only 5–8%), that means one form of participation attracts another. If a student gets involved in any form of political participation, he or she will inevitably become more active in another form of participation too.

Moreover, the data suggest that students „pooling” participation are the largest group of young students. They are also the ones who are present at all the three possible fields of activity.

Contrary to our hypothesis new participation did not become an independent, considerable factor, as an alternative of „activity by feet”, but it opens a new scene in the dissemination of opinions. In terms of democratization cyberspace does not bring significant new opportunities.

The Active Hungarian Young People research of 2012 confirms the results of the 2010 wave of ESS. The participation level of students in direct democracy is really important. The key to political participation of the Hungarian university and college students is direct democratic participation.

Those students who are active in the repertoire of direct democratic forms of participation require increasing levels of self-involvement and thereby increasing individual risk of active participation are likely to be more active in other forms of participation. So – contrary to our expectations – the daily use of the internet is not the key of the Hungarian college and university students’ political participation. The political participation of this large social group can be understood through direct democratic participation that requires deeper personal concerns, and serious decisions in certain situations.

Finally, it is worth taking into consideration those students who are the most active politically, students „pooling” participation. Analysing the three forms of participation together it can be concluded that the socio-demographic, socio-cultural background of the emitting family (eg. higher social status, sex, father’s / mother’s

level of education), political socialization processes and individual competencies, that is, certain factors predisposing political participation determine which groups of people politicize.

Students attending religious higher education and students of state universities, Master and PhD students are the most active students. As for the different course structures on the one hand students of social sciences, humanities and arts and students of legal and administrative studies are the most active, most of them take the increased awareness of political issues from home. On the other hand less oriented toward the political issues are students of sports science, medical and health sciences, engineering and economics. It is worth pointing out that the former privileged students are freer use of their time, but in the latter training areas students are much more restricted, they receive consistently a huge amount of studies, so they have less time for political activity. The virtual space can create greater opportunities for the latter group, which does not require extra time for individual activity, compared to the normal daily routine of the internet use.

Dániel Róna – Anett Sörös: *Kuruc.info Generation. Reasons behind Jobbik's high popularity among the Hungarian youth*

The electoral success of Jobbik drew enormous public and scientific attention. Although many scholars detected Jobbik's remarkable popularity among the youth, no in-depth study dealt with the reasons behind the phenomenon. This paper establishes five hypotheses which could explain the young characteristics of radical constituency: policy preferences, anti-establishment attitude, economic recession, internet-usage and subculture. Each assumption is investigated with respect to the following questions: why would become either youngster Jobbik-voter whereas the other one not; why could Jobbik gather much more supporters among the youth; especially among 18-21 years old voters; and why did the radical breakthrough occurred after 2008? The analysis is based on our primary data collection: we conducted an online survey among appr. 1500 university and college students. The data-collection was completed by 200 face-to-face interviews in order to ensure an unbiased and representative sample. Comparing our data with other youth database and representative survey samples of the full population we were able to pinpoint the main differences between age groups and between opinion climate at 2008 and 2011.

The empirical evidence suggests that economic recession did not play an important role in the success of Jobbik. Poor students do not tend to prefer Jobbik more than other parties. Although it is true that living standards worsened between 2008 and 2011, this tendency affected every age groups at the same extent, thus there is no reason to assume that this is the reason behind Jobbik's success among the youngest cohort.

Value preferences do not explain such a sudden ascendance and the over-representation either. Regarding authoritarianism, prejudice, leader cult and pro-order atti-

tudes youngsters do not differ significantly from their older counterparts. However, political views are strongly correlated with party preferences: according to our multi-variate logistical regression model radical and pro-order opinions – especially anti-Roma sentiments – are strong predictors of Jobbik-vote. In our interpretation, Jobbik's popularity is caused by the salience of Roma issue – not by shift towards prejudicial stance in the electorate.

Anti-establishment attitude is a more powerful explanatory variable. The entire Hungarian population is disappointed with elite but the youth showed a paramount disaffection. Trust in political institutions and satisfaction with the way democracy works shrunk dramatically since 2006, especially among the youngest generation. Not only youngsters are not interested in established political parties but they tend to be more sceptic about democracy as well. It is striking that only 40 percent of the students – and only 20% of Jobbik-supporter students – think that democracy is the best political system, whereas every third respondents agree that dictatorship can be better in certain circumstances. This is a much more serious problem than simple dissatisfaction with the way democracy works – this undermines the fundamental democratic commitments.

We also examined how internet-usage influences university student's political participation in general and young people's preferring extreme right party in particular. Despite that young students use alternative communication channels (internet, web2 etc.), it was proved that they do not use these for political activities, e.g. adding comments or voting on websites. Radical right wing youngsters, however, are over-represented among active citizens. They prefer consuming extreme right webpages which are essential parts of their subculture. One of the most popular partisan website in Hungary is Kuruc.info (closely linked to Jobbik): an extremely harsh, racist, anti-Roma and anti-semitic web page.

These results already refer to the subculture's key role in students' extreme right preferences. Radical youngsters participate more intensively in cultural, political and sport organizations. We also found significant differences between radical and non-radical students regarding their desire to belong to such communities: the former group showed remarkable willingness to join civil associations.

Unoccupied, zippy, energetic youngsters – especially teenagers – tend to have more time and enthusiasm for community-activities. This is why Jobbik is extraordinary popular among the 18–22 age cohort. In Eastern-Hungary Jobbik is almost the only option for interested and active youngsters. The radical party holds the vast majority of demonstrations, youth forums, camps: other political forces have insignificant activity next to Jobbik. Radical subculture has its own popular music style, bands (national rock), events, clothes etc. This life-style – especially its militant, hierarchical component – suits much more for man than for woman: Jobbik is almost twice as popular among male students. To sum up, out of the five hypotheses, only the subculture approach can elucidate the extremely high popularity in youngest (18–21) strata. The qualitative research also suggest that the key factor is the grass-

root of the party: most youngsters are appealed through radical concerts, festivals, youth organisations and internet forums.

András Keil: *About the „Critical Mass Generation”. Analysis on the LMP-voter students.*

Nowadays we could hardly find such publications in political science, which aim to study the LMP (Lehet Más a Politika – Politics Can Be Different) party's voter base. The breakthrough of Jobbik (the extreme right party in Hungary) inspired many papers, but the reasons of LMP's success have not been sufficiently investigated yet. First of all, it is worth clarifying how we can characterise LMP voters, their social background and their way of thinking. In order to understand these characteristics, we should study a well-separable part of green voters: the young students. The Active Youth in Hungary 2012 research focused on this target group; after analysing the database, we can highlight the features of the so-called „Critical Mass Generation”.

- Data recorded in 2011-2012 shows, there is a part of youngsters who are interested more than the average in public issues, social problems, and their commitment towards democracy is unquestionable. This empirically detected group is the so-called „Critical Mass Generation”. This group consists of mostly LMP voters and partially voters of DK (Demokratikus Koalíció – Democratic Coalition; party of the former PM, Ferenc Gyurcsány). As for attitudes, voters of LMP and DK have a lot of common attributes.
- The Hungarian green party has the second oldest voter group among university and college students. Therefore, most of LMP supporters work regularly and have a stable financial background. Additionally, LMP voters work the most among Hungarian students.
- Majority of LMP supporters are females: 56 % of green voters consist of women. Every third female among students (who can choose a party) is LMP voter.
- Supporters of the party had a great success in 2010, the last parliamentary election, are mostly high-qualified people
- The family background of LMP voters comprises well-educated parents (this ratio is more than the average) and internally, LMP supporters study mostly humanities, economics and social sciences.
- Among university and college students, voting willingness on LMP is directly proportional to settlement size. The bigger the town somebody lives in, the more the willingness to vote on LMP rises. It is a controversial phenomenon among LMP supporters that there are huge social differences. High-class students and students fighting with regular financial troubles are both overrepresented in our sample.
- Furthermore, LMP supporters can describe as people interested in public issues, social questions more than the average. In contrast, strictly political topics are rather far from them. We can also see it if we consider data about the level of

trust in political institutions: organisations directly linked to politics are more undervalued than the average. This anti-political attitude is probably stimulated by the message used by the party during the election campaign in 2010. The anti-establishment nature of this political community and the name of LMP (“Politics can be different!”) imply that this phenomenon is not an accidental characteristic among supporters. In this context, it is also important to underline: LMP voters are characterised with the most autonomous way of thinking, the independence from effects of friendship and parents.

- University and college students perceive mostly political issues as conflict situations. In their view, government vs. opposition, Roma vs. non-Roma people relationships are the most divisive ones. Among LMP supporters, it is supplemented by the perception of confrontation between poor and rich people. Regarding the judgement of conflicts, there can be detected a „mild” left-oriented way of thinking and social sensitivity among LMP voters.
- LMP supporters do not like traditional participatory techniques (voting, activist role, etc.), but some of them can be canalised into this type of activities with the help of the internet.
- Studying value preferences among students, we can state: LMP supporters are linked to the post materialist values (following Ronald Inglehart) but this phenomenon is not an emphatic one. Nevertheless, it is important to note this relationship to understand green voters in the future.
- As for their self-definition, LMP voter students are more left-oriented (on a left-right scale) and more liberal (on a liberal-conservative scale). Moreover, the Hungarian green party has the second most moderated voter base.
- The sub-cultural nature is an important cohesive power of this group – Critical Mass festival is a real sub-cultural event and it is visited by mostly green voters.

The existence of this Critical Mass generation can also highlight the importance of new parties in Hungary. Given the outstanding support of LMP and Jobbik among youngsters, it is important to focus on studying this phenomenon in order to predict future trends of the Hungarian democracy.

Roland Reiner – Dániel Oross – András Keil: *A new chapter in the relationship between Fidesz and the youngest age group of voters?*

The relationship between young people and Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats), the party that is indicating youth in its name is a determinative issue of public opinion in Hungary since the founding of the party. Our objective was to explore the socio-demographic background and attitudes of voters who, despite record-high proportion of uncertain young people hold out their favourite party, Fidesz.

The extraordinary popularity of Fidesz within the youngest age group of voters was a two-decade trend of Hungarian politics. However we assume that by 2012, in terms of party preference a new formula is valid for the youngest generation of

voters (the 18–29 age group). Our hypothesis is that the current government party has lost its former „young” character; the clear dominance of the party measured among the youngest voters is utterly lost.

As for the features of young Fidesz voters, the results of the research Active Youth in Hungary 2012 found that the key element of the identity of the ruling party’s voters is religion. Those young people who said that religion has significant role in the lives are very likely to strengthen the camp of Fidesz. Fidesz has very strong positions among the upper-middle-class students. As for territorial distribution of young voters, the research indicates that Fidesz has the biggest embeddedness in Budapest. As for their political socialization, young voters of Fidesz often talk about political issues with their parents and the opinions of the young supporters of the ruling party are determined by the opinion of their parents. Looking at the breakdown of students in different training areas most young voters of Fidesz can be found among the students of medical sciences.

While during the period of 1990–2010 Fidesz was clearly dominant among young people, according to the data based on our special sample of university and college students, we witnessed a turning point in the former trend. The former assumption that Fidesz is the favourite party of young people was not justified by our data.

Two new parties, Jobbik and LMP have entered into the Parliament following the 2010 elections, and those parties have carved out an important part of young voters from Fidesz. In the age group of 18–29 years the rise of Jobbik and LMP is clearly visible, while Fidesz have no longer a youthful character. If we approach our research findings from a generational perspective, Fidesz as the representative of the generation of the late Kádár era is separated from the generation that walks behind him.

András Bíró Nagy: *Diverse young Hungarian left.*

The results of this study prove the hypothesis that young supporters of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and Democratic Coalition (DK) represent two different worlds. The difference between the voters of the two parties is so significant that it can be comfortably stated: in terms of their social background, activity and values there is more to connect the supporters of LMP and DK, than the youngsters of MSZP and DK.

Of the students in higher education only the supporters of MSZP come from a non-privileged background. The qualifications of their parents are in line with the nationwide average, whereas their financial situation is slightly worse. Their families have a considerable influence on their political socialization, which, amongst others, is because they hardly discuss public affairs with their friends. MSZP voters’ interest in politics is lower than the average. The young supporters of MSZP are especially passive. It is a significant challenge for the party to get them involved in demonstrations and campaigns while their willingness to participate in the election is not better than the average.

Yet MSZP can benefit from the fact that their young supporters stand closer to the

centre and the average Hungarian youth's values, than the more liberal DK and LMP. The latter two parties - and naturally to a greater extent does LMP - quite possibly cover completely those young people who emphasize post-materialistic values, as well as sharing a liberal perspective on cultural, economic and social policy related issues. MSZP - especially in the light of its traditional leftist strategy they have followed since 2010 - should not take a similar direction, instead pursue a leftist economic policy in comparison to the two more liberal parties for people with average or worse backgrounds. This way they could have a chance of increasing their support base among those young people who are open for more a centrist social policy. Moreover, MSZP's official stance on politico-economic questions is even further to the left from the young socialists', exactly where the young followers of Fidesz and Jobbik place themselves.

In the Hungarian party system all parties to the left from Fidesz are overrepresented in Budapest. This is particularly true for DK and LMP. The level of qualification and the financial situation of the parents both put the voters of LMP and DK in a pole position. In terms of public activity LMP does better than MSZP, but lag behind DK. The reason for that is that LMP's support structure is twofold. Next to a very active core - who are ready to collect signatures and campaign - the party also has a more apolitical support base, who are difficult to convince even to participate in the elections. On the other hand the supporters of DK - which is nevertheless the smallest party on the left - are almost all very determined. It is in DK's circles where the greatest interest in public life can be detected, as well as a willingness to vote. Moreover, they are the most frequent consumers of online news. In the values of DK and LMP the data show an almost complete overlap. In economic terms they are both proponents of individual responsibility and a small state, whereas in terms of social policy they represent the liberal angle. Among the MSZP supporters the financial security and the safety of their family, while for DK's and LMP's people freedom are the most important values. In some socio-cultural questions - e.g. religion, gender, Hungarians in neighboring countries - the young supporters of the socialists also place themselves on the liberal side, but closer to the center.

There are however a great deal of questions on which MSZP, DK and LMP take a completely different stance. Beyond the role of the state such topics include law and order. In questions of authority the supporters of MSZP place themselves on the conservative side. The socialists are much less committed to democracy than the other two parties and the financial situation is a much more relevant problem for them. Their judgments regarding the Roma community is also visibly different. The socialists have very similar anti-Roma attitudes to the ones of the supporters of Fidesz, whereas the people of DK and LMP represent a much more liberal view.

The parties of the left benefit from the fact that their young supporters receive their information through channels where communication is the cheapest, and where the opposition's media is the strongest to date. Today the majority of the young supporters of all three parties of the left can be reached via online, but only those of DK

and LMP are really frequent users. Communication with the younger generations is made more expensive by the fact that even the socialist students in higher education read less online news while television remains very popular among them.

Based on this research, the young people of the left can be divided into two liberal and one economically leftist, culturally centrist groups. The differences in opinion between the two liberal parties, DK and LMP are not based on socio-demographic background, questions of public life or attitudes, but rather on their assessment of the established left's results from the last time they were in government. It is evident that for LMP, which completely rejects „the last twenty years”, would refuse to cooperate in any ways with former PM Ferenc Gyurcsány, who embodies the last MSZP-SZDSZ government – regardless of what liberal values he represents. Whereas for the people at DK Gyurcsány is who motivates them the most. If we add this cleavage to the differences in social background and attitudes between the three parties, then it is clear that it is difficult to find a common ground among the young left beyond simply opposing the right-wing Fidesz government.