

**DEMAND, DESIRE AND THE DRIVE
in Sidney's Texts and Their Contexts**

by
Antónia Szabari

My interest in Philip Sidney was evoked by the seminars of György Endre Szőnyi in 1989/90 at Attila József Tudományegyetem and later evolved into writing a research paper under his guidance. The following thesis, then, in its present form, was written as a series of term papers for private tutorial classes with Casey Charles in the Winter and Spring of 1994 at the University of Oregon. Many of the ideas in it were learnt, borrowed from or conjured up with him.

INTRODUCTION

Psychoanalytical theory has left the confines of the mental clinic and — among other fields — broken into the field of literary criticism. The "hermeneutic approach" within psychoanalysis emphasizes that texts, as well as people, can be "psycho-analyzed." Moreover, the French founder of the *école freudienne*, Jacques Lacan, argues that Freud's analysis of people via, for example, the analysis of their dreams, was already the analysis of a linguistic structure, a "discourse":

...in *The Interpretation of Dreams* every page deals with what I call the letter of the discourse, in its texture, its usage, its immanence in the matter in question. For it is with this work that Freud begins to open the royal road to the unconscious.... The linguistic structure that enables us to read dreams is the very principle of the "significance of the dream," the *Traumdeutung*.⁷⁴

Lacan takes up the Freudian task of interpreting "linguistic structures" when he undertakes the task of re-reading Freud's writings. "Commenting on a text is like doing an analysis," as he defines the relation of psychoanalysis and textual interpretation.⁷⁵ In his theory, language and interpretation become inseparable from traditional psychoanalytic issues, such as the problem of symptoms, transference, etc. For him therapy and theory are not one another's opposites, but they are manifestations of the same hermeneutical process. Lacanian theory thus, fulfilling the hermeneutical purpose which is inherent in psychoanalysis, becomes a convenient tool for interpreting non-clinical texts, for example literature.

While psychoanalysis has become an established (although not unchallenged) part of standard literary criticism and theory, the question of submitting literary texts written before the modern era to psychoanalysis is still a matter of controversy. Analysing texts written before the foundation of a Cartesian world-view and subjectivity, which psychoanalysis has attempted to challenge and of which, undeniably, is itself some sort of an heir, contradicts the logic of theoretical explanation; it can be argued that these texts are outside the range of Freudian theory. Lacan points out Freud's indebtedness to the Cartesian philosophical, scientific tradition in the following manner:

The colophon of doubt.... indicates that Freud places his certainty, his *Gewissheit*, only in the constellation of the signifiers as they result from the recounting, the commentary, the association, even if they are later retracted.

⁷⁴ Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977) 159.

⁷⁵ Lacan, *Seminar I* 73. Quoted by Judith Butler in her "The Lesbian Phallus and the Morphological Imaginary," *Differences* (4, 1, 1992) 140.

Everything provides signifying material.... That is why I compare it to the Cartesian method.⁷⁶

Here, Lacan locates that element, doubt, within Freudism, which closely links it to the Cartesian tradition and consequently to a tradition of the subject as the perception-consciousness system of positivist science. This doubt is, at the same time, that inherent uncertainty within Cartesian philosophy which, pointing towards the linguistic uncertainty of the unconscious, undermines its basic premises, the idea of a unified consciousness, the *cogito*.

Such an intimate interrelation of Cartesian thought and psychoanalysis brings up the problem of interpreting pre-Cartesian texts in an intensified manner. This problem — as another fundamental uncertainty — has, in reality, been in the core of psychoanalysis since Freud analyzed the Oedipus-complex of the Sophoclesian hero who, since then, lends his name to the phenomenon. Joel Fineman, a contemporary psychoanalytical critic of Renaissance literature, summarizes the famous Oedipus/Hamlet versus Freud controversy in the following manner: "Is Shakespeare a Freudian or is Freud a Shakespearean?"⁷⁷ His suggestion for solving the controversy is to reject the logic of cause and effect in psychoanalytical literary criticism: "There is at least a possibility that modernist...theories of the self are not so much a theoretical account or explanation of subjectivity as they are the conclusion of a literary subjectivity initially invented in the Renaissance."⁷⁸ Fineman rejects the authoritative position of (psychoanalytical) theory of subjectivity over literary manifestations of subjectivity. Such a dethronement of theory is also a refusal of the logic of the relationship between cause and effect — according to him, neither did Shakespeare beget psychoanalysis, nor did psychoanalysis beget Shakespeare — , which is the only way to validate the psychoanalytical interpretation of a Renaissance text.

I agree with Joel Fineman's proposal to place psychoanalytical theory on the same plane — neither above, nor below — with a Renaissance text. This proposal allows for a text oriented method of interpretation instead of a solution oriented one and, thus, is closer to the hermeneutical agenda of Freudian-Lacanian theory. The text oriented critic does not look for solutions, "theoretical accounts" of the rebus of a text, but concentrates on its particularities, "its texture, its usage, its immanence in the matter in question."⁷⁹ It will be my attempt to follow his method and carry out a text oriented interpretation, applying the Lacanian theory

⁷⁶ Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, ed., Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1978) 44.

⁷⁷ Joel Fineman, *Shakespeare's Perjured Eye: The Invention of Poetic Subjectivity in the Sonnets* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986) 46.

⁷⁸ Ibid. 47.

⁷⁹ Lacan, *Écrits* 159.

of demand, desire and the drive to a Renaissance text and its contexts. In Lacanian theory, demand, desire and the drive are three different manifestations of the subject's attraction to an object, which is a common theme in the literary texts to be analyzed. The following three essays, which constitute the paper, will attempt to prove that a Renaissance text is an appropriate place to witness psychoanalytical theory in the form of demand, desire and the drive.

The literary texts which will be the subject of my analysis are Sir Philip Sidney's two *Arcadias* (the *Old Arcadia* and the *New Arcadia*) and two further texts, which constitute their context — an early Renaissance Italian poet Sannazaro's *Arcadia* and Ovid's well-known story "Pygmalion" from *Metamorphoses*. I will look at Sidney's *Arcadias* in three different ways.

The first part of the paper will examine demand, looking at the theme of unrequited love as it appears in the eclogues of the *Old Arcadia* and their Italian predecessor, Sannazaro's *Arcadia*. From here on, demand will be defined as the "deviation of man's needs from the fact that he speaks in the sense that in so far as his needs are subjected to demand, they return to him alienated."⁸⁰ Demand, therefore is that kind of speech which alienates the subject from his needs and thus cuts him off from satisfaction. Demand establishes an "unrestorable" split between language (by which Lacan designates speech and writing within the family as well as culture itself) and the pre-linguistic, pre-social biological existence of man. The Lacanian theory of demand is at the same time the theory of culture, for example literature, which emerges by severing itself from the real of biological needs. Such an emergence of demand in the form of love-poetry is characteristic of the bucolic lyric of both Sidney and Sannazaro. Their lyric constitutes a frame which allows the speaking subject (the lyric "I" of the eclogues) to reject the satisfaction of his needs and thus, establish himself as the subject of language.

The second part of the paper will look at the narrative of Sidney's *Old Arcadia* and Ovid's "Pygmalion," a text which the Renaissance narrative establishes as its distant and ambiguous, but recurrent, point of reference. It will be shown that the characters' commonly held sexual frustrations in both texts give the reader an example of Lacanian desire. Desire, as opposed to demand, which marks the split between language and the real of needs, can be defined as a lacking inherent to the symbolic field, the field of language. It is "neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the phenomenon of their splitting (Spaltung)."⁸¹ Desire is, therefore, generated by the fact that the symbolic field, by nature, is inflicted with a certain splitting or gap. The Lacanian signifier of this inevitable symbolic lacking, the "symbolic phallus," is what reappears in certain key images in both Sidney and Ovid.

⁸⁰ Lacan, *Ibid.* 286.

⁸¹ Lacan, *Ibid.* 287.

The third part of the paper will look at the heroic features of the narrative of Sidney's revised book, his *New Arcadia*, and Lacan's concept of the drive. By the latter, Lacan means that process of "headless subjectification," that is, that mechanical, repetitive process, to which the symbolic subject is subordinated beyond his symbolic subordination to the castrating, alienating order of language.⁸²

The field of the drive is "beyond" the subject's symbolic field of existence, in the sense, that the drive's conservative nature, its endless return, points towards an unchanging excess of the real within the symbolic, which is not affected by language. The heroic nature of Sidney's revised *Arcadia*, defines the book as an excess in two ways: On the one hand, the new version is, in itself, an excess, a "reduplication" in relation to the shorter, non-heroic "old" version. On the other hand, heroism itself, appears to an excessive extent in the revised text; the images associated with heroism occupy central, "over-estimated" positions and the stories which give account of heroic deeds take up a majority of the narrative. This excess of heroism is expected to elevate/sublimate the frustrated sexuality of the narrative of the original version, to "fill in" the gaps of desire in it. The object of the drive's endless circulation, the *object petit a*, is exactly this excess, "a certain type of objects which, in the final resort, can serve no function" as opposed to the "beneficent, favourable objects," the objects of desire.⁸³ The heroic *objects petit a* in the analyzed literary text, the sword, the armour and the wounds, prove to be such forms of excess, which also represent that "point of lack" in which "the subject has to recognize himself," which is an impending threat to the subject's symbolic existence.⁸⁴

Thus, in the following three parts, it will be my attempt to show that, even if psychoanalytical criticism is not prevalent in Renaissance literary scholarship, Renaissance texts and modern psychoanalysis both function as interrelated catalysts, which generate the process of the interpretation of the other text. Thus, reading these two types of text side by side allows for a text oriented interpretation, in which the theoretical text and the literary text can equally be foci of analysis.

⁸² Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts* 184.

⁸³ Lacan, *Ibid.* 242.

⁸⁴ Lacan, *Ibid.* 270.

PART ONE

"Sweet tunes do passions ease": Sidney's and Sannazaro's Eclogues as Manifestations of Lacanian Demand

Mastix, one of the shepherds in the eclogues of the *Old Arcadia*, names "blow point," "hot cocles," and "keels" as the shepherd's favorite pastimes. He forgets, however, to name among these popular games the most popular one, the singing contest, in which he himself is partaking.⁸⁵ Singing, often in the form of a contest, is the predominant "game" among shepherds — at least, among those of the literary genre. Virgil's *Eclogues*, for example, are entirely made up of songs of shepherds. Later, Sannazaro, in his *Arcadia*, became the first poet to combine songs with narrative elements. Even for him, however, the narrative is of secondary importance; the songs, in the form of eclogues, dominate his book. Sidney, who follows Sannazaro in combining narrative with prose, writes eclogues which remain independent from the narrative plot. Even some of the main characters of the narrative part, for example Pyrocles/Cleophila and Musidorus/Dorus, are willing to postpone their amorous plottings in the eclogues and be content with merely singing about love. The narrative's forward progress is, thus, repeatedly stopped by the eclogues, in which the characters entirely devote themselves to static singing.

In the first part of my paper, I will examine the relationship between this thriving lyric poetry and the woman to whom most songs are sung. In order to do this, I will look at the eclogues of Sidney's *Old Arcadia* and the eclogues of Sannazaro's *Arcadia*, arguing that the eclogues in both books are manifestations of the Lacanian concept of demand, which designates the subject's attempt to re-establish the pre-symbolic, imaginary stage of fullness within language. In order to find a common ground between the otherwise distant discourses of the pastoral and psychoanalysis, I will compare the eclogues to the structurally similar "fort-da game," which in psychoanalytical literature is known as the archetypal story of demand. Then, I will look at those particular characteristics of the eclogues, which allow us to define them as forms of demand. For example, the singing contests are

⁸⁵ Sir Philip Sidney, *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia (The Old Arcadia)*, ed., Katherine Duncan-Jones (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985) 69. Hereafter, page numbers in parentheses, in the body of the text, will refer to this edition.

never really contests between shepherds; rather they are contests for the recognition of a third party, the woman whom the shepherd loves. This woman is the addressee of the shepherd's songs; she is, however, never addressed as an actual person, but as a set of conventional poetic images. Moreover, she exists in the poet's imagination as a phantasy, which Lacan calls the (m)Other of demand. Demand itself works as a metaphor, which substitutes this phantasy-Other for the mother, lost at the acquisition of language. The eclogues follow the metaphorical structure of demand, since the actuality of the woman is abolished in them and she is turned first into a metaphorical discourse, usually into landscape metaphors, then into a source of symbolic meaning and imaginary love. This metaphorical discourse of demand is believed by the subject-poet to compensate him for his Oedipal loss.

This phantasy of the woman-Other makes the poet's lyrics thrive through deprivation. In order for demand to be maintained undisturbed, the dialectical relation of demand to the non-linguistic "needs" requires that the woman-Other should be posited as inaccessible, as someone who deprives the shepherd of her own presence. Conventionally, thus, the woman of the pastoral is cold and refusing; she is absent from the pastoral scenario. In this way, the shepherd's "clamour" is the loudest and the most undisturbed when his love for the woman is the most unhappy and unrequited. Pastoral poetry, thus, thrives by covering over the gap of alienation inherent to language through a love relation with an imaginary Other.

The Oppositional Structure of the Pastoral

The pastoral genre is inseparable from the myth of the Golden Age, described by Ovid in his *Metamorphoses*. For classical, medieval and Renaissance readers, it presents the vision of how the world ought to be. What most definitions of the pastoral share in common is that it creates the phantasy of an idyllic place and/or time, to which men can withdraw to redress their wounds gained in amorous courtings and political intrigue. Critics do not always agree what the perfect features are which belong to the ideal state the pastoral envisions. Poggioli, for example, defines this "golden age" on the basis of free love. The pastoral genre, he asserts, "projects its unrealizable yearning after free love into a state of nature that exists nowhere, or only in the realm of myth."⁸⁶ At the same time, the pastoral also envisions a world devoid of physical needs, social or political tensions and any kind of constraints. In all pastorals, there is a reference to the myth of a golden past of some sort. In Sannazaro's *Arcadia*, for example, we get the following lengthy account of the past from the old shepherd, Serrano:

⁸⁶ Renato Poggioli, *The Oaten Flute: Essays on Pastoral Poetry and the Pastoral Ideal* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1975) 43.

One man could not grow wrathful toward another:
the fields were common and without boundaries
and Plenty caused her fruits always to spring forth anew.

(...)

The happy lovers and the tender maidens
went from meadow to meadow renewing in their minds
the fire and the bow of the son of Venus.

There was no jealousy, but pleasing themselves
they trod their sweet dances to the sound of the cither,
and in the manner of doves exchanging kisses.⁸⁷

Sannazaro's fairly conventional description at once employs the images of a lack of social tension, freedom, fulfilled love and natural plenitude. There is, however, more than just a description of a perfect state in this part of the text. Serrano tells the story of the past with a special purpose, in order to contrast the present, the corrupted state of Arcadia. His nostalgic account of the past is evoked by the story of another shepherd, Opico, who says that, in the present, "faith is dead and envies hold the reign; and bad practices grow stronger every hour."⁸⁸ Serrano's "heart is pierced with an empoisoned and incurable wound," when tells the story, which indicates the present state of sadness and void, as opposed to the happiness and plenitude of the past.⁸⁹ What we encounter here is not simply an idyllic situation, but a contrasting of that past state of bliss with the present turmoil. The contrast, however, is not only between the past and the present, but also within the present. We find stories and lamentations about death (Ergasto's mother and father's) and unrequited love (Sincero, Carino and Clonico's parallel stories of unhappy love) as well as fulfilled and promising love relationships. Gallico, in the third eclogue, for example, sings about his unrequited love, but in the following narrative section, the "crimsoned" face of his beloved Pastorella immediately answers Gallico's Petrarchan laments and renders them unnecessary.⁹⁰ Similarly, Carino's tormenting unrequited love dissolves into the good omen of the happily kissing doves.⁹¹ These examples suggest that the pastoral — rather than solely envisioning an idealized state of love, peace, satisfaction nor a state of complete lack and sorrow

⁸⁷ Jacopo Sannazaro, *Arcadia*, trans. Ralph Nash (Detroit, 1966) 67-68.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* 65.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* 68.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* 49-50.

⁹¹ *Ibid.* 82.

— operates by creating a tension between the two types of visions.⁹² The pastoral scenario is conventionally set up in the way that it is capable of integrating any opposition, ranging from plenitude to loss, from happy to unhappy love or from court to the country. Thus, prior to the question of what the subject matter of the pastoral is, what kind of perfection it presents, we should look at the structure of the pastoral genre. The focus on the structure of the pastoral reveals its closeness to another cultural phenomenon, very distant in subject matter, but similar in structure. This cultural phenomenon is a game, used in psychoanalysis to understand/explain the mastering of oppositions.

The Pastoral as the "fort-da" Game

In psychoanalysis there is an exemplary story of the signification of oppositions, known as the "fort-da" game. This game was the invention of Freud's one and a half-year-old grandson. The game takes place when his mother leaves the small child for her everyday chores. It consists of the child's throwing away a small reel and then pulling it back on a string, while repeating the words "fort" (gone) and "da" (there)⁹³. The reel, thus, serves as a means for the child to master the oppositions of absence and presence or here and there. In the Renaissance pastoral, in the phantasy land of extreme opposites, the bucolic poet attempts to master oppositions in a similar way. He subordinates all oppositions in his poetry to one main opposition, the absence and presence of the woman.⁹⁴ The woman is the shepherd's main concern, either the condition of his well-being or the cause of his

⁹² D.M. Halperin arrives at the same conclusion. After reviewing the classical and Renaissance concepts of the pastoral, he establishes four criteria necessary for the genre, one of which is the oppositional nature of pastoral texts. He asserts that these texts achieve "significance by oppositions, by the set of contrasts, express or implied, which the values embedded in its world create with other ways of life." See D.M. Halperin, *Before Pastoral: Theocritus and the Ancient Tradition of Bucolic Poetry* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1983) 64.

⁹³ Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, trans. C.J.M. Hubback. (London: The International Psycho-Analytic Press, 1922) 14-15.

⁹⁴ The influence of Petrarchism on the pastoral genre has a significant role in the thematic dominance of the shepherd's love for the woman—and consequently his preoccupation with her absence and presence—in the Renaissance pastoral. Sannazaro's undertaking is archetypal in this sense. His *Arcadia* is the first Petrarchan pastoral, which Sidney closely followed both in the mixed (lyric-prose) structure of his *Old Arcadia* and in the form of certain particular eclogues. On the influence of Petrarchism on Sannazaro and Sidney, see David Kalstone, *Sidney's Poetry: Contexts and Interpretations* (New York: Norton, 1977) 9-39.

plight. In the *Arcadia* of Jacopo Sannazaro, who is the founder of Renaissance pastoral, for example, the whole country becomes the projection of the main character's mind. Sincero is a sojourner from the city, who is lamenting over the loss of his mistress. In his lamentation, the natural images of fullness ("daylight bright" or "green hills") are associated with her perfections, while the natural images of lack and suffering ("places shadowy and black") are associated with her cruel refusal of Sincero's poetical wooing.⁹⁵ Moreover, the reader often finds shepherds like Ofelia and Elenco, for whom the most pleasant Arcadian idyllic situation is the loved woman's presence, and the lack of this bliss is her absence:

The woods are shady: and were not my sun
now present you would see in novel fashion
the flowers withered and the springs exhausted.

The mountain bare, and there is no climbing further;
but if my sun appear there, I shall see it yet
clothing itself with grass in a pleasant shower.⁹⁶

Just as Sincero, Ofelia and Elenco also use the sun as the metaphor of the woman who penetrates every inch of the literary landscape, just as the sun penetrates into the woods and mountains of Arcadia. In this way, the woman becomes the signifier of presence and absence in the hands of the Arcadian shepherd. The woman is the main signifier, the "reel," in the rudimentary form of language, which is embedded in the basis of the pastoral tradition and its elaborate metaphors. The shepherd's singing contest is, thus, an elaborate, adult version of the fort-da game. As the child learns to master the signification of absence and presence, by throwing away and pulling back the reel, the shepherd, using the signifiers "present woman" and "absent woman," hopes to master language, as it is manifested in the art of poetry.

The "Woman" as the Addressee of Bucolic Poetry: The Other of Demand

The "fort-da" game, for Freud, illustrates the supremacy of the pleasure-principle. The consequences he draws from the observation of the game are that there are always "ways and means" of making of "what is in itself disagreeable, the object of memory and psychic preoccupation."⁹⁷ The disagreeable memory the child has to learn to cope with is his weaning. The game Freud's grandson plays is a way of learning to deal with a traumatic experience, to compensate himself for the loss of the mother. The game can be seen as a rudimentary exercise in language

⁹⁵ Sannazaro 75.

⁹⁶ Ibid. 99.

⁹⁷ Freud 16.

acquisition, what Saussure would define as the signification of the difference between absence and presence as well as the phonemic differences of the two syllables. Lacan re-reads Freud's text and further interprets it, arguing that the game represents the moment "in which the child is born into language."⁹⁸ He adds that the "fort-da" game not only represents language because the differential nature of the symbolic system is embodied in the two "elementary exclamations" of "fort" and "da", but also because by repeating these words, the child becomes engaged in the "concrete discourse of the environment," he picks up his words from a space alien to him, the family, society and language.⁹⁹ Thus, with the first pair of words uttered by the small child, he enters the cultural heritage, linguistic field surrounding him, which is called by Lacan language or the big Other. The game, thus, creates a symbolic register in which the absent mother, whose loss is the consequence of the incest taboo and the castration threat, is repressed and the place of her loss is covered over by a system of signifiers. For the subject this means that, although the loss of the real mother can never be filled in, the signification of her going away and coming back, or any signification, allows him to avoid that real, pre-symbolic lack in his speech. Lacan calls this manifestation of language "demand." He further states that the subject uses demand in order to fill in the gap of the subject's repressed desire for the lost mother.

Demand, therefore, strives to fulfill the pleasure principle by reducing the anxiety that the incest taboo and the castration threat implants into the subject. While doing so, however, it reiterates this Oedipal loss, which is constitutive of the speaking subject. When the child is denied access to the mother by the prohibitions involved in the Oedipus-complex and represented by the phallus, he replaces his repressed desire for the mother with an attempt to articulate this desire verbally. To use a simple analogy, the child's gaping mouth, which misses the mother's breast, is filled with words. Demand serves as a way of substituting language for the pre-linguistic loss. Lacan, however, points out that the use of language as a substitute, results in the "deviation of man's needs by the fact that he speaks, in the sense that as long as his needs are subjected to demand, they return to him alienated."¹⁰⁰ That is, demand is always for something more than what the subject needs. While the subject's needs are satisfiable with certain objects during his undifferentiated symbiosis with the mother, "they return to him alienated," after his entrance into language. Being the consequence of the phallic intervention into the mother-child dyad, where needs are satisfied, demand comes about as the result of the unrestorable split between the real (needs) and the symbolic (demand).

⁹⁸ Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977) 103.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* 103.

¹⁰⁰ Jacques Lacan, *Feminine Sexuality*, eds., Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (New York: Norton, 1982) 80.

Because of the self-referential nature of language, demand is never capable of compensating the subject for what he has lost.¹⁰¹ The loss, which reappears in the phenomenon of "splitting" (Spaltung) between need and demand, indicates that demand is unsatisfied and unsatisfiable by nature.¹⁰²

To the question of what makes demand capable of furnishing the subject with the belief that language can compensate him for the loss crucial to his emergence, the eclogues provide us with a more elaborate answer than the fort-da game. The eclogues, often sung as singing contests, posit a figure of authority for their field of poetry, by whom the compensating power of language is guaranteed. Formally, the singing contest is the contest of two or more shepherds in verse. However, the rules of the contest dictate that there be a "third party" present. This "third party" is not present as a speaking voice, but only in the phantasy of the shepherds. For example, in the First Eclogues of Sidney's *Old Arcadia*, Lalus and Dorus, two love-sick shepherds, compete to see who can better "signify" his amorous sorrows and the perfection of his mistress (52). Their singing is not a contest in the strict sense of the term, since instead of addressing the other or attempting to surpass him in poetry, they echo parallel stanzas of similar imagery and rhetoric. Their real addressee is not the fellow-poet, but the beloved lady, whose love they demand. For example, when it is time to decide who is the more skillful poet, Dorus, withdrawing from the contest, gives up his aspiration to defeat Lalus, but still keeps his ambition to win the lady's favors:

Of singing thou hast got the reputation
Good Lalus mine; I yield to thy ability:
My heart doth seek another estimation. (56-7)

Dorus withdraws from the contest in order to maintain his conversation with and contest for "another estimation," the demanded love of his beloved lady. This example illustrates how the singing contest presents a peculiar form of interpersonality, which is never between the two parties actually present, but between the subject and a "third party," who is absent (only present as a phantasy).

Already in his earlier essays, Lacan emphasizes this interpersonal nature of demand. In "Aggressivity in psychoanalysis," he defines verbal communication within the psychoanalytical practice as the "dialectical grasp of meaning."¹⁰³ In the "Function and Field of Speech and Language," he asserts that "all speech calls for a reply" and later he adds that "what I seek in language is the response of the

¹⁰¹ "No signification can be sustained other than by reference to another signification." This unescapable self-referentiality of language implies that it can never designate that extra-linguistic realm of needs, which Lacan calls the real. Lacan, *Écrits* 150.

¹⁰² Lacan, *FS* 80.

¹⁰³ Lacan, *Écrits* 9.

other."¹⁰⁴ The interpersonality of demand ("verbal communication" and "speech") is, therefore, not to be understood in the sense communication theories define interpersonality. Interpersonality for Lacan does not mean the transmission of a "signal" from a sender to a receiver, from one subject to the other.¹⁰⁵ Lacan refuses this communication model when he asserts that language is not a business between the subject and another subject. The addressee of demand is never the other subject, but a fantasized authority in control over love and meaning.¹⁰⁶ In his later essays Lacan terms the addressee of demand the "Other," in order to distinguish it from the other, the fellow-speaker. The shepherds refuse to consider the singing contest a matter between two shepherds; they consider it a communication between a shepherd and the absent imaginary "woman," in this way elevating her to the position of the Lacanian Other of demand.

The "woman," in order to fulfill the role of the addressee of demand has to take on certain characteristics. She becomes elevated in position and is often referred to as a goddess. In Sannazaro's *Arcadia*, the shepherds elevate Philli after her death to the position of an "earth-goddess." In their lamentation, the landscape becomes her altar and temple. Philisides, the melancholic lover of the *Old Arcadia*, sees Mira, his mistress, in the company of Venus and Diana in his vision-like dream. In this vision Mira, the "waiting nymph" of Diana, exceeds both goddesses in perfection "as orient pearls exceed / That which their mother height, or else their silly seed" (293). Philisides, who, like Paris, is chosen to decide who of the two goddesses is more worthy to rule, boldly appoints Mira, who, in his eyes, is more worthy of the title of a goddess than the real ones. The "goddess" Mira appears as a vision, rather than an actual person and in many ways she is inseparable from the pastoral landscape. She the exemplar of the pastoral "woman," who inhabits the landscape in a pantheistic manner, penetrating into every element of it. When Philisides goes to sleep like a "feeble flow'r" or as a "silly bird," observing "nature's rule," he finds himself in such a "sweet repast," an enchanted "Samoathean" forest inhabited by the goddess Mira (291-2).

The idea that the woman belongs to the Arcadian landscape like a ghost, or a vision is a very frequent theme in both texts. Dorus, for example, describes his love's presence in the following way:

O sweet woods, the delight of solitariness!
O how well I do like your solitariness!

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. 40, 86.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. 83.

¹⁰⁶ In the process of the psychoanalytical treatment the figure of the analyst is transformed into that authority, which "punctuates" the analysand's flow of free association thus "conferring meaning" upon it. Parallel, he also becomes the distinguished object of the analysand's transference. See Jonathan Scott Lee, *Jacques Lacan* (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1990) 40.

Yet dear soil, if a soul closed in a mansion
As sweet as violets, fair as lily is,
Straight as cedar, a voice stains the canary birds,
(...)
Oh! If such a one have bent to a lonely life,
Her steps gladly receive, glad we receive her eyes.
And think not she does hurt our solitariness,
For such company decks such solitariness. (146)

He uses the similes of flowers, cedar trees and canary birds in order to describe the beauty of his love, the body which her soul is closed in. The neo-Platonic cliché, which says that the beautiful body of the woman leads her adoring lover to her more perfect soul and then to abstract virtue, is at work here, but transformed in meaning when combined with Dorus' pastoral images. The new connotation Dorus' lines gain is that the woman is imprisoned in the woods, like a bodiless soul or a nymph, who is invisible to the human eye. In the song she is represented only as feet stepping and eyes, two body parts that ensure her presence but do not allow her to take an active part in his "solitariness." She is portrayed as mute and without response to Dorus' feelings. An earlier song by Dorus expresses the same idea. Dorus feels her to be "seen and unknown; heard, but without attention" (57). Here, the woman is reduced to eyes and ears; she is capable of seeing and hearing the shepherd, but she cannot provide him with a reply. The "woman"/Other of demand has to be silenced and transmuted into an empty screen, on which the poet can project his own phantasy, because her answer would disrupt the poet's demand; it would indicate that the Other is not what the subject of demand posits it to be in his phantasy.

The "Landscape-Woman": Pastoral Language as Metaphor

What Lacan terms the Other is different from what the subject fantasizes it to be. It is not a tool in his hand, but an external precondition, that "material support" of the "letter" (language) upon which the speaking subject depends on for his existence. The Other is the field of language into which the subject is born and in which he becomes what he is, a speaking subject.¹⁰⁷ For the child who plays the

¹⁰⁷ "By 'letter' I designate that material support that concrete discourse borrows from language.

This simple definition assumes that language is not to be confused with the various psychical and somatic functions that serve it in the speaking subject--primarily because language and its structure exist prior to the moment at which each subject at a certain point in his mental development makes his entry into it"

"fort-da" game, for example, the two syllables of "fort" and "da" are parts of language or the cultural heritage, a linguistic field external to him, in which he "finds" himself, both in the sense of discovering his identity and falling to the lot of existing within that culture outside his own will. Language is called the "Other" because it always transcends the subject's rationalizing, meaning-making attempts, it always remains "other" to him.¹⁰⁸ This "Otherness" of language signifies to the subject the alienation inherent in the language of his demand. Demand recognizes the inherent dependence and alienation of the subject on and from the Other. To cover up the point of alienation the demanding subject creates a phantasy of the Other, different than it is in reality.

In demand, language appears as a metaphor which substitutes the phantasy-Other for the maternal, real loss. Demand creates the phantasy of the Other, in order to compensate the subject for the loss, which constitutes him, as a site of control over language, where the fundamental "Otherness" of language disappears. This presupposed capacity of language to fill in the gap separating the real from its symbolization, defines language as a metaphor. Lacan's formula for the metaphor, "one word for another," follows the logic of substitution:

The creative spark of the metaphor does not spring from the presentation of two images, that is of two signifiers equally actualized. It flashes between two signifiers one of which has taken the place of the other in the signifying chain, the occulted signifier remaining present through its metonymic connexion with the rest of the chain.¹⁰⁹

The Lacanian notion of the metaphor is a such a substitution, which — although in reality it takes place between two signifiers and not between a pre-symbolic entity and the signifier — is interpreted by the subject of demand. Metaphor supports this delusion of demand since in it, "sense emerges from non-sense," in which the non-sense is the irrationality of repressed desire, the effect of language's incapacity to be a maternal substitute, which demand strives to conceal.¹¹⁰

(Lacan, *Écrits* 147-8).

¹⁰⁸ In order to argue that language is not a unified field, Lacan reinterprets its structuralist definition. The field of the Other is "the locus of the signifier's treasure, which does not mean the code's treasure, for it is not the univocal correspondence of a sign with something is preserved in it, but that the signifier is constituted only from a symbolic and enumerable collection of elements in which each is sustained only by its opposition to each of the others" (Lacan, *Écrits* 304).

Jonathan Scott Lee argues that the Other is "the condition structurally necessary for there to be a speaker of language, and this condition is itself utterly distinct--utterly other--from any individual other" (Lee 60).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, Lacan 157.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Lacan 158.

Metaphor attempts to make sense out of the nonsensical nature of language invested with lack and desire.¹¹¹ Thus, the structure of the metaphor supports the phantasy of demand to substitute the Other for the mother. Demand, addressed to this metaphorical (m)Other, furnishes the subject with an imaginary relation to language, promising a state of fullness and meaning, instead of the lack and irrationality of desire that characterizes the post-castration symbolic field. In the eclogues of Sidney's and Sannazaro's respective *Arcadias*, the actual woman is substituted by the phantasy of the metaphorical "woman."

In the shepherds' demand, the woman becomes the metaphorical Other. Instead of being an actual person, the "woman," to whom most eclogues are addressed and whose excellencies they praise, is a series of conventional images, poetic clichés, a "sexual" and rhetorical "archetype," who remains identical in the different texts.¹¹² Her image is shaped by the conventions of the pastoral genre, rather than by the attributes of an actual woman. The "woman" of the pastoral is nothing but a discourse, a system of poetic figures (mostly similes and metaphors), into which the shepherd-poet enters and which he has to learn to master in demand. The pastoral repeats the process of language acquisition in the sense that the shepherd, like the small child playing the fort-da game, picks up pieces from a large field of cultural heritage whose existence transcends him. For the child this heritage is language itself, from which he picks up the words "fort" and "da." For the poets of the pastoral genre the cultural heritage is embodied in the conventions of the

¹¹¹ While in metonymy, meaning is always "resisted, excluded, suspended or defended," in metaphor meaning emerges. The reason for this is that "the signifier that produces an effect of 'significance' is not somewhere else, in a dislocation, but instead, appears directly in the chain itself, albeit as a substitute that takes the place of another signifier, thereby deriving it from the chain, repressing and supplanting it." See in Samuel Weber, *Return to Freud: Jacques Lacan's Dislocation of psychoanalysis*, trans. Michael Levine (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991) 66.

¹¹² Poggioli 16.

very genre.¹¹³ Most conventionally, the pastoral lyric uses images of the landscape to represent the beloved "woman."

In the conventional discourse of the Renaissance pastoral, heavily influenced by Petrarchism, the beloved lady and the pastoral landscape become so strongly connected that it is hard to separate one from another. The "woman" fades into the landscape and becomes a sort of "landscape-woman," which is itself a metaphor. This transformation of the actual woman into a metaphorical "landscape-woman" in the pastoral, functions as a way of transforming the other into the Other of demand. Strephon, another of Sidney's Arcadian shepherds, for example, believes that his Urania's beauties shine "more than the blushing morning;" she exceeds "in state the stately mountains" and in straightness she outdoes "the cedars of the forest" (287). The main task of the shepherd becomes the naming of his love and the singing contest becomes a contest over who can recite more metaphors for the lady. A typical challenge is the way Lalus challenges Dorus in the First Eclogues: "Come, Dorus, come, let songs thy sorrows signify," adding that "no style is held for base where love well named is" (52). In this challenge, Lalus expresses the main goal of the pastoral love-songs as the naming of the lover. Lalus, himself, recites a number of conventional metaphors for his beloved Kala: a "heap of sweets," "a bee," "a lily field," and "a lamb" (53). Of the two of them, however, Dorus is still the more skillful singer by pastoral standards, since his metaphors are closer to the way the metaphorical mechanism of language, demand, works.

Seemingly against the logic of the "naming-game," Dorus insists that his mistress is beyond naming, that her "name to name were high presumption" (53). But if we re-examine the Lacanian definition of the metaphor, whose "creative spark (...) does not spring from the representation of two images, that is of two signifiers equally actualized," we find that Dorus' reluctance to name his beloved lady realizes the function of the metaphor better than Lalus' direct and abundant metaphors. This is true, since in the metaphor, two signifiers, one of which is

¹¹³ Historically, for the sixteenth and seventeenth-century subject, the pastoral was the genre through which he could enter the Other of poetic discourse. It was the genre in which the young and aspiring poets-to-be of the Elizabethan era first tired their hands. According to Sidney, it was the "lowest hedge to leap over." The pastoral, as a central part of school curriculums, served as a means of initiating the Elizabethan schoolboy into the political and cultural discourses of the era. The school, being the representative of these dominant discourses, was also a site of "second weaning," a site where they did not have to deal with actual women, but had to leave their mothers and sisters behind. Instead of the maternal, domestic space, they had to deal with figures and tropes, classics and rhetoric. See Sir Philip Sidney, *An Apology for Poetry*, ed., Forrest G. Robinson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1970) 42; Bruce R. Smith, *Homosexual Desire in Shakespeare's England: A Cultural Poetics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991) 79-85.

substituted for the other, are *not* "equally actualized," only the absent or "occulted" signifier is a necessary element of the metaphor.¹¹⁴ Therefore, when Dorus calls the lady unnameable, he follows the logic of the metaphor faithfully. Only as absent and unnameable can the "woman" appear as the "occulted" signifier of the metaphor, the lost (m)Other of demand. The more Dorus talks about her being beyond naming, the better his words, his demand, fill in the gap of her absence. In this way, for Dorus, any word he utters (his demand), becomes a metaphor that is substituted for the real loss, which is, ultimately, at the core of his poetry (signification in general). While Lalus uses metaphors in his poetry, we can say that Dorus uses language, in general, as a metaphor.

In the Lacanian system, the phallus, the "paternal metaphor," functions as the indicator of the metaphorical mechanism of language. In Sidney's *Old Arcadia*, the metaphor of the sun (sunset, sunrise), in the songs of Dorus and Philisides, takes on the function of the phallic signifier and thus tells us a great deal about the working of language as a metaphor:

Feed on my sheep; my charge, my comfort, feed;
With sun's approach your pasture fertile grows,
O only sun that such a fruit can breed.

Leave off my sheep: it is no time to feed,
My sun is gone, your pasture barren grows,
O cruel sun, thy hate this harm doth breed.(110)

The metaphor of the sun is the most frequent metaphor the Arcadian shepherd uses to designate his love. On the one hand, the signifiers "sunset" and "sunrise" in the two subsequent stanzas work similarly to the reel in the "fort-da" game; they are the signifiers of absence and presence: The presence of the sun is the shepherd's "da," which signifies fertility and prosperity in the pastoral world. This state of presence is opposed by the sun's absence, which is the signifier of absence, barrenness, the poet's "fort." The images, \pm sun, in this sense, work in a homologous manner to Saussurean signifiers, which only exist in their opposition to one-another. On the other hand, the image of the sun represents the more complex Lacanian notion of the signifier as well. Behind the sun's fluctuation between absence and presence, there is a steady presence, which transcends this fluctuation. When the "sun" is gone (that is when absence, "fort" is signified), its cruelty and hatred are still present, which suggests that there is a second function of the signifying "sun." This "second sun," which the poet addresses with the "O cruel sun" exclamation, transcends the "sun"/"no sun" opposition. This transcendence of a certain signifier over signification is that Lacanian signifier which is the pre-condition of all signification. Lacan calls this powerful signifier the phallus, or

¹¹⁴ Lacan, *Écrits* 157.

the paternal metaphor. The paternal metaphor is the indicator of how signification works: first, it creates a lack through the Oedipal prohibitions (incest taboo and castration threat), then covers it over with a system of signifiers. To some extent every signifier works like the paternal metaphor. Lacan call this effect of the signifier the metaphorical side of the "effective field constituted by the signifier," because the metaphor re-enacts castration and abolishes the subject and fills in its empty space with another signifier.¹¹⁵ In the same way, the actual woman is abolished and expelled from the pastoral text, by the metaphor of the sun, only to be preserved as the (m)Other of the shepherd's demand.

The "Woman's" Refusal

We have seen so far that in order to play the role of the fantasized Other, the woman, cannot be present in the pastoral scenario, except in the form of a phantasy. However, because demand has to be, by definition, unsatisfied and unsatisfiable, this phantasy-woman, this poetic cliché, is created in such a way that she is inaccessible to the man. Unrequited love dominates the pastoral discourse of love. The "woman's" power is more in depriving the man of herself, than in rewarding him with her presence. What happens in the eclogues is that the poet, in his demand, "constitutes this Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of satisfying needs, that is, the power to deprive them of the one thing by which they are satisfied."¹¹⁶ In other words, the logic of demand dictates that only as long as the woman-Other deprives the shepherd from the satisfaction of his needs, can the male subject maintain the illusion that she is capable of bestowing bigger gifts upon him; her love raised to the phallic power. "Hence it is that demand cancels out (aufhebt) the particularity of anything which might be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions of need which it obtains are degraded (sich erniedrigt) as being no more than a crushing of the demand for love."¹¹⁷ The eclogues serve as an example of how the "absolute Otherness of the woman" secures the man's "self-knowledge and truth."¹¹⁸

Freud's grandson, after becoming engaged in his game, refuses the presence of the mother and takes great pleasure in his solitary game. Freud notes that the child plays "going away" more often than "coming back," as if he was saying: "Yes, you can go, I don't want you, I am sending you away myself."¹¹⁹ He is that subject of demand who realizes that if the other is present to satisfy his need, he

¹¹⁵ Ibid. 156.

¹¹⁶ Lacan, *FS* 80.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. 81.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. 50.

¹¹⁹ Freud 14.

will never be propelled to articulate his demand — the satisfaction of a need is a "crushing of the demand for love." The lack of the other, via the lack of the satisfaction of a need, is what supports the shepherd's demand. The Lacanian concept of demand can be found behind the idea, so popular in the Renaissance pastoral, that poetry and love, especially unrequited love, are closely connected: "As without breath no pipe doth move, / No music kindly without love," is the summary of some shepherds' argument about the nature of love in the First Eclogues of the *Old Arcadia*. (52). We may add that love kindles music better when unrequited.

The shepherd, then, is more and more deprived of his love and as a consequence, sinks more deeply into despair. He usually arrives at a state at which the woman's inaccessibility nearly kills him. Pyrocles/Cleophila, for example, sings a song about his attempt to use his eyes to communicate with his beloved lady. The deprivation the lady inflicts on him consists of refusing to answer him. This cruelty almost drives Pyrocles to a strange death:

Yet dying, and dead, do we sing her honour;
So become our tombs monuments of her praise;
So becomes our loss the triumph of her gain;
Hers be the glory. (73)

For Pyrocles, death, the state of complete deprivation, paradoxically represents an exalted state; the real triumph does not belong to the lady, but to him, who transforms "her gain" into his means of poetic self-fulfillment. As a result of his "death," the poet is transformed into a "monument," a source, from which praise of the lady is emanated. The metaphor he chooses to describe this state a few stanzas later, in the same sapphics, is the musical instrument, a flute or a lute, which is a dead, "mute timber" brought into life, into music, which can play love songs only in its death (73).

In the Fourth Eclogues of Sidney's *Old Arcadia*, the cruelty of the "woman" and the suffering of her male lover become the central theme of the almost unstoppable flow of the poet's demand. She is described, for example, as "hard," "fierce" and revengeful by Philisides. Although Philisides is driven into near death by this "heavenly tiger," together with his tears, his ink also flows unstoppably (297). His sorrow and frustration propel his singing so much that he could go on for ever "telling the rest of his unhappy adventures, and by what desperate works of fortune he was become a shepherd." Fortunately, however, his tears are stopped when he is interpreted by a messenger bringing the news of the Arcadian king's death.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ This point in the text is one of those occasions when the narrative interrupts the lyric of the pastorals. This interruption is symbolic; it indicates that demand, which is the continuous, static repetition of the same metaphor (Other for mother)

The two saddest shepherds in the Fourth Eclogues are, no doubt, Klaius and Strephon. Both of them base their songs on taking the logic of deprivation, the inherent logic of demand, to its extreme. They posit their mistresses as the absolute depriver, who is lethal, like a "fish torpedo" or a "crowded basilic" (289). In their description, she is more destructive than all possible natural disasters together, leaving behind a devastated landscape, which stands for the devastated souls of her two agonizing lovers. The violent destruction that she causes throughout the landscape, as well as in the hearts of the shepherds, instead of putting an end to the singing career of Strephon and Klaius, propels them into action:

Ye goat-herd gods, that love the grassy mountains,
Ye nymphs, which haunt the springs in pleasant valleys,
Ye satyrs, joyed with free and quiet forests,
Vouchsafe your silent ears to plaining music
Which to my woes gives still an early morning,
And draws the dolour on till weary evening.

O Mercury, foregoer to the evening,
O heav'nly huntress of savage mountains,
O lovely star, entitled of the morning,
While that my voice doth fill these woeful valleys,
Vouchsafe your silent ears to plaining music,
Which oft hath Echo tired in secret forests. (285)

The void that appears in the form of the silent ears of the addressees and the hollowness of the valley which surrounds the shepherds is the void separating language and the real, the Other and the mother, the gap over which speech continuously slides. This void evokes the songs of Klaius and Strephon to fill it up. The songs of Klaius and Strephon represent demand in its pure form, speech uttered in order to fill in some loss, but at the same time depending on this loss, originating from it and reiterating, recreating it.

The valley with its hollowness becomes the symbol of the deprivation of the subject from the satisfaction of its needs. The shepherds typically sing in a hollow valley, in which their Petrarchan eclogues reverberates endlessly. Pyrocles, for example, when singing about his unrequited love for Philoclea, wishes to "teach th' unfortunate Echo / In these woods to resound the renowned name of a

is interrupted by the dynamic events of the narrative. It might even be reasonable to say that all the five narrative parts which are inserted between the clusters of eclogues are such interruptions of demand and, in this way, indicators of the desire in it. This suggestion leads to the second part of this paper, in which I will examine the narrative parts of the *Old Arcadia*, as texts which carry within themselves traces of symbolic desire.

goddess," Philoclea (74). Echo often becomes the shepherds' "partner" in singing, as in the case of Philisides, who frames "his voice in those desert places as what words he would have the echo reply unto, those would sing higher than the rest, and so kindly framed a dispute between himself and it" (140):

Fair rocks, goodly rivers, sweet woods, when shall I see peace.
Peace? What bars me my tongue? Who is that comes so nigh? I.
Oh! I do know what guest I have met; it is echo.

'Tis echo. (140)

The personification of echo in such a way is not the only way for the shepherds' songs to be echoed. The verse structure Sidney uses in the eclogues is highly repetitive in itself. The double sestina of Klaius and Strephon is the high point in Sidney's attempt to create repetitive structures. The double sestina is sung by two shepherds, who repeat the same themes in the successive stanzas. The singers also have to repeat in the first line of their stanza the last line of the previous stanza. Moreover, there is a considerable amount of stanzas in the sestina that share the same grammatical structure; the poem echoes itself.¹²¹ If we look at the other songs in the book, we find that most of them are based on a similar repetitive principle, carried out on a simpler level.¹²² In this way the pastoral obeys the laws of acoustics, which in this case are the same as the Lacanian concept of demand. The emptier the valley becomes because of the deprivation and the destruction the woman carries out in it, the louder and clearer it echoes the shepherd's song.

Conclusion

Dorus' vehement outcry, in one of the songs of the First Eclogues of the *Old Arcadia*, summarizes the operation of the pastoral lyric as the Lacanian demand.

Not limited to a whisp'ring note, the lament of a courtier,
But sometimes to the woods, sometimes to heavens, do decipher,
With bold clamour unheard, unmarked, what I seek, what I suffer (76)

The bucolic poet's singing does not know limits; it echoes boundless in the Arcadian valleys. His songs, the manifestations of Lacanian demand, are not disturbed by anything. The actual woman, whose presence would disrupt this poetic form of demand, is effaced twice: First through being transmuted into conventional

¹²¹ Robert L. Montgomery, *Symmetry and Sense: The Poetry of Sir Philip Sidney* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961) 44-7.

¹²² On the "double sestina" and the repetitive nature of pastoral poetry, see Kalstone 71-83.

images of the landscape, a form of the Lacanian imaginary Other of demand. As this phantasy-Other, she is only present as a "landscape-woman," in the shape of the "woods," rivers or the sun. Second, this phantasy-woman is posited as inaccessible. The poet's demand must go "unheard" and "unmarked" by her, she is not supposed to reply, to disrupt his demand with her speech, in which the Other would be revealed in its actuality, as a field of lack and alienation. Instead, she has to deprive the subject of everything, most of all of her own presence, so that in a state of suffering his lyric can thrive.

PART TWO

"Bastard Love": The Emergence of Desire in the Narrative of the *Old Arcadia* and in Ovid's "Pygmalion"

The representation of the woman in Sir Philip Sidney's *Old Arcadia* considerably changes as the lyric poetry of the pastoral gives way to the narrative and the static position of the shepherds is replaced by the dynamic adventures of the noble heroes and heroines. Unlike their female counterparts in the eclogues, Philoclea, Pamela and Gynecia are far from being materially absent or reduced to a set of literary conventions. Philoclea, the younger of the Arcadian duke's two daughters, for example, not only falls in love with Pyrocles/Cleophila, the cross-dressing prince of Macedon, but also consummates this love. Philoclea is a present and independent partaker of the plot, which evolves dynamically, as the romance dictates, towards her union with the male hero. She has her own desire and acts upon it, which provides her with a personal identity comprised of innocence and sensuality. Although Pyrocles, by playing numerous tricks and by being involved in certain sexual intrigues, has his share in the voluptuous side of the narrative, this new type of female subject is the main reason that the unrequited love of the pastoral dissolves into an over-eager, often uncontrollable and unfulfillable sexuality, a "bastard love" (18).¹²³

Using the narrative of Sidney's *Old Arcadia* and Ovid's "Pygmalion," a subtext around which the narrative's meaning can be organized, my paper will show how the transformation of unrequited love into sexuality represents the shift from the Lacanian notion of demand to desire and how this desire, then, disrupts the sexual relation between two lovers, in this case, between Pyrocles and Philoclea or Pygmalion and his statue-woman.

The best way to understand the shift from love to sexuality in the male-female relationships of the *Old Arcadia* is demonstrated by the shift from the static representation of the pastoral woman to the more dynamic representation of Philoclea. It is her portrait which Pyrocles stumbles upon soon after his arrival in Arcadia, in the gallery of Kerxenus. It acts as a catalyst, which evokes his amorous

¹²³ Sir Philip Sidney, *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia (The Old Arcadia)*, ed., Katherine Duncan-Jones (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985). Hereafter, the page numbers appearing in parentheses, in the body of the text, will refer to this edition.

passions. Moreover, it sets the whole story in motion by introducing an uncertainty and by posing a number of questions to Pyrocles, which kindle his passions and propel him into action.

The portrait evokes an Ovidian analogy, that of the statue-woman carved by Pygmalion. Pyrocles faces much the same task which Pygmalion does; he must attempt to "turn" the image of Philoclea into a real woman and realize his unrequited love in a sexual relation with her. The transformation of the portrait of Philoclea into the actual Philoclea and the parallel metamorphosis of the statue-woman in "Pygmalion" into an actual woman also serve as examples of Lacan's shift from demand (as witnessed in the eclogues) into desire.

While love is traditionally characterized by (at least fantasized as) a state of imaginary fullness, Lacan defines sexuality (Sidney's "bastard love") in relation to a certain lack. This lack is embodied by the symbolic phallus. The sexual relation is the failed attempt of the man and woman, respectively, to "have" and to "be" the phallus. The phallus then, governs the sexual relation by its absence. It is a non-existent object. No one can "have" it or "be" it, only desire it. Desire thus, is predominantly, a state of lacking. Philoclea's desire for the phallus, finding its signifier in the conventional Petrarchan image of chastity, a white marble stone, further entangles *The Old Arcadia* with "Pygmalion." Since her sexual relation with Pyrocles is culminated and terminated at the end of Book Three, my analysis will focus alone on the first three books of the *Old Arcadia*.

Philoclea's Picture: The Emergence of Desire

When in the gallery of his Arcadian host, Kerxenus, Pyrocles catches sight of the portrait of Philoclea, we, as readers, witness a very different male-female relation from the one which dominates the eclogues. Pyrocles, like the shepherds, falls in love with a woman who is not actually present, but appears only in the form of an image, a painting. Yet his love does not remain a static pastoral *tableau vivant* of unrequited love. Pyrocles is not the Keatsian "fair youth," who "canst not leave [his] song" and neither is Philoclea the Pastorella, who "cannot fade" in the eternity of the pastoral scenario. Philoclea's portrait includes a certain excess, which is missing from the image of the Pastorella, glued together from static figures and tropes. The excess is that the picture tells a story with a certain enigma in it:

[Pyrocles] perceived a picture, newly made by an excellent artificer, which contained the duke and duchess with their younger daughter Philoclea, with such countenance and fashion as the manner of their life held them in, both parents' eyes cast with loving care upon their beautiful child, she drawn as well as it was possible art should counterfeit so perfect a workmanship of nature. For therein, besides the show of her beauties, a man might judge even the nature of her countenance, full of bashfulness, love, and reverence — and all

by the cast of her eye, mixed with sweet grief to find her virtue suspected.
(101)

Philoclea's portrait sums up, for Pyrocles, what the reader already knows: the ambiguous prediction of the oracle (which subjects Philoclea's virtue to suspicion), Basilius' subsequent enigmatic withdrawal to the countryside (the new "manner of their life") and the senselessly strict regulations Basilius has introduced regarding the princesses. The fact that Pamela is missing from the family portrait signifies that she has to live under the supervision of Dametas' family, in an enforced pastoral sojourn. Philoclea, in the meantime, is guarded by her parents' "loving care" in the neighboring lodge. The portrait, therefore, is not static, but dynamic; it tells a story. Retrospectively, it tells the story of what has happened so far to the royal characters of the *Old Arcadia*. It, however, leaves certain spaces blank ("What is the significance of the oracle's predictions?," "Why has Basilius abdicated his regal responsibilities?," "What will happen to Philoclea?," etc), which become the enigmas of the story, and also propel the it forward. Structuralist and Post-Structuralist narrative theories suggest that the narrative always metonymically moves towards a gap, an uncertainty or a question. It is in this sense that Philoclea's portrait can be called "narrative." It poses the narrative question on two levels: The first one concerns Philoclea's grief over her present situation, subdued to the cryptic text of the oracle. She "questions" the Apollonian authority. It foreshadows one of the main themes of the romance, which will be her "quest" for virtue. The second question concerns the interest which the portrait evokes within the viewer, Pyrocles. The portrait functions as the object-cause of his personal story; it engenders his cross-dressing as an Amazon and his subsequent amorous adventures in Arcadia.

Suspicion is the key-signifier of the narrative enigma within the portrait. It indicates how the oracle, foretelling the whole of Philoclea's story, casts a shadow of doubt onto her. When the oracle predicts to Basilius that "thy younger shall with nature's bliss embrace / An uncouth love, which nature hateth most," this ambiguous text (how can it be a love which is both "nature's bliss" and what "nature hateth most?") introduces some gaps of uncertainty into the previously full and self-contained idyllic bliss of the royal family by questioning Philoclea's virtue. Philoclea's relation to this oracular questioning — the oracular questioning represented mainly by the father, Basilius, who becomes the agent of the oracular imperatives — is expressed in the family portrait by a "sweet grief" on her face. This "sweet grief" indicates both obedience and dissatisfaction (grief), which is a passive form of rebellion on her part. Such an attitude, the silent questioning of unchangeable, but nevertheless, senseless and enigmatic facts of life, is a characteristic subjective position in the enigmatic Lacanian field of the Other, where the subject has to "play the Other's field," question the Other, represented by, for example, the parent:

The desire of the Other is apprehended by the subject in that which does not work, in the lacks of the discourse of the Other, and all the child's why's reveal not so much an avidity for the reason of things, as a testing of the adult, a "why are you telling me this?" ever-resuscitated from its base, which is the enigma of the adult's desire.¹²⁴

Philoclea's "sweet grief" is not a form of demand for the recognition of her father, not a form of demanding more of his "loving care." It is rather a desire, a form of testing the paternal-oracular force — this omnipotent "subject-supposed-to-know" of the *Old Arcadia* —, as if Philoclea were asking: "Why is my father/the oracle/the Other putting my virtue in doubt?" "Why is the Other telling me to partake in this inquiry, in this portrait, in this story?" As the child in Lacan's passage is asking for more than what the parent can give (his questions are not an "avidity for the reason of things"), so Philoclea is asking for more (virtue) than what her father's "loving care" can give. Philoclea's grief is addressed to the Other, and concerns those enigmatic gaps in it, which Lacan calls the "desire of the Other." Her desire for her lost virtue demonstrates that in the field of the Other, the subject's desire is "bound up" with the desire of the Other. The subject itself becomes reduced to an enigma upon confronting the riddle of the Other.¹²⁵ In this way, as the embodiment of the desire of the Other, Philoclea's portrait becomes the object-cause, the catalyst, of another story — another desire —, that of Pyrocles.

For Pyrocles, Philoclea's portrait represents the Lacanian Other of desire. This Other having been introduced into the portrait, the lover's static state of fullness is broken and Pyrocles is propelled to do something the bucolic poet would never do. He is first moved "to fall into questions of" Philoclea, then lets these questions carry him into the chaotic undertaking of cross-dressing, deceit and sexual intrigue. Unlike the eclogues, in which the Other's discourse has no gaps (since it is reduced to a silence through the substitution of a mute image for the actual woman), the picture evokes several questions within Pyrocles about the actual Philoclea, starting with who she is and how she can be reached. Moreover, the effect of the portrait is such that Pyrocles

from questions grew to pity; and when with pity once his heart was made tender, according to the aptness of the humour, it received straight a cruel

¹²⁴ Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed., Jacques Alain-Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1978) 214.

¹²⁵ Lacan defines the Other as "that beyond in which the recognition of desire is bound up with the desire for recognition." What the subject desires, therefore, is bound up with what the Other desires, in other words, the Other's designs for the subject. See Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977) 168.

impression of that wonderful passion which to be defined is impossible, by reason no words reach near to the strange nature of it. They only know it which inwardly feel it. It is called love. (11)

This passage is a characteristic example of Sidney's verbal elongation, which here, serves as a way of intensifying, for the reader, his main character's multi-phasal development of desire. In the quoted sentences, the suspenseful linear movement of Sidney's rhetoric is combined with the displacing movement of Pyrocles' desire, the force which steers him towards Philoclea. Desire propels Pyrocles into action, into dressing up as an Amazon in order to gain access to the semi-imprisoned Philoclea.

Paradoxically, but not contrary to the logic of Lacanian desire, only by degrading himself as a woman can Pyrocles hope to obtain the desired object, and thus reach self-completion in love. His desire for Philoclea finds its expression in a certain loss, in the fact that through his transformation into a woman, Pyrocles becomes somewhat less than he was before.¹²⁶ Pyrocles' friend, Musidorus, is the one who reveals the demeaning nature of his cross-dressing by revealing to Pyrocles his opinion that, "this effeminate love of a woman doth (...) womanize a man." (18).

Pyrocles' Amazon-garb becomes the emblem of the self-loss which desire inflicts upon the lover. More precisely, it represents the paradox of desire, that while the yearning lover strives at self-completion through obtaining the object of his desire, his yearning by definition, forces a constant loss of self upon him. The Renaissance rhetoric of love defines love's psychology in an Ovidian manner, as a kind of warfare, in which conquest, loss and victory occur. This rhetoric is the "double-talk" of desire, in which conquest (self-completion) means defeat (self-loss). Pyrocles, just after he has attired himself as a woman, echoes this type of double-talk:

Transformed in show, but more transformed in mind,
I cease to strive, with double conquest foiled;
For (woe is me) my powers all I find
With outward force an inward treason spoiled.

¹²⁶ Elizabeth Dipple suggests that the self-loss, suffered by the princely lovers, is the main theme of the book when she asserts: "it seems to me that the central ideological impulse in the *Old Arcadia* is to deliver a study of frustration." The characters' self-loss is the loss of a stereotypical Renaissance ideal image of the self. At "every turn [the princes] encounter frustration: neither virtue, nor beauty, nor canniness can allow them to maintain their idealistic selves." See Elizabeth Dipple, "Metamorphosis in Sidney's *Arcadia*," *Essential Articles: Sir Philip Sidney* (Hamden, Connecticut: Shoestring Press, "Anchor Book," 1986) 334-5, 335.

For from without came to mine eyes the blow,
Whereto mine inward thoughts did faintly yield;
Both these conspired poor reason's overthrow;
False in myself, thus have I lost the field.

And thus mine eyes are placed still in one sight,
And thus mine thoughts can think but one thing still;
Thus reason to his servants gives his right;
Thus my power transformed to your will.
 What marvel, then, I take a woman's hue,
 Since what I see, think, know, is all but you? (26)

In this poetic account of his transvestitism, Pyrocles/Cleophila (to whom, from this point on, even the narrator refers to under the feminine pronoun) defines love in terms of "striving," "conquest," "treason," etc. — the terminology of warfare. Love is an attack, for example, of the outside upon the inside, of an "outward force" upon the mind of the lover (stanza one), of the eyes upon the lover's "inward thoughts" (stanza two) or a joint attack of the eyes and the inward thoughts upon the lover's reason (stanza three). These three attacks gradually annihilate the lover. He is first defeated on this psychic battlefield because of "inward treason," then his inward thoughts "faintly yield" and finally his reason is "overthrown" by the "conspired" forces of his eyes and thoughts. Parallel to the increasing loss, however, the outside battle of love is quickly becoming a process of union.

The semantic tension, set up in the first stanza between "show" and "mind," "ceasing" and "striving," and "outward" and "inward" is diminished in the next two stanzas, since the lover's self, while being lost on the one side of the battlefield, is being united on the other side, on the victorious side. When the lover says: "I cease to strive," his inside is joining the conquering outside. Next, his conquered thoughts join the treacherous eyes, and finally, his reason joins the conspired forces of eyes and thoughts. Thus, while the poem describes the lover's self-deserting, it also describes a parallel unification, self-completion by means of a conspiratory alliance of his deserting parts. Significantly, for the lover, the conspiratory union entails his union with the beloved lady. This union is first indicated by the twice repeated word "one" in stanza three. The logic of the poem, therefore, suggests that in the warfare of love, in which the lover is repeatedly and inevitably defeated and loses parts of himself on the one hand, on the other hand is a victory, in which the lover and the beloved lady become one ("one sight," "one thing"). As a final twist, this self-completion, by means of a complete assimilation with the lady ("what I see, think, know, is all but you") is also the point of complete self-loss, the disappearance of his original self ("I take a woman's hue"). Pyrocles' Amazon costume is a form of the aforementioned "double talk," since it refers to his identification with the woman of his desires

both as a victory (union, self-completion) and as a loss (the disappearance of his ideal, masculine self). Being a twist on the conception of art as demand, Pygmalion's story summarizes the woman's side of desire in the sexual relation and the man's self-loss and frustration, which it evokes.

The Pygmalion Myth: The Desire of the Statue-Woman

Pygmalion begins by creating a statue, which, done so well, is elevated to a level of perfection which no actual woman can attain, and originally embodies the mute Other of his demand for love. Seeing what sinful lives real women, the cold prostitutes called Propoetides, lead, Pygmalion is "offended with the vice whereof great store is packt within / The nature of the womankynd."¹²⁷ He refuses all women, with the exception of the statue he has carved out of ivory, in which he "tooke / A certaine love."¹²⁸ Pygmalion's attempt to avoid actual women and adore a woman who only exists in his phantasy, through a work of art, is merely a fetishistic attempt to posit an Other of love (which is the reason why the myth was often condemned for idolatry by medieval and Renaissance scholars).¹²⁹ From the point of view of this fetishistic attempt to posit the addressee of the love, Pygmalion is similar to the bucolic poets — both of them practicing an art which is stimulated by the imaginary phantasy of the artist. Ovid, however, adds a magical twist to the usual story of art kindled by unrequited love.

The magic of Pygmalion's statue is in its peculiar fluctuation between being a statue and being a real woman — that is, using the terminology of the myth, between the hardness of ivory and the softness of flesh. This fluctuation transforms the original idyllic situation of unreturned love into an even more frustrated sexual relation. The fluctuation performed by the statue is a unique Ovidian invention, which subverts the pornographic fetishism of the earlier Hellenic version of Philostephanus, in which Pygmalion simply satisfies himself by making love to the statue of Aphrodite.¹³⁰ Pygmalion finds more than an inaccessible woman or a sexual toy in the ivory statue. Becoming enchanted by the perfection of his statue, he cannot decide whether it is a statue or a real woman: "The looke of it was ryght a Maydens looke, / And such a one as that yee would beleeve had lyfe, and that

¹²⁷ Ovid, *Metamorphoses: The Arthur Golding Translation: 1967*, ed., John Fredrick Nims (New York: Macmillan, 1965) 256.

¹²⁸ Ibid. 256.

¹²⁹ A brief overview of medieval and Renaissance adaptations and evaluations of the Pygmalion story can be found in William Keach, *Elizabethan Erotic Narratives: Irony and Pathos in the Ovidian Poetry of Shakespeare, Marlowe, and Their Contemporaries* (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1977) 136-7.

¹³⁰ Keach 135.

/ Would moved bee, if womanhod and reverence letted not.¹³¹ The statue-woman's strange oscillation between being a statue and being a real woman attracts Pygmalion to the white ivory and, interrupting his unrequited love, lures him into a sexual relation with it:

He often toucht it, feeling if the woork that he had made
 Were verie flesh or Ivorye still. Yit could he not perswade
 Himself to think it Ivory, for he oftentymes it kist,
 And thought it kissed him ageine. He hild it by the fist,
 And talked to it. He beleaved his fingars made a dint
 Upon her flesh, and feared lest sum blacke or broosed print
 Should come by touching over hard.¹³²

Pygmalion's demand for the love of the statue is frustrated when the statue is suddenly transformed from hard into soft — from a projection of his phantasy into a fellow being. In this peculiar animation of the statue, it is the fluctuation between hardness and softness and not the fact that in the end the "Ivory waxed soft: and putting quight away / All hardnesse, yeelded underneathe his fingars" that counts.¹³³ Shortly, it is through the *fluctuation* between ivory and flesh, statue and real woman, that the statue "comes alive," becomes a desiring fellow being, who acts upon her desire instead of being the passive object of Pygmalion's demand for love. Her fluctuation is the indicator of her desire, because it opens up an enigma in the formerly self-contained unrequited love-relation. In actuality, Pygmalion does not "fall into questions," like Pyrocles does in front of Philoclea's portrait, but his uncertainty shows that he is confronted by the famous Freudian question: "What does the woman want?" ("*Was will das Weib?*"), which for him is equivalent to the questions: "Does she kiss me back? If she does, then why does she withdraw from my embraces when I become excited, and turn back to ivory?," which is, ultimately, the question "Does she want me?"¹³⁴

The emerging desire, introduced into the relation by the statue's fluctuation, frustrates the relation, because it points to a post, which is outside the relation and which is not occupied by Pygmalion. Ovid's Pygmalion becomes entangled in a frustrating, dissatisfying relationship with a statue-woman, who comes alive, but always immediately turns back into a statue, as soon as Pygmalion is sexually aroused — as soon as the sexual relation is about to become actualized. The statue's constant return to its hard state indicates that her desire is for something other than what Pygmalion can offer. Lacan's theory of the sexual relation names

¹³¹ Ovid 256.

¹³² Ibid. 256.

¹³³ Ibid. 257.

¹³⁴ On "*Was will das Weib?*" see Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1989) 112.

the phallus as the point of convergence for the woman's desire, as the element which always comes to stand between the two parties, to foil their sexual relationship.

Lacan's understanding of the "relation" between the sexes altogether questions the possibility of a fulfilled union. "There is no sexual relation" — he says in his *Seminar XX*, suggesting that the relation only takes place in the phantasy of the participants.¹³⁵ In the "Meaning of the Phallus," an earlier essay, Lacan goes into more detail, explaining that it is failure which is introduced into the sexual relation by the phallus:

Let us say that these relations will revolve around a being and a having which, because they refer to a signifier, the phallus, have the contradictory effect of on the one hand lending reality to the subject in that signifier, and on the other hand making unreal the relations to be signified.¹³⁶

There are two different relations of subjects to the symbolic phallus, one assigned to men, the other assigned to women. Man is defined by "having" the phallus and the woman is defined by "being" it.¹³⁷ "Having" and "being" are not, however, simply the ways men and women relate to the phallus. "Having" and "being" establish male and female subjectivity. Thus, the "realities" of both types of subjectivity are established, "lent," to man and woman by the phallus. Lacan, however, suggests that the physical interactions of the sexual relation are "unreal" in some way. The sexual relation does not take place in reality, but only as a phantasy of the participants.¹³⁸ For the purpose of this paper, it will be necessary

¹³⁵ Quoted by Jacqueline Rose in her "Introduction II" to Jacques Lacan, *Feminine Sexuality*, eds., Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (New York: Norton, 1982) 46.

¹³⁶ Lacan, *FS* 83-4.

¹³⁷ Both "having" and "being" are imaginary positions, means of covering over the lack of the phallus. "Having" connotes the possession of an organ, which appears to simulate the function of the phallus. It is the myth of obtaining the missing object of desire. "Being" suggests that the phallus is the desire of the mother and the subject wants to become the object of her desire. It is ultimately a mask, with which the "phallic mother" and later the woman becomes equated, before it becomes clear to the subject that behind the mask there is nothing, just a lack.

¹³⁸ The subject's phantasy, which turns the actual other in the relation into an Other of demand (the site of fullness, the site where the phallus resides) is what prevents the actual sexual relation between subject and other from taking place. The phantasy, however, is doomed to fail, since the phallus, the support of the phantasy, is a non-existent object, essentially a fraud. At the same time, it refers

to look at the woman's side in the Lacanian theory of the sexual relation more closely, since her desire plays a central role in the development of the eager but unfulfilled sexuality which characterizes both the narrative of the *Old Arcadia* and "Pygmalion."

The woman's "being" is called a "masquerade" by Lacan. This concept suggests that the woman only "masquerades" as the phallus, but that she is *not*, in reality, the phallus. It suggests that she "expects to be desired as well as loved" for "what she is not."¹³⁹ The position of the woman, thus, is a mask, which covers over the fact that she is lacking. Moreover, this mask covers over the man's lack of "having" as well. "Being" the phallus, the ultimate object of male desire, the woman supports the man's position of "having." Her desire for what she lacks makes the man believe that he can provide it for her. This is why Judith Butler suggests that for "women to "be" the Phallus means (...) to reflect the power of the Phallus, to supply the site to which it penetrates, and to signify the Phallus through "being" its Other, its absence, its lack, the dialectical confirmation of its identity."¹⁴⁰ The masquerade establishes the illusion that the male-female relation is mutually satisfactory and "confirming;" the woman is given her much desired "phallus" — indeed a fetishistic substitute — by her man, who, in return, can rest assured in his belief that he really "has" the phallus. The sexual relation, therefore, an attempt to cover over the crude fact that it is not a relation of the sexes with each other, but the non-relation of each sex with the non-existent phallus. There is, however, an excess of desire to this non-relation.

Lacan emphasizes that the sexual relation does not simply cover over its own impossibility, but also reveals it, that the "confirming" nature of the woman's "being" for the man's "having" is undermined by her desire for the phallus. He further suggests that the "Verdrängung (repression) inherent to desire is lesser" in the case of the woman than in the case of her male partner.¹⁴¹ This Lacanian suggestion implies that the woman, partaking in the sexual relation, has a tendency to realize that what the man has to offer to her is not the phallus, but something

to the total presence of the pre-symbolic mother and the power of the symbolic father, whose exclusive property the phallus is, after the child realizes that the mother does not have it, but only desires it. However, "even the father cannot possess the phallus, but only speaks in its name." Since the phallus does not exist, no one can "have" it or "be" it, there is no Other, but only an other. See Samuel Weber, *Return to Freud: Jacques Lacan's Dislocation of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Michael Levine (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991) 146.

¹³⁹ Lacan, *FS* 84.

¹⁴⁰ Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990) 44.

¹⁴¹ Lacan, *FS* 84.

else, a mere fetish, which "ideally deprives her of that which it gives."¹⁴² The sexual relation, thus, instead of repressing or satisfying the woman's desire for the phallus, reiterates it, by repeatedly making her realize her state of lacking. The Lacanian theory of sexuality, which portrays the woman as a constantly "frigid" subject (Lacan's phrase), who refuses the satisfaction offered by the man and whose desire always points outside the thus thwarted sexual relation, is articulated in the Ovidian myth by the fluctuation of the statue-woman.

Ovid's story demonstrates how desire, which reappears on the woman's side, disrupts Pygmalion's fetishistic demand for the love of his ivory toy. It is in vain that Pygmalion takes his beloved statue to bed on a "pillow soft," since as soon as he embraces her, she is a statue again.¹⁴³ His idolatry is also thwarted when the statue does not react to the abundance of presents which he showers her with: precious stones, flowers, birds, garments, pearls, etc. She does not react to his attempt to "give," a metonymical support of his "having:"

Sumtime (the giftes wherein the yong Maydes are wanted to delyght)
He brought her owches, fyne round stones, and Lillyes fayre and
whyght,
And pretie singing birds, and flowres of thousand sorts and hew,
In gorgeous garments furthermore he did her also decke,
And peynted balles, and Amber from the tree distilled new.
Riche perles were hanging at her eares, and tablets at her brest.¹⁴⁴

At those moments when the statue is animated, she represents the woman whose desire for the phallus is converging onto that fetishistic substitute the man is offering, confirming the illusion of "having" on his side. In the act of returning to her inanimate state — and especially in the act of hesitant oscillation — she represents the woman who realizes that instead of obtaining the phallus in the sexual relation, she is being deprived of it. The ivory statue's repeated withdrawal to its hard state implies the repeatedly experienced gap of desire by the woman in the sexual relation. By turning back into a statue, she refuses the satisfaction offered by the man and continues desiring the phallus, which, she knows, the man does not have. The cold, removed nature of the ivory statue signals to the man that he is incapable of satisfying her desire. Demonstrating the impossibility of "having" and "being," Pygmalion's story unveils the gap of desire, which inevitably lingers around every act of love-making.

¹⁴² Ibid. 84.

¹⁴³ Ovid 257.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. 257.

Philoclea: The Statuesque Woman of *The Old Arcadia*

Not only the portrait of Philoclea, but her character, as represented throughout the narrative of the *Old Arcadia*, acts as Pygmalion's statue-mistress. She also, like the statue-woman, fluctuates between acceptance and refusal. Her fluctuation, however, is assigned a terminology different from softness and hardness, flesh and ivory. Her position is defined, instead, in terms of chastity and sensuality. In fact, it is Pyrocles himself, who, in his argument with Musidorus over the nature of love, introduces this new terminology.

In the argument, which takes place soon after the princes' arrival in Arcadia, Pyrocles introduces a paradoxical notion of female chastity in order to talk his way around Musidorus' strict ideal of virtue, which allows for no sexuality. Musidorus, the older of the two cousins, who has yet to follow the predictions of the oracle and fall in love with Philoclea's sister, Pamela, represents the imaginary position of unrequited love. Very similarly to the Pygmalion who rejects the Propoetides, he uses misogynistic language to disguise his demand for "heavenly" or "virtuous" love. Worldly — sensual and sexual — love, he says, "utterly subverts the course of nature in making reason give place to sense, and man to woman" (18). He scorns the "bastard love" of actual women and promulgates the neo-Platonic love of abstract virtues, which becomes the site of his narcissistic self-elaboration, a means of becoming the emblem of the heroism and the education, which is expected from the Renaissance prince (18).

On the contrary, Pyrocles, who is already in love with Philoclea's magical portrait, promulgates a definition of the beloved woman. This female object of love, represented in the narrative by Philoclea, reconciles carnal love with chastity and denotes a symbolic relation of the man towards his object of love. This is in direct confrontation with the idea of the imaginary relations of the eclogues, represented here by presence and words of Musidorus. Pyrocles' rebuttal to Musidorus' neo-Platonic ideas of love goes in the following manner:

Let this suffice: that they [women] are capable of virtue. And virtue, you yourself say, is to be loved; and I, too, truly. But this I willingly confess: that it likes me much better when I find virtue in a fair lodging than when I am bound to seek it in an ill-favoured creature, like a pearl in a dunghill. (20)

In his argument, Pyrocles does not attempt to hide the fact that a woman's physical beauty is not a bit less important to him than her chastity.

The expression which summarizes his idea of the ideal woman, "virtue in a fair lodging," echoes another of Sidney's works, sonnet 71 from his "Astrophil and Stella":

Who will in fairest booke of Nature know,
How vertue may best lodg'd in beautie be.

From this point in the story, indeed, from this point in the essay, Pyrocles and Astrophil are bonded together by a certain similarity in their respective psychologies and rhetorics of love.

The bond which ties these two characters, Astrophil and Pyrocles, together, is a bond of duplicity, which characterizes Sidney's love poetry. This duplicity is Sidney's peculiar kind of "Petrarchism," which informs both his Sonnets and the *Old Arcadia*. The desired woman portrayed by these texts is both virtuous — which, according to sixteenth-century morals, demands the complete lack of sexual experience on her part — and physically attractive, on the elaboration of whose physical details the poet gladly spends time. Because of these characteristics, Sidney's "Petrarchism" must be differentiated from Petrarch himself. In Petrarch, the poet/lover willingly accepts the exile his lady inflicts upon him, because he knows that he can only receive the grace of poetic illumination and momentary visions of bliss from/of her, in this state of deprivation. Petrarch's poet/lover finds satisfaction in the poetry substituted for the lady and his poetry is static, nothing more than "variations on a single emotional experience."¹⁴⁵ On the contrary, in the case of Sidney's lovers, Astrophil and Pyrocles, the lady's virtuous refusal does not hold the lover in the same static position of reiterating his deprived state and his hopes for future bliss. For Astrophil and Pyrocles, the hindrance of desire is "what gives it leave to go," so that, in the final line of the quoted Sonnet 71, Astrophil exclaims: "'But ah,' Desire still cries, 'give me some food.'" This is why the omnipresent Petrarchan rule, which dictates that the lady's chastity should be preserved, encourages the emergence of elaborate sensual-sexual imagery, which is not simply substituted for the sexual relation, but is in itself a form of figurative-verbal sexual relation.¹⁴⁶ In the hands of a "Petrarchan" poet like Sidney, who

¹⁴⁵ On the difference between Petrarch's *Rime* and Sidney's Petrarchism see David Kalstone, *Sidney's Poetry: Contexts and Interpretations* (New York: Norton, 1970). The quotation is from Adelia Noferi, whom Kalstone quotes on page 108.

¹⁴⁶ Sidney's Sonnet 9 from "Astrophil and Stella" is a characteristic example of the sensual-sexual overtones Sidney has contributed to Petrarch's love poetry:

Queene *Vertues* court, which some call *Stellas* face,
Prepar'd by Natures choisest furniture,
Hath his front built of Alablaster pure;
Gold is the covering of that stately place:
The doore by which sometimes comes forth her Grace,
Red Porphir is, which locke of pearle makes surt:
Whose porches rich (which name of cheekes endure)
Marble mixt red and white do enterlace.
The windowes now through which this heav'nly guest
Looks over the world, and can find nothing such,
Which dare claime from those lights the name of best.

uses the same language to express the lady's virtue and the man's sexual relation to her, the Pygmalion myth proves to be a convenient tool, since it articulates the paradoxical coexistence of virtue and sexuality.

While the "Petrarchan" poet is an artist in language, who creates a fictional relation with his (often fictional) lady, Pygmalion is an artist in stone, who does the same to an ivory statue. Pygmalion, thus, is the ideal Petrarchan lover (in the sense of Sidney's "Petrarchism"), since he realizes a sexual relation with a perfectly virtuous woman (Ovidian "hardness" is reinterpreted as "virtuousness" in English Renaissance poetry), who does not cease to be perfectly virtuous even in the sexual relation — provided that the story ends quickly. This does happen soon after, when the statue is transformed into a real woman by Venus, because the unlimited availability threatens even the ivory woman's "virtue." There can be established, therefore, a parallel between Pygmalion and the Petrarchan lover, on the basis that "where the Petrarchan lover's mistress is figuratively as hard and unyielding as a stone, Pygmalion's statue is literally that way."¹⁴⁷ Because of the high potential Ovid's story has for Petrarchan love poetry, as it was introduced into England by Sidney, it became a theme, which was echoed throughout Elizabethan love poetry either openly, as in Marston's *The Metamorphosis of Pigmalion's Image* or covertly, with the "false Florimell" of the *Faerie Queen* (Ch8, Bk3), put together by the witch to satisfy her son. Sidney's Philoclea is one of the elaborate, although not completely open references to the Ovidian myth. She is "virtue in a fair lodging," the chaste but sensual mistress of the desiring lover.

The duplicity of Philoclea's character is the kind of duplicity of virtue and beauty which so much kindles Astrophil's desire in sonnet 71. Philoclea's blushing sensuality arouses a "strange delight" in Pyrocles (as it did within Astrophil). It is not the static delight of poetic illumination, but the desirous one which compels him to look for possible ways to enter into a sexual relation with her (34). From the narrator's brief description in Book One, we learn that Philoclea is more physically attractive and sensual than her sister, Pamela. At the same time,

Of touch they are that without touch doth touch,
Which *Cupids* selfe from Beauties mind did draw:
Of touch they are, and poor I am their straw.

On the one hand, the poem solves the virtuous spirit-sensual body opposition by asserting that Stella's body, her face, is "Vertues court." On the other hand, however, the mine-imagery, used in the elaboration of the assertion is a sexual pun. Through this pun, the poet, while exalting the lady's virtues, establishes a figurative sexual relation with her. See Sir Philip Sidney, "Astrophil and Stella," *English Sixteenth-Century Verse: An Anthology*. ed., Richard S. Sylvester (New York: Norton, 1984) 421-2.

¹⁴⁷ Keach 138-9.

however, she is also the more markedly innocent of the two sisters. While Pamela is noted for her "noble heart" and her "shepherdish apparel," Philoclea appears in her semi-transparent "nymplike apparel," which displays her bodily "perfections," her "excellent fair hair," the perfect blackness of her eyes and the perfect whiteness of her skin, yet remains "so apparelled as did show she kept the best store of her beauties to herself" (33, 34). This duplicity of Philoclea's character, that she is both desirable and unobtainable, is represented by a Petrarchan-Ovidian image, a white marble stone.

The image of the white marble stone appears in two poems written by Philoclea and links her figure to the statuesque woman of the "Pygmalion" myth. At night, when everyone else from the lovesick Arcadian company is asleep, Philoclea steals out of her parents' lodge to visit a little wood, "where many times before she had delighted to walk" (96). She returns to a white marble stone, the symbol of chastity, in relation to which she defines herself. There are two poems which describe Philoclea's two different relations, past and present, to the marble-stone. The past Philoclea, as she appears in the first poem, is similar to the mute and unresponsive statue Pygmalion originally intends to create and to the mute and refusing phantasy lady of the bucolic poet:

Thou purest stone, whose pureness doth present
My purest mind; whose temper hard doth show
My tempered heart; by thee my promise sent
Unto myself let after-livers know.

No fancy mine, nor others' wrong suspect
Make me, O virtuous Shame, thy laws neglect. (96)

Her identification with the stone freezes her in the role of the object of love ("being" the phallus), that fullness of "being" which poetic demand addresses in the eclogues. Through the metaphor of the marble, thus, she "masquerades" in the role of the Other of demand. The marble stone represents Philoclea in a state of self-contained satisfaction, as a woman "not knowing evil," "not passed through the worldly wickedness, nor feelingly found that evil carrieth with it" (95). The marble stone is an image of an innocent woman who "enjoyed herself," "was the mistress of herself" and had no "other thoughts but such as might arise out of quiet senses" (96). The white marble stone is a phallic signifier which provides her with completeness and self-control both on the levels of sexuality and writing, which the poem merges in her self-confident vow that her "virgin life no spotted thought shall stain" (96). This first poem, in which her "purest mind" and the "purest stone" are identical, shows her in a state of imaginary fullness. This imaginary identification is then broken in her second poem.

Like Pygmalion's statue, Philoclea also "comes alive" in the second poem. This poem tells how in the present, upon her secret return, Philoclea finds her first poem written on the stone "foreworn and in many places blotted" (97). This transformation of the poem suggests the alienation of Philoclea not only from the

marble stone, but also from chastity ("being" the phallus) and writing. The image of the blotted stone indicates her lost completeness and self-control both on the field of sexuality and writing. "Fair marble, which never receivedst spot but by my writing" (97), she laments. In her second poem, although Philoclea still defines herself in relation to the marble stone, the image of the marble stone shifts from an object representing imaginary fullness, to representing her alienation from this state of fullness:

My words, in hope to blaze my steadfast mind,
This marble chose, as of like temper known:
But lo, my words defaced, my fancies blind,
Blots to the stone, shame to myself I find;
And witness am, how ill agree in one,
A woman's hand with constant marble stone.

My words full weak, the marble full of might;
My words in store, the marble all alone;
My words black ink, the marble kindly white;
My words unseen, the marble still in sight,
May witness bear, how ill agree in one,
A woman's hand with constant marble stone. (97)

The stone, instead of being her identical image, becomes the object of her desire, the phallus: she desires, but has no access to it. The stone is inaccessible, since she cannot read her poem on it, which became blotted and she cannot write a new poem on it, because it is too dark. The second poem, which she desires to write down, "but she could not see so perfectly as to join this recantation to the former vow," hovers at an uncertain distance from the stone and thus articulates her emerging desire. She "comes alive" from the block of stone, similarly to Pygmalion's woman, through articulating her emerging desire for the phallus, embodied by the same marble stone. This desire of Philoclea is revealed in the narrator's next direct allusion to the Pygmalion myth.

Soon after the marble stone episode, at the end of Book Two, the plot comes to a point when Pyrocles, still remaining in "drag," reveals his true sex and identity to Philoclea. In this episode the reference to the Ovidian story is direct, but with a peculiar reversal of roles:

The joy which wrought into Pygmalion's mind while he found his beloved image wax little and little both softer and warmer in his folded arms, till at length it accomplished his gladness with a perfect woman's shape, still beautified with the former perfections, was even such as, by each degree of Cleophila's words, stealingly entered into Philoclea's soul, till her pleasure was fully made up with the manifestation of his being, which was such as in hope did overcome hope. (106)

The narrator turns the story upside-down by placing Philoclea in the position of Pygmalion and Pyrocles in the position of "his beloved image." Pyrocles' role as a woman can be explained by his "drag," but Philoclea's transformation into Pygmalion surprises the reader. Why is Philoclea in the male role of Pygmalion? The logic behind the narrator's role reversal, however, is not novel for the reader. It is similar to the logic used when Philoclea becomes alienated from the marble stone. In both cases, she is represented as a desiring woman instead of "being" a static object of desire. Placing Philoclea into the position of Pygmalion is the narrator's way of designating her "coming alive." Her "joy" evoked by Pyrocles' story, is the indicator of such a desire finding its' object. Philoclea's "joy," however, does not last long. The romance of the happy lovers is suddenly interrupted when Philoclea's desire diverges from Pyrocles and converges on her "honour," which disrupts the seemingly idyllic relation. Her "honour" signifies that point, outside her relation with Pyrocles, onto which her desire is directed. "Yet did a certain spark of honour arise in her well disposed mind. . ." (106). Her honor is then, the "phallus," which reveals itself in its lack, in the threat that the "the pureness of her [Philoclea's] mind may be stained" and disrupts the story evolving towards the union of the lovers. The same lack, articulated as desire has to be covered up in Pyrocles and Philoclea's (non)consummation of their relation at the end of Book Three, where the narrative breaks up and gives way to the lyric.

At the end of Book Three, then, Philoclea and Pyrocles finally, after a great deal of sexual intrigue and many deceitful acts, consummate their love. This consummation is, however, evaded to the greatest possible extent, by the narrator, who literally "covers up" the act by a poem. The narrator has chosen a peculiar way to describe the sexual act, this crucial and climactic event in the narrative. While Pyrocles and Philoclea "make love," he gives us, the readers, a poetic blazon. The blazon is a metaphorical and highly conventional representation of a lady's body in verse. The lyric "I" of the blazon lists her body parts in great detail, designating them with metaphors of precious stones, fruits, natural treasures and a great deal of other things, which in the Renaissance were considered appropriate for the description of a desirable woman:

What tongue can her perfections tell
In whose each part all pens may dwell?
Her hair fine threads of finest gold
In curled knots man's thought to hold;
But that her forehead says, 'in me
A whiter beauty you may see.'
Whiter indeed; more white than snow
Which on cold winter's face doth grow." (207)

The blazon is not only a way of evading the relating of the sexual act, but it is also an elision, a gap created in the text, which has to be covered up. The animated, desiring Philoclea has disappeared at the narrator's command and has been replaced

by a mute, static and statue-like image of a woman. The metaphors of the blazon create a woman-statue out of snow, ivory, marble, precious stones and crystals, materials similar to the materials Pygmalion used to build his statue and the wine, milk, jewels and fruits that Pygmalion carried, as treasures, to the feet of his adored, but not adoring mistress, when she resumed the position of a statue and, thus, regressed from being Pyrocles' sexual partner to being the addressee of Pyrocles' demand again. Only by relegating Philoclea to the position of the Pygmalionian statue-woman, can her "relation" with Pyrocles — frustrated by her desire, which has been diverted from him and refocussed upon her virtue — be rescued. The relation, however, is rescued in the form of a non-relation, the phantasy relation of the poet and image, the Other of his demand. The blazon, since it is an enumeration of *all* the body parts of the beautiful lady, is a such a genre, which, in its description, posits a feminine site of fullness. Moreover, the blazon implies a regression back to the imaginary realm, where poetry (for example bucolic love-poetry) is substituted for the sexual relation. The blazon merges the images of writing with the images of chastity and describes a state of fullness, in which her completeness of "being" (chastity) and his poetic capacity support one another. Her chastity thus, turns into the poet's figurative writing pad, which "nothing but impression lacks" and is readily waiting for his poetic "tongue" to relate "her perfections" and "dwell" in the totality of her body, which the blazon, enumerating her body-parts in abundance, so does (209, 211).

Conclusion

Even if, at the end of Chapter Three, the narrative regresses back to the static, lyric mode, to a self-elaborating lyric "I," addressing the woman as a fantasized site of fullness, the female character (Philoclea) portrayed in the text to this point, is of an entirely different kind. Instead of being a mute image (painted, carved or verbal), the Philoclea of the previous text "comes alive," mimicking Pygmalion's statue-woman from both her portrait and the white marble stone she identifies with. Her "coming alive" is in both cases equivalent to a manifestation of desire, with which she disrupts imaginary fantasies of unity and self-completion, represented by the white marble stone, as well as by the motionlessness of the unrequited love-relation. The consummation scene's regression back to the lyric mode indicates the shift the narrative has made from unrequited love to sexuality and from demand to desire. This shift is made possible by the introduction of a new type of female subject, represented by Philoclea and the nameless statue-mistress of Pygmalion, who introduce the enigma of desire into the male-female relation.

PART THREE

In Pursuit of "More": The *object petit a* of the *New Arcadia*

Sidney's *New Arcadia* is a peculiar literary project which is "more" than itself. It is not a completely separate book from the *Old Arcadia*, since Sidney preserved the main line of the original plot and much of the original text in it, nor is it the same as the *Old Arcadia*, since Sidney put a great amount of effort into improving the original text. Thus, the two versions cannot be equated, but nor can they be clearly differentiated from one another. This merging and splitting of the text(s) is further complicated by the fact that they merge into one book in the Countess of Pembroke's edition. Instead of defining the *Old* and *New Arcadias* as two separate texts or as one self-identical text, I propose that we should define them as one *non-identical* text. The new version, thus, becomes a strange a-symmetrical reduplication of the "old" one. A-symmetrical, because it is a reduplication containing an excess which the *Old Arcadia* lacks. It is a perplexing creature, which keeps readers and critics busy trying to grasp its main accomplishment, trying to discover what makes it "more" than the "old" version. In this paper, I will argue that this "more" is the surplus which distinguishes the *Arcadia* from itself, and that the *New Arcadia* marks that point of fracture in which Sidney's text loses its self-identity.

From Sidney's literary theory, his *Apology for Poetry*, we learn that he rewrites his book in order to capture a certain surplus which exists in literature and which he calls the "fore-conceit" of a work of art. This theory explains why literature is "more" than other forms of writing, such as history or philosophy, but it does not account for that *surplus* which appears in literature itself, as seen in the case of his reduplicated *Arcadia*. The Lacanian theory of art and signification provides us with the answers which explain why literature is "more" than itself. According to him, in all forms of art, the real is revealed as a surplus. This surplus is responsible for the non-identity (a-symmetrical nature) of the symbolic system. He equates a special object, the *object petit a*, with this "more."

Heroism, or rather some objects associated with heroism, serve as the *objects petit a* of the *New Arcadia*. This is so, because the most conspicuous excess in the new version which is lacking from the old one is the additional series of heroic-chivalric stories, which initiate Pyrocles and Musidorus, idle lovers in the original version, into the world of heroism. Sidney installs an abundance of new heroes, such as Amphialus, Anaxius and Argalus, to name only those who come first both alphabetically and heroically. This surplus heroism has the function of making the

New Arcadia more than its original by propping up the places where the original is lacking, where the characters' are unable to control their desire, manifested in their overpowering sexual passions, and the failures they encounter as they attempt to repress or satisfy these passions. Heroism, however, most truly takes on the role of the *object a*, when it is incarnated by such particular objects as suits of armor, shields, swords and the wounds which occur on the battlefield.

One of Sidney's new characters, Amphialus, demonstrates the subject's relationship to these objects and, through them, to the real, the field, which is heterogeneous to the subject's symbolic existence. In Amphialus' subsequent confrontation with his armor, his sword and finally with the blood and the wounds, which accompany the chivalric jousts, the Lacanian subject is revealed. This subject recognizes, in the *object a*, the real and lost part of himself, identifies with this loss and disappears from the symbolic order in submitting himself to the dictates of the death-drive. Amphialus is a hero who always loses something of himself in his victories, until finally, in his wounds, he is reduced to that emptiness which the drive encircles when it encircles the *object petit a*. The case of Amphialus demonstrates that the *object petit a* makes it possible for the subject to resolve his own symbolic lacking in another lack, the real. Similarly, Sidney's magnificent style, which swells into an excessive rhetoric in its description of the glitter of battles and jousts and, which is itself an *object a*, accumulates around sites of cutting, bursting open and wounding, till the manuscript, abruptly, breaks off, revealing a similar relation between literature and the real.

The Non-Identity of Literature: The Real

As it has been stated, Sidney's *New Arcadia* is not a completely independent version from the *Old Arcadia*. Critics, for example, often refer to a vague amalgam of the two books as "Sidney's *Arcadia*." Moreover, when, after Sidney's death, his writings were published under his sister's supervision, only one text was produced out of the two versions. A great amount of meticulous work was invested into producing a single volume, known as *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia* or the *New Arcadia*, involving Sir William Alexander's bridging passage and Mary Sidney's emendations to the earlier work, attached to the end of the revised manuscript.¹⁴⁸ The attitude of both modern critics and the contemporaries

¹⁴⁸ Their meticulous work was not all in vain. *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia* has become one of the most widely read books in English Literature. The drawbacks of this success are, however, that the original version, *The Old Arcadia*, was destined to be forgotten till 1912, when Feuillerat bought it out in his edition. On the circumstances of the publications of the two versions and on their relation see Maurice Evans, introduction, *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia*, by Sir

suggests that they look at the two books as the reduplication of one "Arcadia," rather than as two separate and independent books. The question, most pursued by critics, arises: What has propelled Sidney into the revision — the reduplication — of his book? What is that "more" in the *New Arcadia*, which validates the revision?¹⁴⁹ The most available answer is to be found in Sidney's literary theory, the *Apology for Poetry*.

Sidney wrote his *Apology for Poetry*, a short summary of his literary agenda, in the interval between the writing of the two versions, at a time when he was already contemplating the transformation of the *Old Arcadia*. The *Apology*, because of this, is not only a defense of literature in general, but also a verification of the forthcoming revision. In this book, Sidney defines literature in regard to a certain excess which it contains. He asserts that the "skill of the artificer standeth in that idea or fore-conceit of the work, not in the work itself."¹⁵⁰ This definition arrives at the paradox that the work of art is not equal to the work of art, because there is always something more in the work of art than itself. He calls this excess the "idea" or "fore-conceit." This strange non-identity of art dominating Sidney's literary theory, is what propels him to search for something more in the *Old Arcadia* than what it is. His attempt to write the new version is an attempt to capture and make visible the Platonic excess of the idea or fore-conceit in his "Arcadia." In his attempt to define the nature of excess, he arrives at the conclusion that the fore-conceit makes it possible that art is more than the reality it imitates. Poetry is as "an art of imitation..., a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth — to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture — with this end, to teach and delight."¹⁵¹ Poetic mimesis, therefore, offers more than a mirror image of the world. It also involves a pragmatic excess (which makes it possible for the

Philip Sidney (London: Penguin Group, 1987) 11-12.

¹⁴⁹ Critics' views vary according to the answers they provide to this question. Here are two of the various approaches: Katherine Duncan-Jones sees the motive for the revision in Sidney's "deepening commitment to the intellectual French band of protestantism," on the one hand, and in the non-satisfying nature of his marriage, on the other. See Katherine Duncan-Jones, *Sir Philip Sidney: Courtier Poet* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1991) 251, 256. Annabel M. Patterson, on the contrary, believes the "more" to be less. She sees a growing mystification of the clear Old Arcadian political judgements in the *New Arcadia*. See Annabel M. Patterson, "'Under...Pretty Tales': Intention in Sidney's *Arcadia*," *Essential Articles for the Study of Sir Philip Sidney*, ed., Arthur F. Kinney (Hamden: Shoe String Press, "Anchor Books," 1986) 357-375.

¹⁵⁰ Sir Philip Sidney, *An Apology for Poetry*, ed., Forrest G. Robinson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1970) 16.

¹⁵¹ Sidney, *Ibid.* 18.

poet to deliver nature's "brazen" world "golden") and an excess of enjoyment.¹⁵² The excess of "teaching and delight," however, only explains why poetry (literature) is more than history and philosophy. Sidney's defense of poetry, thus, is only a defense in relation of other forms of writing, but it does not explain why poetry is more than itself. Sidney's far-reaching proposition that there is something more in the work than the "work itself," remains unaccounted for in his theory. This missing theory of the non-identity of art is explicated in the Lacanian concept of art.

Lacan argues that art reveals the excess of the real which haunts the symbolic system. His symbolic order is never a self-contained entity as, for example, structuralist theories envision it. According to Lacan, the automatism of signification, the reference of signifiers to signifieds or other signifiers, is never undisturbed in language. Instead, the symbolic system becomes the locus of some alien, disturbing, non-symbolic surplus, over which signification has no power. This point of surplus disrupts the mechanism of all reference because it does not take part in signification. It does not refer to anything and resists the possibility of being referred to. This surplus within signification, around which the signifiers endlessly circulate, is the Lacanian real.¹⁵³ In his definition of art, Lacan relies on the non-identity of the symbolic system. Art reveals the fraction in the symbolic caused by the real. It becomes "the support of the hidden reality," since the work of art "always encircles the Thing," the real.¹⁵⁴ Art, thus, does not signify the real, which cannot be involved in the mechanism of signification. By encircling it, however, it makes it more apparent. Lacan names a specific object, the *object petit a*, which makes the real more apparent.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Sidney, *Ibid.* 15.

¹⁵³ The real is one of the three fields, the imaginary, the symbolic and the real, on which subjectivity is played out according to Lacan. In this triad, the real is, for example, the organism and its biological needs. More precisely, the real is what is completely heterogeneous from language, what cannot be designated by language. It lingers on in language as an alien residue, "the foreclosed element, which can be approached, but never grasped: the umbilical chord of the symbolic"; see Alan Sheridan, introduction, *Écrits: A Selection*, by Jacques Lacan (New York: Norton, 1977) x. Because of the real's fundamental heterogeneity to language--the real is what language is *not*--Lacan often refers to it as a lack or nothing.

¹⁵⁴ Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: 1959-60*, ed., Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: Norton, 1992) 141.

¹⁵⁵ By *petit a* (small "a") Lacan designates the small other (*autre*). In this way, he distinguishes it from the "big Other," the symbolic order. The *object petit a* represents such an "otherness," which is an otherness even to the symbolic Otherness of language.

The *object petit a* has a heterogeneous role in the heterogeneous orders of the symbolic and the real. Although part of the real, it lingers in the symbolic order due to its strange complicity with the fetishistic object of desire, the object which the subject chooses as a poor substitute for the lost phallus. As an element of the real, it "rises in a bump" in the symbolic system into which it is inserted.¹⁵⁶ It sticks out. When the desiring subject, constituted as deprived, castrated at its entrance into language, is confronted with the surplus the *object a* represents, he takes it for the lost object of his desire. The thus "over-estimated" *object petit a* is used as a stuffing that would fill up the porous field of language invested with the lack of the phallus.¹⁵⁷ Sidney, in his revision, invests a similar expectation into heroism. He hopes that the increased heroic quality of his book will put an end, on the one hand, to his shortcomings as a writer and, on the other, to the troubles his heroes create when they prove incapable of satisfying their vehement sexual passions.¹⁵⁸ By transforming his light-hearted lovers into heroes, he expects them to be capable of dealing with problems in the interpersonal field of desire, something which normal men cannot do.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed., Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1978) 257.

¹⁵⁷ Lacan, *Ibid.* 256.

¹⁵⁸ Lacanian theory contends that castration, the subject's lacking of the symbolic phallus, is an inevitable consequence of every subject's--male or female--entrance into the symbolic order. Moreover, this lacking has an equal impact on the field of signification and the field of desire. The subject's relation to both the language he speaks and the objects he desires are means of compensating for the lost phallus. Thus, the phallus becomes the signifier of the lacking state of the subject's symbolic existence, "a privileged signifier of that mark in which the role of the logos is joined with the advent of desire." See Lacan, *Écrits* 287-9. Such a conjunction of language and desire in the Lacanian theory underlies my attempt to draw a parallel Sidney's attempt at revision and his heroes' attempt to come to a point of satisfaction in their amorous and heroic pursuits.

¹⁵⁹ Even Sidney, as a writer, aspires to obtain heroic virtues. He attempts to shape poetry and writing into forms of heroism. Edward Berry suggests that, in his *Apology*, Sidney argues in favor of a literary heroism, by fusing the contemplative and active vocations of the poet and the warrior, by defining the goal of poetry as incitement of the reader to "virtuous action," by using military metaphors when discussing poetry and by exalting the heroic genre as the "most accomplished kind of poetry"; see Edward Berry, "The Poet as Warrior in Sidney's Defence of Poetry," *Studies in English Literature* (29, 1989) 21-34. This close association of poetry with heroism suggests that not only the characters' transformation from lovers into heroic examples but Sidney's attempt to capture a certain "more" in art is a form of heroic pursuit.

The Excess of Heroism: In Pursuit of Desire

Heroism demands that one follow the road Aeneas took in Virgil's epic when he obeyed "the god's commandment to leave Dido," that is, to sacrifice love in order to continue heroic duties¹⁶⁰. In the *Old Arcadia*, the two princes do exactly the opposite. They give up their heroic pilgrimage and stop in Arcadia to be completely absorbed in matters of love. This failed heroism has to be restored in the new version. Sidney's solution is, however, not absolutely Virgilian. His heroes do not sacrifice love for heroism, nor heroism for love. They attempt to reconcile love with heroism, hoping to redress the shortcomings of the former in this way. In order to furnish Pyrocles and Musidorus with more heroic traits, Sidney installs, into the plot, a lengthy journey the princes take prior to their arrival to Arcadia. In Book Two, Pyrocles and Musidorus, already in love with the Arcadian duke's two daughters, give a detailed account of this heroic journey. They use their narration in order to draw the princesses attention to their worthiness and, in this way, win their favors. Hence, the lustful tricksters of the *Old Arcadia*, are have turned into narrators of their own heroic adventures. They substitute the act of talking about their adventures for the pitfalls of desire involved in the sexual relation.

Sidney breaks the tradition of the sweet talking seducer, embodied by, for example, Chaucer's student or Marlowe's Leander, when he transforms Pyrocles and Musidorus into mouthpieces of their own heroism. When, for example, Pyrocles, still wearing the costume of an Amazon and using the name Zelmane, reveals his true sex and feelings to Philoclea, the barrier standing between them and the consummation of their love is lifted. The heroic narrative threatens to break off and turn into Pyrocles' and Philoclea's love-making — as eventually happens in the *Old Arcadia*. After several promises of love and marriage, kisses and embraces, however, Philoclea "kindly" persuades Pyrocles to keep himself busy talking of "those things which have made" him "precious to the world."¹⁶¹ Pyrocles continues speaking, and his narration becomes a means of avoiding the sexual relation:

¹⁶⁰ Sidney, *Apology* 49.

¹⁶¹ Sir Philip Sidney, *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia*, ed., Maurice Evans (London: Penguin Group, 1987) 331. Hereafter, the page numbers in parentheses, in the body of the text, refer to this edition. This edition merges the revision and the second part of Book Three and Books Four and Five of the *Old Arcadia*. In my essay, however, I use the name *New Arcadia* to refer to the revised Books One and Two and the first part of Book Three; and the name *Old Arcadia* to refer to the original five books, which is *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia (The Old Arcadia)*, ed., Katherine Duncan-Jones (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985).

Pyrocles easily perceived she was content with kindness to put off occasion of further kindness, wherein love showed himself a cowardly boy that durst not attend for fear of offending. But rather love proved himself valiant that durst with the sword of reverent duty gain-stand the force of so many enraged desires. But so it was, that though he knew this discourse was to entertain him from a more straight parley, yet he durst not but kiss his rod, and gladly make much of that entertainment which she allotted unto him... (331)

There is a fusion of the images of heroism and sexuality in the narrator's hesitation about whether love is "cowardly" or "valiant."¹⁶² In Renaissance discourses of love, following the Ovidian tradition, it was common to use such military and heroic metaphors. Cupid's valiance is usually in his triumphant arrow, capable of wounding any one and achieving a very "straight" or, at least, very successful "parley." The narrator of the above passage, however, decides that restrained love is "valiant." In this way, the love of Pyrocles becomes a different kind of warfare. His love is heroic because it resists and controls the temptation of "enraged desires." "Duty" and obedience become his "sword." Pyrocles is not Cupid's passionate warrior, but a warrior against his passions. At this point, thus, heroism governs love and sexuality. Furthermore, Pyrocles is doubly a hero, for he is also heroic in talking about his heroic deeds. This exaltation of the power of the hero follows the logic of the "over-estimation" of heroism: heroism exceeds the problems of love and desire — there is "more" in it — , therefore, it is capable of solving them.

Sidney devotes a significant part of Book Two to showing that there is an excess amount of heroism in Pyrocles and Musidorus, which makes them capable of handling problems created by greed, love and hatred. At the end of Chapter Nine, after their first heroic successes in Phrygia and Pontus, the two princes make

¹⁶² Paul Allen Miller examines the fusion of images of love and heroism in Sidney's rhetoric and concludes that they are of Ovidian origin. Moreover, he argues that Sidney's first name, *Philippos*, which is Greek for Horse-Lover, already predestines him to the role of a knight, of which the poet is well aware. Sidney is also aware of the implication of the prefix *phil* (lover) in his name, which is discernable in his frequent use of this prefix in naming his heroes. Among these heroes are, for example, Astrophil (Star-Lover), Philisides (Star-Lover), Philanax (King-Lover), Pamphilius (All-Lover) and Antiphilus (Opposed-to-Loving); see Paul Allen Miller, "Sidney, Petrarch, and Ovid, or Imitation as Subversion," *English Literary History* (58, 1991) 516-18. Sidney's preoccupation with both the military and the amorous images explains why he exploits the fact that in his own name matters of love and heroism are already mingled. As a "Horse-Lover," a poet-knight, he fuses these two matters with an exceptional sensitivity in his writings.

a promise to actively seek honorable adventures, to "privately seek exercises of their virtue, thinking it not so worthy to be brought to heroic effects by fortune and necessity, like Ulysses or Aeneas, as by one's own choice and working" (275). Pyrocles and Musidorus are eager to prove that their heroism is "more" than the heroism of Ulysses and Aeneas. Their heroism appears as a point of fracture within the heroic tradition — that point of fracture where the heroic genre goes beyond itself. Possessing this excess of heroism, Pyrocles and Musidorus are expected to provide what other people lack or pursue in their relations with each-other.

All the characters Pyrocles and Musidorus run into are pursuing something unobtainable. The paranoid king of Phrygia, "full of watchful fearfulness," pursues personal safety above everything else (266). The king of Pontus, who lacks all consistency, does not know what he wants. Indeed, he even lacks an object to lack and, thus, he pursues a variety of objects, for example, generosity, cruelty and flattery. His counsellor, on the contrary, wants everything, so his jealousy turns what other people have into "the ground of his unhappiness" (272). On the whole, what most of the characters want is power. Plexirtus, however, the usurper of his brother's throne, and Antiphilus, who takes advantage of Queen Erona's love to obtain it, desire it the most. The other unobtainable object of desire is the object of love. Unrequited love dominates the chapter. It includes the friendly love of Tydeus and Telenor for Plexirtus, the self sacrificing love of Erona for Antiphilus, the aggressive love of Tiridates for Erona, the lecherous love of Andromana for Pyrocles and Musidorus, the faithful love of Palladius for Zelmane and the tragic love of Zelmane for Pyrocles. Indicative of this complicated emotional mixture of love, greed and jealousy is the story of Pamphialus.

Pamphialus pursues women or, as he puts it, "beauty, in others and delight" in himself (338). In his miscellaneous love relations, he takes advantage of the very fact that everyone pursues whatever he/she lacks. He makes his harem of women "now jealous, now envious, now proud..., desirous of more, now giving one the triumph" (336). When Pamphialus manipulates his mistresses' jealousy, he takes advantage of the Lacanian mechanism of desire, which dictates that desire should be a state of lacking, rather than the pursuit of an object.¹⁶³ This lacking field of

¹⁶³ Lacan argues that desire cannot be embodied by an object, but rather, it is the lack of the object. For example, the phallus, the ultimate object of desire, is nothing else but a lack, "the minus-phi $[(-\phi)]$ of castration" (Lacan, *FFC* 89). Pamphialus takes advantage of the Lacanian mechanism of desire, because, he gains the women's desperate desire primarily not by being a supremely attractive object of love or--to use Joan Rees' expressions--not by "his deployment of persuasive arts," but by "his use of the weakness which the women's infatuation" exposes. Pamphialus, thus, demonstrates Lacan's argument that desire does not originate in the desired object, but in the desiring subject. See Joan Rees, "Sidney and a Lover's Complaint," *The Review of English Studies* (42, May, 1991) 159.

desire is what Pyrocles and Musidorus are expected to bring to a state of fullness by their being heroic.

Pyrocles and Musidorus try to live up to this heroic ideal, by attempting to rescue and supply these people being missed. For example, they rescue the countries of Phrygia and Pontus from unjustly ruling tyrants with foul ambitions and restore the rightful rulers. They expel Plexirtus, the malicious bastard son of the Paphlagonian king, who usurps the throne, and restore the true son, Leonantus. They help Erona, the queen of Lycia in her battle against the aggressive love of Tiridates, by rescuing Antiphilus, the man she is in love with, from Tiridates' revenge. On his way to teach a lesson to the over-proud knight, Anaxius, Pyrocles rescues Pamphilius from dying at the hands of the tormenting Dido and other furious gentlewomen. Pyrocles and Musidorus, then, turn out to be victorious and valiant heroes in all their fights. While they do not lack anything as heroes, there is a price to be paid for their heroism.

In spite of the princes' best efforts to be heroic, towards the end of Book Two, their deliberate heroism turns into survival skills. Their fights are carried out not so much by their "own choice and working," as forced by accidental circumstances or even by the evil forces they unleash. Most often, their well-intended chivalric deeds backfire, and, when they labor to restore what or whom is most desired, they cause more trouble than good. At Phrygia, for example, their victory against the melancholic and wickedly suspicious king is glorious, but it has a price. The price is to be paid by the two faithful servants of the princes, who are executed as an act of revenge by the inconsistently cruel king of neighboring Pontus. The subsequent restoration of the just Leonantus to the throne of Paphlagonia unleashes a number of evil manipulations by his bastard brother, Plexirtus. One of them causes the death of Tydeus and Telenor after they battle each other in disguise. Pyrocles and Musidorus rescue Antiphilus from Tiridates, but it is all in vain, since Antiphilus proves to be so unworthy. In return, this cowardly and hypocritical character puts Queen Erona into the danger of being burnt alive. Similarly, when Pyrocles saves Pamphilius from the fervent vengeance of the women, he, indirectly, causes the death of the noble Dido. Ironically, when the princes' own person is desired by the lecherous Andromana, they quickly escape from the burdens of her desire. This escape demands the lives of the helpful Palladius and the languishing Zelmane. As the story progresses, there is more of what the princes should avoid doing and less of what they should do. Although they always find themselves in the middle of already very problematic situations, these problematic situations explode into a myriad of losses and even serious tragedies as soon as they touch them. Their adventures in the pursuit of what others lack end on tragic notes.

Mopsa, Pamela's simple-minded maid, tells a mock-heroic romance, which turns out to be a comic echo of the princes' stories about the impossibility of the pursuit of a desired object. The heroine of her story, the "fairest daughter" of the "mightiest" king, gets her prince-charming, the knight with "one hair of gold, and

the other of silver" (311) Still, the princess gains no satisfaction from what she has obtained. As soon as she asks the name of the knight, he vanishes. When the princess sets off on a quest for him, she finds the same disappointment with every object she obtains. Mopsa expresses this disappointment with the dull repetition of the element of the nut which is given to the princess, but which she cannot open. The fact that the knight vanishes as soon as she asks his name — which she does, since "her mouth so watered that she could not choose but ask him the question" — indicates that underneath the subject's pursuit of its desire the oral drive is present (311). On the one hand, Mopsa's greediness — revealed by her insistence on over-telling the story and her desire for Philoclea's wedding gown, which she is offered if she stops talking — and, on the other hand, her preoccupation with food, indicate the complicity of desire and the oral drive. Such a complicity of desire and the drive becomes more apparent in Amphialus' heroism mixed with love.

The Heroic Excess in Amphialus: The *object petit a*

Amphialus appears as a new character in the *New Arcadia* and becomes a double of both Pyrocles and Musidorus in matters heroic and amorous. His figure, however, is not an identical reduplication of the princes, since he embodies the heroic excess missing from Pyrocles and Musidorus. Amphialus is the hero whom Pyrocles and Musidorus would like to or should be. His relationship to Pyrocles and Musidorus is similar to the relationship of the *New Arcadia* to the *Old Arcadia*. There is a certain "more" in Amphialus. He is, for example, characterized as an all-exceeding super-hero in Queen Helen's telling description: "Who is courteous, noble, liberal, but he that hath the example before his eyes of Amphialus? Where are all heroical parts but in Amphialus?" (122). She suggests that Amphialus is the paragon of chivalric heroism. The fact that Amphialus exceeds Musidorus as a hero is further illuminated in the scene in which Musidorus finds his scattered armor. He puts it on, but feels that the armor is "something too great," indicating that Amphialus is greater than Musidorus (119). Amphialus' armor, the symbol of his heroic prowess, is alien to Musidorus, who does not even have a chance to grow into the armor in a series of ordeals, like other chivalric heroes of Renaissance narratives (for example Spenser's Red Cross knight, who grows into the old and dented armor he takes on as he sets off on his heroic pilgrimage to rescue Una's parents). The fact that Pyrocles is inferior to Amphialus in heroic prowess is further shown when they both fall in love with the same woman, Philoclea. In their mock fight, by the river Ladoñ, over the glove of Philoclea, Pyrocles/Zelmae wounds Amphialus, yet Amphialus still proves to be superior in chivalric heroism over Pyrocles in Zelmae-"drag." He enrages Zelmae by being what she/he would like to be: masculine and heroic. The Zelmae costume allows Amphialus to be a chivalric hero who does not hurt a lady and it degrades Pyrocles/Zelmae to a

feminine, non-heroic level, which he keeps till the end of the manuscript. Amphialus, therefore, is set up as an example for Pyrocles and Musidorus, with whom they cannot compete.

Although Amphialus is a near-flawless knight, there is one trouble with him. His whole existence in the story is superfluous. Amphialus is always at the wrong place at the wrong time. He has no evil within him, yet his mere existence is enough to cause tragedies. He unintentionally kills his best friend and his stepfather. Through another unintended murder, he inflicts death on his faithful servant Ismenus. He kills Parthenia without knowing about it. He is also inserted into the love quartet of Pyrocles-Philoclea-Musidorus-Pamela as a "fifth wheel." He is especially superfluous in the relationship of Pyrocles and Philoclea, which he threatens to destroy with his fervent love. Although we cannot condemn him for any of the actions, his presence proves very destructive to the other characters. Rather than being an image to solely identify with, he also functions as a "stain" which blurs the "picture" of both the romance and heroism.¹⁶⁴ In the case of Pyrocles and Musidorus, we have seen that heroism is not capable of providing what other people lack. However, while Pyrocles and Musidorus do not lose anything, but watch others lose, Amphialus is, himself, inflicted with loss. His entrance into the story, for example, is already related to a series of tragic relationships.

Sidney's introduces the reader to Amphialus' story *in medias res*. We see him after he became "all directed to setting forward the suit of his friend, Philoxenus," to Helen Queen of Corinth (124-25). This is shortly after Helen's has fallen in love with him and after Amphialus has left the court to avoid the awkward love-triangle. Nonetheless, still he ends up unintentionally causing both his friend's and his old stepfather's death. The reader first "encounters" Amphialus at this point of the story. The encounter is a peculiar one because it does not take place in the ordinary sense of the word. Amphialus is not present when Musidorus and his companion, Clitophon, on their quest for Pyrocles, come upon his deserted armor:

... Clitophon espied a piece of armor and, not far off, another piece; and so the sight of one piece teaching him to look for more, he at length found all, with

¹⁶⁴ This metaphor of the stain anticipates the relation of Amphialus to the real through the *object petit a*, which my paper explains a little further. The stain is a function of the *object petit a* of the scopic drive, the gaze. Lacan defines it as that, "which always escapes from the grasp of that form of vision that is satisfied with itself in imagining itself as consciousness" (Lacan, *FFC* 74). The stain, therefore, disrupts, blurs, the visual identifications, both the narcissistic one with the ideal-ego in the mirror and the symbolic one with the ego-ideal, constituted by the image of the "parent holding [the child] up before the mirror" (Lacan, *Ibid.* 257). Amphialus is, similarly, such a heroic example with whom Pyrocles and Musidorus find it increasingly difficult to identify or, simply, coexist.

head-piece and shield, by the device whereof he straight knew it to be the armor of his cousin, the noble Amphialus. (119)

Although Amphialus has never lost a fight, nor has he ever failed in his heroic duties, still, his armor indicates that, as a hero, he is suffering from a certain loss. He has lost a good friend and a stepfather and has made a noble lady's life a tragedy. All of these losses become represented by the loss of his armor. His relationship with the armor and the heroic ideal ego, which it represents, indicates why he cannot be a heroic example. Until the tragic loss of his friend, Philoxenus, and his step-father, Timotheus, Amphialus wears the armor and identifies with the chivalric ideal it represents. The scattered pieces of the armor lying on the ground, however, indicate that the identification is broken. Another form of "identification," the drive's movement around its *objet petit a*, is also revealed in the relation between Amphialus and his armor.

The armor, lying almost carcass-like, functions as an *objet petit a* for Amphialus. Scattered on the ground, in pieces, which have been taken off Amphialus and, which used to fit his body very well, the armor closely resembles the body-parts of its owner. These empty armor-pieces fulfill Lacan's definition of the *objet petit a*:

The *objet a* is something from which the subject, in order to constitute itself, has separated itself off as organ. This serves as a symbol of the lack, that is to say, of the phallus, not as such, but in so far as it is lacking. It must, therefore, be an object that is, firstly, separable and, secondly, that has some relation to the lack.¹⁶⁵

The pieces of Amphialus' armor function as the *objet petit a*, since they imitate the body-parts (arms, legs, chest and head) from which they have been detached. Through the anthropomorphic nature of the armor, Amphialus' own carcass, his mutilated body, is imitated. Although he has won the fight with Philoxenus, it is as if he had lost parts of his body, as if he had also been wounded, like Philoxenus, and as if he were missing metallic limbs. Moreover, Amphialus is himself missing from the scene. Since the *objet a* represents what the subject has lost in

¹⁶⁵ Lacan, *FFC* 103.

The subject is always in loss of something real, since he never stops separating himself from parts of himself. The subject separates himself from various body-parts (placenta, feces, urine, sperm, and so on) and from parts superimposed on him: the breast, the voice and the eye. These objects are the originals of the *objet petit a*, the lost object of the real. See Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, *Lacan: The Absolute Master*, trans. Douglas Brick (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1991) 230-1. These objects have to be separable, indeed, already separated from and never to be regained by the subject in order to embody what the subject lacks in the real.

order to appear as a subject, the armor scene reflects on the parallel nature of self-loss and symbolic existence. This paradoxical emergence of a split in the Lacanian subject is manifested in Amphialus' own disappearance from his armor and with his coinciding emergence in the story.

Amphialus enters the story through his "device," displayed on the shield, which Clitophon recognizes. In Lacanian terms, this heraldic design takes on the function of the signifier which represents Amphialus "for another signifier" and, in this way, drags Amphialus "by the shield" into the signifying network of chivalry.¹⁶⁶ He is tossed "device first" into the story, which is being narrated, at this point, by Helen. Queen Helen's mourning coach comes, and she reveals the intricate relationship of Amphialus to Philoxenus and herself. The coach also, "itself very richly furnished in black and white, ... drawn with four milk-white horses furnished all in black, with a black-a-moor boy upon every horse, they all apparelled in white" in a sense tells a certain story (119). It arrives in intricate black-and-whiteness, which is like — to use a contemporary analogy — an embellished, hand-written page of a chronicle (after all, Helen relates old events) or — to use a modern, Saussurean analogy — the symbolic field of differences, onto which the subject's story is inscribed. At the same time, it is a mourning coach, indicating that Amphialus is represented in his own story as someone dead — or at least absent. In this scene, Amphialus, the subject, is constructed, but constructed as what Lacan calls a split subject (\$). The subject is divided by a bar, like the signifier from the signified, because language "refers itself to the discourse of the other" and never to the real. Thus, in language, something is inevitably alienated.¹⁶⁷ His device on the armor embodies the loss which destines Amphialus to be absent from his own story. As a lost body-part of Amphialus, the armor embodies the real loss. As a signifier, it signifies the symbolic loss the split subject has to suffer. Thus, "two lacks," a symbolic and a real lack, overlap in the armor.¹⁶⁸

Amphialus Disappears: The Death-Drive

The second lack of the real is revealed behind Amphialus' pursuit of desire. Amphialus pursues heroic victories, which he always equates with amorous victories. The whole revised part of Book Three is a description of a series of such victories. After Amphialus' mother, the cruel Cecropia kidnaps the princesses and Zelmane/Pyrocles, Basilius' launches a siege on his castle. Amphialus is prepared, and a chivalric "tug-of-war" over the "three ladies" begins. Amphialus, like

¹⁶⁶ Lacan, *FFC* 207.

¹⁶⁷ Lacan, *Écrits* 85.

¹⁶⁸ Lacan, *FFC* 204-05.

Pyrocles, Musidorus and, as we have seen, many Renaissance lovers, treats victory in love as he does victory in battle. Although the capability of Amphialus as a military commander is contrasted with his incapability as a lover, he still tries to substitute one for the other. As a commander, Amphialus "amplified with arguments and examples, and painted with rhetorical colours" spreads "abroad many discourses" (454). As a lover, however, he becomes "dumb-stricken" at the sight of Philoclea (457). Amphialus' solution is to organize the battle into a means of obtaining Philoclea. He hopes that by proving a hero in Philoclea's eyes, he will change her emotions towards him for the better. He organizes private jousts with, for example, Phalantus, who similarly fights "for the love of honour or the honour of his love" (494). He victoriously takes part in a number of jousts, held in front of Philoclea's window, deluding himself as if it were simultaneously a victory in love. Cecropia helps him believe in this delusion in order to satisfy her political ambitions. Heroic victory and amorous victory, however, go separate ways. Heroic victory is inflicted with loss, the loss of Amphialus as well as of his adversaries.

In the end, all of Amphialus' victories prove to be Pyrrhic victories. One by one they undo him. As private jousts of Amphialus become more and more tragic, they serve less as occasions of victory, and more as occasions of loss. In their description, for example, the emphasis shifts from providing a proof of Amphialus' heroic prowess to portrayals of wounding, cutting, bursting open and death. In, for example, Amphialus' fight with Argalus and, subsequently, Parthenia, Amphialus' victory proves to be a cruel victory. Argalus dies, because "Amphialus forgat all ceremonies, and with cruel blows made more of his [Argalus'] best blood succeed the rest" (506). This time, Amphialus only loses tears, with which "he honoured his adversary's death" (509). In the subsequent death of Parthenia, however, the tragic widow of Argalus, his loss is greater. Realizing the vanity of his victory, he casts away his sword, after breaking it into pieces:

[Amphialus'] wisdom could not so far temper his passion but that he took his sword, counted the best in the world (which with much blood he had once conquered of a mighty giant) and brake it into many pieces (which afterwards he had good cause to repent) saying, that neither it was worthy to serve the noble exercise of chivalry, nor any other worthy to feel that sword which had stroken so excellent a lady; and withal, banishing all cheerfulness of his countenance, he returned home, where he got him to his bed, not so much to rest his restless mind as to avoid all company, the sight whereof was tedious unto him. (531)

The rejection of the sword is almost the exact repetition of the act of shedding the armor. Here too, the sword embodies a certain loss. The broken pieces of the sword are reminders of the blood Amphialus lost when he obtained it. The sword transforms from the signifier, which initiated Amphialus into the field of the Other — the Lacanian "mighty giant" — into the *objet petit a*, his blood. The blood

Parthenia shed when she was struck by the sword, and his own "blood," stand for the real loss the subject is invested with, in the field of language. As the sword breaks into pieces, it is transformed from a phallic substitute into a manifestation of such a loss, from a signifier into an *object petit a*. Reduced to mere fractures, the sword serves as the lack, with which Amphialus identifies, and in this identification fantasizes about his own disappearance, "banishing all cheerfulness of his countenance" and retiring to his room. Because of his intimate relation with his broken sword, after casting it away he hides from people, as if saying: "What if I ceased to exist too, like my sword, or like I already ceased to exist, when I came into existence at the loss of myself, my blood, my *object petit a*?" The phantasy of disappearing in the annihilating identification with the *object a*, the death drive, is the only solution that Lacan proposes to the split subject's symbolic existence in the dialectic of alienation:

The phantasy of one's death, of one's disappearance, is the first object that the subject has to bring into play in this dialectic, and he does indeed bring it into play—as we know from innumerable cases, such as anorexia nervosa. We also know that the phantasy of one's death is usually manipulated by the child in his love relations with his parents.¹⁶⁹

The phantasy of the *object petit a*, then, is a chance for the subject to step out of the rigid network of its symbolic existence. Such an exit is only possible, because the *object a* furnishes an image of the subject in which he "identifies, without being able to identify himself in it."¹⁷⁰ Identification with the *object a* opens up a real field of existence, an existence fundamentally other than being constructed by various chains of signifiers. This identification is fundamentally different from the subject's imaginary or symbolic series of identifications. The narcissistic identification with the ideal ego is full and unobstructed, and in it, the ego is constructed. The symbolic identification is an obstructed and partial one, the subject can never completely be like the ego ideal, however, it engenders the subject. In the *object petit a*, however, the subject identifies with what is *not* him, that is, his own absence. The identification with the *object a* annihilates former identifications and their products, the ego and the subject. The *object a*, thus, is that "point of lack" at which "the subject has to recognize himself."¹⁷¹ The subject's exit from the alienated symbolic field is, at the same time, his disappearance as a subject, the death drive.

The fight of Amphialus with the Black Prince, the most significant joust of Book Three, becomes a foreshadowing of his disappearance. In its description, the

¹⁶⁹ Lacan, *Ibid.* 214-15.

¹⁷⁰ Borch-Jacobsen, *Lacan: The Absolute Master* 237.

¹⁷¹ Lacan, *FFC* 270.

text revolves around images of wounding and death. It is a fight of exaggerated mutilation. The two knights do not stop fighting when they are "bleeding so abundantly that everybody that saw them fainted for them..." (541). They still fight, animated by wrath and courage alone, after they receive the following injuries:

[T]he forsaken knight, coming in with his right leg and making it guide the force of the blow, strake Amphialus upon the belly so horrible a wound that his guts came out withal. Which Amphialus perceiving (fearing death, only because it should come with overthrow) he seemed to conjure all his strength for one moment's service; and so, lifting up his sword with both hands, hit the forsaken knight upon the head a blow, wherewith his sword brake. (542)

To the horrifying images of mutilation, Sidney adds the element of an irrational and inhuman heroic persistence. In the fighting figures of Amphialus and the Black Prince ("the forsaken knight"), he has created figures of almost supernatural proportions. Such an extremity of perseverance resembles Old English heroic poetry, in which courage and vengeance know no obstacles, and Arthurian romances, in which supernatural forces often assist the hero. It is not, however, a characteristic feature of Sidney's writing, whose heroes tend to be very human in all aspects. The senseless mutilation of the fight is carried out to its extreme. If Amphialus' supporter, Anaxius, does not rescue him and put an end to the fight, both knights would, undoubtedly, fight till the end of time, since "pain rather seemed to increase life than to weaken life in these champions" (542). Amphialus is especially heavily wounded, after "receiving wound upon wound" and is carried back into the castle half dead (543).

Sidney proceeds by experimenting with the reader's imaginative capacities. The fate he allots to Amphialus is not death, but more wounds, and it is in dying, not in death, that his hero "lives" the death drive. Having been ignorant of the fact that Cecropia has been mentally and physically tormenting the princesses in order to satisfy her political ambitions, Amphialus is deeply shocked when he finally learns about it. He takes Philoclea's knives and stabs himself "into divers places of his breast and throat, until those wounds, with the old, freshly bleeding," bring him "to the senseless gate of death" (575). While he stabs himself, the knives become both symbolically and physically integrated into his body. As an *object petit a*, the knives appear as a cut in every attempt of integration. In this way, when Amphialus stabs himself, he imitates the workings of the drive, which encircles its lost object and, in its circular movement, constitutes the body as an empty

"rim."¹⁷² Amphialus' wounded body becomes this rim of the drive. Repeating the motion of the drive, he stabs himself with a senseless and mechanical persistence.¹⁷³ Instead of the finality of death, he becomes a "living wound," an *alien* body in this world, which is, nonetheless, still present. At the end of the manuscript, it is still not certain, whether he will die or survive with the help of Helen's magic "surgeon". He is still bleeding and as he lingers on in the story, his tragedy causes similar losses in his faithful servants as well, who are "tearing their clothes" and even "wounding themselves, and sprinkling their blood in the air" (579).

Sidney's Revision: The Death Drive

Shortly after the "death" of Amphialus, leaving neither enough time for the servants' blood to stop "sprinkling" nor for Helen's tears to stop flowing, Sidney's manuscript breaks off. Is Sidney engulfed with his hero by the annihilating leftover of the real, which he has been pursuing in the surplus of the fore-conceit? Has Sidney, the "poet-knight," encountered the gap of the real behind the glitter of heroism? Certainly, we can say that along with Amphialus' increasing confrontation with blood, wounding and the bursting open of the body, Sidney's text also swells into a rhetorical excess around such sites of lack. In Book Three the narrator is most preoccupied with images related to cutting, which, in their overelaborated superfluosity, become "stuck in the gullet" of Sidney's signifiers, as disturbing surpluses, like Amphialus' dead, but still bleeding body.¹⁷⁴ A good example of

¹⁷² The identification with the *object a* transports the subject into the realm of the drive, since the point of lack the subject has to identify with is the part-object of the drive, the forever lost real object. The drive starts out from the "cuts," those parts of the subject's body, where the inside and the outside meet, like the lips, the anus, etc. From these points, which Lacan calls the "rim" of the drive, the drive encircles the non-existent *object petit a*. The drive is never capable of reintegrating the lost object into the subject's already mapped out, symbolic body. However, it is never capable of discharging it either. See Elizabeth Grosz, *Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction* (London: Routledge, 1990) 112. Identifying with the nothingness of the *object a*, becoming the empty rim of the drive, is the only way for the subject to identify with the nothingness of the real from within his symbolic body, which is mapped out by the drive.

¹⁷³ The compulsion to repeat is a manifestation of the real, which is attributed by Freud to the conservative nature of the instincts and by Lacan to the circular and persistent movement of the drive. See Jonathan Scott Lee, *Jacques Lacan* (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1991) 143.

¹⁷⁴ Lacan, *FFC* 270.

such a rhetoric is the description of the dying Parthenia's wound. The metaphors which Sidney uses, ascribe a great deal of beauty to the wound. On her neck, Sidney writes:

most dainty blood laboured to drown his own beauties, so as here was
a river of purest red, there an island of perfectest white, each giving
lustre to the other. (528)

This magnificent rhetoric describes the horrifying wound, the embodiment of loss and destruction, through images of self-destruction. Since the wound is both the island and the river and the one is flooded with the other, the wound is not simply the image of destruction, but an image of intensified destruction — destruction destroying itself. This image creates an increased sense of loss. To this intensified loss of all beauty, an excess of beauty is added, generated by the aesthetically appealing nature of the images of river and island. This beauty of rhetoric/rhetoric of beauty, which is a mesmerizing surplus added to the horrifying image of destruction, is the *object petit a* of Sidney's text. His magnificent rhetoric, thus, encircles the non-symbolic "Thing" embodied in the incomprehensible beauty of destruction.¹⁷⁵ Lacan points out that in every intellectual attempt to write something extraordinary, the elevated white sheet of paper turns into a "piece of lavatory paper," the empty object of the anal drive. Sidney's rhetorical effusions come to a stop in this way, indicating the persistence of the death-drive in writing. His images are not simply images of destruction, but images which destroy themselves. His over-valued and over-elaborated text "drowns" in its own flood of rhetoric.

Conclusion

At this point, the parallel, I have been drawing has come to its natural conclusion. Sidney has attempted to revise the *Old Arcadia* and capture a certain "more" within it. Pyrocles, Musidorus and Amphialus have attempted to bring heroism to an excessive degree, where their shortcomings as lovers are made up for. The Lacanian concepts of the real and the *object petit a* have shown why, paradoxically, Sidney has found the surplus of the "fore-conceit" in that point of fracture where his text loses its self-identity, and why Amphialus' solution to the void of desire, created by Philoclea's refusal, becomes his own disappearance through a transformation into a "living wound." The Lacanian symbolic system carries an alien element in it, which is equivalent to the destruction of the system. The subject has an intimate relation with this surplus in the form of the *object petit a*. This *object petit a* may indeed be a solution to the subject's lacking symbolic

¹⁷⁵ Lacan, *Seminar VII* 141.

existence. Not, however, as a filling in of the porous symbolic field, but as a possible exit out of it. Thus, the subject's relation to his own non-existence, the death-drive, is manifested in Sidney's *New Arcadia*, on two levels: on the level of the text, in its non-identical reduplication and its over-abundant imagery of wounds, and on the level of the story, especially in the persistent and superfluous presence of the living-dead hero, Amphialus.

WORKS CITED:

- Berry, Edward. "The Poet as Warrior in Sidney's Defence of Poetry." *Studies in English Literature*. 29 (1989): 21-34.
- Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel. *Lacan: The Absolute Master*. Trans. Douglas Brick. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1991.
- Butler, Judith P. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge, 1990.
- — — — "The Lesbian Phallus and the Morphological Imaginary." *Differances*. 4, 1 (1992): 134-74.
- Capellanus, Andreas. *The Art of Courtly Love*. Trans. Jay Parry. New York: Columbia UP, 1941.
- Castiglione, Baldesar. *The Book of the Courtier*. Trans. Charles S. Singleton. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959.
- Duncan-Jones, Katherine. *Sir Philip Sidney: Courtier Poet*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1991.
- English Sixteenth-Century Verse: An Anthology*. Ed. Richard Sylvester. New York: Norton, 1984.
- Essential Articles for the Study of Sir Philip Sidney*. ed. Arthur F. Kinney. Hamden: Shoe String Press, "Anchor Books," 1986.
- Fineman, Joel. *Shakespeare's Perjured Eye: The Invention of Poetic Subjectivity in the Sonnets*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
- Freud, Sigmund. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Trans. C.J.M. Hubback. London: The International Psycho-Analytic Press, 1922.
- Grosz, Elizabeth. *Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 1990.
- Halperin, David M. *Before Pastoral: Theocritus and the Ancient Tradition of Bucolic Poetry*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1983.
- Kalstone, David. *Sidney's Poetry: Contexts and Interpretations*. New York: Norton, 1970.
- Keach, William. *Elizabethan Erotic Narratives: Irony and Pathos in the Ovidian Poetry of Shakespeare, Marlowe and Their Contemporaries*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers, 1977.
- Lacan, Jacques. *Écrits: A Selection*. Trans. Alan Sharidan. New York: Norton, 1977.
- — — —. *Feminine Sexuality*. Eds. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose. Trans. Jacqueline Rose. New York: Norton, 1982.
- — — —. *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. New York: Norton, 1978.

- — — — -. *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: 1959-60*. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. New York: Norton, 1992.
- Lee, Jonathan Scott. *Jacques Lacan*. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1990.
- Miller, Paul Allen. "Sidney, Petrarch, and Ovid, or Imitation as Subversion." *ELH*. 58 (1991): 449-522.
- Montgomery, Robert L. *Symmetry and Sense: The Poetry of Sir Philip Sidney*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961.
- Ovid, *Metamorphoses*. Trans. Arthur Golding. ed., John Frederick Nims. New York: MacMillan, 1965.
- Poggioli, Renato. *The Oaten Flute: Essays on Pastoral Poetry and the Pastoral Ideal*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1975.
- Rees, Joan. "Sidney and a *Lover's Complaint*." *The Review of English Studies*. 42, May (1991): 157-167.
- Sannazaro, Jacopo. *Arcadia*. Trans. Ralph Nash. Detroit, 1966.
- Sidney, Sir Philip. *An Apology for Poetry*. Ed. Forrest G. Robinson. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1970.
- — — — -. *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia*. Ed. Maurice Evans. London: The Penguin Group, 1977.
- — — — -. *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia (The Old Arcadia)*. Ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1975.
- Weber, Samuel. *Return to Freud: Jacques Lacan's Dislocation of Psychoanalysis*. Trans. Michael Levine. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991.
- Zizek, Slavoj. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London: Verso, 1989.