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Disorientation regarding axis supranationality / nationality in Europe



ABSTRACT

There have always been different definitions of the character of the European Union; it has been referred to as a “postmodern political form”, a “*sui generis* structure”, or as a “neo-medieval empire”. Whatever the definition, supranationality is a necessary component of it. Supranationality has long been exposed to different interpretations, and the ongoing crisis is only increasing the heterogeneity in this regard. This paper is considering the ideational domain and it is an attempt to present conceptual differences regarding this subject by analyzing the relevant ideas. Our starting point is the role that Max Weber added to the ideas as such, which are the drivers of different interests. Without taking into account the organizational forms of supranationalism (we did not discuss the relationships between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism), our aim here was to shed light on the existing situation regarding supranationalism by presenting a selection of confronted ideas. The paper consists of four parts. In the first part, we are questioning the possibility to subordinate supranationalism to depoliticized functionalism. The second part presents the ordo-neoliberal frameworks of European supranationalism. In the third part, we are investigating whether the notion of populism enables better understanding of supranationalism. Finally, in the fourth part, we are questioning the possibility of dichotomous interpretation of supranationalism.

KEYWORDS

supranationalism, crisis, ordo-neoliberalism, populism, communitarism against supranationalism

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1. BEGRIFFSCONFUSION VIS-À-VIS SUPRANATIONALISM/ NATIONALISM, OR THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF COMPLETE FUNCTIONALIZATION OF SUPRANATIONALITY

Fifty years ago, Friedrich Hayek diagnosed a tremendous confusion about political concepts (HAYEK 1968) that put political sociology and other disciplines into a problematic situation. Yet, Hayek is not a guiding star in our thinking; he is only one of the representative participants in the ordoliberal-neoliberal context. Nevertheless, it should be noted that our research subject is far different from the orientation of this Nobel Prize winner, but his diagnosis can still be valid today.

In fact, the concepts/ideas that are supposed to lead us are nothing less confusing today than it was half a century ago. We are interested especially in the *disorientation regarding axis supranationality / nationality in Europe*, and more specifically the operationalization of these categories in the European Union.

At the same time, we keep in mind the approach of *Begriffsgeschichte* (KOSELLECK 1979) (conceptual history): here, the origin and genesis of the terms that simultaneously undergo certain regressions are taken into consideration. This is exactly what prompted us to choose the title of this chapter denoting a conceptual disorder that has become a dominant phenomenon.

The categorical couple supranationalism/nationalism could be understood as a “conceptual opposition”, as suggested by Reinhard KOSELLECK (1995). Supranationalism generated in the EU is supposed to overcome the particularity and parochiality of national frameworks that undoubtedly posed serious problems for Europe’s self-understanding throughout the centuries, especially in the XX century. In other words, there is the imperative of supranationalism to pacify the conflicts from the past that have been burdening European relations, as well as to enable something that Europe cares about, a free flow of goods and people within the world order. This imperative could be interpreted as an expression of *formal rationality* in the sense of Max Weber, and that it prevents programmatic competition within basic EU framework. In fact, regardless of our interpretation of the scope of supranationalism, it has to meet the following criterion: “*stabilization of social actors’ expectations about the behavior in order to be resilient to disappointment, thus ensuring the structures*” (LUHMANN 1969. 51).

Let us note that supranationalism itself and its interpretations pose a serious difficulty for the transparency of concepts. The elements of cohesion have long been sought in Europe. Can supranationalism emerge as a supranational construction of nation-states, implying peaceful rational cooperation between the nation-states? (SCHMIDT 2016, 2017) Is supranationality an analogous construction with respect to the nation-states?

In fact, it is uncertain in what sense supranationalism has a binding power. Namely, in the discipline that has been in real expansion in recent decades, European Studies often treat (functionally understood) supranationalism, and various theoretical orientations have emerged (LEAL-ARCAS 2007, NEVER 2012, BICKERTON–HODSON–PUETTER 2015). From the perspective of *functionalism*, supranationalism is often served as a neutral term that seeks to avoid complications with such (normative or descriptive) terms as “cosmopolitanism”, “liberal internationalism” or “global interconnectedness” and to understand the tendencies in Europe from the perspective of functional organization of community (SPIEKER 2014, HOOGHE–MARKS 2008).

This would be the way to free the discourse about EU from the heavy debates on identity forms: such a debate would be continuously confronted with the dilemma of whether Europe can be treated at all from an identity perspective? Can “identity” be attributed to Europe at all, or is this doomed to failure? Is it possible to have a “common European identity” within a richly differentiated European environment, or is it necessary to include meta-identity projections here? (WHITE 2012). Supranationalism, which could be an effective basis for European integration, offers relief from such dilemmas. Thus, instead of complex political dilemmas, we might find ourselves on a much more neutral ground where the EU is represented in the light of “deliberative supranationalism” (JOERGES 2000) in order to operationalize the “market-building”, or simply as a “spatial odyssey” of a cooperative European framework. Supranationalism might represent functional continuity, and it would not have to guarantee the identity.

Yet, as already proven by many examples, supranationalism can never be so functional or neutralized to avoid entailing of additional conceptual difficulties. Thus, supranationalism emerges as an instrument for ensuring that Europe becomes a relevant geo-economic and geopolitical factor. For example, liberal-minded politician Guy Verhofstadt, an ardent supporter of the European Federation, believes that supranationalism could destroy the relevance of nation-states and *pro-futuro* would unequivocally promote the EU as a factor in the “world order of empires”. Here, the notion of supranationality clearly goes beyond the neutral frameworks and presents itself as the bearer of “programmatically” projection in terms of EU representation as a supranational “empire” with increased decision-making capacity and extended maneuvering space. A loyal supporter of “old Europe” and discursive Europeanization, Jürgen Habermas, who was one of the most persuasive critics of functionalism in social theory, approaches functional supranationalism when he sees monetary homogenization as the common grounds, that is, he sees euro as a guarantee of communion with the common currency union and central bank. Moreover, his attack on *Kleinstaterei* associates him with the attitude of Angela Merkel, who also insists not only on the functional necessity of the euro, but also on its definition as the substrate of identity. Habermas uses this argument for his robust anti-nationalist attitude that he has long advocated.

The examples given above prove that the logic of supranationalism can never be depoliticized enough to lose its political edge. *We now claim that this recognized non-neutrality of such a term as supranationality is also related to the uncertain consequences of socio-economic changes in recent decades that relate to the state frameworks of a nation.* However, if we wish to grasp this, we need to search beyond the European Studies. Namely, other European Studies treat the substantive aspects of supranationalism in different social theories in a relatively more complex context. However, no interpretive pattern can avoid the consideration of profound changes of the position of the national state, as well as the nation as a collective framework of life (“hollowing out of national state”, “global risk society”, “shift from government to multilevel governance” with the multiplied actors such as NGOs, or subnational entities that take part in “joint decision making”), and this is where supranationality becomes part of a more complex picture. Thus, one can speak of rescaling of the nation-state powers upwards, downwards, or sideways (this scaling has been taken from geography) (JESSOP 2007), or that we are witnessing “uneven denationalization-renationalization”. These discussions are indeed about uncertain outcomes, rather than a one-line projection of supranationalism, which can be seen in the assumptions about the possibility

of a “return of the nation state” (JESSOP 2010). Such attitudes would also represent political implications of the nation as a collective entity from different aspects in contrast to the supranational ideas about marketization of society.

Areas of common life are emerging in Europe as well, requiring the multiplication of governance, new forms of coordination and planning. Yet, the explicit rejection of the hypertrophied and simplified supranational thesis about the change in governance at European level which has made the nation state redundant (ARTS – LAGENDIJK – VAN HOUTUM 2010) suggests a tendency to devise a complex procedure which will not depend on a unilinear logic, but will take seriously new forms of complexity that imply perpetual interferences between the “post-national moments” of globalized European societies and national self-understanding.

Instead of certainty, uncertainty is projected here; instead of *teleology of supranationality*, the conflicts that are intersected by different socio-economic moments are prejudiced. The institutionalization of supranationalism is indisputable in the EU, but this by no means implies that all the relations condensed within it have been exhausted. Accordingly, instead of static, the dynamics of different levels is proposed here, which implicates the elements of supranationality and nationality into the vortex of different constellations. Thus, we can state that the EU emerged as a savior of the collapsed nation-states in World War II (MILLWARD 1992). Yet, other indications must not be disregarded: a nation as an identity framework can acquire a market-like form, that is, market traits: it happens when a nation is represented as a brand in a globalized market (KANEVA 2011, MADRA 2017), that is, when a nation form is reduced to a market category that is promoted in a volatile world market. This implies that the assumption of “conceptual opposition” between supranationality and nationality should also be reconsidered.

The contradictory imperatives of targeting in the EU unable easy finalization of argumentation and interpretation of the relationship between supranationalism and nationalism. Therefore, our (necessarily incomplete) argumentation points to different conceptual directions that shed light on the complexity of constellation and confrontational orientation.

2. ORDO-NEOLIBERALIZATION OF SUPRATIONALISM: EUROPEIZATION OF NEO-ORDOLIBERALISM

The EU cannot be understood without German ordoliberalism which *mutatis mutandis* is in the synthesis with neoliberalism of Austrian origin.

When stating this, we do not want to fall into the trap of overestimating different ideas, that is, we do not want to represent any set of ideas as the sole determinant: it would be dubious idealism. The said assertion is only *minimalist*; it acknowledges that the rooting of certain ideas into a particular institutional reality is always mediated by multiple determinations.

Our starting point is the fact that these two ideological sources have been influencing the essential forms of the EU for a long time.

(1) Ordoliberalism is an idea that emerged as a response to the crisis tendencies in Germany during the 1930s, which certain jurists and economists viewed as a deep civilization regression (Franz Böhm, Hans Großmann Doerth, Walter Eucken, Alfred Müller-Armack, Leonhard Miksch, Alexander Rüstow, etc.). The ideas that were formulated for the purpose of salvation became

extraordinarily popular in the course of the post-World War II reconstruction when certain tendencies made suitable ground for the development of ordoliberal ideas (different terms such as “third way” appeared and they were related to certain representatives of the aforementioned direction, but we will continue to use the previously mentioned term), or the individual politicians (Ludwig Erhard, for example) acted as the promoters of ordoliberal ideas.

Ordoliberalism modeled as crisis therapeutics is, for us, primarily important in the European environment. Namely, when preparations for European unification began in the 1950s, ordoliberals played a significant role in the conception, so the *travaux préparatoires* carried a trace of ordoliberal ideas. However, since the 1970s, when neoliberalism began to breakthrough, ordoliberalism was little mentioned and seemed to have become only part of a unique German history which attracted only those interested in relevant historical sequences. However, in recent decades, there has been a real expansion in practicing ordoliberalism in European and even American journals, and books on ordoliberal achievements are constantly being published (NEDERGAAR 2018, CERNY 2016. 78–91, ANCHUSTEGUI 2015. 139–174. MÜLLER 2019, FÈVRE 2017, HIEN–JOERGES 2017). Ordoliberalism is addressed to those who are responsible for the crisis management, and today it is especially interpreted as the conceptual framework for (rigid or rigorous) German attitudes to austerity during the crisis that erupted in 2007. The fact that top German politicians (Angela Merkel, Wolfgang Schäuble) declaratively referred to ordoliberalism as an indispensable component of German politics within the EU (WEGMANN 2008. MAYER 2000) reinforced the belief that without ordoliberalism there would be no access to ideological turmoil within the EU.

What we are interested here is how ordoliberalism, which has normally transformed in the course of its existence, contributed to the paths of supranationalism. Ordoliberalism (otherwise derived from the Protestant-Lutheran tradition, MANOW 2001. 179–198, KRARUP 2019) can be, with some simplification, interpreted as an orientation that bears the mark of conservative-liberalism. Its association with conservatism is the tendency to have its ideas deep-seated in the order (we should remember here wide connotations of the *ordo* term throughout the history, BÖCKENFÖRDE 2017), as well as the doubts about the scopes of democratic organization of collective life. According to liberalism, there are bridges built with the basic intention: to rehabilitate the liberalism that weakened after World War I and II and to seek to reconceptualize classical liberalism which failed to understand society as a well-articulated whole and inadequately separated the economy from law and politics.

The key term with a remarkable career in terms of legally accomplished integration into the EU is “economic constitution” that representatively summarizes ordoliberal tendencies. The ordering of the market has affirmed as a civilizational principle which goes far beyond standard understanding of the market by allowing its legal framing. The point is to protect competition (which is again an expression of liberal affection) from all possible attacks (including oligopolies) because the competition is interpreted as a lever of order. Competition is not an expression of private law but a guarantee of good order. In other words, ordoliberals wish to affirm the embeddedness of market: unlike many liberals, they are convinced that the market is socially mediated, that there is a deep *social determinacy* of market competition.

The aforementioned term “economic constitution”, which of course has been interpreted in numerous ways, has been a red thread in ordoliberal thinking about the emerging Europe. Constitutionalization through microeconomically postulated competition offered itself as a supranational core of the EU that was intersected by multiple divergences. The synergy between law and the economy

that is operationalized at European level should ensure the already mentioned problem of supranational cohesion, which can be taken over by enlightened European bureaucracy and technocracy.

(2) Austrian theorists such as Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises (and others) gave similar diagnosis as their German counterparts: it is a case of civilization crisis that calls for the rethematization of collective frames after World War I (DEKKER 2014). Undoubtedly, the said theorists follow special paths and they have become the representatives of neoliberalism, but we can also see clear parallels (to add, when Hayek returned from the USA, he ended his career with the ordoliberals, in Freiburg, SKIDELSKY 2006, and this is more than a mere biographical fact). Austrians also want to understand the market in terms of social integration: the market is not “self-referential” but a part of the social order and as such it must be framed by “external”, “meta-economic” mechanisms or entities willing to mediate the same mechanisms. Neither the ordoliberals nor Hayek and others speak of the market *only* from an individualistic perspective: they certainly express the apotheosis of the market, but they are far from being ready to praise the market as an isolated set of different mechanisms. On the contrary, their intention is to emphasize the *meta*-individual aspects of communion, “commonwealth” through the market, as the market is entirely a “social institution” (this could even unexpectedly bring closer the theorists who are across the different fronts of the theory, such as Karl POLANYI and Hayek, SLOBODIAN 2018). The market seems to be just a dependent variable in this construction, it has no origin in itself. There are differences between Austrians and Germans regarding the meta-economic entities that play a driving role: the former tend to minimize state activities, and the latter are far more lenient and willing to allow the state a wider maneuvering space.

The Austrians in particular insist on the harmful erosion of post-World War I cosmopolitan content, and strongly criticize the cult of national self-determination promoted by the US president Wilson as detrimental to economic rationality. The post-war period exceeded the national momentum tolerance threshold. While this may seem like a huge surprise, Hayek and Mises persistently suggest that the logic of national self-determination with established territorial boundaries goes hand in hand with their opponents, that is, socialists of different kinds who see this as the realization of collective patterns of democracy. In any case, the Austrians advocate world governance, or to say this in ordoliberal manner, the rise of the “economic constitution” to the global level, which implies a significant weakening of particular borders. Furthermore, this presupposes persistent “denationalization”, the practice of effective supranationalism.

In doing so, the model of the Habsburg Monarchy’s supranationalism (SLOBODIAN *ibid.*) is being invoked offering the starting points for the reconceptualization of the world cohesion, and later for Europe as well. Communion of different cultures, polyglotism with supranational economic communion, is presented as a historical matter for the normative projection of the constitution of the world and Europe. With heterogeneous interpretations of the monarchy (where some emphasize the combination of backwardness and irreconcilable national conflicts, JÁSZI 1964, and others point to positive cultural and political effects, JUDSON 2016, see, MEDVED 2018), Austrians belong to the group of interpreters who highly appreciate the historical importance of Habsburg Monarchy. Thus, Mises, who writes a book on the genesis and functioning of the nation, always keeps the aforementioned monarchy in mind as the ultimate referential point or as “benchmark” (MISES 1983, SALERNO 2019) for “denationalization” and deep deconstruction of national sovereignty.

The importance of disseminating post-World War II Austrian-neoliberal ideas should not be underestimated. The followers of Hayek and Mises occupied significant positions at international institutions, which is widely and sufficiently documented (see, SLOBODIAN *ibid.*). Even if we try to be realistic about the impact of ideas on the most important tendencies of modernity, neoliberal penetration into different institutional spaces cannot be ignored. Hayek himself advocated interstate federalism (even before the outbreak of World War II), which is by many interpreted as an ideological legitimation of similar tendencies within the EU (HAYEK 1948. 255, BONEFELD 2015). Finally, the powerful influence of Hayek and “his dream” (WORTH 2017) and the concept of “denationalization of money” was also confirmed by Ottmar Issing ECB’s first chief economist, as well as the research on the documents about EU emergence (JAMES 2012. 6, CALLINICOS 2013).

Therefore, we have concluded that Austrian neoliberalism is one of the most significant sources of supranationalism.

3. “POPULISM” AS THE NEGATIVE OF SUPRANATIONALISM

Populism has become a subject of denunciation in recent decades. A large number of those active on academic and political scene do not spare critical arguments in relation to the said phenomenon: at times, it seems that populism has been the name for the concentration of all regressive moments. The engaged *anti*-populism is given a normative meaning, even a missionary-salvation role. So, one can read van Rompuy (former President of the European Council who merely continues the argument of such figures as Manuel Barroso) saying that populism is the greatest possible danger today (JÄGER 2019a) and Guy Verhofstadt, who goes as far as to predict the “new world war” (JÄGER 6/5/2019). Accordingly, the challenge of populism can only be answered by the crusade. Populism as pathological deformation of democracy is blamed to be the supreme culprit for the deterioration of the quality of liberal democracy (KRASTEV 2011), or treated as a malignant and embarrassing challenger of normatively understood liberal democracy (PAPPAS 2016, MUDDE–KALTWASSER 2013). Populism as the embodied danger for the reproduction of liberal democracy is seen as an expression of intense decadence that can push modern (European) society into a total abyss. The poor immunity of liberal democracy is thus attributed to the mythological framework of populism, which is an instrument in the hands of certain politicians to hold voters under the delusion rather than to enlighten them.

However, those trying to discover the phenomenology of negative attitude towards populism will find themselves in a difficult situation, as they will face the opacity and contradiction of the arguments. At the very beginning of the paper, we mentioned the possible confusion of the concepts, and this is particularly evident with “populism”: heterogeneity and contradiction of its application take away that little exactness that this quasi-concept has. Thus, it can be noted that by criticizing populism completely contradictory phenomena are addressed: the US President Donald Trump’s politics is aimed at (referring to harmful protectionism and the ensuing trade war, especially with China), but various “anti-system movements” (Perry Anderson) are also criticized as they mobilized energy in the last decade against coercive austerity-politics or extensive deregulation practice. Different politicians like Tsipras, Le Pen, Corbyn and Orbán suddenly fall into the group of manipulative populists and they all started to share a common denominator and belong to the group of politicians who divert European liberal orientation from the right path.

Whoever identifies as the bearer of populism falls below enlightenment. The stigma of populism is inevitably placed on those criticizing euro, or on the supremacy of technocratic reasoning in the EU (despite of many economists who think that the euro was originally problematic and that it has contributed to discord). Then, populism is treated within the framework of “politics moralizing” with eclatant “antipluralism” that subverts individualism (MÜLLER 2016a, b, c, 2017): the same terms, however, offer little for the present day as they do not represent *differentia specifica* which can distinguish something like “populism”. Populism is treated as an expression of emotional-affective endeavors where affective excess of reason slides towards the implication that populism is equal with anti-rationalism, which contains intensified hatred towards knowledge of experts and statisticians (DAVIES 2019). According to this, populism would fight against expertocracy by taking advantage of infirmity against the advanced knowledge-based governance that is wrapped in neutrality. Here, hope is no longer projected into the stockpile of knowledge, but rather anger or vengeance-like emotions are practiced. However, this can only be confirmed if we accept the strict dichotomy between “popular sentiment” and “expertise”: for example, various technological innovations in history are precisely the work of “popular sentiments” (JÄGER 2019b). There is also a term that summarizes Margaret Thatcher’s time in Britain as “authoritative populism” (GALLAS 2016). Political changes in recent years in Italy are treated as expressions of “digital” and “technological populism” (BICKERTON 2018). Moreover, there is also the notion of “market-populism” (FRANK 1992) by which “people” and “market” are equated (see the contextualization of the notion of market populism in the sociological analysis of “establishment” and “elite-research” with the reference to the anti-populists as “elite of anti-elitists” [DU GAY 2008]). We will not achieve much even if we raise the question of Euroscepticism as the basis of populism, since a non-random link between populism and Euroscepticism would have to be explained (CHOPIN 2016). Populism is criticized for assuming the homogeneity of the people against the corrupt elite, but it does nothing to help us: various politicians (P. Iglesias, for example) who are labeled as populism followers do not turn to the homogenization of the nations; on the contrary, they insist on internal differences of the term (TOSCANO 2015). Economists tend to emphasize crisis experiences as possible drivers of populism (hence the interpretation of the impact of Chinese import on Brexit; GUISSO–HERRERA–MORELLI–SONNO 2017), but crises are always subject to interpretation. The crisis has always been open to the interpretation of political agency. That is, we could come to a valid conclusion, but only if we worked out the structural-agency-problem of populism as a response to crisis.

This is certainly not the end of the attacks on populism; we could continue but this is hopefully enough. It is a fact that populism has been subjected to negative criticism by both theorists and politicians. Nevertheless, the price of recognized inaccuracy and confusion over the promotion of populism, which is supposedly like the Damocles’ sword over modern societies, is too high. This confusion, which pays tribute to daily actuality, cannot be resolved even if we turn to the logic of historization of democracy in Europe, putting populism in the context of the ongoing crisis of democracy in Europe (according to ROSANVALLON 2011). “Populism” as a term should have explanatory value but it simply brings more trouble than help; its analytical value is highly doubtful.

Yet, it is worth noting that the terms used in the academic-political context are not neutral; this is not just about cognitive confusion: “populism” has a performative power, therefore, it does not express the pre-existing reality, but rather creates a new reality. In other words, “populism” is not just an expression of a fact but, to use a paraphrase by Karl Mannheim (which was said while

defining conservatism), a special form of both opinion and experience. More specifically, it is *a way of conditioning and enframing* both experience and thinking and this produces various effects.

It is noteworthy that there are differences between Europe and America regarding the said concept: populism is a European narrative; only in Europe is it carrying a critical arsenal in relation to the projected dangers. Admittedly, the debates about populism originated in America, but the dimension we are discussing now becomes clearer in Europe. Namely, a US historian Richard Hofstadter, who launched the topic of populism on the academic stage, found it appropriate to say in 1968 at the London School of Economics that there is uncertainty about the definition of populism and that we are doomed to numerous definitions which do not illuminate our path to social phenomena (D'ERAMO 2013). Nevertheless, throughout his book, Hofstadter himself contributed to the confusion by adding various negative epithets to populism, but later he admitted that it was relevant, however, that many American subjects had gladly classified themselves as populists by the WWII (HOFSTADTER 1955. 12, POLLACK 1960). In any case, divergence persisted between the US and Europe: something considered as a medium of denunciation in Europe is almost unimaginable in the US in this form (although lately American authors have been engaged in the revival of "populism", EICHENGREEN 2018a, b, see sociological explanation regarding generation-clash, INGLEHART 2019).

Based on a scrupulous reconstruction of the genesis of anti-populism after World War II (partly in the context of the Cold War), Marco D'ERAMO (ibid.) makes a plausible hypothesis that the expansion of *anti*-populism is concurrent with the absence of use of the concept of people. Instead of attacking populism, the focus here is on the processes of the emergence of anti-populism. Populism has a conjunctural value, but mostly in Europe (as for Asia, there is the ironic example of Japan, TASKER 2017). However, the so far presented arguments about the concept of populism have received just about enough of our attention in this paper. The purpose of our argumentation was to consider whether the notion of populism as an anti-thesis of supranationalism could bring clarity to our concepts. The term in question can by no means offer a satisfactory explanation of the scope of supranationalism: if "populism" is the opposite of supranationalism, then our dilemmas only multiply. The counter-concept is justifiable if it contributes to the transparency of the concept, in this case the concept of supranationalism. Still, this cannot be achieved with an imprecise and ambiguous term such as populism.

4. RESISTANCE TO THE PRESENT FORMS OF SUPRANATIONALISM: NEW UNCERTAINTY

Much has been written about the involvement of EU in various forms of crisis (e.g. SCHMIDT *ibid.*), as well as its inertia in that respect. In other words, the crisis diagnosis has almost reached a consensus in EU articles. The same forms of crisis can be interpreted differently, and critical argumentation even mentions a possible EU collapse, that is, an antinomic space where disintegration emerges as a possibility (PATOMÁKI 2017) and the "end of Europe" is declaratively and ominously announced (DURAND 2013).

Most importantly, supranationality is necessarily involved, in one way or another, in all crisis narratives, and although Brexit narration is just one of the many relevant examples, it is also a paradigmatic example with its "taking back the control" slogan. Brexit can thus be viewed as an observation point to watch the resistance to "liberal-cosmopolitan capitalism", "economic

globalization”, “borderless economy” “cosmopolitan positions”, “global liberal economic order” and the opening of a new phase of capitalism in which “stronger rolls for the nation state” as well as the new “politics of scale” are possible (on these terms and about Brexit being merely an expression of convergent tendencies, NÖLKE 2017, JOHNSON 2017). *Based on presented argumentation, we would rather say that this is a resistance to the ordo-neoliberal economic constitution, which also includes centrifugal tendencies.*

In fact, this is a situation that plausibly demonstrates a confrontation with the *existing forms of supranationalism* in modern capitalism – our assessment differs from those who speak about “supranationalism” *in general*: it is not about resistance against supranationalism as much as it is against the *current* dominant forms that fuel the ordo/neoliberal globalization-tendencies.

Resistance to supranationalism stems from a complex political space that cannot be simplified to classical dichotomies (left/right cleavages). However, this does not mean that the same dichotomies should be unreservedly and immediately dismissed as unnecessary theoretical tools for analysis, as many interpreters are quick to claim (WHEATLY 2015); it is rather a *new complexity* where the interference of the aforementioned classical dichotomy and rebellious forms of communitarianism, as well as of “political cosmopolitanism”, occur. The left/right division is complicated by the reconfiguration of “globalization-related risk and opportunities” (AZMANOVA 2011), but it does not eliminate the intelligibility of left / right dichotomy as the crisis narratives prove this (WHITE 2012).

Resistance from the communitarian perspective is referred to as the *Rousseau moment*: the famous French theorist strongly shaped the communitarian horizon as an indispensable moment in the eighteenth century. So, there is the left and right Rousseau argument (LÓPEZ YAÑEZ 2005). This is exactly what we are following now, though without any intention to exhaust the arguments but to present certain tendencies in this field.

(1) *Left communitarianism* against European supranationalism raises the issue of weakened democracy. All countries have come under the pressure of globalization. In fact, it is emphasized that communitarian-national frameworks are genuine sources of democratic legitimacy, which entails certain forms of solidarity and egalitarianism. Supranationalism is now changing the situation after World War II, “*democratic national state is embedded in markets*” (STREECK 2014, 2016a, b, 2018a, b). Such left-wing communitarians are very active internationally, and those like German sociologist Streeck (who, precisely because of the articulation of national and international moment came into conflict with one of the doyens of European social thought, Habermas, who accused him of “small-state nostalgia”, STREECK 2014b) only confirm Hayek’s diagnosis but in a *negative* form: the post-war social-democratic regimes of the West also represented “national regimes” and established at least a fragile balance between the nation-state and democracy. Existing forms of supranationalism are in fact merely an attempt of “rational bypassing of democracy” (SOMEK 2001).

The arguments are political and sociological at the same time and they go back to structural transformations after the Second World War. Supranationalism, as well as the desocialization effects of advanced globalization, are said to relieve the EU of the pressure of democratic legitimation, which necessarily entails eroding of public power and oligarchic power-structure, as well as the deep division between globalized cities and the non-urban population of the countryside, affected by fear of “being economically abandoned”, and borderless knowledge-economy. Let us counter this with some different ideas, that is, confront the leftist communitarianism with other ideas in relation to supranationality and democracy in Europe. The ideas that supranationalism

in Europe actually expands democratic capacities because it removes the constraints of national democracy have proven to be illusory (illusion related to MAJONE 1996) from the perspective of the above mentioned form of communitarianism. It is illusory to think that supranationalism is not striving for unity but rather a “new discipline of solidarity” (as WEILER thinks, 1996. 96). Finally, justice should not be against democracy under the excuse that a supranational Europe need not to be democratic (NEYER 2012). Alexander Somek once said “darling dogma of bourgeois Europeanists” inferring that national democracies are inherently defective so the concept of individualization can be used to play the mentioned democracies (SOMEK 2012, 2013 – the same author however seeks out sources of cosmopolitan citizenship in terms of protecting national democracy from unfettered competition in the world economy).

Powerless national democracy has become a victim of supranational efforts calling on existing states to open up to the European/world market. In other words, supranational globalization has sharpened the incompatibility between capitalism and democracy. Accordingly, as we have witnessed the paradigmatic situation with Brexit, here, the communitarian resistance against globalization is a pattern that occurs in Europe but globally as well. There are different forms of resistance; there is also subnational regionalism but “national nationalism” too, but it is merely a reaction to neoliberal-inspired supranationalism which ruins the chances for “democratic class compromise”. Moreover, Streeck predicts that centrifugal forces will defeat centripetal tendencies by combating the forms of supranationality, that the European “superstate” is doomed to failure and it seeks “restored capacity for national political self-help”. Furthermore, he confronts the supporters of Europeanized labor market saying that “*the only place where social obligations can be created and enforced is still the nation-state, calls for redistributive solidarity often come with appeals to national identity. It is above all at this point that globalist internationalization is confronted with a growing nationalist ‘populism’*” (STREECK 2018b¹, see also GRIMM 2009). In other words, left communitarianism proposes the resocialization of capitalism by reconceptualizing the politics of scale toward a “more de-hierarchized European order”, a “more nation-centered order”.

It would be wrong to criticize left-wing communitarianism for uncritical support of the nation-state and the “primacy of nation” as the structuring principle (see discussion between Streeck and a historian Adam Tooze, TOOZE 2017). Repeatedly quoted here, Streeck makes the typical “path-dependent” argument against hypertrophied constructivism based on which the societies “*can evolve on the basis of what they have created themselves*” (STREECK 2017, see Streeck’s criticism especially regarding his views on migration as well as the critique of his concept of open borders, VAN DYK – GRAEFE 2018). The projected new politics of scale seriously considers that democracy or rather “collective self-determination” can develop only within clearly set boundaries.

Supranationalism depoliticizes, and *re-nationalization*, which connects popular sovereignty and democracy, would create repoliticization. In this respect, there are significant left-communitarian impulses with the French theorists of *demonialisation* (SAPIR 2010, LORDON 2011).

(2) The map of right-wing communitarianism is just as complex as the configuration of left communitarianism. We wish to emphasize here that right-wing communitarianism can contain both *moral* and *neoliberal* aspects (WHITE 2012). Communitarianism, irritated by the crisis that arose in 2007, raises a moral argument: consequently, supranational globalization and “transregressive forms”

¹ When he uses the term “populism”, Streeck always put it in quotes.

of economization (excessive greed, for example), behavior in Europe have resulted in erosion of moral engagement, in “demoralization”. This way, “moral” capitalism is propagated, that is, capitalism in a moralized perspective that will overthrow earlier glorification of the motives such as “greed”. In fact, uninstrumental national solidarity (“one-nation conservative”) should be promoted over non-reflective supranationality. The immediate task is described as the reconstitution of synergies between markets and moral reflections, primarily at the communitarian-national level. To be more precise, remoralization is encouraged based on communitarian arguments. The nation as a moral framework of solidarity opposes the volatile dynamics of globalized supranationalism.

The right-wing communitarianism with neoliberal elements is not satisfied with the EU because it enables forms of intergovernmental agreement but excluding the market. Here, in fact, the aforementioned argument of Hayek’s follower is renovated; according to him there is a surplus of “socialization” in the EU which burdens the smooth functioning of the market with non-market moments. The German AFD, which is a prototype for right-wing communitarianism in our classification, invokes ordoliberalism as a precursor that still inspires and orients (HAVERTZ 2018, see other examples, *ibid.*). National frameworks set against social (and environmental) European supranationalism are emerging as a horizon for market re-empowerment against over-coordinated European markets. Accordingly, *market* supranationalism is propagated and it would not restrict national interests or allow the corrupt elite to coordinate their actions at European level against “people” – here, the already quoted argument of “market populism” is mentioned again, that is, the concept of “people” equates with the logic of market, and endless competition as an expression of intrinsic characteristics of “people” is celebrated (this is the reason why Bebnowski has introduced the term of “competitive populism” in the study of sociology, as well as the paradoxical term of “populism of expertocracy”, although it additionally complicates our conceptual possibilities; BEBNOWSKI 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). The synthesis of economic liberalism and opposition compared to Euro-supranationalism (including the harsh criticism of euro as a cement of the European community, that is, the criticism of common currency) characterizes AFD as one of the paradigmatic examples of the right-wing communitarianism. Even though the withdrawal from the EU is not the aim that is systematically being insisted on, its frameworks seek to narrow back to restore national sovereignty (though, let us emphasize that there are neoliberal secessionists about the EU who, when asked whether neoliberal Hayek would be a brexiteer, say “yes”, BOORNE 2016, SLOBODIAN–PLEHWE 2018). This type of right-wing communitarianism praises free trade of goods from national perspective but, in terms of people, it opposes migration and adopts anti-migrant attitude. Therefore, market supranationalism *does not* imply open borders concerning the circulation of migrants (AFD 2017). The fact that economic liberalism is in relation to restrictive migration is obvious and even different movements of libertarianism advocate different limits in migration processes (HOPPE 1998).

There are obvious differences between this type of left and right-wing communitarianism. The left-wing communitarianism protests against neo-ordoliberal supranationalism and projects national ordering for democracy. On the other hand, the right-wing communitarianism (the term “enlightened conservatism” has appeared in self-understanding of the actors in question, and the interpreters use the concept of “national liberalism”, KELLERSOHN 2014, RAVETZ *ibid.*) of the mentioned type advocates for national ordoliberalism which connects national frameworks that are embedded in the cultural patterns with the strong state, that is, the maxim “strong state and free market” is repeated.

CONCLUSION

Supranationalism is embedded into self-understanding of the EU and it always implies a political interpretation based on structural-ageeey problem. We have claimed that the dominant form of supranationalism in the EU originated from neo-ordoliberalism; it is confirmed by the genesis and way of functioning of the EU. At the same time, the crisis, which resolution has been postponed, create supranationalism. However, since there is a lack of transparency of the mentioned term, we cannot put together an adequate picture of the European reality. Therefore, we have tried to classify the relevant communitarian arguments directed against the pres supranationalism. However, since there is a lack of transparency of the mentioned term, we cannot put together an adequate picture of the European reality. Therefore, we have tried to classify the relevant communitarian arguments directed against the present dominant forms of supranationalism in Europe by persisting in left/right cleavage. Heterogeneity of interpretation opens up new forms of complexity and uncertainty.

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