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ISTVÁN SZENTPÉTERI

**The Development of Interpretation  
of Bureaucracy**



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Redigunt

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Szerkeszti

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(Szeged, Lenin krt. 54.)*

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## PHASES AND PRESENT TASKS OF THE FIGHT AGAINST BUREAUCRACY

1. In the work of state organization and in political sciences a fight against the bureaucratic deformation of our mechanism has been taken up time and again, sharply or indirectly. It is doubtless that the tasks of the fight against bureaucracy, its directions, methods in the single sectors of the development of the people's democracy could be determined in different ways under the given historical conditions. It is reflected very well in the political literature, and in the concrete work of organization, as well, what a multi-fold phenomenon bureaucracy is with its more and more recent problems. Before the year of change *the liquidation of the most reactionary organizational and functional manifestations of the old state machinery was going on in the spirit of the fight against bureaucracy.*<sup>1</sup> From 1948, this slogan has *culminated in a programme of destroying completely the machinery inherited from the bourgeois State.*<sup>2</sup> Some were inclined to expect from the solution of this task that, on the basis of its perfect performance, under socialist conditions, the problem of bureaucracy can essentially be dropped. The bureaucratic phenomena that can be found in the mechanism of the dictatorship of the proletariat were considered — after the old state machinery having been destroyed — to be a *surviving remainder of the former state bureaucracy of the exploiters.* That is *vitalized or renewed by the influence still exerted here and there by the capitalistic surroundings, by the class of exploiters on the socialist state organization; it can, however, be completely eliminated in a comparatively short time by making the class-warfare more consequent and educating the socialist mind of people.*

The classics of Marxism did not at all take bureaucracy for an adversary to be overcome so easily, although it was first of all Lenin who treated of its problems emerging in the course of the building up of Socialism. At the beginning of eliminating the subjectivist mistakes committed in the period of the personal cult, and in the political sciences at the liberation from the limiting shackles of the dogmatic outlook, one began to see in it some tendencies that were *much more difficult to be eliminated, renewing time and time again even in the new circumstances on the basis of certain con-*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dr. Lajos Szamel, *Development of socialist democracy and demolition of the bourgeois bureaucracy in its administration.* Studia Juridica Auctoritate Universitatis Pécs Publicata. (Publisher of school-books). Budapest, 1960, pp. 3. et sq. (Hungarian).

<sup>2</sup> Following the year of change, a monograph was published about the essence of bureaucracy and about measures and methods of the fight against it, by Tivadar Gál, *Rationalization of the administration* (State and Administration, Vol. 1950, Nos 6—7, pp. 423 et sq. Hungarian) and by Ferenc Vida, *Nation of bureaucracy and the ideological fight against it* (State and Administration, Vol. 1951, Nos. 11—12, pp. 615 et sq. Hungarian).

ditions. As opposed to the opinion comprehending bureaucracy as a bourgeois remainder of *state structure* and of *consciousness* surviving even in the period of Socialism, the attention was called on another opinion to the essential elements of reality *considering bureaucracy a consequence of an extremely fast state-organizing work*. The organizatory work of immense rhythm after the year of change — they said — is accompanied perforce by some distortions that could supposedly have been avoided if there had been time to *measure* the effects more exactly. The fight between 1954 and 1956 againts bureaucratic tendencies was carried on, in fact, on the basis of the programme of correcting the mistakes made during *building socialism*.<sup>3</sup> In 1956 there were taken still more definite measures for correcting the organisatory faults that had caused bureaucratic distortions in the course of the Socialist transformation. Construction and function of the mechanism have particulary two major problems of being improved. First of all, a *decentralization of state administration must begin*, by increasing the independence of the organs of lower degree, giving up competences. Another major task is to *simplify the state apparatus*. In connection with that, the thought of the reform of the administrative country-planning and that of the organisatory simplification of state administration, etc. have arisen.<sup>4</sup>

These purposes could anyhow be realized organizedly but after the consolidation of 1957. At the beginning of the two-front fight of the Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government it was more and more realized, as well; that in the life of our socialist State the bureaucratic tendencies were not only necessary consequences of a fast rhythm of the earlier work of organization but, in a high degree, also *the mistakes of the earlier leading which could have been avoided during building Socialism*. From that time, the fight against the bureaucratic elements of state organization has take place in the spirit of the *consequent and complete elimination of the mistakes committed*, in the period of personal cult, and in that of *the reorganization of the apparatus in compliance with the new exigencies*.

From 1957 our Government have taken a long series of measures pushing the earlier bureaucratic phenomena into the background and even ceasing them here and there completely. There could be obtained considerable results in increasing local independence as a result of mesures for *deconcentrating the competences*. In large areas, the elaboration of the *organizational and functional rules* („*Status rules*”) of the administrative state organs has been.

<sup>3</sup> The latest way of approaching democracy is demonstrated by a lot of measures after the party decision in 1953. As a consequence of that, in the legal literature, as well, there has again been increased the interest in fighting the bureaucratic manifestations and eliminating them. From the papers published in 1954 cf. the following ones: István Pozsonyi: *Causes of bureaucracy appearing in the council apparatus and the fight against them*. (State and Administration, Vol. 1954, Nos. 6—7, pp. 271 et sq. Hungarian); Miklós Révai: *Some methodical questions of the fight against bureaucracy*. (State and Administration, Vol. 1954, No. 12, pp. 648. et sq. Hungarian).

<sup>4</sup> The contemporary tasks of the fight against bureaucracy were elaborated, opening new vistas, by István Kovács and Imre Markója, in their paper, *Against bureaucracy — for improving the work of administration*. (Social Review, Vol. 1956, No. Sept. pp. ... et sq. Hungarian).

completed, an *Act concerning the procedure of state administration* has been created, the *public management* has become standardized more and more. *Staff decreases in the administrative apparatus*, etc. have been carried out by our Government of more occasions.

The claim to improve the state mechanism has become a fact beyond argument, nevertheless, the public opinion, the state work, the political sciences have met other phenomena of bureaucracy, different ones from those mentioned above; and not in a low degree, either. On the basis of these experiences some common belief has gained ground about bureaucracy being a hydra of a thousand heads: being cut one of its heads immediately another one grows instead of it. Our daily press often unmask bureaucratic procedures that poison the life of people — sometimes, perhaps, in cases appearing insignificant — but anyhow cut to the quick. Seeing these phenomena, some are looking at the fight against bureaucracy with some pessimism, being inclined to accept a standpoint according to which it is something joint necessarily with life, against which we are in vain trying fighting.

Some are comparing bureaucracy with a cancerous disease of organism. We are knowing a lot about it, immense experimental material is collected about different methods of its development, about some forms of appearance of its devastations, and even — if revealed in due time — about the highly probable expectation of the positive effects of some fast procedures which are to be applied, etc. The cancer is, however, not yet cleared up in respect of its basic causes, the most different variations of its development, the therapeutic procedures, methods show up no definitely positive results, either. *Is it right to draw a parallel between bureaucracy and this disease that keeps on being, in some degree, still so mysterious?* As it is said, every comparison is containing something which does not suit the related other case at comparing them. But not speaking about that, it is still doubtful whether or not it is useful to make a comparison the final consequence of which concerning bureaucracy is that we don't know exactly either its causes or a sure therapeutic method for its healing, and shall possibly never be able to overcome it.

*We have, of course, no cause to be so pessimistic;* but it cannot be said, either, that the social sciences gave a definite and complete answer to the questions: what are the exact causes of bureaucracy, what is the direction of their future influence and, first of all, whether or not their pernicious effect can be prevented putting an end to bureaucracy at some time in the future.

The socialist political sciences, the science of organization and sociology keep examining these problems deeper and deeper, having explanations more and more exact concerning the causes that elicit bureaucracy and looking for ways of preventing, resp. terminating these pernicious tendencies. The science provided with the arms of Marxism-Leninism is — in our opinion — absolutely suitable to support the state organizing work effectively in its struggle against bureaucratic manifestations. They will soon discover the complex motives, indispensable for fighting definitely down bureaucracy as a constitutional disease. In the following we are trying to review the standpoints elaborated in the social sciences and in the science of organization con-

cerning *some* basic problems of bureaucracy, to take up a position in respect of them and, first of all, to determine the present content of bureaucracy.<sup>5</sup>

2. The expression „bureaucracy” has several interpretations. In the *every-day* use of word — i. e., as *public opinion* it uses — any mistakes taking place, occurring in the life of organizations are branded as bureaucracy. Then bureaucracy is a *collective term* occurring in every manifestation of the organizational function if functions and decisions of the organ do not meet the (often subjective) requirements set up by the citizen to the organs.

The term bureaucracy may be applied in more meanings by the *social sciences*, as well.<sup>6</sup> Even a broader interpretation of sciences has, however, a much narrower content than the everyday use of term.

a) The content of the term bureaucracy may be observed in the most consequent and unambiguous usage in connection with the *administrative apparatus that is sharply separated from the society of bourgeois state*. Bureaucracy is, in this sense, an *organ-type of the bourgeois state*, containing necessary but *also pathological* elements, as well. The capitalistic State cannot exist without administration; that administration must, however, be antisocial, because of its constitutional organization and functional purposes. Therefore bureaucracy must be consequently eliminated in the course of the construction of the socialist State, in its structure developed under the conditions of the bourgeois State.

The difficulty of determining the term bureaucracy appears in connection with the socialist mechanism.<sup>7</sup> Sciences to-day have already got over

<sup>5</sup> I want to refer relatively at length to the various conceptions made about bureaucracy by the modern bourgeois *sociology and science of organization*, as well. In the course of that I must use some phrases, technical terms, too, that are still sounding strange in the socialist political sciences here and there. Owing to the more and more frequent sociological studies, however, they are more and more used, too, although it is no definite decision, as yet, concerning their critical evaluation, the mutual comparison of the contents of socialist and bourgeois sociological expressions, and — their critical evaluation towards the bourgeois science. In this domain, we may accept for a starting-point the book of András Hegedűs, *The modern bourgeois sociology and social reality*. (Budapest, 1961. Hungarian).

<sup>6</sup> It has already appeared above that we have considered bureaucracy some organizational and functional *deficiency of the organisms*. The entire Marxist literature is unitary in using bureaucracy only in a *pejorative* sense. The bourgeois sociological and legal literature, on the other hand, is regarding bureaucracy not only as a necessary institution, having consequently also some *positive* functions, but — on the basis of Max Weber's conception — a lot of authors consider it an *ideal* organizational form. Cf. Max Weber, *The essentials of bureaucratic Organization: an ideal-type construction. Reader in Bureaucracy*. Ed.: R. K. Merton — A. P. Gray — B. Hockey — H. C. Selvin. Illinois, 1960, p. 18.: op. cit., further: Kálmán Kulcsár: *Max Weber and the political sociology*. (State and Legal Science. Ed. Academy. Budapest, 1963, Mo. 4, p. 460. Hungarian).

<sup>7</sup> In the socialist literature, one wants to separate the content of the word „bureaucracy”, sharply or hesitating, from the practice of bureaucracy. E. g., Lajos Szamel is differentiating as follows: „Bureaucracy as content is an official staff with privileges; bureaucracy as practice, however, is a method of working.” (Lajos Szamel: *Fundamental legal problems of the leadership of administration*. Budapest, 1963, p. 109, Hungarian). Even after ceasing of bureaucracy, bureaucracy as a method of working does not cease necessarily. Thus in our people's democracy, too, after bureaucracy had been eliminated, „the bureaucratic outlook and the methods of working deriving from it have survived and are still living, upholding some of their old formations and getting new ones, as well — although in a more and more decreasing degree”. In his opinion, „for overcoming bureaucracy, socialist conscience



denying the possibility or fact of the development of bureaucratic tendencies in the socialist administrative organization. What can, however, be called bureaucratic with us? The political sciences are giving two kinds of answers to that question; one of them may be called a wide scientific interpretation of bureaucracy, the other a narrow interpretation.

b) In the legal literature all the inadequacies of the functioning of organism are considered bureaucracy, having taken their origin during the activity of organism from an *organizational insufficiency*, from bad *organizational solutions*. *The functioning of an administrative organ may be bureaucratic in a broad sense if a mistake occurs that could have been avoided with an adequate organizational work in a given sector of the organization.* (If the competences are arranged, the procedure necessary to the decision formed, the members of the apparatus educated professionally-politically, etc.) It can be understood, therefore, that bureaucracy can always be evaluated in comparison with *time, place, and given conditions*, and that the main form of its appearance in the different periods of the people's democratic state construction is differing, as well. It could be called a bureaucratic mistake if an organ did not take part in its domain with proper intensity in the class-warfare (not fighting efficiently enough for crushing the old machinery), and it was, the same, a bureaucratic failure when the functioning of organs with a maximal efficiency has been checked by chaotic *competences, unelucidated constitutional connections, lack of procedural rules*. A wide interpretation of bureaucracy is, as seen, a *relative notion*, the *measure* of the negative character can scarcely be established definitely, depending greatly upon what we are considering the most important link of chains „*next in turn*” in the course of the continuous improvement of the organism. This bureaucracy in a broader sense can, in fact, have as a *cause* every mistake or the lack of any natural endowment exerting, in a given period, the *insufficiency of the organic functioning*, resp. producing grotesque results.

c) In our days, the political sciences have got to the *elaboration of a narrower content of bureaucracy which can be determined much more exactly* than as far. It is, of course, no mere chance that to-day we can already give a more recent notional definition of bureaucracy. Our constitutional development has namely got in our days to the phase where the *peculiar form of bureaucracy*, that can be separated more from other constitutional mistakes, like a kind of *danger*, obtains more and more actuality. Bureaucracy, as a „*pure*” pathological phenomenon, is showing its true face in this phase of building up Socialism where the *organizations are regulated* on a definite

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must be raised upon a high level.” (Op. cit. p. 110). This delimitation — in another form — can be found at János Beér, too. He is declaring, with reference to Lenin, that „bureaucracy is built up on a separate layer of officials in privileged position.” (Administrative Law, I. General part. Ed.: Beér—Mártonffy. Budapest, 1959, p. 324, Hungarian).

On the other hand, „the essence” of the rule of bureaucracy is „being detached from life, carrying out the tasks but mechanically, an administration becoming self-contained, a self-imposed seclusion behind the desks, often escaping from responsibility.” (Op. cit., p. 326). All these may be named some *methods of working*, too, as spoken about by Szamel.

high level or, calling it in another way, where the *formalization* is in an advanced stage.

Bureaucracy is an *organizational deformation* brought about on developed levels of the *formalization* of an organism performing the function of execution. The *formalization*, that means the conditions of the appearance of bureaucracy, *appears at an overregulated organizational structure and function*. (Lack of proportion). The administrative organization (is attaining the level of formalization where the bureaucratic dangers in *particular* sense appear if 1. the external framework of the organizational structure of performing the tasks is more and more established by *norms* and the *division of labour* inside the organization is fixed in *status rules*, even in its details; 2. some phases of the functioning of the organ are made stiff by the *order of functioning* elaborated for the organs in the frames of the status rules and the ways of administration are bound more and more tightly by *general* and *particular* rules of *procedure*, 3. the decisions inside the organization are made according to *programmes* of high degree. The programmes endeavour to paraphrase the functions of organs participating in the preparation of decisions, as well the obligations of the single organs in the preparatory work, and the *liability for the decision* on the basis of the formal and informal participation 4. in the formal organization the specialists on different stages of the organizational system get into a rigid hierarchy on the basis of the legal organization, while *having some common particular interests*, as well.

Bureaucracy may appear in any structural element of the organization rising on a higher level of formalization. The main forms of the manifestation of bureaucracy are: a claim to the quantitative development of the *organization*, the failures of the *norms of procedure*, of the *blueprinted decision* arisen by *structural* causes, and the formation of a *habit* of own white-collar workers.

Apart from the pattern of structural forms, bureaucracy is influenced by the *size* of organization, too, as well by *complexity of the tasks* standing before the organization. The larger the organ system is and the more complicated tasks an organ has to solve, the greater is the danger of bureaucratic mistakes in the structural pattern. Anyhow, the basic factor in respect of bureaucracy is *level and method of the regulated structure* because it depends finally upon this factor whether or not the bureaucratic distortions come about.

It follows from the above-mentioned facts that not every organizational deficiency may be called bureaucratic in the former — narrower — sense of the word. E. g., it cannot be attributed to *bureaucracy* if the administrative organ of jurisdiction, from want of expert knowledge, is interpreting a legal norm erroneously, incorrectly and makes a false decision. A mistake like this, originating from subjective causes, is not at all a problem connected with being highly regulated, the formalisation of the mechanism has namely just the consequence that the members of organization have an *expert knowledge* as deep as possible. The peculiar bureaucratic distortion begins only if an incorrect decision comes about even in case of a due expert knowledge, of an endeavour to respect the legal norms.

There are — or more exactly only there were — a number of other

deficiencies of organizational construction and function the harmful consequences of which were obvious without being able to be considered bureaucratic in a narrow sense. (It is another question that these are treated by the public opinion and often even by the legal literature indiscriminately as especially bureaucratic distortions). The „infantile disorders” of „young” organism were not real bureaucratic distortions. We cannot consider bureaucratic distortions. We cannot consider bureaucratic failures in a narrower sense even the deficiencies in the organizational life that are the consequences of being regulated not on a due level. E. g., the *constitutional deformation*, i. e., a state where even the regulation that constitutes an organism is to be found, as a rule, only in its principles. (There was a situation like that in connection with a lot of organs immediately after the Soviet revolution or, in this country, at the beginning of the Hungarian Soviet Republic). Also the failure may be classed here that comes about from the normative disorder of the inner proportions of the *organism*. This has the consequence that the division of labour — and with it the expert administration — is getting on more slowly, „Everybody is making everything”. If the *competence* of the organs *isn't* determined but in principle, it is much possibility for disputes, the weight of labour is transferred to the organs of general competence, they being responsible for the final arrangement of every case sent from one organ of special administration to the other, as well, etc.

The procedure of a „juvenile” administrative organism has hardly any norms. The course of administration is characterized by *spontaneity*; they develop at random, on a casual basis ever changing administrative procedures. The procedure of deciding being unprogrammed, there prevails, within broad limits, a complete *discretionalism* and, jointly, a contradictory and conflicting practice. There are several drawbacks to all these in the functioning of organs, and they are manifestations of *negative* content similarly to the bureaucracy in narrow sense. Nonetheless, they are to be separated from that since their causes and the forms of their appearance are thoroughly different. The above-mentioned deficiencies are arising from the lack of the rationalization of organism; the bureaucracy in a narrow sense, however, *appears under conditions of highly regularized administrative processes*.

## II.

### FACTORS ELICITING BUREAUCRATIC TENDENCIES

The causes evoking bureaucratic tendencies are, even in a socialist society, unquestionably in connection with some alienation existing under certain conditions. The alienation in the state organism is, of course, not identical simply with bureaucratization. Anyway, it is no mere chance that our literature of political theory is referring to the bureaucratic manifestations as standing almost in the first place among the alienation phenomena of *state organism*.

An investigation of the general socio-economical causes of alienation cannot be our task. In the following we are, however, moving necessarily in the framework treated of by Marxist philosophy like causes of the appe-

arance of alienation tendencies. We wish to concretize under which conditions, in fact, the development of the division of labour in a socialist constitutional system can become the originator of an organizational deformation.

First of all we have to make it clear that in a socialist state mechanism the bureaucratic tendencies do not occur on the same level and in the same connection as under capitalistic conditions. I. e., in a bourgeois State *certain types of organs* (the administrative organization) *are necessarily and unalterably* bureaucratic in some degree. In the socialist revolution it *ceased* to be possible for an organ-type to *produce bureaucracy as a whole and constantly (continuously)*, ripening almost a conviction that without a way of organization like that there is no modern organizational life. Among the socialist state organs, as well, the administrative organs are doubtless the most „inclined” to be distorted in bureaucratic direction. *Nonetheless, it would be a grave error, to consider bureaucracy necessarily inseparable from the administrative organization under socialist conditions.* We should examine, anyway, *wich are the factors* evoking and harbouring bureaucratic tendencies since the beginnings of the socialist state organization — apart from the subjectivist mistakes in the state construction — and in our days, as well.

Bureaucracy means generally an *organizational separation* where the *possibility of a super-organic social control decreases-* and possibly ceases to be. The *independence* of the bureaucratized organization is manifested first of all in the fact that the *responsibility* for functioning and decisions of the organization *cannot* — or can but in a limited degree — be enforced. The legal guarantees may be degraded to be mere formalities in respect of clearing up and applying responsibility. On the basis of a bureaucratic organizational „*independence*” the administrative organs get a possibility, even in case of the existing *decisions produced on a representative bases*, to function in accordance with their particular organizational interests.

The organizational separation of administration is a necessary concomitant of the state organization of the exploiting society. The function of the organization that is serving for the expression of class rule evokes in itself a *separative* tendency. Yet bureaucracy becomes a *special problem* only in the phase of social development where the development of the forces of production needed a major *division of labour* in the organizational system.

(1) The basic cause enabling the bureaucratic manifestations to prevail — and even to seem stronger here and there to some degree — under socialist conditions, too, *originates from living conditions more and more complicated.* In the socialist society *number* (quantity), *extension* and *character* of the tasks demanding solution are rising on a higher and higher level. In the socialist mechanism — and inside it in the administrative organization — the solution of tasks more and more *complex* is of common occurrence. In the first phase of the people’s democratic state construction we have carried out

<sup>8</sup> Cf.: Dr. Mihály Samu: *Estrangement of State.* (State and Administration. 1965, No. 7, pp. 582 et sq., Hungarian; András Hegedüs: *Optimalization and humanization.* Truth, Vol. 1965, No. 3, p. 25, Hungarian). In the bourgeois literature an immense number of experiments have taken place for clearing up the connections between estrangement and bureaucratized situation. Among them we find a highly interesting, even if not fully elaborated, train of thought on pages 19 et sq. of E. E. Jennings’s book, *An anatomy of leadership* (New York, 1960.).

a lot of organizatory work that — in certain sense — means a closing up on the line of organizatory technique. After a complete socialization of the instruments of production, however, the socialist States got some organizatory tasks that are much more complex than those of the administrative organs of the developed imperialistic States. To organize for instance the economical management on the basis of the collective propriety of all the instruments of production of basic importance is a much more complex task conglomerate than that met by the economical management of imperialistic States where some experiments have taken place to introduce some elements of planning. There, namely, even the most rational influencing (control) is but a *completion* of the tendencies, determined in their bases by the value rules.

Apart from the obvious complexity of the economical tasks, we could refer anyway to a long series of cultural, hygienic, stylistic, etc. problems demanding a solution from the socialist administration, as well. It is ascertained by the everyday experiences in the socialist state construction that an efficient solution of a task is the function of other problems appearing in ten or a hundred other fields of administration. Under socialist conditions, therefore, *the solution of tasks is depending upon the efficient collaboration of more and more factors*. Concerning the solution of complex tasks, the administrative organization does not rely on *spontaneous* signalling installations but it is planning and carrying out the organizatory processes preceding the realization intellectually thoroughly wellweighed and calculated.

As the tasks are so complex, in the socialist society there has been formed an administrative mechanism that is capable of organizing the work *rationally*, on a much higher level than any of the former ones. An opportunity arises to perform a *division of labour* among the organs participating in carrying out the tasks in a higher degree than ever before. The tasks being so complex, there develops necessarily a much more differentiated organ system than anywhere else, e. g., in some imperialistic States. The broader the *division of labour* is between the organs, the more is depending the successful solution of complex tasks upon the harmonious collaboration of larger and larger *organ systems*.<sup>9</sup>

Bureaucracy is, therefore, a *problem of consciousness* not only in the sense that the ideological relics of the capitalistic state order are still having an influence at us on members of the official organization; bureaucracy is more and more a basic question of *consciousness* in respect of the problem: to what extent the organizer can take in the *enormous connections*, and do his *rational* function — with the help of his natural endowments, special qualification, and experiences. Bureaucracy is, in that relation, a consequence not so much of harmful ideological effects but that of a conscious, constitutional and technical „insufficiency” or inadequacy.

Besides the former factors, in the formation of bureaucratic tendencies also the *accelerated presentation* of the tasks demanding a solution has a considerable role, as well the need of a fast *adaptability* of programmes, blueprints, to the *changing socio-economical conditions*. As the modern life

<sup>9</sup> In respect of the administrative tasks becoming more and more complicated in our days and of an ever stronger division of labour, cf. the paper of János Beér, *The most important factors influencing the level of the state work*. (State and Administration, 1964, No. January, pp. 5 et sq., Hungarian).

conditions are developing, the content and administrative procedures of the public tasks to be realized must be amended, on several occasions, already in the course of the *planning of execution*, immediately, and reformed in compliance with the changed new demands. The new results of science are making obsolete, from one day to the other, the documentations of the plan, elaborated in details at economical investment plans or in thoroughly different fields of administration, as well. The living conditions themselves changing extremely fast set, therefore, extraordinary tasks to the state organization in some periods, particularly to the administrative organization. Only the most versatile organism can comply with the requirements changing fast. The administration in modern times continually strives — partly for reasons beyond its control — against a „lack of time”. This situation produces — as we shall see — the immediate conditions that lead to the formation of the different forms of the manifestation of bureaucracy.

(2) The factors, however, whose influence is directed to a bureaucracy motivated by the development of the social conditions, harboured from objective side, may only elicit a real bureaucracy if they are *immediately depending upon formal* (organizational-structural) *solutions*. A quick change of the living conditions is, therefore, eliciting bureaucratic manifestations if connected with certain *peculiar organizational* deficiencies. The causes *immediately* evoking bureaucracy come from the *organizational* (formal) side. The occurrence or recurrence of bureaucratic mistakes may be promoted by certain *organizational solutions, structures, organizational conditions of functioning*. In the following we try to summarize shortly the *formal* conditions at which — particularly in the present phase of our state construction — some form of bureaucracy may come about.

Among the eliciting causes of the bureaucratic manifestations in a broader sense, the lack or disorder of the *proportions of the organizational units forming a basic condition of the efficient functioning*, has a considerable role. Every organ type has a *peculiar function* in the entire mechanism. If the organizational composition, resp. the ratios of the functioning elements are modified so that one organizational form or the other — because of the predominance of another organizational form. — becomes incapable of performing its function or is limited in administering, it, then bureaucratic consequences come about. The troubles of proportion in cooperation of the units forming the organism can originate from an „organizational” failure of the institutional structure (because of being wrongly regulated legally) or from a wrong practice that forces its way through an adequate legal rule.

(a) The confusion between the peculiar functions of organs takes place first of all in *administrative and representative* relation, as well in the relation of representative and *direct democratic forms*. The administrative organs — as executive-operative organs — really often practice the basic function of representative organs like, for instance, *deciding* in an important question concerning the interests of some collective. Even if the competence of representative organs is formally assured, the right proportion in the work of representative and administrative organs may be missing. Besides the legal possibility, other conditions are needed, too, that the representative organ can perform a meritorious work at making the decisions that are of basic importance in

respect of the function of the representative organ.<sup>10</sup> One of these conditions is, e. g., that the members of the representative organ should have all the *informations* necessary for a multilateral examination of the problems the most important for the community. Mentioning the notions that are used in the sociology in lack of informations, as a consequence of the representative organs may be but formal. These public bodies, some times in consequence of the personal, subjective mistakes of their members, at some other time because of some conditions not at all known or approved of by our government, are not possessing the knowledge, data, indicators possessed by the executive organs; in such cases the proposition is determining, in fact, the *decision*, giving rise among members of the representative organs to a suspicion that their role is but formal.

A similar contradiction may exist in our mechanism between the *body representing the collective and the collectivity of the members of community*. Sometimes the representative organs do not take in consideration that, at the solution of the tasks, the hearing of the whole membership of the collectives may be useful in that respect, too, that they will take part in carrying out the made decisions with a much greater intensity if at the decision also their opinion was taken into consideration. In some *basic decisions*, therefore, the best method is to give to the entire community a hearing. A fundamental area of direct democracy is a community of minor strength in which the members may multilaterally exchange their opinions, express their possible anxiety in connection with the would-be decision. In the organizations where there is an opportunity to negotiate personally, immediately the basic problems (brigades, smaller villages, etc.) and where it is really done, the *organic separation* that, if consolidated, causes inevitable bureaucratic tendencies, is minimized.<sup>11</sup>

The direct cooperation of the working people in the state affairs is regarded by the classics of Marxism as one of the most efficient measures of the defence against *bureaucracy*.<sup>12</sup> Our socialist political sciences constantly emphasize that our work of state construction has realized important results particularly by drawing the working people into the concrete administration of the tasks. It is doubtless that direct democracy must be realized first of all in the field of the administrative work in the future, as well. In the present phase of our development, however, we must take into consideration that we have a lot of possibilities to draw the working people into the *decisions*, as well. That would have a very positive influence on the further development of activity, too, by carrying out the administrative tasks and on forcing back the bureaucratic tendencies.

(b) In the last decade of the people's democratic development of our State we did much for developing the right proportions between functions of the

<sup>10</sup> From these conditions we don't mention those being functions of the method of construction and of the constructional pattern of the representative organization. About this problem cf. more fully: Ottó Bihari: *Representative democracy*. Social Review, 1965, Nos. 8—9, pp. 42 et sq., Hungarian).

<sup>11</sup> About harmonizing the peculiar functions of the direct and representative democratic forms cf. András Hegedüs, *Optimization and humanization*. Truth, Vol. 1965, No. 3, p. 29, Hungarian; István Szentpéteri: *Present role of the direct democratic institutions*. Social Review, 1965, No. 7, pp. 37 et sq., Hungarian).

<sup>12</sup> Cf.: Lenin, *State and revolution*. Lenin's Works, Vol. 25. Budapest, 1952, p. 523. (Hungarian translation).

central and local organs. The harmful consequences of the *exaggerated centralization* characterizing the initial period of our socialist state construction have already been successfully eliminated in a considerable part. The *local independence*, however, is still mortified here and there and, at the same time, there is a danger, too, that in cases where the point of view of a unit of higher degree (or that of the collectivity) ought to prevail there are, nevertheless, local, localpatriotic considerations decisive. The guarantees of the *local independence* may, therefore, be developed in a series of domains according to the principle that *the regional organs with the most perfect local experiences* should decide in the affairs of not-general interest. The centralization is, however, a factor restraining the evolution only in deciding fast and efficiently the so-called local questions. In other cases it is even a condition of the organizational consolidation that a parochial outlook, the local „par-simony” should be eliminated thoroughly from the administration.

(c) There are a lot of examples of harmful proportion changes in the organizational functioning in relations of the ramified and *functional* organs, as well.<sup>13</sup>

There is a tendency of detrimental consequences, documented well in the history of the socialist state construction in the U. S. S. R., that appeared in the *non-coordinated functioning of the functional organs* in a definite period.<sup>14</sup> The harmonization of functions of organizational units functioning on the basis of *line* and *functional* principles is eliminating, resp. preventing a lot of *anarchic* disorganizing manifestations. It is the task of the science of organization to establish exactly how the functional parts of the organs that increase, anyhow, the efficiency of their function may be connected with the help of a control method able to *accept the responsibility for the efficiency of the entire administrative activity*. The troubles produced by the predominance of functionalism are often called, with good reason, bureaucratic manifestations as they not *only* prolong the period of *accomplishment* of some task of an organ but — *nolens-volens* — they diminish, by upsetting the proportions, the *efficiency, maximal productivity* of the ramified and functional organs.

(d) The *not satisfying relations between individual and corporative organs* may also be classed among the disorder of the proportions between organs. In formal organisms the conditions of the participation in the procedure, construction and decision of the organs are laid down in norms. It is question-

<sup>13</sup> About the bureaucratic deficiencies produced in the state construction owing to the extreme centralism cf.: István Pozsonyi, *Causes of bureaucracy appearing in the council apparatus and the fight against them*. (State and Administration, Vol. 1954, Nos. June-July, pp. Hungarian). About the bureaucratic consequences of overcentralization in Ferenc economic relations cf.: G. Fülöp, *Economic problems of the Ferenc economic planning*. (Truth, 1965, No. 6, p. 71, Hungarian).

<sup>14</sup> About the mistakes connected with a unilateral functionalism in an older phase of the Soviet state development cf.: G. I. Petrov, *Soviet administrative law*. Budapest, 1963, pp. 166 et sq., Hungarian; further the analysis of István Kovács, *Foundations of the Soviet political and legal system*. (Ed.: László Névai), University lecture notes. Budapest, 1959, pp. 98 et sq., (Hungarian).

In motivation of the present reorganization of the direction of Soviet industry they often refer to the fact that the functional organs (people's economic councils) formed since 1957 have conduced, among others, also to the *bureaucratic* mistakes of organization.



nable, however, whether or not we everywhere find the exact line dividing the domains between functions and decisions of the corporative and individual organs in that manner that the least possibility remains for red-taping, kicking about a document, and administration of formal idling, etc.

Some may consider it an exaggeration that we are classing the harmful consequences of displacement of the organic-systematic *proportions* among the causes eliciting bureaucracy. It is doubtless that the negative effects of them *do not always get to the surface like bureaucratic manifestations*. This is the case in connection with almost every factor made known above as motives setting the development of bureaucracy on foot. At outlining the forms of the manifestation of bureaucracy we are, however, wishing to attest that in several cases they elicit a broadly interpreted bureaucratic tendency.

(3) Among the causes of bureaucratic manifestations we have to mention the *inadequacies of the legislating work*, and more nearly, those of the *legal technique*, as well. It would be, of course, a vulgarization to say that „bureaucracy is born” by the legal norms. Anyhow, the legal regulation is tending, partly, unquestionably towards a *stabilization*, fixation of the existing administrative relations. At elaborating the executing norms of the administrative tasks *the legal rules are establishing some patterns, as a matter of routine*. The antinomies between the abstractions of the legal rules and the effective formation of the legal rules that are to be arranged get to the surface, at the present accelerated *pace of life*, in a rather short time. Also the legislative work must face the problem that is so frequent at planning, technical development work, i. e., that the propositions become already out-of-date for the time when the plans are made in their details. In our legislative work we endeavoured consistently in the last decade to arrange as exactly as possible the administrative relations, for eliminating any *discretionary rule* that makes possible the *arbitrary actions*. An inadequate legal regulation — that in its abstractions does not follow the variations and developmentary trends of the real relations — increases, of course, the bureaucratic tendencies. And it is still more dangerous if the legal sources that were originally good, are accepting solutions becoming obsolete in consequence of the changing conditions. Without *revising continuously* the enormous quantity of *substantive* and *adjective* laws concerning the solution of the administrative tasks, and without substituting new adequate norms for the out-of-date rules, the danger of bureaucracy doubtless increases.

Among the factors causing bureaucratic distortions, finally the role of *subjective* elements, as well, is to be mentioned. The connection between bureaucracy and the deficiencies of the professional and political qualifications of persons having a leading role in the control of the organizational structure is generally known. Education and afterschool instruction have therefore always been considered, rightly, a tool of the antibureaucratic fight.<sup>15</sup> A considerable contribution to a more exact examination of the subjective factors of bureaucracy may anyhow be yielded by *personal psychology* and *social*

<sup>15</sup> Cf.: Dr. Ferenc Dallos, *The councils are the organs of the socialist democracy*. Budapest, 1964., p. 289, Hungarian; István Kovács—Imre Markója, *The fight against bureaucracy in the administration*. (Social Review, 1956, No. 9, pp. 28 et sq., Hungarian).

*psychology* that have made already concrete steps towards revealing the *character-criteria* of individuals inclined to bureaucracy and, as well, toward trying to clear up existence and development of the motives of bureaucratic behaviour.

### III.

#### FORMS OF APPEARANCE OF BUREAUCRACY

(1) It is not a recent observation in the political sciences that, in the administrative mechanism, stronger or weaker tendencies may gain ground for *increasing in a continuous and standing way their own organism*. It is extremely difficult to ascertain in which degree this endeavour expresses an objective need and where it passes the limit where we can already only speak about an over-developing of the organism by itself. It is generally known that, under modern social conditions, the *administrative organism* gets on with its standing growing in structure, in number of people in its staff. When can be said that the organism has *hypertrophied* the necessary size?

The boundary between *necessary* and *superfluous* can generally be established, in practice, only when in the organizational development, that initially was considered reasonable, later on *negative consequences of the organizational overgrowth* are calling our attention to some anomaly. In the beginning of the socialist revolutionary change, at creation of a considerable part of the administrative *organizational mechanism* which was necessary to carry out the highly multifold task-group waiting for realization, there was *no objective possibility for a „measurement“* preventing the constitutional elephantiasis. The *overorganization* was considered unavoidable by Lenin himself in the first phase of revolution,<sup>16</sup> but nothing was further from his thoughts than to consider it as a standing *concomitant* of the *socialist organization*. The constitutional overgrowth can be prevented in a definite phase of development, resp. the organization can be out back to the necessary size.

This ensues when, after the political and economical consolidation of the revolutionary results, it becomes *practicable to plan the functioning of organs more exactly, to carry out investigations analysing carefully whether or not the tasks and the mechanism necessary for administering are „economical“ ones*. As simple as this thesis is in principle it is as difficult to carry it out in practice. To prevent the overgrowth of an organism we need a science of organization with comparatively reliable measuring methods in respect of the efficiency of some procedures necessary to perform the tasks of our organs.<sup>17</sup>

In the socialist States — in this country, too — there have taken place several experiments in the recent period to measure the *administrative work*. For ascertaining an overgrowth, there are interesting first of all the investigations that want to reveal with exact methods the *load of work* and the *work carried out effectively* by the working people of some administrative organ-

<sup>16</sup> Cf.: Lenin, *About the work of the Soviet state apparatus*. Budapest, 1956, p. 79. (Hungarian transl.).

<sup>17</sup> Cf.: Dr. Ferenc Dallos, *The councils are the organs of the socialist democracy* Budapest, 1964, pp. 312 et sq., Hungarian; János Beér, *The most important factors influencing the level of state work*. (State and Administration, 1964, No. 1, p. 12, Hungarian).

parts. The investigations like these will doubtless contribute to establish possibly the personal capacity, organizational size necessary for some elements of the administrative activity. Because of the high degree of complexity of the administrative tasks, however, there are some procedural processes, complicated and hardly suitable for being typified, for the measurement of which the *science of organization* hasn't, as yet, any absolutely efficient methods. The direction of the formation and development of organizations in the most hierarchic organizations is demanding, therefore, practically — even besides the endeavours to take a previous measure of the organizational efficiency — first of all to *apply the lessons of a number of empirical observations*, to establish by *estimation the capacity* of the organ to be set up. etc.

A body qualified for forming the organ (or a part of its) is standing before extraordinary difficulties if it has to decide about establishing some new organ or extending an old one. The organizational unit *interested in the development* of organs always emphasizes in the preparatory work the points of view stressing the importance, weight and significance of the organ to-be (or of its part to-be). The initiating administrative organism generally blueprints the would-be apparatus upwards with a *maximal* loading. It reckons with every imaginable task of the organ at motivating the personal claims. It takes for a basis an *ideal* situation where the solution of tasks produces *maximal results* and the *formal prescriptions* (procedural rules) are carried out entirely, in their completeness. For supporting the personal, material, etc. demands of the organ to-be, they avail themselves of the frameworks given by the legal norms having erstwhile standardized to output norms on a level being rather low still — according to other conditions, etc. Apart from all these it is supposed that the different organs, as the experience shows, in the course of the revision of plans will anyway select the list of demands, therefore the proposer endeavours to raise more claims than needed objectively even for the maximal loading.

The bourgeois science of organization has recognized some relations, of a growing tendency of mechanism but, as well-known, it could not impede the organizational overgrowth with objective measurements. In the directing mechanism of private economy a resistance against the creation of new organizational elements is still relatively stronger because the capitalist is pondering every initiative strictly from the point of view of his immediate profit. In the *monopolistic organizations*, however, even the capitalists themselves cannot realize the measure of efficiency of some would-be organ thus there exist more favourable conditions for the development of an *economical bureaucracy*. In the sector of capitalistic State — capitalist, however, there are fewer and fewer factors turning against the demands of creating newer organizations. They consider therefore the *organizational overgrowth* to be more and more definitely objective that cannot be avoided.<sup>18</sup> The Parkinson rule raises a „thesis” with witty *irony* for establishing the measures of growth, resembling

<sup>18</sup> About the investigations carried out concerning the measurement of work-loading of some administrative organs cf.: Dr. József Balázs—Dr. István Forgó—Ferenc Juhari, *Measurement of the administrative work*. (State and Administration, 1965, No. 1, pp. 55 et sq., Hungarian); Dr. József Kovacsics, *Fact investigations concerning the analysis of the efficiency of administrative work at the Town Council in Székesfehérvár*. (State and Administration, 1965, No. 2, pp. 122 et sq., No. 3., pp. 227 et sq., Hungarian).

with not a little self-irony the science dealing with bureaucracy the English medical science in which if once a disease is recognized, denominated, described, and taken into consideration then the English are usually satisfied and prepared to begin investigating the next problem raised. Are they asked about the way of therapy then they are surprized and propose to employ penicillin and, anyhow, before or after it, to extract all teeth of the patient.<sup>19</sup>

Agains overgrowth of the organization under socialist conditions the most efficient help could be given to the organs, qualified for deciding, by a more developed science of organization. The socialist government organs from the beginning continue with observing anxiously the organizational demands of large size but they have, of course, in the interest of solving the new tasks getting constantly to the surface, to take fast and definted developing measures. *What may be the cause of being so extremely difficult to eliminate the exaggerating organizational claims?* The tasks waiting for a solution by the administrative organs are often so *unadapted for any programme* that it is to-day impossible, as yet, to look, over, in an exact way, the procedural method of being *optimally* carried out. And the more unsuited for any programme the procedure of decision of the administrative organs is, the more uncontrollable is the *reality of the claim* elaborated by the initiators. At the formation of organs the capacity of the would-be organ cannot be planned exactly. The framework of the total capacity of an organ must be confirmed with such a „latitude” that it will in practice never make use of. This administrative organizational endeavour may rightly be compared with the outlook of engineers at bridgebuilding, planning, reasonably and correctly, with a „security” of deflecting forces which the bridge built is never subjected to.<sup>20</sup> From the pont of view of the *capacity* of a would-be new organ-system or organ-element, there arose also the question of personal composition of the organizational unit, the problem, *what kind of qualifications the persons should have*, and whether or not people of a qualification like that can be found. The personal capacity of the single members — either depending upon their qualification or leaving it out of consideration — is very different. At the formation of an organ the planning of manpower-utilization takes place either reckoning with a *mean capacity* or with an *excellent dexterity* of the attainable employees. I have picked out but a circumstance or two for demonstrating how difficult the planning of the capacity and efficiency of a new organizational form is even if taking the ideal case that we are succeeding in outlining beforehand and exactly the course necessary for performing the task and in separating the different elements of its activity. (In reality, anyhow, this can be carried out but rather rarely, in case of simple enough tasks.)

Despite of all these difficulties, the socialist state construction generally prevents the assertion of exaggerated organizational demands at creating new organs, first of all by deciding these questions by high-level governmentary organs that are aware of the existing maximalist tendencies at organizations. The over-organization is, as a rule, a concomittant of the *later phase* of the

<sup>19</sup> C. Northcote Parkinson, *Parkinson's law or the school of self-assertion*. Budapest, 1964. (Hungarian translation).

<sup>20</sup> Cf.: R. K. Merton, *The nature and sources of pathological bureaucratic behaviour*. Ed. by R. Dubin, *Human relations in administration*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J. II. Ind ed., 1962, p. 151.

development of an organization created for carrying out some task-group, as well. In the organizational work the deliberation by *comparing the task and forces at our disposal* is possible, in practice, really but in the phases of the creation or further *personal enlargement* of the organ. We consider typical the state of *organizational overgrowth where the organization has fulfilled its function* in some of its elements, partly solving the tasks it was obliged to perform. On governmental level it is extremely difficult to follow continuously with attention how things stand objectively with the formation of task-groups, carrying out the purposes marked out being realized in some branch of administration.

Also the exact establishment of the competence of administrative organs — whether it takes place at creating the organ-group or posterior to it, e. g., at the council organs of special administration, etc. — may contribute to the development of an organizational mentality that conduces to an *organizational overgrowth*. The arrangement of competences in the statutes of organization and functioning of the line administration and the personal division of the administrative tasks in the single institutions endeavour to establish exactly the rights and duties of the single employees. Having that arrangement, the special organs resist any classification of *new tasks* into their competence that is not followed by a staff increase by the higher organs. The special organs of administration argue with taking into consideration in the rules of status essentially the maximal capacity of the organ and having, beyond that, no „free capacity”. They refer, as well, to all the circumstances in connection with which the higher organs rejected their claims for a development that they considered reasonable, producing by this decision itself a state of overloading. (The special organs would anyhow try, unnoticed, to augment continuously the administrative number of personnel if not impeded by governmental rules).<sup>21</sup> This argumentation of the organs of special administration may be accepted in some degree without, anyway, accepting it as a verification of a full utilization of the working capacity of organization. The higher special organs in some cases — for one reason or another — cannot give satisfaction to the reasonable claims to development, either resp. they cannot carry out a reasonable increase of numbers in the organization even parallelly with getting

<sup>21</sup> A guarantee of that is that, in socialist countries, the creation of new organizations is decided generally on governmental level, similarly to the possible staff increase in the existing administrative organs. The careful control of the existing administrative organs. The careful control of the initiations that contain, as a rule, too great demands, is carried out by an office functioning beside the government and presenting suggestions to it. The prevention of an unjustified staff increase of the existing apparatus has been the purpose of measures in the S. S. S. R. according to which the *staff-contingent* and *wage fund* must be registered, in the confirmed framework, at the competent financial organs. (Cf.: G. I. Petrov, *Soviet administrative law*. Budapest, 1963, pp. 169 et sq. Hungarian transl.). The practice of establishing the *staff norms* for preventing an organizational overgrowth has, so far, fallen short of its original purpose. Rightly is missing J. A. Tichomirov the lack of clearing some scientific measurements, some notional elements in the old practice; „there are not ascertained, as yet, the criteria of determining in the branches of the people's economy and culture the relation between the administrative staff and the productive personnel. In that relation, mainly the budget-financial method is prevailing...” J. A. Tichomirov, *The seasonable organizational and legal problems of the administrative work*. A Collection of Foreign Law Monographs. 1965., No. 3., p. 441., (Hungarian).

new tasks. Also that contributes to the causes of the state of *organizational overgrowth*, manifested particularly in the *inclination of the organism to reserve some capacity*. I. e., the administration „is hiding from the view” into other „*transitory*” parts its members whose tasks have already *ceased even formally to exist*. (And in the administration the circle of tasks no more carried out *really* but not terminated as yet by legal rules, is still much larger).

The continuous preservation of the right proportions between the task waiting for a real solution and the personal capacity and material force concentrated in the organization is therefore an extremely difficult problem at the organs qualified for carrying out *continuous* and *casual tasks*. An organization of bureaucratic inclination is *endeavouring to maintain* the personal staff of *organism*, even if the major part of the *functions* in its competence anyway ceased to exist. Even if it is constrained to cut down its functions, it does everything for placing the persons employed in the administrative organization at other organparts. At an organizational behaviour like that, the liquidation of some organpart often doesn't mean a simplification of the organization but only a reorganization where the administrative staff number remains unchanged. And the harmful consequences of the administrative „hydrocephaly” appear in the procedure, in the well-know evil that an organ like that wants to produce, at any price, on appearance of work.

The governmental organs apply, for liquidating the bureaucratic overgrowth, the weapon of a general *reduction of personnel*. In these cases, within the frames determined by the central organs, it is compulsory to dismiss a certain number of persons from the administration. This way of rationalization leaves it finally — within the given frames and with some directives — to the discretion of the leaders of the local administrative organs to dismiss the persons they want to. It depends upon them that the staff cut touches really those persons whose functional-political incompetence caused the most complaints. The general staff cuts — apart from creating situations that may be also subjectively highly unpleasant — give reason to complaints in the apparatus because they don't induce necessarily a *simplification of the working process* and, in consequence of that, the burdens of work of the single civil servants — although only temporarily, as experienced — do increase. The general staff cuts like these — in spite of every difficulty and problem joint with them — may be indispensable in case of an *overgrowth* of the organization. However, we may hope with good reason that, as the science of organization develops more and more, the state organization obtains methods making unnecessary these general staff cuts connected with lots of shocks and commotions.

In regard of the prevention of the organizational overgrowth, resp. the amputation of the administrative „hydrocephalic overgrowth” already produced, it will be highly important to measure in some objective *way the work load* in each of the administrative branches. Even if it is very difficult to obtain measurement results giving real pictures in case of a series of tasks, we must not be unwilling, to make these experiments. In some branches and in some working processes the measurements have produced some part-results even in the past, and we may expect to get sooner or later, improving our measuring methods, some results, expressing more exactly than any of the former ones the *optimal* size wich can produce, with a given investment, the best administrative results.

In the elimination of the overgrowth the machines applied in the administration may have a great role. We shall take into account not only the mechanization of the simplest work elements (e. g., registrations) but the machine may be „consulted” even at complicated non-programmed decisions, saving thus possibly a considerable „capacity” of persons.<sup>22</sup> Apart from the scientific results mentioned and found wanting above, only a few major factors are to be taken into consideration. In preventing the organizational over growth the well-functioning *representative* organs and generally the *social forces* have a not negligible role. They may play but a role of *brake*, of *resistance* against the tendencies striving, as a rule, for growing the organizations but as long as we cannot elaborate more exact scientific methods this limiting function cannot be dispensed with.

Another important measure against the bureaucratic growth of organizations is a continuous amendment of the *organizational systems* for being internally more and more *organized*. In some cases that can be expressed in a deconcentration of the organization. The overcentralization that may be observed in the large organisms is not characterized by a strong, firm central direction but by assuming a lot of local tasks by the main organs, hoping only thus an efficient performance of these tasks under the given conditions. An overcentralization like this considers to be a smaller mistake if the local parts aren't completely utilized or they are utilized but formally because of producing a not appropriate work. Sooner or later we must, however, inevitably take up the question of the *division of the organizational function* at which the leader of the local part may measure with full responsibility and real independence the use of the personal and material capacity at his disposal that assures the maximal efficiency of that capacity. This may, of course, not happen to the detriment of the central direction and even this makes possible a continuous raising of the level of the local organization by central guiding rules, using really scientific results.

In eliminating the tendencies that have an influence towards the overgrowth of the organization the *status* rules of the branch have some role, i. e., the *norms determining the internal order of functioning* of the single institutions; these eliminate the antinomies between the actual manpower redundancy of the administrative organization and the requirements. Anyhow, these are mostly the harmful remainders of the earlier unorganized states. In this way we can, namely, bring about a basis for a real comparison between the work load, actual capacity and the proper output of the working people of some territorial organs within the same administrative branch.

2. The other form-group of the appearance of bureaucracy may be considered *procedural* of *functional mistakes* of the administrative organs. The

<sup>22</sup> The problem of mechanization of the administrative organization is surpassing far the limits of our problems. For preventing the overgrowth of the organization, the possibilities of which are not cleared up at us, we have to reckon with the new „simulating”, etc. possibilities of machine calculation that can be applied in decisions of great complexity at other places — in the economic control, military decisions. About that problem cf.: Sándor Szalai, *Traditional and modern procedures in the organization of administration*. Multiplied material of the Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for the Science of Organization. *An up-to-date scientific foundation of leadership and administration and the practice of the education of leaders*. Compiled by Ferenc Erdei. Budapest, 1964, pp. 70 et sq., (Hungarian).

bureaucratic tendencies appearing in the form of procedural failures are manifested in different ways in the phases of the people's democratic state development.<sup>23</sup> In the period immediately following the socialist revolution the procedural forms were missing and the single phases of administration were unarranged by legal rules at solving the tasks of different character. With the expression of the science of organization, the solution of tasks has mostly taken place in the framework of an *unprogrammed* procedure.<sup>24</sup> It is also be taken into consideration as an antecedent that the competences have been rather unelucidated, the performance of any case could be postponed indefinitely both with exceptions to competence and with those to jurisdiction. And the procedures without programmes had the meaning that in accordance with the character of the extremely manifold new tasks there were no rules containing differentiated procedural processes exactly laying down the single phases of administration. This had some traditional causes, too, and on the other hand, it could be explained also by the peculiarities of the given phase of the revolutionary development. A regulation of the administrative procedure (i. e., its being programmed generally) was missing in Hungary before Liberation, and even in the more developed capitalistic countries its organization took place but in a few places.<sup>25</sup> The continuous, enormous changes following the year of change in the legal system have not made possible to begin this work. In the unprogrammed procedure, it was essentially trusted to the *socialist legal conscience* of the administrator what kind of informations he takes out in connection with the undecided problem, how many propositions he elaborates in his representations, whose opinion the deciding organ listens to and what points of view are prevailing at his making the decision, and how to control the execution of the content of decision. In the initial phase of the socialist state development, the bureaucratic procedural failure of „passing the buck to another department” took, therefore, its origin in the lack of procedural rules or regulations.

These being the conditions of procedure, the administrator has examined every single case *individually* seeing in it a problem differing from every other problem. They could, of course, not overcome the feeling concerning the concrete tasks increasing more and more in number that the organization with its determined personal capacity cannot cope with these increasing new tasks. The period of the unprogrammed administrative procedures has deve-

<sup>23</sup> About the appearance of procedural mistakes in the bourgeois state organization cf.: M. Rice Sharp, *Procedural Vices: La Paperasserie*. R. K. Merton — A. P. Garay — B. Hockey — H. C. Selvin, *Reader in bureaucracy*. Illinois, 1960, pp. 408 et sq.

<sup>24</sup> About programmed and non-programmed procedures of decision cf.: Sándor Szalai: *Programmed and non-programmed decisions*. Multiplied edition of the Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for the Science of Organization. *An up-to-date scientific foundation of leadership and administration and the practice of the education of leaders*. Compiled by Ferenc Erdei. Budapest, 1964, pp. 63 et sq. (Hungarian), Further on cf. „The theory of administrative decisions”. J. A. Tichomirov, *The seasonable organizational and legal problems of the administrative work*. A Collection of Foreign Law Monographs. 1965, No. 3, pp. 446 et sq. (Hungarian transl.).

<sup>25</sup> The codification of the administrative procedure has been motivated in the capitalistic States, as well, first of all from the point of view of decreasing bureaucracy. Cf.: *The administrative procedure*. Monograph and notes written by Ferenc Toldi. Budapest, 1957, p. 7. (Hungarian).



loped, therefore, a claim in the apparatus that *the new tasks can be satisfied only by enlarging the organization.*

Since 1957, we have taken long steps forward in the organizational administrative work in fixing the *competences* of the administrative organs with exact legal rules and, as well, in *arranging the functional procedures*. The so-called status-rules, giving a taxative enumeration of the tasks expected to be realized by some line administrative organ, have been elaborated and confirmed in different instances of the administrative organs. In 1957 a law was enacted about administrative procedure *generally arranging*, apart from some special administrative branches, *the procedural processes*. The *procedural processes have been made programmed* in a more and more complete degree by several other legal rules, as well.

In some *elements* of the administrative procedure, however, the still existing lack of being programmed, or *some programmes carried out wrongly*, may *conduce us to bureaucratic mistakes*. In the course of administration — apart from the entirely simple administrative tasks — the administrative elements contained generally in every organizational process may be limited. Even if there are still some debates concerning the exact number and content of these phases of leading, the opinion distinguishing four such elements of leading is more and more accepted; these are information, analysis (proposal), decision and control. The programming of the administrative work tries to circumscribe more or less tightly or loosely what the administrative organs *have to do* in the different cases in the single phases. The mistakes of *procedure of functioning* can occur in any functioning phase.

Among the procedural and functional mistakes the innumerable sorts of *assemblings of data, registers and reports*, demanded by the higher organs *sub titulo information*, have a great „tradition“. It is doubtless that a basic condition of the right decisions is to get the *informative* material necessary for a multilateral elaboration of projects. The different administrative organs, however, have sent (and even do send at present, too) directions without mature consideration, a great quantity of questionnaires to the subordinate organs. These quickly made informations could practically scarcely be used, similarly to some groups of the official statistical informations (although just this fact was one of the reasons of the extraordinary informations). The Central Bureau of Statistics repeatedly endeavoured to eliminate the so-called „black statistics“, this problem has remained (even if not so gravely as in the past) unsolved even to-day. On the lower level of administration people are often complaining rightly about the exaggeration of compulsory informations. That complaint is reasonable first of all, if they are demanded to furnish, besides the confirmed obligation of giving informations, data that are available for the demanding organ in other registrations (records, dossiers), as well: On the other hand, the leaders often need more recent particular supplementary data, apart from the ordinary informations, before making more complicated, complex decisions.

In case of a considerable part of tasks, the programmed administration has made much easier the situation of administrator. The executing administrative organ conduces the affair through phases determined exactly on the basis of the programmed procedural rules exercising a definite function in the complex of administration. In a considerable — but in its character

rather simple — group of administrative tasks the course of administration has become immensely easier, the *typization* fixed in legal norms coming into prominence instead of the *individualization* of affairs.

With the programmed procedure the other forms of the bureaucratic procedural mistakes have come into the limelight. The *routine-like practice* of the administrative organ that has developed on the basis of procedural rules predisposes the executive organ to class the given affair schematically into some category created by a legal rule even if that procedural method is not the most suitable for administering it. *In the present phase of our socialist state construction just this routine-like administrative procedure of the organs means one of the main dangers from the point of view of a functional bureaucracy.* In the execution there may develop a feeling that it is responsible not for deciding an affair on its merits, with maximal efficiency, but only respecting some procedural formalism. A decision made in a formally adequate procedure is making it, according to its impression, irresponsible even if it does not meet in every way the general human points of view. At the simple administrative tasks, it is true, there is no particular problem, all the more it may be dangerous to have a routine-like procedure in the deciding processes of higher degree that are trying to harmonize many kinds of regards, as well in cases touching the major interests of citizens.

Much as they have endeavoured to regulate with prevision and in details the procedural and administrative methods, it has been impossible to normate them concerning every complex administrative task. The state control of national economy — particularly its planning — as well the general administrative work want a lot of highly important and basic decisions made which *could not be programmed, so far.* In the field of performing the tasks of extreme complexity there are still prevailing the same harmful tendencies as those mentioned generally in connection with the programming procedure that was missing in the first phase of the socialist state construction. A decision about the program of our largest industrial investments and the determination of the purposes of a more developed agricultural production suppose in their complexity a knowledge of interconnections of the proportions of the reciprocal effects of several different factors not easy to survey. The tasks of particular complexity like these are so much *individual* ones that, as a rule, they cannot be programmed according to our present knowledge.

On the other hand, in an administration carried out with an unprogrammed procedure, there are several opportunities for *protracting* the administrative course, inserting *superfluous, practically repeated* (i. e. *uselless*) opportunities to work. This bureaucratic procedural mistake does a particular damage first of all by *wasting* valuable — sometimes irreplaceable — *time* in the course of administration.<sup>27</sup> At these task-groups to be realized, the

<sup>26</sup> Concerning that see: Tivadar Gál, *Rationalization of the administration.* (State and Administration, 1950, No. June—July, pp. 429—430, Hungarian), József Kovacsics, *Bureaucracy in the work of the administrative statistics.* (State and Administration, 1951, Nr. March—April, pp. 217 et sq. Hungarian).

<sup>27</sup> In important affairs difficult to survey the loss of time, that is a consequence of the non-programmed or badly-programmed procedure, is extremely harmful, but the most deterrent is the surplus of time and work caused by it before making even *relatively simple* decisions. J. A. Tychemirov rightly calls the attention to that

unprogrammed procedurs of decision, resp. a „*universal programme*” taking the place of that is still making its harmful consequences feel in the „old” way. „A necessity of not-programmed decisions — as Sándor Szalai writes — arises in the most cases only in *definite points of level* of the administrative organization. It is to say, that in every other point or level, as an *adequate programme is missing*, immediately a »universal programme« prevails, saying: »It does not belong to our competence« or: »We are to refer the question to our superior authority.«”<sup>28</sup> In complex cases, the organ responsible for the decision often tries to *divide the responsibility with other organs by asking for the expert opinion of as many organs as possible* in the case. According to the experience of the administrative organization, namely, the more organs have taken position about some task, the less *the proportion of responsibility for the made concrete decision can be established*. The organ making the final decision can, namely, refer, at any occasion, to several other organs whose opinios proved to be defective or not fully satisfying in practice, and also the concerned institution can defend itself with several circumstances the objectivity of wich can hardly be established from outside. The more complex the tasks are the less can the decision be programmed and, accordingly, the more the deciding organ needs to perform a procedure on the basis of wich it may throw the responsibility — at least subsequently — partly to other ones. After all, the delay of deciding at tasks of this character — often implying some major damages — can only be prevented by a *standing raising* of the *professional and political preparness* and disposing, at the same time, of a well-arranged institutional framework to furthering to them the scientific results that are the most up-to-date in the given period.<sup>29</sup>

In the modern science of organization there are to-day already made efforts to investigate the procedures and methods with the help of which it is possible to blueprint rationally the most complicated deciding operations.<sup>30</sup> Also some results of the sciences of line organizations (organization of economy, etc.) may more and more contribute to the advancement of the general theory of organization in that domain.

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with these superfluous procedural phases the organ obliged by a legal rule to make a decision very often tries to cover itself for shifting the responsibility, at least partly to anybody else. Cf.: J. A. Tichomirov, *The seasonable organizational and legal problems of the administrative work*. A Collection of Foreign Law Monographs. 1965, No. 3, p. 44. (Hungarian transl.)

<sup>28</sup> Sándor Szalai, *Programmed and non-programmed decisions*. Multiplied edition of the Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Science for the Science of Organization. *An up-to-date scientific foundation of leadership and administration and the practice of the education of leaders*. Compiled by Ferenc Erdei. Budapest, 1964, p. 68. (Hungarian).

<sup>29</sup> A delay is often caused just by the differing scientific opinios. On the other hand, it is — under other conditions — a problem of the *organization of science*, as well, how something „most up-to-date”, that can be decided but difficultly, may get to the governmental and upper administrative organs.

<sup>30</sup> Although the formulae of the bourgeois science of organization cannot be taken over, it may nevertheless be of inspiring effect if we study the enormous literary material that is investigating the processes of an optimal decision. From the works dealing with this problem cf.: C. West Churchman, *Prediction and Optimal Decision*. London, 1961; J. G. March — H. W. Burck — B. Sapin, *The decisions-making approach*. Published in: H. Eulaw — S. J. Eldersveld — N. Jannowitz, *Political behavior*. Illinois. 2 nd ed., 1959, pp. 352 et sq.

In connection with the procedural mistakes we have to mention the harmful consequences of the deficiencies of legal organizations, too. It is verified both by organizational experiences and by scientific observations that an *overprogrammed, over-regulated* administration, as well, may result in harmful consequences. The hands of administrators are, namely, bound by these rules even in cases where an *individual dexterity in initiation* and inventiveness could find better possibilities than those proscribed by the over-programmed procedures. The problem of the legal regulating technique is mostly whether or not the legislator can properly determine the procedure defining the powers and limits of a necessary programming and of the individual initiating ability of the executive persons. Anyway, the legal organization *can deform, with overregulation, the course of execution in a bureaucratic direction*, by limiting the initiative of individual leaders, developing an inclination to contempt the contradictions of form and facts. In connection with the character of regulations, we have to mention the *exceptions* made to the general rules. An exception is, in fact, a breaking through the programmed procedure by the legislator. The programmed procedure may, of course, not be considered as an inviolable and sacrosanct dogma, and it would be a failure to decline to make a regulation that is reckoning with the peculiar situations and differing from the general one. On the other hand, a programming procedure creating *several exceptions* to the power of a general rule throws difficulties into the way of carrying out the legal rule and makes possible to protract the course of procedure. And another danger, too, may emerge as a consequence of an *unsatisfactory legal regulation*. A legislator may have arranged a decisionmaking procedure on a too large scale, too, without performing the necessary generalizations. A regulation like that, however, induces the organs of the national administrative execution in the *direction of an exaggerated individualization*.

It is obvious from all these that a procedural mistake may be very manifold and it appears in some definite phases of the historical formation of the development of States in different main forms. Here we are again facing the problem of *proportions*. The extremes (unprogrammed and completely programmed procedures) *conduce, us, similarly, procedural mistakes*, even if with different signs. The elimination of procedural mistakes, therefore, depends upon the combinations assuring the maximal efficiency in the course of procedure.

3. The most dangerous form of appearance of bureaucracy is the development of a peculiar *„red-tapism“*. Bureaucracy may *congeal to be a system*, may become characteristic of the *style of leadership*, may get to the surface in the *whole habit* of the civil servants and, obviously, in the single acts, as well, delivered in the course of functioning of the organization. Having investigated bureaucracy above as an organizational overdevelopment and procedural mistake, we regarded it first of all as a distortion of one element of more of the organizational *structure and function*. Therefore, the deliberation of *proportions* had always such a great significance. Bureaucracy is getting its *most devastating and most insurmountable* shape after being congealed to be a peculiar style of work. A procedural failure as a *casual* bureaucratic mistake may be made even by an organ functioning the most efficiently; if, however, the *leading style* and the *behaviour of the officials* of

an organization is generally taking bureaucratic features then that organization becomes more and more *estranged* from human purposes, growing to get a power over the society.

The question is whether we need to deal with this shape of bureaucracy. Whether or not in socialist relations, this extreme form of organizational *distortion* may be produced at all? It is doubtless that the socialist mechanism has produced since the revolution a lot of measures that serve just for preventing bureaucracy. This bureaucracy is a *concomitant of the bourgeois administrative system*, in its extreme shape it could develop under the conditions of the socio-political relations there. Some *single elements* of the bureaucratic red-tape *habit* may, anyhow, come about — although *not generally* — at us, too, under certain conditions. Just by calling the attention even to its milder forms already at the beginning of their formation, we can hinder them from getting even in single cases a more developed shape. Also we ought to take into account a possibility of distortions like these because of the existence of some *formal factors, structural patterns* which — though our social system is basically resisting that bureaucracy — may have an influence in that direction, even besides the good political content, if some subjective conditions are supporting them. It is particularly actual to speak about all that in the present phase of our socialist state construction because the arrangement of powers, the growing division of labour between the organs, and particularly the *detailed legal regulation of the procedural relations* may be a starting point in some extent — as discussed later on — form some tendencies like these. Bureaucracy that appears here and there as a casual mistake may, namely, get repeated and, in this way, it can turn from a wrong *routine to an organizational working style*. A description and characterization of different fully developed features of the bureaucratic habit may, *perhaps*, be helpful in eliminating even its manifestations being moderately latent still in the bud.

The bureaucratic institutional habit is often vividly *characterized as an arteriosclerosis of the organization*.<sup>31</sup> They enumerate the basic symptoms of the senescence of the institution among the forms of manifestation of bureaucracy.<sup>32</sup>

These vivid expressions, themselves, are referring to the fact that for a tendency like this — besides the causes evoking the different forms of the bureaucratic manifestations — the *interrelation between the „age” of organization and the peculiar social factors* has, in fact, anyway a decisive importance. I. e., the development of organizational life is endangered by different *possibilities of distortion* in different historical phases. The *peculiar danger of distortion* of an administrative mechanism getting into a solid, „grown-up” age is the *bureaucratic habit*. That is to say, as long as the organization is still young, there is but a smaller probability for this form of bureaucracy

<sup>31</sup> Marshall E. Dimock, *Bureaucracy self-examined*. Publ. in: *Reader in bureaucracy*. Ed.: R. K. Merton — A. P. Gray — B. Hockey — H. C. Selvin. Illinois, 1960, 2 nd ed., p. 402; F. Morstein Marx, *Einführung in die Bürokratie*. Neuwied, 1959, p. 38.

<sup>32</sup> The last stage of development of the organizational senescence is caricatured very appropriately, even in the title, by Parkinson, in Chapter „Intichitis or Paretic Paralysis”. Cf.: C. Northcote Parkinson, *Parkinson's Law or the school of self-assertion*. Budapest, 1964, pp. 135 et sq. (Hungarian translation).

being possibly created. We shall discuss later on, when speaking in details about the measures to be applied against the bureaucratic habit, why the „young” organizations are more resistant to these harmful tendencies. We are, anyhow, mentioning already here that the socialist revolutionary practice has produced a lot of formulae with the help of which the mechanism can be supplied with fresh energies, preventing, resp. finishing the organizational handicaps connected with „senescence”.

This problem appears on a higher level of the socialist organizational development similarly to any society of an organization of high degree. When the fight against the bourgeois state forms was a central question in this country, there consequently belonged to smashing to pieces the old apparatus also the liquidation of the *bureaucratic habit*. On the other hand, the development and improvement of the socialist administrative organization, manifested, partly in the *formalization of the organization* (arranged competences, programmed functioning, etc.), are again laying a new stress, *from another aspect*, upon the struggle against the peculiar bureaucratic danger of formalism. A bureaucratic habit is the style of working with bad result that may appear in case of an organization of high level, of a procedure regulated far-reaching. The harmful manifestations of „redtatism” are anyway *formalist* mistakes. The bureaucratic habit comes about if in a strongly formalized organization the *revolutionary conscience of law* in the administration, that has meant a compass in the procedures non-programmed, becomes blunted. A formalist administrative specialist can reason his procedure and decision in almost hundred percentage, referring to the various norms. Nevertheless, the part, being extremely little in a single case, in which he wrongly or incorrectly grasps some rule — or in which he does not know a relevant rule — may conduce to thoroughly bad and obviously incorrect decision. We must reckon with the fact that a highly regulated administrative organization makes blunted at some persons, even in socialist circumstances and under certain conditions, the socialist revolutionary conscience of law.

In the first, comparatively unregulated, phase of the socialist administrative organization the main opportunity for mistakes was to be found in the lack of *formal guarantees* with the help of which it would have been possible to prevent the administrative decisions that were well-intentioned from the revolutionary point of view yet having a pernicious effect because of hurting the legal interests of citizens. The *revolutionary conscience of law* of the administrators has surmounted, by and large, the problem originated in the lack of legal rules or in their shortcomings. Already Robespierre called the attention to that the revolutionary firmness of administrators may substitute the legal rules.<sup>33</sup> That could be, of course, but a transitory solution. The revolutionary conscience of law cannot substitute at all for a detailed regulation of the relations and for the possibly most exact fixation of the procedures. At present, however, a synthesis is doubtlessly contained in the demand that after the formal constituents elaborated we mustn't *forget* the care for, and development of, the *revolutionary conscience of law* of the administrators, either, because they cannot be familiar with the unprogrammed procedural phases and the details of the different rules themselves.

<sup>33</sup> Cf.: M. Robespierre's *memoirs*. Budapest, 1944, p. 83. (Hungarian transl.).

a) What is manifested the *institutional bureaucratic* habit in, or an otherwise *formulated* constitutional „senescence“? The literature of organizational science considers, uniformly enough, the deformation of the *style of leading* the primary starting point of the manifestations following the senescence of an organization. A bureaucratic structure of leadership may develop as a result of highly different factors. Among them there are personal endowments like *rigidity*, an inclination to *formalism*, etc. The organizational distortion is magnified if the leading cannot uphold the level concerning the more and more growing professional political requirements. Then it is behind with the self-instruction, does not know the sociological normativities of the institutional structures, etc. A leadership being behind with the requirements is limiting the way of unfolding of talents within the institution because it instinctively imagines an adversary in every subordinate waking, with his particularly good work, the thought in the organs on a higher degree of hierarchy that he is not irreplaceable.

The institutional bureaucratic habit may develop in the relations *between the exempted and not professional members* of the body steering the organization in case of some disturbances in the relation of a one-man manager and the body controlling him. In the course of the managing work, in the leaders of the organizational life the conviction may develop that the successful solution of tasks has *only one guarantee*: his expert knowledge, organizatory ability, and the professional work of the apparatus under his management. The social factors of the organization can tell him „nothing new“, their proposals are not moving on the ground of reality, they don't reckon with the „exigencies“ — i. e. with the purposes able to be realized by the administrative organization under the given politico-economical conditions. Under certain conditions the professional leaders are inclined to be led to the conclusion that the social factors do not (or do but in a very small degree) contribute to deciding the problems on their merits, and in the field of execution they cannot propose any adequate methods for being usefully applied by the apparatus.

At some territorial organizations there are deeply rooted opinions, regarded as objective normativities, that the *actual* decisions of the body — in spite of every contrary effort — are made but by a few men, the persons carrying out (owing to their long practical experience) professionally the administrative work. The non-exempted members of the executive committees — they say for instance — cannot have the expert knowledge on a high enough level necessary for deciding the present extremely multilateral, technical, economic and legal problems that need an enormous review.

These opinions may reflect, in some places of our institutional system, the *real facts*, yet it would be a *bureaucratic* outlook to led by that to the conclusion that the *social element* is superfluous. If the facts described above evidence a *complete passivity* of the social element so we have to change that situation; the way to that being, however, the restoration (or developing) of the proper functions of the *social and professional* organizational factors. This is not an easy task simple to be solved but we are referring to some of its elements as examples. If such tendencies are developing we must meditate on the nominating work preparing the election of these bodily organs, whether or not in the course of that the persons proposed for nomination

were those which, inside the community, had really the greatest expert knowledge, practical experiences, well-founded high reputation. On the other hand, an amendment of the communicating system became necessary for preventing the decisions of bodily organs from becoming merely formal. The not exempted members of bodily organs often do, namely, not possess the knowledge needed for taking part in the complex meritory decisions. The legal frames enable each of the members of the representative organ, in principle, to get these informations. Yet it seems from some experimences that this fact itself is not enough. We should have to see after that, through the „canals of communication”, these indices of basic importance, etc. do reach every delegate. Some are interposing an objection that the delegates are informed in details about the economical (budget) capacity, the organizational etc. conditions by the reports and proposals. About that we can only say that, unfortunately, the documents yielding informations are, to some extent, difficult to be surveyed, resp to be understood by those who are not familiar with the special terminology and dividing points of view of the administrative branch.

b) The *bureaucratic habit* that begins to develop on the side of the leadership of organization may weave through some details of the administrative mechanism. In these components of the organization there are becoming dominant some peculiarities satirized and unmasked in the belles-lettres, as well; however, the defense against their subversive social effect is not at all a simple problem.

One form of the manifestation of the bureaucratized administrative organizational habit of harmful effect is the development of a peculiar official system of the *defence of prestige*.<sup>34</sup> In a bureaucratized organization, the direction of the *conformity* of the civil servants has a harmful influence on the basic aims of the organization.<sup>35</sup> In the division of labour of the administrative organization, the officials become more and more aware of the efficiency of their work depending upon the cooperation of their fellow officials. An element of administration, being however adequate, may be differently valued depending upon the good will or bad will of specialists that take part in carrying out the task. That is the cause of the strong *conformity* existing between the members of the expert apparatuses: I must be loyal to my colleagues as the administrative mechanism is such that my detail work, even if carried out with the best intention, diligence and expert knowledge, may be demonstrated negative, ineffective and inadequate in the processes of the *whole administration*.

The members of the organization that are inclined to bureaucracy do acknowledge unconditionally the primacy and „*spiritual superiority*” of the entire organization, the office. The *interest of office* (in a bureaucratized organization) is separated and overcomes the purpose for the service of

<sup>34</sup> About the bureaucratic prestige cf.: N. J. Powell, *Personnel administration in government*. Englewood Cliffs. N. J., 1956, pp. 22 et sq.

<sup>35</sup> About the overconformity of officials cf.: R. K. Merton, *The nature and sources of pathological bureaucratic behavior*. Ed. by Robert Dubin, *Human relations in administration*. Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962, pp. 151 et sq.; F. Morstein Marx, *Einführung in die Bürokratie*. Neuwied, 1959, pp. 39 et sq.; P. M. Blau, *The dynamics of bureaucracy*. Chicago—London, 2 nd ed., 1963, pp. 232 et sq.



which the organization was created. This is one of the bases of the development of a *separate mentality of officials*.

The conformity of the members of the bureaucratized organization is manifested in the defence of the *civil service prestige*, in one of its most extreme forms. They try to *justify* even the obviously *wrong, erroneous, inefficient* dispositions, made by one member of the organ or by another one, with the help of a grotesque conception of the official authority. The basis of that defence of prestige is an „obligation of mutual defence”, originating in an increased conformity. Any civil servant may get into a situation — either in consequence of an objective cause or because of his own personal circumstances — where he can be liberated from the danger of individual responsibility only by a mutual taking of responsibility. In a bureaucratic organization, therefore, the *lines of responsibility* — that are anyway to be observed more and more difficultly, owing to the division of labour — are to be surveyed even more difficultly, owing to the defence of prestige. The overconformity of specialists — for some time and till some level — is able to defend the members of a bureaucratic organization on the „basis of principle” that „everybody may commit mistakes”, to-day I have got into a situation like that but tomorrow you will get into, our mutual interest is „to help one another”.

The „defence of prestige” by officials is *taking collective responsibility* by the whole bureaucratic organization in cases where against some member of its there exists the danger to be called to individual account. The office knows that it is anyway exposed to some odium in such cases — however cleverly it is whitewashed. Yet they can defend their misconstrued mutual interests by decomposing the burden of the individual responsibility into so small details which the whole collective is able „to forbear with”. The „defence of prestige” of a bureaucratic organization has, therefore, the fundamental aim to exculpate an official from being called to individual account and from the consequences of that.

Any elements of a bureaucratic structure are bound by the „professional interest”. To be sure, *conformity* is not of the same intensity between the different degrees of the official hierarchy but, after all, it joins the entire bureaucratic organization in some degree of common interests. This internal conformity, as well, is participating in the endeavour of the bureaucratic organization to resist any change that would endanger the interest already „harmonized”.<sup>36</sup> That is the source of one of the very important symptoms of the bureaucratic organization: *resistance to every planned change touching the personal staff*. The office does not defend, of course, the persons contravening gravely the „spirit of specialists”, violating the norm made

<sup>36</sup> The difficult position of an administrative reformer, the antagonism against any rationalizing blueprints, and generally the grotesque „red-tapism” are drawn very plastically by Balzac's novel, „*The civil servants*”. He characterizes Rabourdin's reforms-plans and the official antagonism against them in the following way: „His system, therefore, was based on a reorganization and manifested in new administrative technical terms. This is, perhaps, the cause of hate brought about by reformers against themselves. The cancellations required by the improvements, misunderstood at first, are threatening the vital conditions of those wanting not to accept any change in their conditions.” Balzac, *Comédie humaine*, vol. VI, Budapest, 1963, p. 891 (Hungarian translation).

by the group of harmful nature. The bureaucratic organization endeavours, too, to throw out of itself those making themselves noticed by a „too good work”, and it „lets drop” its members that, because of their poor professional or moral endowments, could not be raised, upon an acceptable level indispensable for preserving the professional authority, although their responsibilities were repeatedly undertaken by their colleagues.

The *resistance* of the bureaucratic organization after a personal change in leadership is obvious.<sup>37</sup> A leader brought from outside is particularly inclined to deal, as a first step, with major *reform blueprints* concerning the functioning of the organization. He is, however, awakened by the bureaucratic organization, in a mild or rude way, to the official conformity that he must adjust himself to, otherwise loosing the „air for breathing around him”. The large-scale conceptions, formed by the new leaders concerning organization and function of the organization, are very often prepared, in fact, without knowing the personal, organizational material conditions and, therefore, they may contain much of irreality. And the bureaucratic organization *resists* even the plans of the *changes* being highly actual and sometimes expressly unavoidable. The greater routine the apparatus has and the stronger conformity is, the more the new leader is resisted by the officials.

The office endeavours in a lot of ways to discredit the „reform plans”.<sup>38</sup> First of all it demonstrates the *responsibility* they may be connected with. The result of reforms depends upon a lot of factors that are not depending on the leader: he has, therefore, because of his hazardous plans, to take the risk without having practically any possibility of a control. A vivid description of the danger of the individual *risk* and *responsibility* is the first obstacle thrown by the office against the reforms. A rather energetic leader will, anyhow, be reluctant to abandon therefore alone his main conceptions. However, even a leader starting with a great initiative will experience how cunning and stubborn and, at the same time, elusive the *resistance* of the bureaucratic specialists is against any reform. The fight between the leader and bureaucracy is, of course, not of a preestablished consequence, but qualities much higher than average ones are needed for crushing the resistance by a bureaucratic mechanism of routine. The leader needs an extraordinary vigilance, rapid glance, professional-political firmness, strategical and tactical sense for realizing his purposes completely even despite of the *resistance of office*. Bureaucracy tries everything to discredit the conceptions of the leader, to present them the public opinion as nonsense, etc. The bureaucratic resistance quietly sabotages the work, if possible, in the course of the procedure of realizing the aims, and even it takes definite „steps” to prevent

<sup>37</sup> About the „resistance” of officials, its forms and content, see in details: Marshall E. Dimock, *Bureaucracy self-examined*. Ed. in: *Reader in bureaucracy*. Ed.: R. K. Merton — A. P. Gray — B. Hockey — C. Selvin. Illinois. 2nd ed. 1966, pp. 403 et sq.

<sup>38</sup> A lot of statements, affecting scholarly airs, are made by the bourgeois group-sociology about conditions and methods of the „group-norm”. There are discussed problems like „conformity: a clue to influence” or „why the leader has to be conform”, etc. (Cf.: Sindney Verba, *Small groups and political behavior*. Princeton, 1961, pp. 186, 188.). On the other hand, they are giving the capitalistic undertakings and bourgeois administration councils, that are not all useless, in problems like: „how can be a leader reformer and conformist”, etc. (S. Verba: op. cit., pp. 196 et sq.).

the prospective results, if there is no particular fear of being detected. Bureaucracy, for realizing its „own official plans”, is gathering its *personal connections* developed during the old cooperation with higher instances of the organizational hierarchy. And it tries to turn the major bodies against the „unreflecting”, „revolutionizing” leader through the delegates controlling the administrative mechanism and being in good acquaintance and connection with the office since a longer time. The leader will experience how many legal, procedural impediments will be brought up in the most different phases of the operations to be discharged, etc.

The observation of the force of the bureaucratic resistance will convince a number of leaders experimenting with reforms that they can reckon with the support of their purposes only in case of some *compromises*. The new leader must comply with the *bureaucratic structure*, he must accept the „official spirit” (that the office is above its members, *l'art pour l'art*), he must evidence that he grows comfortable with the members of organization (entering the mutual defence system), he must declare that he fundamentally accepts the old group norms as valuable, etc. Then the *homogeneity* of the administrative organization is getting restored in the spirit of bureaucracy, and the *appearance* of a *harmonious* state of repose, appearing productive in the eyes of outside observers, is substituting the phase „charged with conflicts.” This „harmony” is of course, a state of *unproductivity* following bureaucracy, that succeeds in solving every problem „with good results”, seen on the surface, but the only important thing for it being to show the appearance of a good work.

c) The fight against the „official spirit” developed at the bureaucratic structure is the *most difficult form* of the struggle against bureaucracy. The organizational overgrowth and the procedural mistakes can essentially be derived from *formal* causes, therefore the *improvement of the organizational solutions* will doubtlessly be helpful, and even a complete elimination of the failure can take place alone by amending the *organization*, as it is possible under the given concrete conditions. On the other hand, the harmful consequences of the bureaucratic organization cannot be solved by amending merely the *formal* (organizational and legal) framework. The elimination of „red-tapism” is needing a multilateral treatment, „medical interventions” of different character. This form of the developed bureaucracy is considered in the bourgeois literature almost *irremediable*. This is, of course, but a generalization valid only for the bourgeois relations, not for those in Socialism. The socialist revolutionary practice has created the guarantees in case of which this organizational disease cannot get a developed form. For prevention, we have partly to restore certain elements of the revolutionary traditions — where they are forgotten or have become merely formal — or partly — in case of growth of the *administrative* organization — the socialist science has to answer the new problems produced by the formal side coming strongly into prominence. The methods and forms of the fight against these bureaucratic distortions are detailed in a lot of branches of social sciences. The foundation is laid by *Marxism-Leninism*. Against the formal sides of bureaucracy efficient weapons are offered by the *political* and *legal sciences*, as well by the *science of organization*. For revealing the essence of the bureaucratic structure and for starting of the elimination of it as a social manifestation,

some *structure-sociological* knowledge is indispensable, completed by some investigations of social-psychology and *individual psychology* that reveal the individual features of the persons participating in the organizational structure and *their connections with bureaucratic tendencies*. The chiefs of the administrative organizational *leading*, and the representative organs controlling them, have, therefore, to apply the results, of every science to-day, for *finding measures* to cease the most different causes that evoke bureaucratic tendencies.

A completely detailed treatment of the procedures used against bureaucracy would exceed our present task. And we cannot follow, either, even if *analyzing the manifestations of bureaucracy*, the example of the bourgeois scholars who, after having described the „disease”, consider their task fulfilled. What are the measures recommended by the revolutionary practice, Marxism-Leninism, and the different ramified sciences for fighting against bureaucracy? In a very brief account, risking even to be misunderstood, we can outline these, as follows.

On every level of the socialist mechanism, at the top of power there are standing *representative organs*. Lenin saw that the function of the proper representative organs may prevent the development of bureaucratic tendencies in the administration. The socialist representation can respond to task if it unites in itself the functions of legislation (decision) and execution.<sup>39</sup>

The socialist representation has to *control de facto* the work of the organs of general competence and of those with specialized power, as well.

The representation, and the citizens directly, must get an institutional framework, assuring the real conditions for being able to establish the *responsibility* on every level of administration for the activity of the organs and persons, and, if necessary, to call them to account.

A fundamental guarantee of realizing the responsibility is the right to recall each of the civil servants (and expert) (*revocation*). The legal possibility in itself is, anyhow, not enough since the practical employment of it has some socio-structural conditions, too. The development of an inclination to the bureaucratic separation can be prevented partly by a not too long *term of mandate* (frequent reelections), that is to say, that after the first signs of „separation” the members of the apparatus may get into other spheres of activity. The organization is remaining *elastic and vivid* only if it gets on with being in a close connection with the society. In the Soviet revolution the organs were frequently reelected and therefore no separatory tendency would develop there. Going back to the revolutionary experiences, we can fight with measures of the „primitive” democracy the most efficiently against the organizational „senescence”.<sup>40</sup>

Even if the administration is controlled representatively, it is very important that in the deciding leading positions of the specialized apparatus there are leaders knowing also the *special points of view* and being able to reveal the useful signs from the social notices and claims, however naive or impatiently pretentious they often be. The opinions of „laymen” generally

<sup>39</sup> Just by that is distinguished the socialist representation from the parliamentarism joint with bureaucracy. Cf.: Lenin, *State and revolution*. Lenin's Works (Hungarian transl.), Vol. 25, Budapest, 1952, pp. 455, 523.

<sup>40</sup> Cf.: Lenin: op. cit., pp. 451, 523.

contain, even under the most unfavourable conditions, some intellectual elements and suggestions that are worth while to be thought over. From the point of view of fighting against bureaucracy it is very important that at the *strategical points* of the hierarchy of administrative organization there stand persons being able, because of their individual habits, living social connections, to resist to be becoming one-sided, and leading in the organization under their control individually the elimination of such distortions in the persons that appear inclined to „red-tapism” as a consequence of specialization. We should call the attention to that fact in the phase of our people’s democratic state construction where, in connection with the formally adequate *procedures*, the demands are growing more and more, and there may appear also the germs of the dangers that the types of a leader, satisfying more the forms, are appreciated more by their superior authorities than the brave-initiators. The increased claims are, of course, both-sided in connection with the leading. The particularly worth administrative leader-type is in whom the *special expert* knowledge (containing also a knowledge of the procedural formules) is connected with a sence that can *select and use* the *warnings*: coming from the representative organs and other social connections.

The administrative leader can be informed about the bureaucratic distortions in several forms. The most severe cases are published in the press, as well; the delegates often refer to them during their *interpellations*; the objections and interventions at the *report-back meetings* of the council members, the so-called *announcements of common concern*, the individual *complaints* are all institutions giving the leader a survey over the inelasticity of the organization, the beginnings of the development of a peculiar „red-tapism”, of an official „prestige” that is understood erroneously, etc. A *Popular Front organization* that is functioning with substantial success may give warnings, as well, towards the leaders of the administrative organization if an undesirable formalism appears either in its work or in that of its employees. *The value of the habit concerning the prevention and elimination of the bureaucratic structure* is characterized, as a rule, by the fact how conscientiously the *administrative leader* is dealing with the warings from these sources, how much he can treat of the informations showing the true sources of the troubles, leaving out of consideration the possibly considerable quantity of the unfounded, erroneous observations that were coming from false informations.

\* \* \*

The bureaucratic dangers, as mentioned, have first of all in the domain of the administrative organization. Inside that type of organizations the „agar-agar” is — owing to the character of organizations — particularly favourable to it. It is, therefore, no mere chance that the investigation of the bureaucratic manifestations and the testing of measures used against them have begun inside the administrative organ system. The state construction has been successful, even so far, in its struggle against the bureaucratic manifestations observed in the administration — partly by the help of science, partly by using the acquired experimental material with a simple practical generalization.

The forms of bureaucracy may, anyhow, appear at state organs of *other type*, as well. Every authoritative state organ has also elements of activity

of administrative character and in *such fields* the bureaucratic distortions can occur. The recommended measures of the antibureaucratic struggle must be „adopted” to the peculiar relations of other organ-types, since the forms employed with success in the administration cannot be applied simply to these organs.

Bureaucracy under the modern living conditions may be considered, too, as a *general organizational disease*. The state leading in Socialism has always struggled against the bureaucratic dangers of administration in an organized form. It is a much more important problem to fight against the bureaucratic tendencies manifested in the *state organizations without the character of authority*, in a methodic, well-weighed and unflagging way. A survey of our daily press can convince us very fast that the overwhelming majority of the problems *showing up the elements of bureaucracy* have arisen not so much from the activity of state organs as authorities but from the work of *undertakings, institutions, instituts*. These problems cannot, of course, be always separated from the administrative activity of State, nevertheless, there are more and more *numerical* data of complaints concerning expressedly the *supplying work of under-takings*, the peculiar activity of these institutions. These manifestations of bureaucracy embitter the lives of thousands of people. Bureaucracy, therefore, is to be treated of as a *general sociological phenomenon*, a real danger in any organizational structure.

It is important that the fight against bureaucracy comprises, under the lead of governmental organs, the *entire* organizational mechanism carrying out the *concrete realization* of public tasks.

Under the conditions of Socialism, there are available extremely favourable conditions for carrying out a comprehensive fight, including every organizational form, not only intermittently but continuously and well-organized. While the fight against the bureaucratic forms of appearance like these has begun by the bourgeois economical, supplying mechanism, in principle limited by the points of view of *profit*, and while there the administrative organization is not at all interested in prosecuting bureaucracy, the socialist organization may form a judgment of the whole problem on the basis of *humanitarianism*, from the point of view of the public interest. In the socialist state and social mechanism, the leading organs may *intervene everywhere immediately* — both in the administration and in the system of undertakings and other institutions. This *possibility* can be used of in a *rather organized* way by the controlling organs. The basic knowledge of the *sociology of bureaucracy* should be made a part of the professional continuing education organized at almost *every organization*. This would contribute to thrusting into prominence the *prevention* instead of the elimination of conditions of the manifestations of a bureaucracy already met with.

These statements do refer, with some amendments, to the *social organizations, associations*, etc, as well. A social organ is exposed, in principle, in a lower degree, to the danger of being bureaucratic, as the social bases of the mechanism are broader and more vigorous than those of the typical *formal* organs. Number and complexity of the tasks of some of these may, however, be increased in such an extent that it can become necessary in that domain, too, to study the danger of a bureaucratic organizational distortion and to begin an institutional defence against it.

**A SZEGEDI JÓZSEF ATTILA TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM  
ÁLLAM- ÉS JOGTUDOMÁNYI KARÁNAK E SZOROZATBAN  
ÚJABBAN MEGJELENT KIADVÁNYAI**

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