Counter-terrorism legislation as a proxy for "improper influence" in the judiciary by the executive and legislature

Oyoo Were Boaz: Counter-terrorism legislation as a proxy for "improper influence" in the judiciary by the executive and legislature. In: Comparative Law Working Papers, (4) 2. (2020)

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Abstract

In this article, counter-terrorism law provides a suitable proxy for the dyadic influence of the executive and the legislature on the judiciary. Counter-terrorism law of a democratic nation is often a product of both the executive and the legislative branches of government. Yet this law has substantial bearing on the independence of the judiciary. The present paper employs it as a substituted measure (proxy variable) of the executive and the legislative influence on the judiciary.

Item Type: Article
Journal or Publication Title: Comparative Law Working Papers
Date: 2020
Volume: 4
Number: 2
ISSN: 2560-1911
Number of Pages: 11
Language: English
Publisher: Szegedi Tudományegyetem, Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, Összehasonlító Jogi és Jogelméleti Intézet
Place of Publication: Szeged
Related URLs: https://acta.bibl.u-szeged.hu/86585/
Uncontrolled Keywords: Terrorizmus - nemzetközi jog, Biztonságpolitika, Igazságszolgáltatás
Additional Information: Bibliogr. a lábjegyzetekben
Subjects: 05. Social sciences
05. Social sciences > 05.05. Law
Date Deposited: 2025. Feb. 14. 09:18
Last Modified: 2025. Feb. 14. 09:18
URI: http://acta.bibl.u-szeged.hu/id/eprint/86604

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